Two conflicting stories are being told about technological
progress: the first has it creating widespread opportunities, while the second
has it reducing real wages and creating misery for large numbers of people. The
first story is a much more credible. That means, among other things, that
governments should stop protecting vested interests that are trying to prevent technological
innovations.
Machines are certainly replacing labour. As discussed in a recent post on this blog, new technologies are displacing routine
jobs, including many jobs requiring technical and professional skills. This
technological change is often described as labour-saving, for obvious reasons,
but like many other economists I prefer to call it labour-augmenting, because its
impact is like that of an increase in labour supply. (Think of robots.)
Technological change also creates new jobs - often involving creative
application of technology to solving problems – but the overall impact is less
labour being required per unit of output. In other words, the story is about
rising average labour productivity.
At an aggregate level, innovations that raise labour
productivity tend to increase the demand for labour because they make labour
more productive. High labour productivity is associated with high real wages rather
than with low real wages: international comparisons show that real wage levels
are more or less proportional to average productivity levels. It is almost
axiomatic that countries with high average productivity (national output or
national income per unit of labour, Y/L) will have high real wages (SL*Y/L
where SL is labour’s share of national income).
Actually, real wage growth has not been quite proportional
to labour productivity growth in those countries where labour’s share of
national income has fallen over recent decades. The median labour’s share of
income for OECD countries has fallen from 66.1% in the early 1990s to 61.7% in
the late 2000s. That implies (on my calculation) that real wages have typically
been growing at a rate around 0.35% per annum less than the median labour productivity
growth of 1.64% per annum in high-income countries.
As discussed in an earlier post, the most plausible reason for the failure of real wages to keep pace with
the growth of labour productivity is that capital deepening (the growth of
capital per unit of labour) has not been sufficient to offset the labour
augmenting (or labour saving) bias of technological progress. In other words,
investment levels have been too low.
This is consistent with the OECD’s recent analysis in The Future of Productivity which
indicates that while the slowdown in the contribution of investment to GDP
growth in the United States, Europe and Japan was accentuated after the GFC it was
evident in the period 2000-07 (Figure 5, p 20). Investment in information and
communication technology – a major source of labour augmenting technological
change – remained relatively strong despite the overall weakness of investment.
Investment levels in Australia and Canada have remained
strong until recently, mainly reflecting investment in mining to service a
construction boom in China. Looking to
the future, however, Australia is unlikely to be immune from the malaise affecting
the US, Europe and Japan, unless it follows superior economic policies.
The weakness of investment does not mean that governments
should be scrambling to put in place an array of new investment incentives, but
it does mean that they should be seriously considering removal of regulatory and
tax impediments to innovation. The OECD’s recently updated Policy Framework for Investment provides a checklist of questions
that are just as relevant to stagnating high-income countries as to the developing
countries they were originally designed to assist.
There is a discussion of some aspects of government failure
in high-income countries in my recent post on the policy implications of
widening diffusion gaps. Last week’s post relating to the competitiveness of
cities raised the relevant question of whether powerful interest groups that
stand to lose will have the political clout to slow down innovations that have
potential to reduce transport costs e.g. Uber. The issue I want to raise now is
whether excessive regulation to protect intellectual property rights is likely
to limit the opportunities created by technological progress.
The idea that protection of intellectual property rights
could ever be excessive may seem to be morally suspect to some authors and inventors.
Questioning whether people have an unlimited natural right to ownership of
their intellectual creations might seem akin to questioning whether people have
a natural right to the fruit that grows on their trees. Even so, individual
claims to ownership of land and fruit trees are viewed as unethical in some traditional
societies.
Arguably, laws regarding property rights have tended to
evolve in market economies over many centuries in ways that now serve the individual
interests of the vast majority of citizens in living peacefully and enjoying
economic opportunities.
Viewed in that context it makes sense for claims to property
ownership to be assessed in terms of what it is reasonable for people to
expect. For example, it seems to me that it would be unreasonable for property
owners to view passers-by who pick fruit from branches overhanging the boundary
of their property as having breached a claim to ownership that is worthy of
being enforced. It is possible that view might reflect my ignorance of reasons why
such picking of fruit might be viewed as a crime in some jurisdictions. My
point is merely that the property owner’s claims need to be balanced
against the reasonable expectations of other citizens.
The economic benefits of copyright and patent laws derive
from the incentive they provide to authors and inventors to engage in creative
activity. The granting of such monopoly rights could therefore be expected to
result in more technological progress and higher productivity growth than would
otherwise occur. However, the exercise of such monopoly rights imposes a cost
on users and can restrict adoption of new technology. In this context it seem
reasonable to expect that the aim of government involvement in enforcing
intellectual property claims would be to achieve an appropriate balance between
providing incentives for creative activity and diffusion of technology.
A recent issue of The
Economist (August 8, 2015) notes that a high proportion of patents (40-90%)
are never exploited or licensed out by their owners. The authors suggest that “the
system has created a parasitic ecology of trolls and defensive patent-holders,
who aim to block innovation, or at least to stand in its way unless they can
grab a share of the spoils”. The authors suggest that patents should come with
a blunt “use it or lose it” rule, so that they expire if the invention is not
brought to market.
A recent article by Brink Lindsey also argues that current
laws regarding copyright and patents in the US are retarding growth of
productivity by raising the price of copyrighted and patented products
excessively and inflating the costs of innovation. He suggests some modest
reforms to rein in the vast expansion in reach of copyright and patent law
during recent decades: removal of
criminal liability for copyright infringement; removal of liability for
non-commercial copying; reducing copyright terms from life plus 70 years to 14
years; and ending patent protections for software and business methods.
It seems paradoxical that while there is recognition in some
quarters in the US that current intellectual property (IP) laws have
over-reached, the US government is actively engaged in trade negotiations to
impose dubious intellectual property regulations on international trading partners.
Australia’s Productivity Commission noted in Trade and Assistance Review 2013-14 that under the Australia-United
States Agreement (AUSFTA) copyright protection was extended to the life of the
author plus 70 years, compared with life plus 50 years under the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
The Commission added:
“The relevance of trade related IP issues for Australia has
gained even greater prominence because of the potential reach of the proposed
TPP in this area. Potentially, the IP chapter in the TPP could be extensive and
go beyond the provisions contained in the TRIPS Agreement and AUSFTA. For
example, based on US media access to the current draft text, it appears likely
that the TPP will include obligations on pharmaceutical price determination
arrangements in Australia and other TPP members, of an uncertain character and
intent. The history of IP arrangements being addressed in preferential trade
deals is not good. Indeed, to the extent that the return to IP holders awarded
by more stringent IP laws outweighed the benefits to the broader economy, the
provision would also impose a net cost on both partners, lowering trading and
growth potential across the bloc.”
Let us hope Australia’s trade negotiators do not end up paying
too high a price for the sweet deal they are still seeking on sugar exports to
the US market.
Postscript:
The Australian Government has now asked the Productivity Commission to undertake a public inquiry on intellectual property. Further information is here.
Postscript:
The Australian Government has now asked the Productivity Commission to undertake a public inquiry on intellectual property. Further information is here.