The government’s recent tax discussion paper contemplates a
similar tax reform agenda to that recommended by the Henry tax review in 2010.
The general thrust of the proposals is a move away from taxes which hamper
efficient allocation of resources (e.g. stamp duties on property transfers) and
taxes which impose disincentives on investment (taxes on capital income) or
productive effort (high taxes on labour income).
Some commentators, for example Peter Martin in the SMH, have
suggested that the discussion paper “has set out the case for an increase in
Australia's rate of goods and services tax”. Perhaps the report hints in
that direction, but the Treasury research findings noted in the report do not seem
consistent with the view that there are large gains to be had from substituting
increases in GST for the taxes that have highest economic costs. The marginal
excess burden (MEB) on GST is estimated to be in the medium range (around 20%) along
with taxes on labour income, compared with an MEB of around 50% for company tax.
As discussed in my recent post on the intergenerational report, the MEB of a
tax rises exponentially with increases in the rate of the tax. If the relevant
elasticities are such that the MEB on GST is currently around 20% (rather than around
10% as I previously thought) a doubling of the rate would cause the MEB on GST to
50% - as shown below.
It seems that the only way to get large economic gains by substituting
one tax for another would be by relying more heavily on land taxes (and
municipal rates) which, according to Treasury research, have a slightly
negative MEB. The use of land tax to replace stamp duties on property transfers
would make a great deal of sense from an economic perspective and should not
pose huge political feasibility problems. People who cannot afford up-front payment
of the land tax (e.g. old people who often income-poor despite being asset-rich)
could be given the option of having payment deferred until after death,
with appropriate interest being charged.
However, I find it difficult to imagine that increased
revenue from land taxes could do much more than to replace some of the most highly
distorting taxes used by state governments. Perhaps I could fire up my imagination
by reading what Henry George had to say many years ago about the desirability
of funding government by a single tax on land. However, I doubt whether any
politician could persuade the electorate to accept substantial losses on the
wealth invested in their homes in the hope that they might enjoy the benefits of lower taxes on
capital income. Most Australian politicians are not even game to contemplate
the merits of subjecting home owners to the same capital gains tax
regime as is applied to owners of other assets.
One way in which it might be feasible to obtain benefits
from lower taxes on capital income would be to reduce the tax concessions applying
to superannuation. It might also be possible to reduce government spending by
tightening up the assets means test on aged pensions. The potential for a
bi-partisan agreement emerging in these policy directions has recently emerged
with the Labor party offering to end superannuation concessions for the wealthy
and the Australian Council of Social Services (ACOSS) suggesting that the assets
test on aged pension eligibility should be tightened to better target the
pension to those who need it.
At first sight these indications of a willingness among some
politicians to contemplate a reduction of concessions to the elderly might
appear to be attempting to swim against the tide of grey power – the growing
proportion of old voters in the electorate. Paradoxically, however, the ability
of any group to benefit from redistributions extracted from the rest of the
community tends to diminish as it comes to represent a higher proportion of the
population.
A big question which groups representing old people need
to face is whether they stand to gain more by using their political muscle to
increase their share of the economic cake or by using their political muscle to
increase the size of the economic cake. As the elderly come to represent a
higher proportion of the population, their attempts to obtain a larger slice are
eventually likely to reduce the size of the cake by leading to higher tax rates
and thus dampening economic incentives. A larger slice of a smaller cake could end up to be very little indeed. The elderly can possibly defer the time
of reckoning by encouraging governments to adopt a complacent attitude toward
growing government debt, but that strategy runs the risk of great hardship if the welfare system becomes unsustainable and has to be sacrificed
to repay debt.
Perhaps we are now beginning to see the political limits of
grey power in Australia. The way ACOSS is using its influence seems likely to produce
outcomes along the lines of those I predicted a few years ago when I considered
the question of whether the elderly poor tend to fare better under a pensions
means test than under universal pension benefits:
“As the increase in proportion of
elderly people in the population in Australia reduces the per voter
political power of this group, I would expect the per voter political
power of the elderly poor to diminish to a smaller extent than that of the much
larger group who hope to benefit from the private superannuation tax and
pension means test rorts. I expect incentives for early retirement implicit in
the superannuation arrangements will be an early casualty as attempts are made
to contain government spending on retirees. If a choice has to be made at some
time in the future between, say, maintaining the current level of the aged
pension in real terms and maintaining superannuation tax concessions, I expect
that maintaining the aged pension levels would be likely to win the political
debate. Similarly, given a decline in grey power on a per voter basis I doubt
whether superannuation tax concession would win the political debate if a
choice has to be made at some time in the future between maintaining these tax
concessions and an overall lowering in income tax rates to promote economic
growth.”
After reading that again, I hope that the government doesn’t
forget to obtain a substantial reduction in tax on capital incomes as a quid
pro quo for a reduction in superannuation tax concessions.
The conclusion of my last post that young people have good
reason to be concerned about their futures is also relevant in considering what
tax and spending reforms might be feasible. As young people become more aware of
the range of factors that affect their future well-being, more of them can be
expected to show interest in the way economic policies are impacting on their own
incentives to acquire skills, and on the incentive for investors to take the risks
that will need to be taken to ensure the growth of remunerative employment opportunities. Perhaps young people will come to recognize that, as a
group, their interests are likely to be best served by lower government
spending and lower tax rates.
When a government throws all the pieces of tax and spending policy in the air there is no guarantee that what we will end up with will look any better than the mess we had before. On this occasion, however, there are some grounds for optimism. The political winds seem to be blowing in the right direction .
Postscript
I have just noticed that Treasury estimates of marginal excess burden of GST in their working paper, Understanding the Economy-wide Efficiency and Incidence of Major Australian Taxes (2015–01) imply a much smaller increase at higher tax rates than shown above. See Chart 20, page 36. The Treasury estimates are more likely to be correct, but it would be nice to be able to understand the reasons for the difference.