In arguing that we are born to be good, psychologist Dacher Keltner has in mind a particular definition of what it means to be good. In his book “Born to be Good” he views goodness as synonymous with the Confucian concept of jen: a person of jen “brings the good things in others to completion and does not bring the bad things of others to completion” (p. 4).
The author’s aim is to enable the reader to see human behavior in a new light. He presents evidence supporting his view that we have been wired by seven million years of hominid evolution to practice emotions like compassion, gratitude, amusement and wonder that are associated with bringing the good in others to completion. “We have neuropeptides that enable trust and devotion, and a branch of nerves that connects the brain, the voice and the heart that enables caretaking. Our capacity for awe has given us art, a sense of the sacred. We have genes, neurotransmitters, and regions of the brain that serve these emotions as we serve others. These emotions are the substance of jen” (p 269).
Keltner does not deny that we are also wired to pursue self-interest. His claim is that this is “half the story” (p 11). His research suggests that rather than just one reward circuit in the brain that is activated in response to any kind of pleasure, different neural circuits are involved in different kinds of positive emotions such as sensory pleasure, pride, compassion and awe (pp 265-267). He suggests that in our search for happiness many of us have tended to focus excessively on sensory pleasure and to lose sight of the emotions associated with, for example, “subtle cues of embarrassment, playful vocalisations, the visceral feelings of compassion, the sense of gratitude in another’s touch to your shoulder” (p 15).
The main reservation I have about the book relates to the author’s tendency to equate self-interest solely with pursuit of sensory pleasure and to contrast this with the other positive emotions associated with bringing good things in others to completion. At one point he writes: “Ironically enough, compassion may be a prerequisite to the pursuit of self-interested happiness” (p 249). It seems to me that this is only ironical if one takes a very narrow view of self-interest – a much narrower view than that taken, for example, by neoclassical economists who incorporate the happiness of others in the utility functions they use in their theoretical work.
As discussed in an earlier post, it seems to me that there is a lot of good involved in self-actualization that does not necessarily involve bringing the good in others to completion. Being good also involves such things as the human capacity to distinguish between wanting and liking and to defer gratification that are also the result of evolution. In addition, Gregory Burns seems to me to make a strong case that evolution has also wired humans to meet personal challenges: “The sense of satisfaction after you’ve successfully handled unexpected tasks or sought out unfamiliar, physically and emotionally demanding activities is your brain’s signal that you’re doing what nature designed you to do” (“Satisfaction”, p xiv).
The book omits what seems to me to be the strongest argument that can be advanced in favour of the view that humans have evolved to be good, namely the evolution of the concept of self. As philosopher Daniel Dennett has pointed out, evolutionary processes have supported the evolution of minds powerful enough to capture the reasons for things and make them our reasons: “ We are not perfectly rational agents, but the social arena we live in sustains processes of dynamic interaction that both require and permit the renewal of our reasons, making us into agents that can take responsibility for our acts” (“Freedom Evolves”, p 287).
Despite these reservations and my critical comments in earlier posts about Dacher Keltner’s portrayal of Adam Smith’s views and his apparent attempt to argue that social cooperation cannot emerge from self-interest, I found this book to be highly informative. I am not competent to judge the quality of the author’s research findings, but he is obviously an authority in his field. The book makes a strong case that humans have been wired by evolution to experience positive emotions when they seek to bring the good in others to completion.
Tuesday, April 28, 2009
Saturday, April 25, 2009
Does tit-for-tat prioritize the gains of others over those of the self?
The essential feature of a tit-for-tat strategy is reciprocity – rewarding cooperation and punishing defection. In his book, “Born to be Good”, Dacher Keltner claims that “tit-for-tat instantiates the principle of cost-benefit reversal”. He argues that a set of mechanisms that reverse the cost-benefit analysis of giving is built into the human organism. He suggests: “These mechanisms might prioritize the gains of others over those of the self, and transform others’ gains into one’s own” (p. 71).
Keltner bases his claim that tit-for-tat involved cost-benefit reversal on three observations:
- When cooperation is the default setting, tit-for-tat favours mutually beneficial cooperation.
- Tit-for-tat is not envious – the strategy doesn’t change as a partner’s benefits mount.
- Tit-for-tat is a forgiving strategy – cooperation is resumed following the first cooperative action of a defector.
It seems to me, however, that none of these features of tit-for-tat necessarily involves prioritizing the gains of others over those of the self. It is possible for a tit-for-tat strategy to be adopted purely out of self interest. Robert Axelrod recognised this in “The Evolution of Cooperation” (p 173-4) , in his discussion of the experiments that Keltner uses as the basis for his discussion of tit-for-tat.
A tit-for-tat strategy based on self-interest provides a plausible explanation for the emergence of cooperation among strangers who have no reason to trust each other. For example, consider a situation where strangers are considering the initiation of trade in the absence of third party (e.g. government) protection against opportunistic use of force and fraud. From the perspective of each party the possible outcomes would be: a) a potential gain from trade; b) a potential loss resulting from opportunism by the other party – i.e. theft of the goods offered for trade; c) a potential gain from opportunism – theft of goods offered for trade by the other party; d) a stand-off.
If trade occurs in this situation, is it likely to be because one party places higher priority on the potential gains to the other party than on the potential gains to the self? I think it is more likely to occur because both parties consider that, in view of the likely responses of each other, they have more to gain from a series of mutually beneficial exchanges that they would gain from attempting to steal from each other.
If both parties adopt a consistent tit-for-tat strategy, then trade is likely to continue and they may come to trust each other. It is possible to envisage that the relationship could even develop to a point where they each gain some satisfaction from the benefit that they bestow upon each other through the exchange of goods. But this trust and affection is the outgrowth of mutually beneficial cooperation rather than a pre-condition for it.
I don’t understand why Dacher Keltner seeks to denigrate those who see self interest as a motivating force (see: How high was Adam Smith’s jen ratio?) and seeks to eliminate self-interest from the evolution of social cooperation. Perhaps he identifies the self-interest motive with opportunism, greed and selfishness to such an extent that he cannot see that it is good to desire to avoid being a burden on others, to help family members and other loved ones, and to accumulate the means to contribute generously to worthwhile causes. Perhaps he is uncomfortable with the idea that an invisible hand involved in voluntary exchange processes could enable people to benefit from cooperation with each other without actually intending to benefit each other.
Wednesday, April 15, 2009
How high was Adam Smith's jen ratio?
Jen is apparently the central idea in the teachings of Confucius. In his book, “Born to be Good”, Dacher Keltner tells us that the numerator in the jen ratio is actions that bring the good in others to completion and the denominator is actions that bring the bad in others to completion. For example, if a writer misrepresents the views of others he would tend to lower the jen ratio.
I have been looking forward to reading “Born to be Good”. I have previously considered on this blog the question of whether the inner nature of humans is good and I want to explore this topic further.
However, after reading a few pages I began to wonder whether reading this book will do much to improve my jen ratio. The problem is that it seems to me that Keltner’s discussion of the views of Adam Smith is uncharitable. Keltner claims that Smith portrayed Homo economicus as some kind of ideal of human evolution who was designed to maximize self-interest in the form of experienced pleasure and advances in advances in material wealth ( p 8).
Smith had a realistic view of human nature. I don’t think he saw humans as rational maximisers of anything, but it is true that he did make some famous observations about self interest as a motivating force. Smith stated: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” (“Wealth of Nations”, I.ii.2). It seems to me that this is an observation about the way the world works rather than a statement advocating selfishness.
I think the closest Smith got to advocating selfishness is his claim that by pursuing his own interests an individual frequently promotes that of society: “I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the publick good” (W.N., IV, ii, 9).
It is arguable that Smith was being too cynical at that point. It is possible to think of examples of a great deal of good being done by not-for-profit organisations e.g. in running schools and hospitals.
Anyone who had an interest in presenting a fair picture of Smith’s views of human nature, however, would also take account of the views he presented in “The Theory of Moral Sentiments”. For example: “The virtues of prudence, justice, and beneficence, have no tendency to produce any but the most agreeable effects. ... In our approbation of all these virtues , our sense of their agreeable effects , of their utility, either to the person who exercises them , or to some other persons, joins with our sense of their propriety, and constitutes always a considerable, frequently the greater part of that approbation” (TMS IV, iii, 59).
It is not fair to portray Adam Smith as promoting an “ideology about human nature ... with a jen ratio trending toward zero”.
I have been looking forward to reading “Born to be Good”. I have previously considered on this blog the question of whether the inner nature of humans is good and I want to explore this topic further.
However, after reading a few pages I began to wonder whether reading this book will do much to improve my jen ratio. The problem is that it seems to me that Keltner’s discussion of the views of Adam Smith is uncharitable. Keltner claims that Smith portrayed Homo economicus as some kind of ideal of human evolution who was designed to maximize self-interest in the form of experienced pleasure and advances in advances in material wealth ( p 8).
Smith had a realistic view of human nature. I don’t think he saw humans as rational maximisers of anything, but it is true that he did make some famous observations about self interest as a motivating force. Smith stated: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” (“Wealth of Nations”, I.ii.2). It seems to me that this is an observation about the way the world works rather than a statement advocating selfishness.
I think the closest Smith got to advocating selfishness is his claim that by pursuing his own interests an individual frequently promotes that of society: “I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the publick good” (W.N., IV, ii, 9).
It is arguable that Smith was being too cynical at that point. It is possible to think of examples of a great deal of good being done by not-for-profit organisations e.g. in running schools and hospitals.
Anyone who had an interest in presenting a fair picture of Smith’s views of human nature, however, would also take account of the views he presented in “The Theory of Moral Sentiments”. For example: “The virtues of prudence, justice, and beneficence, have no tendency to produce any but the most agreeable effects. ... In our approbation of all these virtues , our sense of their agreeable effects , of their utility, either to the person who exercises them , or to some other persons, joins with our sense of their propriety, and constitutes always a considerable, frequently the greater part of that approbation” (TMS IV, iii, 59).
It is not fair to portray Adam Smith as promoting an “ideology about human nature ... with a jen ratio trending toward zero”.
Monday, April 13, 2009
What is the role of animal spirits in the political sphere in producing economic crises?
“Conventional economic theories exclude the changing thought patterns and modes of doing business that bring on a crisis. They even exclude the loss of trust and confidence. They exclude the sense of fairness that inhibits the wage and price flexibility that could possibly stabilize an economy. They exclude the role of corruption and the sale of bad products in booms, and the role of their revelation when the bubbles burst. They also exclude the role of stories that interpret the economy. All of these exclusions from conventional explanations of how the economy behaves were responsible for the suspension of disbelief that led up to the current crisis” (George Akerlof and Robert Shiller, “Animal Spirits”, 2009, p 167).
I don’t have many problems with the argument of Akerlof and Shiller (A & S) that animal spirits play an important role in economic crises. I think they attempt to carry their argument too far; it seems to me that the economic system tends to be self-equilibrating despite notions of fairness and money illusion. But I accept that when there is high leverage in the system (i.e. high levels of debt relative to equity) it is a lot more vulnerable to economic crises than when there is low leverage. I also accept that changes in confidence help explain why leverage fluctuates. Stories that interpret the economy seem to have a big role in determining confidence. A few years ago it was common to hear the story that the risks involved in lending on housing were minimal – even “as safe as houses”. Now the story we hear is that investment in government-backed securities offers “a safe harbour”.
The main problem I have with this book is its failure to recognize that animal spirits also play a role in politics. In fact, as Arnold Kling and Clive Crook have pointed out, A & S fail to mention public choice theory. Instead, their model of government is what Kling describes as the “shockingly naive metaphor of a parent”. In their preface, A & S write:
“The proper role of the government, like the proper role of the advice-book parent, is to...give full rein to the creativity of capitalism. But it should also countervail the excesses that occur because of our animal spirits.”
Crook writes: “This is an unappealing analogy. I would sooner take up arms against a government that saw me as a child than vote for it.”
It seems to me that the most important animal spirit that Akerlof and Shiller fail to mention is the anti-market bias, stemming from an excessive desire for security and stability, which comes to the surface whenever a financial crisis threatens to occur. Rather than allowing the normal process of liquidation to occur when large financial institutions fail, the animal spirits that rule the political domain say that everything must be done to “keep the first domino from falling” (as A & S advocate on page 85).
When viewed in isolation, the bail-out of each institution seems like cheap insurance to government policy advisors. The problem is that a series of bail-outs tends to generate excessive confidence in central banks and governments. If you are lending money to a company that you expect to be backed by government, then you are not going to be too worried if the salary packages of the executives of that company give them incentives to take excessive risks. Creditors might not be surprised if the company gets into financial difficulty, but they will be shocked if it isn’t rescued by government.
From the A & S perspective the current crisis occurred not because parents encouraged the kids to act unwisely by incurring gambling debts , but because the parents decided to let one of their wayward children file for bankruptcy. That unsettled the creditors, so the parents lost their nerve and decided to pay all the kids’ debts. At this stage the lesson that the parents seem to have learned from this is that the kids need more parental supervision to make sure that their animal spirits don’t ever get out of control again. How will the kids respond? Will they leave home to get away from this parental supervision? Or will their animal spirits lead them to pretend to be good for a while in order to re-establish cosy relationships with their parents?
I don’t have many problems with the argument of Akerlof and Shiller (A & S) that animal spirits play an important role in economic crises. I think they attempt to carry their argument too far; it seems to me that the economic system tends to be self-equilibrating despite notions of fairness and money illusion. But I accept that when there is high leverage in the system (i.e. high levels of debt relative to equity) it is a lot more vulnerable to economic crises than when there is low leverage. I also accept that changes in confidence help explain why leverage fluctuates. Stories that interpret the economy seem to have a big role in determining confidence. A few years ago it was common to hear the story that the risks involved in lending on housing were minimal – even “as safe as houses”. Now the story we hear is that investment in government-backed securities offers “a safe harbour”.
The main problem I have with this book is its failure to recognize that animal spirits also play a role in politics. In fact, as Arnold Kling and Clive Crook have pointed out, A & S fail to mention public choice theory. Instead, their model of government is what Kling describes as the “shockingly naive metaphor of a parent”. In their preface, A & S write:
“The proper role of the government, like the proper role of the advice-book parent, is to...give full rein to the creativity of capitalism. But it should also countervail the excesses that occur because of our animal spirits.”
Crook writes: “This is an unappealing analogy. I would sooner take up arms against a government that saw me as a child than vote for it.”
It seems to me that the most important animal spirit that Akerlof and Shiller fail to mention is the anti-market bias, stemming from an excessive desire for security and stability, which comes to the surface whenever a financial crisis threatens to occur. Rather than allowing the normal process of liquidation to occur when large financial institutions fail, the animal spirits that rule the political domain say that everything must be done to “keep the first domino from falling” (as A & S advocate on page 85).
When viewed in isolation, the bail-out of each institution seems like cheap insurance to government policy advisors. The problem is that a series of bail-outs tends to generate excessive confidence in central banks and governments. If you are lending money to a company that you expect to be backed by government, then you are not going to be too worried if the salary packages of the executives of that company give them incentives to take excessive risks. Creditors might not be surprised if the company gets into financial difficulty, but they will be shocked if it isn’t rescued by government.
From the A & S perspective the current crisis occurred not because parents encouraged the kids to act unwisely by incurring gambling debts , but because the parents decided to let one of their wayward children file for bankruptcy. That unsettled the creditors, so the parents lost their nerve and decided to pay all the kids’ debts. At this stage the lesson that the parents seem to have learned from this is that the kids need more parental supervision to make sure that their animal spirits don’t ever get out of control again. How will the kids respond? Will they leave home to get away from this parental supervision? Or will their animal spirits lead them to pretend to be good for a while in order to re-establish cosy relationships with their parents?
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