Unfortunately, few readers of this blog will know anything
about Bill Carmichael or his transparency project. My main purpose here is
therefore to explain who he was and why the question I have posed above is
worth considering.
W.B. (Bill) Carmichael died recently at the age of 93. In
his obituary, Gary Banks, former chair of the Australian Productivity
Commission, described Bill aptly as “an unsung hero” of the Australian Public
Service (APS).
In my experience, most members of the APS who are working on
economic policy like to claim that they are contributing to the well-being of
the public at large. However, I find it difficult to accept such claims unless the
people concerned can demonstrate that they are actively seeking to either undo
mistakes that governments have made, or to discourage governments from making
more mistakes.
Bill Carmichael made a huge contribution in helping to undo
mistakes that Australian governments made over many decades in insulating much
of the economy from international competition. His efforts in support of trade
liberalization have helped Australians to enjoy greater benefits from trade and
greater productivity growth than would otherwise have been possible.
Alf Rattigan’s right-hand man
Bill’s contribution to trade liberalization was largely
behind the scenes, helping Alf Rattigan, the former chairman of the Tariff
Board, to pursue his reform efforts. Rattigan argued successfully that tariff
reform was required because industries that had been given high levels of
government assistance to compete with imports were inherently less efficient
users of resources than those requiring lower levels of assistance or none at
all.
As Gary Banks’ obituary
indicates, Bill played an important role in developing strategies, writing the
key speeches that Alf Rattigan delivered, dealing with difficult bureaucrats,
and engaging with economic journalists who were highly influential in informing
politicians and the public about the costs of protection and the benefits of
international competition. Bill’s contribution reached its pinnacle in the
early 1970s when the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) was established
with an economy-wide mandate to ensure greater transparency to processes for
provision of government assistance to all industries.
Bill eventually became chairman of the IAC. However, in my
view, his most important contribution was made in helping to establish the
organisation and ensure that it had access to the professional economic
expertise it required to undertake research and produce quality reports.
Bill’s transparency project
Bill Carmichael’s interest in the transparency of trade
policy did not end after he retired from the IAC in 1988. My reference to Bill’s
transparency project relates specifically to the efforts he made during his
retirement to bring greater transparency to trade negotiations. These efforts
were made in collaboration with Greg Cutbush, Malcolm Bosworth, and other
economists. The best way to describe that project is to quote some passages from
an article in which Bill suggested that Australians are being misled about our
trade negotiations and agreements. The article, entitled ‘Trade Policy Lessons
from Australia’, was published
by East Asia Forum in 2016.
Bill wrote:
“The goal of trade policy is not limited to
increasing export opportunities. Nor is it just about improving trade balances.
Rather trade policy is about taking opportunities to improve the economy’s
productive base. When assessing a nation’s experience with bilateral trade
agreements, this is the test that should be applied.
In each bilateral agreement Australia has completed to date,
projections of the potential gains for Australia, based on unimpeded access to
all markets of the other country involved, were released prior to negotiations.
These studies did not, and could not, project what was actually achieved in the
ensuing negotiations. The quite modest outcomes for Australia from those
negotiations meant the projected gains conveyed nothing about what was
eventually achieved. Yet the projections were still quoted to support the
agreements after they were signed, as though they reflected actual outcomes.
This approach to accounting for the outcome of trade
agreements has meant that Australia has missed opportunities for productivity
gains. So how, given Australia’s recent experiences, can trade policy and
negotiations be better conducted in future?
Australia cannot change how it negotiated its agreements
with the United States, Japan, South Korea and China. But policymakers can
refine their approach to future negotiations. Australia’s trade policy should
be guided by a model based on its conduct in the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations. The Uruguay Round confirmed that the domestic decisions needed to
secure gains from unilateral liberalisation and those required to secure the
full gains available from negotiations have converged.
The negotiations in the Uruguay Round took place at a time
when former prime ministers Bob Hawke and Paul Keating were reducing
Australia’s barriers to trade unilaterally. Their productivity-enhancing
reforms were subsequently offered and accepted in the Uruguay negotiations as
Australia’s contribution to global trade reform. Consequently, Australia
secured all the gains available from trade negotiations: the major gains in
productivity from reducing the barriers protecting less competitive industries,
as well as securing greater access to external markets.
This was the kind of win–win outcome negotiators should seek
from all trade agreements. It made a substantial contribution to the prosperity
Australia has since enjoyed. …
In future trade negotiations, the Productivity Commission —
Australia’s independent policy review institution — could provide a basis for
market-opening offers by conducting a public inquiry and reporting to
government before negotiations get underway.”
In a subsequent paper,
publicly endorsed by a group of trade economists, Bill argued:
“If we are to close the gap between trade diplomacy and
economic reality, we need to respect three lessons from experience: first, a
major part of our gains from trade agreements depends on what we take to the
negotiating table, not what we hope to take away from it ; second, liberalising
through trade negotiations cannot be pursued simply as an extension of foreign
policy ; and third, … future bilateral agreements should be subject to
cost-benefit analysis before ratification.”
How should Bill’s project be pursued?
I raise this question without much optimism
that greater transparency of trade policy can be achieved in the short term. There
is no more reason to be optimistic that the Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade will suddenly become receptive to ideas that challenge its claims about
the benefits of trade agreements it has negotiated than there was to be
optimistic that its predecessor, the Department of Trade and Industry, would be
receptive in the 1960s to the ideas of Rattigan and Carmichael which challenged
the protectionist orthodoxy of that department. Added to this, it is difficult
to ignore signs that protectionist sentiment is on the rise again in Australia
in the wake of the Covid 19 pandemic and fears that a further deterioration in
international relations could lead to disruption of international shipping.
Nevertheless, as Bill might say, none of that should stop us
from pursuing longer-term goals. I hope
that some people reading this will feel motivated to think constructively about
how Bill Carmichael’s transparency project could be pursued as a longer-term
exercise in institutional reform.