I have been feeling a strong urge to write about the
economic policies of the former government of our resurrected prime minister,
Kevin Rudd. Whenever I begin to write on this topic, however, what comes to
mind is my grandmother’s advice that if you haven’t got anything nice to say,
perhaps you shouldn’t say anything. It might be churlish of me to attempt to
remind people that Kevin – whom so many people seem to revere as much now as in
2007 – has a record of achievement that is somewhat less than perfect.
Fortunately, not everyone has such qualms and some excellent
articles about the economic policies of the Rudd government have appeared in
the media over the last week or so. The best newspaper article I have read so
far is one by Henry Ergas, entitled ‘Rudd’s Real Record’, published in The Australian last Saturday (July 13,
2013). Ergas reminds us, among other things, that in 2009 Rudd mounted a massive
scare campaign about the severity of the GFC in an attempt to justify a splurge
of poor quality government spending.
I recall how Janet Albrechtsen suggested in The Australian at the time that the GFC
provided Rudd and his treasurer, Wayne Swan, with an opportunity that they were
only too eager to grasp:
‘The Rudd Government finds itself at a very fortunate
juncture. As Rudd’s treatise in the present edition of The Monthly reveals, he
can blame capitalism for the coming government extravagance funded by
taxpayers. Prepare for Rudd’s hubris-filled pitch on how he “saved” capitalism
and why you had to pay for it.’
Whether we are prepared or not, we are now hearing Rudd’s
hubris-filled pitch:
‘As you know, here
in Australia, we deployed a national economic stimulus strategy, timely
targeted and temporary, which helped keep Australia out of recession, kept the
economy growing, and kept unemployment with a five in front of it – one of the
lowest levels in the world.’
The hollowness of the claim by Rudd and Swan that the fiscal
stimulus pulled Australia though the GFC has been demonstrated many times. For
example, in an article entitled ‘Wayne Swan’s legacy of unrivalled incompetence’
in yesterday’s Financial Review (July
16, 2013), John Stone, former secretary to the Treasury, points out that the
hubris of Rudd and Swan overlooks the strength of Australia’s fiscal position
prior to the GFC, the role played by monetary policy, the underlying strength of
Australia’s banks and the growth in China’s demand for our minerals.
John Stone’s article also raised the question I am intending
to address here about balance sheet recessions. Stone suggests that the
Australian Treasury had erred in seeing 2008-09 as another cyclical recession
like that of 1991-92, rather than as a ‘balance sheet recession’ of the kind
that Irving Fisher wrote about in an Econometrica
article in 1933.
In my efforts to overcome my ignorance about the characteristics
of a balance sheet recession I have managed to find an ungated copy of Irving Fisher’s article. Fisher suggested that in ‘great booms and depressions’ … ‘the
big bad actors are debt disturbances and price level disturbances’, with other
factors playing a subordinate role.
Fisher argued that it is the combination of
over-indebtedness and price deflation that causes the depression:
‘When over-indebtedness stands alone, that is, does not lead
to a fall of prices, in other words, when its tendency to do so is counteracted
by inflationary forces (whether by accident or design), the resulting
"cycle" will be far milder and far more regular.
Likewise, when a deflation occurs from other than debt
causes and without any great volume of debt, the resulting evils are much less.
It is the combination of both—the debt disease coming first, then precipitating
the dollar disease—which works the greatest havoc.’
Fisher suggested:
‘it is always economically possible to
stop or prevent such a depression simply by reflating the price level up to the
average level at which outstanding debts were contracted by existing debtors
and assumed by existing creditors, and then maintaining that level unchanged’.
That seems to me to be similar to the rationale for the quantitative
easing policies adopted by central banks in recent years, following the failure
of fiscal stimulus efforts. Lars Christensen, a market monetarist, has written more extensively about this similarity on his blog.
John Greenwood’s analysis, conducted in the spirit of Irving
Fisher, suggests that some balance sheet repair has occurred in recent years in
the countries most affected by the GFC, with greater progress having been made
in the US than in the UK and least progress having occurred in the eurozone.
Postscript:
An article by Max Walsh in today’s Financial Review (July 18, 2013), entitled ‘Rudd’s demands could
exceed all expectations’, is another excellent article about the implications
of the economic policies of the first Rudd government. Walsh refers to Rudd’s essay
in The Monthly (February 2009) in which
he sought to differentiate the economic ideology of the two major political parties
in Australia. As might be expected, Rudd sought to portray his political
opponents as extreme proponents of free market ideology, but he also portrayed the
Labor party as being wedded to interventionism.
Kevin Rudd wrote: ‘Labor, in the international tradition of social
democracy, consistently argues for a central role for government in the
regulation of markets and the provision of public goods’. Max Walsh comments: ‘That’s
a view that looks to be at odds with the deregulation and privatisation
initiatives of the Hawke-Keating years’.
Viewed in that context, it seems to me that the most likely outcome of Kevin Rudd’s recent promise to pursue microeconomic reform ‘with new urgency’ will be further
restriction of economic freedom and lower productivity growth.