Why do Australians want to stop the boats?

There are some questions that I have tended to put in the too hard basket because I don't have answers for them. The problems of refugees and the attitudes of Australians toward people seeking asylum in this country fall into that category. So, what I am about to write doesn't reflect any deep insights. The main message I would like to convey is that all humans deserve the opportunity to live happy and meaningful lives. People become refugees primarily because they are not free to flourish.

The number of people who come to Australia each year on refugee boats is apparently now greater than at any time since the Vietnam war. Nevertheless, as Julian Burnside, QC, pointed out in a presentation in September last year, the rate at which boat people have been coming here in recent years represents a tiny annual increment to Australia's population – about a quarter of one percent. 

It is fairly obvious, however, that a high proportion of Australians want to stop the refugee boats and that the main political parties in Australia are competing to establish who has the best policies to do this. That means, I think, that those who would like their fellow Australians to do more to help refugees need to be sure that they understand why so many of us want to stop the boats.

In the paper just referred to, Julian Burnside expressed the following view of why Australians want to stop the boats:

'Xenophobia lies just below the surface in most Australians, and it is easily scratched, and politicians who are cynical enough are willing to scratch it to the surface and then exploit it for their own political end'.

If that had been said about Australian attitudes 30 or 40 years ago I would have had no difficulty in agreeing. Less than 50 years ago, xenophobia was very much on the surface in this country. In the first half of the 20^th century the level of xenophobia in Australia must have been among the highest in the world. How else could anyone explain the support of the majority of the Australian people for the government's shameful history of using a dictation test in the most cynical and offensive manner imaginable to exclude non-white immigrants?

However, recent evidence on Australian attitudes seems to me to suggest that, in general, people in this country are no longer particularly fearful or hostile toward foreigners.  A fact sheet on public attitudes toward asylum seekers, based on a survey by the Scanlon Foundation conducted in 2012, suggests that about three-quarters of Australians feel positive about refugees who have been assessed overseas and found to be victims of persecution coming to live in Australia as permanent or long term residents.

Attitudes toward boat people were more negative, with only 23 percent suggesting that they should be allowed to apply for permanent residence. The most common response (38 percent) was that they should be allowed to apply for temporary residence only; 26 percent suggested that their boats should be turned back and 9 percent suggested that they should be held in detention until they could be sent back.

The negative attitude toward boat people seems to be associated with scepticism about their motives for coming to Australia. Responses to an open-ended question on this topic suggest that Australians more commonly perceive that boat people are coming in search of a better life, rather than fleeing persecution or driven by desperation.

Julian Burnside suggests that the negative public attitude toward boat people could be turned around by courageous political leadership. He suggests that we need leaders to stand up and say:

'These people are running for their lives. They're doing nothing wrong. They're doing what you would do. We've got the space, we've got the wealth to make them safe. Let's do that'.

I think it would be good if more political leaders said that kind of thing. But I don't think it would do much to change attitudes toward boat people. It is possible to recognize that boat people are fleeing persecution and driven by desperation and still to regard them as queue jumpers - and to be concerned to avoid encouraging more refugees to take the risk of putting their lives in the hands of the people smugglers.

Cartoon by Nicholson from “The Australian” newspaper:www.nicholsoncartoons.com.au

I have to admit that I am sympathetic to such concerns, even though I know that the queue metaphor is not appropriate. As Fr. Frank Brennan has pointed out, in some parts of the world (like Pakistan) 'there is only mayhem'. The Hazaras fleeing from Afghanistan via Pakistan may not perceive that they have the opportunity to join an orderly 'queue' with a predictable waiting time, even after they reach Indonesia and are given the opportunity to have their claims processed. Nevertheless, it seems to me to be undeniable that those who choose the hazardous option of coming to Australia on an over-crowded and leaky boat are seeking an advantage over similarly placed persons who wait in Indonesia in the hope that they will eventually be allowed to come to Australia.

So, that kind of reasoning leaves me in support of a 'no advantage' policy. Unfortunately, however, the 'no advantage' policy that the government foreshadowed last year, with the re-introduction of off-shore processing in Nauru and PNG, hasn't stopped the boats. That is probably because boat people perceive the 'no advantage' rule, as currently applied, to be a bluff. They may think that the Australian government lacks the resolve to maintain a 'go slow' policy in processing their claims – and if so, they are probably correct.

As noted at the outset, I don't have any deep insights to present. I doubt whether we will be able to stop the boats until we are able to negotiate an appropriate bilateral arrangement with Indonesia, whereby the Indonesian government allows boat people to be returned to that country for processing, in exchange for Australia's agreement to contribute to accommodation and processing arrangements, and to provide an increased quota of resettlement places from Indonesia. As Frank Brennan says:

'We need to set up a workable, transparent, honourable queue in Indonesia'.

If such a solution is possible it will probably require a substantial increase in our total refugee intake. But I don't think that a future government would have huge problems in gaining public acceptance for such a policy. Most Australians have fairly positive attitudes towards helping those whom they perceive to be victims of persecution. 

Would it be costly to require banks to raise equity to 30 percent of total assets?

In their recently published book, 'The Banker's New Clothes', Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig make a strong case that in order to reduce the risk of insolvency in major financial institutions, shareholders should be required to fund their lending and other investments to a much greater extent.

The authors argue that government regulation to reduce the risk of insolvency of major financial firms is desirable because failure of such firms has adverse effects that are analogous to those that can arise from accidents in nuclear power plants. When I discussed that analogy in an earlier post, I accepted (somewhat reluctantly) that it is appropriate. As a result of the interconnectedness of financial markets, it would probably not be possible to avoid major economic disruption if large financial institutions were allowed to fail when they became insolvent. That makes it desirable to find the least cost way of regulating them to make it less likely that they will become insolvent. Governments are thus presented with problems that are similar to those involved in regulating the nuclear power industry to reduce the risk that serious nuclear accidents will occur.

Admati and Hellwig suggest that the best way to reduce the risk of insolvency of major financial institutions is to require them to raise shareholder equity from current levels (which under Basel III can apparently still be as low as 3 percent of total assets) to 20-30 percent of total assets. The higher ratio of shareholder equity to total bank assets would provide greater scope for any future fall in the value of bank assets to be accommodated without insolvency.

The authors suggest that requiring banks to rely more on equity funding would impose little, if any, cost to society. In this post I want to focus specifically on the reasons they give for that view. I encourage readers who are interested in a broader discussion of this important book to read John Cochrane's review.

The authors argue that requiring banks to rely more on equity funding would impose little cost on society because it would offset the bias in favour of borrowing provided by government guarantees and tax systems. Banks and their creditors benefit from explicit guarantees to protect depositors as well as implicit guarantees associated with the 'too big to fail' concept. These guarantees enable banks to borrow on more favourable terms than would otherwise be possible. Tax systems tend to favour borrowing because they make interest paid a tax deductible expense.  (The dividend imputation system in Australia reduces this bias to some extent but, as acknowledged by the Henry Tax Review, there is still a bias in favour of foreign borrowing and Australian banks rely heavily on this source of funds.)

The authors point out that equity ratios of banks were generally much higher in the 19^th century, prior to the existence of government guarantees.  In the US, until the middle of the 19^th century, equity levels around 40-50 percent of banks' total assets were typical and early in the 20^th century it was still common for banks to have equity of around 25 percent. The picture seems to have been broadly similar in Australia. Data presented in an article by Charles Hickson and John Turner shows (apparently) that the average equity to deposit ratio of Australian banks declined from around 60 percent in the 1860s to around 20 percent in 1892. The subsequent depression would presumably have substantially depleted the equity of those banks that managed to remain in business. Adam Creighton, a journalist, implies that the surviving banks re-built their capital ratios following the depression, so that a century ago they maintained capital ratios of between 15 per cent and 20 per cent. (See: 'Time to Force the Big Banks to Hold More Capital', 'The Australian', 23 November, 2012.)

Admati and Hellwig point out that the proposed increase in bank equity would not interfere with core banking functions of accepting deposits and making loans. Given the current structure of balance sheets, the increase in equity levels would tend to displace additional borrowing from sources such as money market funds rather than bank deposits.

The authors point out that bankers' claims that equity is more costly than debt are flawed because they don't take account of the effect of increased equity in reducing the risk of bank failure and thus reducing the rate of return required by shareholders. Equity only seems costly because government guarantees provide an implicit subsidy on debt. The increase in equity could be accomplished without significantly disadvantaging existing shareholders by requiring banks to retain earnings rather than pay dividends, until equity levels have reached the minimum level.  

I am normally sceptical of claims that governments can improve matters when they attempt to offset the adverse effects of previous interventions by adding a further layer of regulation. It seems, however, that Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig have found an instance where the theory of second best provides a valid guide to policy action. There are strong grounds to argue that if governments cannot credibly bring the 'too big to fail' policy to an end, they should take decisive action to offset the effects that policy has had in encouraging banks to become more fragile.  In my view the authors' proposals deserve strong support.

How can individuals learn to manage their self-control problems?

The essential characteristic of a self-control problem is failure to do what you want to do, even though you have sufficient knowledge, skill and opportunity. If you opt to have an additional glass of wine after weighing up the short term pleasure against the longer term pain that might result, that doesn't qualify as a self-control problem. But if after choosing to deny yourself the additional glass you often give in to an impulse and have it anyhow, you may have a self-control problem.  

Opinions differ about the extent that individuals can exercise will-power to deal with self-control problems, with support from their families, friends and professional advisors. For many thousands of years self-control problems were often viewed as evidence of possession by evil spirits. More recently, the observation that action precedes thought has brought into question the concept of free will and provided many people with a pseudo-scientific reason to doubt their own capacity to exercise will-power. This has been accompanied by a tendency for many people to re-define individual self-control problems as social problems. For example, individual health problems associated with nicotine addictions, alcoholism and obesity are frequently referred to as public health problems.

The advent of behavioural economics and happiness economics has unfortunately contributed to the view that individual self-control problems are social problems that should be dealt with by public policies. In my view, the efforts of economists to move beyond MaxU, the profession's conventional assumption that individuals maximize their utility, should be welcomed. It has become increasingly difficult to defend MaxU in many contexts in the face of evidence (e.g. a paper by Alois Stutzer and Bruno Frey) that people who are experiencing self-control problems tend to be relatively unhappy.

However, practitioners of behavioural and happiness economics take a step too far when they imply that identification of self-control problems is sufficient justification for government intervention to control people's lives, or remove temptations from them. I have presented my views on why that is so in Free to Flourish. In brief, the nature of humans is such that individuals need to exercise their capacity to make choices and to accept responsibility for them if they are to realise their potential. In other words, humans need to be in control their own lives if they are to flourish. It is also in the nature of humans to make mistakes, but the experience of learning from mistakes has potential to make individuals more competent in making decisions. By contrast, attempts by governments to protect people from themselves run the risk of making them increasingly dependent on government.

One possible objection to the view that people should be free to flourish is that this would be likely to result in worse outcomes for those who have had self-control problems from an early age. The famous marshmallow experiment, conducted at Stanford by psychologist Walter Mischel, suggests that children who have difficulty in deferring gratification to obtain greater reward at four years of age are likely to be prone to self-control problems throughout their lives. Findings of the Dunedin longitudinal study, reported byTerrie Moffitt et al, suggest that childhood self-control predicts such things as physical health, substance dependence and personal finances later in life (at age 32) about as well as intelligence and social class origins.

The findings of the Dunedin study also suggest, however, that it is possible for people to learn to exercise greater self-control. Some children moved up in self-control rank over the years of the study and this had a positive impact on their well-being as adults.

There has been previous discussion on this blog of research findings relating to ways in which people can learn to exercise greater self-control. For example, on the basis of extensive psychological research, Roy Baumeister argues strongly that individuals have the potential to exercise a great deal of self-control if they know how and want to do so.

Research by another psychologist, Tim Wilson, suggests that autonomy support can be helpful. This involves helping young people understand the value of different alternatives facing them and conveying a sense that they are responsible for choosing which path to follow.

Another relevant area of research, that I have recently begun to read about, concerns the role of construal. Research by Kentaro Fujita et al suggests that self-control is enhanced by high-level construal (the use of cognitive abstraction to extract the essential and goal-relevant features common across a class of events) rather than low-level construal (the process of highlighting the incidental and idiosyncratic features that render a particular event unique). What that means is that I would be more likely to maintain my resolve to have only one glass of wine with dinner (except for special occasions) if I construe the second glass as a bunch of calories that will require me to make greater sacrifices later to achieve my BMI target, rather than construing it as an immediate pleasure and entitlement.

If high level construal can help people to manage their self-control problems, that suggests to me that it is important for individuals to find ways to inspire themselves to pursue higher level goals. Techniques such as mBraining, discussed on this blog a few weeks ago, could help.

Is the regulatory problem in banking similar to that in the nuclear power industry?

In their recently published book, 'The Banker's New Clothes', Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig suggest that the causes of the global financial crisis were similar in some respects to the causes of the nuclear power disaster in Japan in 2011. In the case of the nuclear power disaster, the authors suggest that corrupted politicians and regulators had colluded with the Tokyo Electric Power Company to ignore known safety concerns. They comment:

'When an earthquake and tsunami occurred in 2011, this led to a nuclear disaster that was entirely preventable.

Weak regulation and ineffective enforcement were similarly instrumental in the buildup of risks in the financial system that turned the U.S. housing decline into a financial tsunami'.

It might seem obvious to just about everyone that government regulation of the nuclear power industry is desirable to prevent outcomes such as those experienced in Japan (even though regulation was spectacularly unsuccessful in this instance) but I feel inclined to step back a little to consider why such regulation is desirable. What is the problem that the regulation is intended to remedy in the nuclear power industry?

The obvious answer is that in conducting their business of providing electric power to their customers, there is a risk that nuclear power firms may accidentally cause harm to other people. But that is also true of many other business activities. Firms have an incentive to take precautions to avoid such incidental harm because they know that potential victims can sue for compensation.

So, why is additional government regulation needed in the nuclear power industry? Leaving aside the possibility of nuclear material getting in to the wrong hands, a need for additional regulation may arise because of the potential magnitude of the harm that might occur as a result of a nuclear accident. The harmful consequences of a nuclear catastrophe might be so great that the responsible firm would be unable to pay full compensation. That would pose a problem for government of whether to step in and help the victims, but it also poses the problem of how to ensure that the managers of the firm have a greater incentive to take precautions to avoid a catastrophe that would bankrupt the firm twice over, than to avoid a catastrophe that would bankrupt the firm only once. So, there might be a case for the government to step in to attempt to ensure that adequate precautions are taken.

Is there a similar case for regulation of major financial institutions? When I looked at this question a few weeks ago I suggested that when the failure of one bank leads to loss of confidence in other banks that have taken similar risks might just reflect a process in which the market is taking appropriate account of new information. For example, if a financial institution becomes insolvent because a decline in property values causes a decline in the asset backed securities in its balance sheet, that information could be expected to bring about a re-assessment of the value of assets of other financial institutions. It should not be surprising that those financial institutions that are considered to be at greater risk of becoming insolvent would suffer from a loss of confidence and have greater difficulty in conducting their business. That is the way an efficient market could be expected to weed out firms that can no longer be trusted to pay their bills. There does not seem to be anything in that scenario that is analogous to the harmful pollution released as a result of a nuclear accident.

Why do the authors argue that major financial institutions ought not be allowed to fail? The main reason they give is contagion, which adversely affects the broader economy. When a major financial institution collapses it is unable to meet its obligations to other institutions, which are also weakened. As more financial institutions anticipate liquidity problems and attempt to sell assets, there is likely to be a further decline in asset values. As financial institutions cut back lending, the broader economy is adversely affected.

Those effects on the broader economy would be dampened, in my view, if central banks were doing a good job of maintaining public expectations of steady growth of aggregate demand. Central banks were slow to use tools such as quantitative easing to do this during the global financial crisis. Even if central banks had made a more determined effort to manage expectations, however, it is doubtful whether they would have been entirely successful in countering fears that failure of several major financial institutions was likely to have severe adverse impacts on aggregate output and employment.

The authors make the point that it would be extremely difficult to allow large complex financial institutions to fail without major disruption when they became insolvent. Proposals that they could be taken over by public authorities until they were placed under new ownership would be difficult to implement because these firms have thousands of subsidiaries and other related entities spread over different countries. Separate resolution procedures would be required for different subsidiaries in different countries. Massive problems of coordination would be involved.

Governments seem to have managed somehow to get us into a vicious cycle where fears of contagion have led them to encourage major financial institutions in the believe that they were too big to fail, while the belief that governments would bail them out has led major financial institutions to take excessive risks. If we can't let big financial institutions fail when they become insolvent, perhaps the next best option is to find the least cost way of regulating them to make it less likely that they will become insolvent. That does present governments with problems that are similar to those involved in regulating the nuclear power industry.

In a later post I will discuss Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig's views of how governments can reduce the risk of insolvency in financial institutions that are too big to be allowed to fail.

Postscript

I am writing this postscript before I have posted the article because I have had some further thoughts about market failure, a concept that I was tempted to mention above. An earlier post about financial crises led to a discussion with Jim Belshaw about the meaning of market failure. During the course of that discussion I conceded that the concept of market failure is of limited use and made the point (attributed to Harold Demsetz) that the relevant choice is not between an existing imperfect market and an ideal norm of a perfect market, but between real world outcomes under current institutional arrangements and a proposed alternative set of institutional arrangements. My new point (new to me anyhow) is that if some feasible outcome is superior to that which exists at present, then past failure to implement the changes necessary to achieve that outcome should be viewed as government failure rather than market failure.