Will the 'better angels' keep winning?

When about half way through reading Steven Pinker’s book, ‘The Better Angels of Our Nature’ (2011) I wrote something supportive of his view that Enlightenment humanism is a coherent world view. Since I have now finished reading the book I can now take a broader view of it. However, I don’t propose to attempt more that a one sentence summary of the line of argument in the book. Peter Singer’s review seems to me to provide a good summary.

Pinker argues that our ‘better angels’ are winning because violence has declined over the centuries. His book is full of evidence supporting this proposition, most of which I find persuasive. My lingering doubts centre around the spread of nuclear and biological weapons. There seems to me to be potential for crazy political leaders to destroy a higher proportion of humanity in future wars than in past wars.

Some reviewers have raised more fundamental doubts about Pinker’s view of moral progress. For example, John Gray suggests that if Darwin’s theory is right there is no rational basis for expecting any revolution in human behaviour. In my view Gray misses the point. Pinker’s view of moral progress seems to be based primarily on cultural evolution – the evolution of social norms – rather than biological evolution.

However, Pinker suggests that we should not expect our explanation of the evolution of norms opposed to violence ‘to fall out of a grand unified theory’:

‘The declines we seek to explain unfolded over vastly different scales of time and damage: the taming of chronic raiding and feuding, the reduction of vicious interpersonal violence such as cutting off of noses, the elimination of cruel practices like human sacrifice, torture-executions and flogging, the abolition of institutions such as slavery and debt-bondage, the falling out of fashion of blood sports and duelling, the eroding of political murder and despotism, the recent decline of wars, pogroms and genocides, the reduction of violence against women, the decriminalization of homosexuality, the protection of children and animals’.

The historical forces that Pinker views as leading to a reduction in violence are: the emergence of government with a monopoly on the use of force; the growth of commerce i.e. mutually beneficial exchange; growth in the power of women; an expansion in the circle of sympathy to encompass people in other communities and other countries; and what he refers to as ‘the escalator of reason’. The escalator of reason involves ascending to the vantage point of an impartial spectator (i.e. detaching oneself from a parochial viewpoint). Pinker argues:

‘A humanistic value system, which privileges human flourishing as the ultimate good, is a product of reason because it can be justified: it can be mutually agreed upon by any community of thinkers who value their own interests and are engaged in reasoned negotiation, whereas communal and authoritarian values are parochial to a tribe or hierarchy’.

The main distinction between the expanding circle and the escalator of reason is that whereas the escalator of reason requires the vantage point of impartiality, the expanding circle requires a capacity to see things from the vantage point of other people. Pinker explains that the expansion in literacy and greater reading of fiction from the Enlightenment onwards is one of reasons for an expansion in the circle of people for whom we feel sympathy. Australian blogger, Legal Eagle, helps make this point by combining a review of Pinker’s book with a review of Suzanne Collins’ series ‘The Hunger Games’. Legal Eagle suggests: ‘If, in popular fiction, we explore with the ideas of how various utopian designs of society can go wrong, and feel sympathy for the victims, hopefully we can guard against being swayed by such visions’.

Even though Pinker argues that we should not expect our explanation for the decline in violence to fall out of a unified theory of cultural evolution, it seems to me that he is actually not far away from developing such a theory. His linking of growing skills in abstract reasoning (the so-called Flynn effect) with Adam Smith’s concept of the impartial spectator is a major contribution.  As I have argued previously, however, the extent to which we develop impartial spectators that influence our behaviour must depend on the context of social interactions that reward particular behaviours and penalize others. The prisoner’s dilemma model and the concept of moral progress as positive sum game, which Pinker uses in his final chapter, seem to me to be on the right track toward development of a unified theory of cultural evolution.

It seems to me that a theory of cultural evolution should have four central ingredients:  a vision of ethical behaviour promulgated by the major world religions; the sense of personal identity of individuals in different communities and cultures; the incentives individuals have to change the way they perceive themselves and the way others perceive them; and the incentives of groups to change the rules of the game that determine individual incentives.

The golden rule of treating others as one would like to be treated oneself qualifies as the vision of ethical behaviour. A person who perceives himself or herself as the kind of person who acts in accordance with the golden rule is likely to obtain satisfaction from acting in accordance with this ideal. The extent to which individuals perceive themselves in this way will depend on their perception of the incentives in their environment. If they perceive that people outside their family group or tribe are not to be trusted they will not risk attempting to engage with them in cooperative ventures or mutually beneficial exchange. If they perceive that the incentives in their environment favour predatory behaviour they will tend to adopt a sense of personal identity that enables them to feel comfortable with such behaviour. Since societies that adopt rules of the game which discourage predation will tend to be more successful in enabling individuals to flourish, there is an incentive to adopt similar rules of the game in other societies.

This model suggests that moral progress depends heavily on the extent to which individuals perceive that others can be trusted. This is supported by research, some reported on this blog, which has shown that the countries in which community values are most strongly supported tend to be those with relatively high levels of social trust. An implication of the importance of trust, however, is that moral progress of societies may tend to be somewhat fragile.

Postscript:
I keep referring to 'The Better Angels ...', particularly the 'escalator of reason'. There are references here and here.

In my view 'The Better Angels of our Nature' is one of those books that people will still be referring to in 50 years time.

Is a desire for enlightenment (in the Eastern sense) consistent with Enlightenment humanism?

‘The mind is the ruler of the soul. It should remain unstirred by agitations of the flesh – gentle and violent ones alike. Not mingling with them, but fencing itself off and keeping those feelings in their place. When they make their way into your thoughts, through the sympathetic link between the mind and body, don’t try to resist the temptation. The sensation is natural. But don’t let the mind start in with judgments calling it good or bad.’

Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (Roman Emperor from 161 to 181 AD).

‘Every sensation arises and passes away. Nothing is eternal. When you practise Vipassana you start experiencing this. However unpleasant a sensation may be-look, it arises only to pass away. However pleasant a sensation may be, it is just a vibration-arising and passing. Pleasant, unpleasant or neutral, the characteristic of impermanence remains the same. You are now experiencing the reality of anicca [impermanence]. …

Only this experience of anicca will change the habit pattern of the mind. Feeling sensation in the body and understanding that everything is impermanent, you don't react with craving or aversion; you are equanimous. Practising this continually changes the habit of reacting at the deepest level. When you don't generate any new conditioning of craving and aversion, old conditioning comes on the surface and passes away. By observing reality as it is, you become free from all your conditioning of craving and aversion.’

S N Goenka, leading teacher of Vipassana meditation, from aspeech in Bangkok in 1989.

I have chosen the quotes to illustrate the similarity between an important strand of Western philosophy, stoicism, and Buddhist meditation practice. Goenka seems to me to be an appropriate source to quote because his courses attract students from a wide range of different religious backgrounds all over the world (and I have rudimentary personal experience of Vipassana meditation).

In a comment on my last post Ramana asked: Should civilization be devoid of a desire for enlightenment in the Eastern sense of the word? I have changed his question because it seems to me that the critical issue is whether particular ideas are consistent with Enlightenment humanism. Some ideas that are broadly consistent with Enlightenment humanism might nevertheless not survive the competition of ideas in modern societies. I have in mind, for example, a range of different beliefs about life after death.

In my view a desire for enlightenment, in the Eastern sense, is highly consistent with Enlightenment humanism because the people who have that desire are usually inclined to respect the rights of other people and seek to live peacefully with them. That doesn’t mean that I accept that people can actually achieve some ultimate state of complete enlightenment through successive reincarnations. In my view, the desire to walk the path has merit at a human level, in terms of improved mental health and personal relationships, irrespective of the end point attained.

In his monograph on the merits of western civilization, which was briefly reviewed in my last post, Wolfgang Kasper is critical of adulation of Tibetan wisdom in the West:

‘At present, one can observe a certain cultural ennui among elites, who take prosperity and freedom for granted. Protest songs, adulation of Tibetan wisdom (which, with a big class of indolent monks exploiting the workers, looks not all that attractive from close up), and the nihilistic cult of dropping-out reflect a certain disenchantment, but also utopian assumptions about what humans can achieve’.

I know what Wolfgang means. There is a tendency in some quarters to put forward utopian visions of society that are inconsistent with liberty. Such a vision seems to be reflected, for example, in the introduction to the ‘World Happiness Report’, that I wrote about here recently. But, in my view Wolfgang’s remarks about Tibetan wisdom and indolent monks are inappropriate. Such remarks are analogous to questioning adherence to traditional Christian virtues on the grounds that church leaders have failed to protect children from molestation by predatory priests. The existence of indolent monks and predatory priests should not be a reason to reject either ancient Buddhist wisdom or traditional Christian virtues.

Wolfgang’s remarks about Tibetan wisdom are in a section of his monograph about ‘enemies of civilisation’. In my view such terminology would only be appropriate (in the context of a discussion of western civilization) when used in relation to people who are opposed to institutions such as freedom and democracy. Western civilization has nothing to fear from the Dalai Lama. He makes clear in his writings that although he is not a fan of many aspects of modern economic life in the West, his quest is for spiritual revolution in the minds of people all over the world. There is a vast difference between seeking to change behaviour by influencing the perceptions and beliefs of individuals and seeking to change behaviour by imposing restrictions on individual freedom.

Postscript

The following account of historical links between Indian religion and western culture is based heavily on material written by Jean Sedlar, an American historian.

The most promising direct historical link between Buddhism and Stoicism seems to be via Pyrrhon of Elis (365-275 B.C.), the reputed founder of Scepticism, a forerunner of Stoicism. There seems to be fairly reliable evidence that Pyrrhon accompanied Alexander's army to India. Diogenes Laertios (2nd cen. A.D.) claims further that Pyrrhon's encounters with Indian wise men led directly to his love of solitude and to his formulation of the Sceptics' fundamental thesis: namely, that knowledge is impossible and that the truly wise man should therefore suspend judgment on all questions.

Jean Sedlar acknowledges that Pyrrhon could ‘scarcely have failed to notice’ the ‘mental impassivity and physical endurance’ of the Indian holy men. However, she questions whether a mature and well-educated Greek, with ideas presumably well-formed already, would be significantly influenced by talks with them. She also suggests that there were obvious prior causes within Greece for the ideas developed by Pyrrhon, so it would seem gratuitous to assume Indian inspiration. 

The legend of a meeting between Alexander and Dandamis, an Indian holy man, is also relevant. Sedlar describes several different accounts of this meeting. From the perspective of the influence of Indian influences on western civilization, the one that seems most interesting is the interpretation in terms of Christian monasticism of the 4^th Century. The points emphasized are that the Indian ascetics advocated a life-style that satisfies only the minimum physical needs; they attacked riches, luxury, and the perversions of Greek life. According to the story, Alexander had to go to meet Dandamis because he had refused an audience, despite inducements and threats. Dandamis said nature already furnished him with everything he needed and he did not fear death. When they met, Dandamis invited Alexander to abandon the world and find tranquillity in a life of renunciation. Alexander refused, citing the responsibilities of his position.

Sedlar comments: ‘The message of the text is clear: Alexander approves of the ascetics' life-style. Only practical considerations prevent him from imitating it himself’.  She notes that this account of the meeting became favorite reading in Christian monasteries both West and East – providing ‘support from pagans in defence of a Christian-ascetic mode of life’.

However, in the late 4th or early 5th century the story was changed to provide the opposite message, ‘namely to deprecate the monastic ideal’. In this text, Alexander had the last word, expressing the view that the Brahmins' life of renunciation is due not to free choice, but rather to the conditions of poverty prevailing in India. He then praised the riches of Greece and the high morals of its citizens. But that was not the final version. During the medieval period, the text was again rewritten to exalt Dandamis' philosophy of asceticism.

I wonder whether the meeting between Alexander and Dandamis has been portrayed in any modern movies. Different interpretations of what could have happened at such a meeting might well have an ongoing influence on culture in the West and the East in the years ahead.

Jean Sedlar also refers to the links between Greek philosophy and Buddhism that are evident in ‘Questions of King Milinda’ (probably written ca. 150-100 B.C.) which is included in the Burmese version of the Pali Canon. The book is an account of discussions between Menandros, the Hellenistic ruler of part of India, and a Buddhist sage named Nagasena. It concludes with the king becoming the monk's disciple. As Sedlar notes, the book is modelled in some respects upon a Greek dialogue. An abridged version edited by Bhikku Pesala is available on the web.  

Should Enlightenment humanism be equated with Western Civilization?

In a comment on Jim Belshaw’s blog a couple of weeks ago Ramana, one of his regular readers, commented:

‘Surely, words like civilisation and progress themselves need acceptable definitions before we can arrive at a consensus?

These two words have gained a lot of notoriety because of the heavy slant towards the Western idea of them. That other parts of the world could have different ideas need to be recognised and accommodated.’

Jim drew attention to the comment in a later post in which he also referred to my post: ‘Is Enlightenment humanism a coherent world view?’ A spirited discussion ensued.

My response to Ramana, influenced by Steven Pinker’s ‘Better Angels  …’ book (which I still haven’t finished reading) was that the civilizing process is about widespread adoption of an attitude that violence is unacceptable, accompanied by a reduction in violence within societies. I suggested that such a view of the civilizing process should have appeal all over the world. I noted that the societies in which rates of internal violence have fallen over the last couple of centuries are certainly not all in the West and the process doesn't have much, if anything, to do with the 'westernization' of culture. I was making a distinction between western culture and the social norms associated with classical liberalism and humanism.

Wolfgang Kasper’s monograph, ‘The Merits of Western Civilization’ (IPA, 2011) is directly relevant to the questions we have been discussing. Wolfgang discusses the evolution of western civilization in a particularly thoughtful manner.

In discussing the tendency of people to feel that their own civilization is superior to others, Wolfgang acknowledges that there could be a kernel of truth in such claims.  They make sense because each individual ‘has to become habituated to his community’s given rule-set, and many institutions have to be internalized to the extent that they are obeyed unthinkingly’.  Wolfgang makes the point, however, that ‘not all rule-sets … are objectively of equal value in terms of attaining such fundamental goals as freedom, justice, security and peace’.

Wolfgang also discusses the importance of rule-sets - particularly informal institutions or social norms - being able to evolve in response to changing circumstances, in harmony with accepted cultural values. He notes that civilizations tend to decline culturally and materially when they are based on rigid rule systems.  On this basis, he argues that the most outstanding feature of western civilization is that it has remained adaptive and open to new challenges and opportunities as well as sufficiently open to allow other civilizations to borrow from it.

The openness of western civilization to influence from other cultures, along with strong historical influences from Western Asia, make the task of defining western civilization somewhat difficult. In his discussion of how to define ‘the West’, Wolfgang provides a fairly supportive critique of the views of Philippe Nemo, in his book ‘What is the West?’ Nemo argues that a common cultural heritage is shared by Western Europeans and North Americans, as well as outliers such as Australians.  He asserts that the values on which western civilization are built stem from the invention of the city and rational science in ancient Greece, Roman invention of the law, the addition of compassion by Judaeo-Christian thinkers, a papal revolution between the 11^th and 13^th centuries (which apparently introduced the concept that individual initiative and good deeds can redeem humanity) and the Enlightenment from the 17^th to the early 19^th centuries.

Nemo ‘fails to completely convince’ Wolfgang that a medieval papal revolution acted as ‘a stepping stone to modernity’. He suggests that Nemo ‘almost forgets’ the role of the Protestant Reformation in the 16^th Century, which gave religious endorsement to innovation and material progress ‘and distinguished European civilization from the many others that made a virtue of a fatalistic outlook on life’.

The intellectual, political and economic liberalism of the Enlightenment is viewed by Wolfgang as the ‘crowning achievement’ of western civilization. Since the Enlightenment happened in the West, it seems to me that it certainly makes sense to identify the emergence of modern western civilization with Enlightenment humanism and intellectual pluralism.

Does this mean that Enlightenment humanism and intellectual pluralism should be equated with western civilization? I don’t think so. I think it is an exaggeration to assert, as Wolfgang does, that ‘no civilization outside the West has turned intellectual pluralism into a value of its own’. It seems to me that recognition of the merits of intellectual pluralism has spread outside the West to such an extent that it is no longer appropriate to identify these values solely with western civilization. In my view Enlightenment humanism and intellectual pluralism should be seen as cosmopolitan values that tend to be reflected in social norms to the extent that a society is open to influence from other cultures.

Wolfgang Kasper ends his monograph with the assertion that the history of civilizations and the role of cultural evolution are among the most fascinating fields of study. In my view his monograph makes a useful contribution in demonstrating that to be so.

What is the 'World Happiness Report'?

The release of the UN’s ‘World Happiness Report’, edited (and to a large extent authored) by John Helliwell, Richard Layard and Jeffrey Sachs, does not seem to have captured much media attention. I became aware of it only while looking for reports of the meeting on ‘Happiness and Well-being:  Defining a New Economic Paradigm’, which was held in New York early this month. My interest stems from my attendance at a preliminary meeting in Bhutan last year. I still don’t have much idea what happened in New York, but the ‘World Happiness Report’ deserves consideration.

The mainstream media apparently didn’t consider the ‘World Happiness Report’ to be particularly newsworthy. That is presumably because it doesn’t contain much information that is new. It is not news that people in wealthy countries tend to be happier than people in poor countries. It is not news that average levels of happiness are still fairly low in China despite substantial gains in income levels over the last couple of decades. (That makes it difficult for me to understand reports that the Chinese government has apparently made it difficult for people in China to obtain the report via the internet.)

   

The report consists of an introduction by Jeff Sachs and chapters on the state of world happiness, the causes of happiness and misery, and policy implications. The report also contains three case studies – one on measurement of Gross National Happiness in Bhutan, one on the work of the ONS in Britain and the other OECD proposals for measurement of subjective well-being.

The introduction sets the scene by arguing that the quest for happiness should be seen to be intimately linked to the quest for sustainable development.  The author seems particularly concerned that economic growth will ‘undermine the Earth’s life support systems’: ‘In years or decades, conditions for life ‘may become dire in several fragile regions of the world.’ He is also concerned that economic growth is not making people happier: countries ‘achieve great progress in economic development as conventionally measured; yet along the way succumb to a new crisis of obesity, smoking, diabetes depression and the other ills of modern life’. He suggests that we can ‘protect the Earth while raising quality of life’ if we adopt ‘lifestyles and technologies that improve happiness (or life satisfaction) while reducing human damage to the environment.’

In my view the picture painted in the introduction is exaggerated, in terms of both impacts of economic growth on the environment and human happiness. In broad terms, the regions where conditions for life are under threat are suffering from lack of economic growth, rather than too much of it. The regions where happiness levels are highest have had greatest economic growth.

It is tempting to dismiss the introduction as alarmist nonsense.  It provokes in me the same feelings as I get when religious fanatics try to tell me that the end of the world is nigh. Yet, I readily acknowledge that some aspects of human activity are impacting adversely on the environment and that many people who have the benefits of living in high-income countries do not make good use of the opportunities that modern life offers to them. My point is that the introduction is unlikely to persuade many people that the measurement of happiness is worth considering seriously.

The introduction raises in my mind the question of how measurement of happiness will induce people to change their lifestyles in ways that reduce environmental damage. Will this occur through a spontaneous change in culture or are we about to see a new wave of central planning to regulate individual lifestyles? Perhaps happiness research will provide evidence that individuals with a small environmental footprint tend to be happier, other things being equal. Such evidence might induce larger numbers of people to make substantial lifestyle changes spontaneously.  I would not be surprised to see such evidence emerge, but the possibility of obtaining it doesn’t seem to be discussed in this report.

I think there is reason to be concerned that we are about to see a new wave of central planning of individual lifestyles, linked to happiness measurement. I am not referring here to limited action by governments to change relative prices in order to reduce specific negative spillovers associated with economic growth e.g. through carbon taxes or trading schemes. My concern is about the manipulation of the tax and regulatory system in ways designed to counter any aspirations that people might have that are not immediately reflected in happiness or life satisfaction. The author of the introduction fuels my concerns by objecting to the view that ‘happiness is in the eye of the beholder, an individual’s choice, something to be pursued individually rather than a matter of national policy’. There are plenty of political players in most countries, who will be only too eager to use this report to support their efforts to try to make people happier by regulating their lives.

Will these government planners be successful in their efforts to use happiness data to make people happier? It seems to me that there are parallels here with the use of GDP in economic planning. Half a century ago economic planners had great hopes that national income measurement - then being standardized with United Nations involvement – would help them in their efforts to lift economic growth rates. The UN’s 1969 Declaration on Social Progress and Development (discussed on this blog a few weeks ago) must have provided economic planners with great comfort by supporting their efforts to raise GDP through economic planning.  In the end, GDP measurement has helped to show that the efforts of the economic planners were counter-productive. I would not be surprised if social planning to raise happiness levels eventually meets a similar fate.

Planners are faced with the challenge of evidence that individual freedom is important to life satisfaction.  On that basis, it seems reasonable to predict that people will tend to become increasingly discontented as social planners intensify their efforts to make them happier.

Unfortunately, the introduction to the report has side-tracked me from considering the main content. People who might be interested in my views on the other chapters have probably stopped reading already. In case anyone is still reading, however, I will add some brief comments.

For the most part, the report equates ‘happiness’ with subjective well-being. It focuses on subjective well-being measures based on questions about happiness and life satisfaction. The authors seem to have in mind that those two questions should form the basis of happiness measurement systems. (The Bhutan case study is an exception. Objective measures of well-being are included in the measurement of GNH in Bhutan along with subjective measures.)

The report contains interesting information on the distribution of happiness in different countries as well as on average levels of happiness. The information on the distribution of happiness suggests to me that great caution is required in interpreting average happiness levels (whether mean, median or mode) as indicators of national happiness. This is particularly so in Latin American and African countries where inequality of happiness is relatively high.

The focus of the report on subjective well-being seems to me to be a weakness, despite its recognition that happiness measurement is part of a larger effort to understand well-being. This weakness is particularly evident when the report comes to making suggestions about policy priorities. It is apparent in that section that the authors were unable to confine themselves to findings arising from subjective well-being research. For example, the report states that a decent education for all is essential. Few would argue with that, but the research findings reported suggest that education makes a contribution to life satisfaction only through its effects on income.

In my view the methodology for measuring well-being should recognize all the factors that people consider to impinge on the opportunities available to them to live the kinds of lives they want to live. It seems likely that many people would consider education to affect those opportunities in ways that are not accounted for by either income or life satisfaction. Similarly, are other factors that contribute to the opportunities for people to live the lives they want to live, including health and the state of the environment, are probably not adequately accounted for by measures of subjective well-being.

Postscript:
Jim Belshaw has made the additional point, in the comments below and on his blog, that when you measure something there is a great temptation to focus on improving 'performance' as measured. Extending this reasoning, if happiness measures focus on contentment one might therefore expect government policies to focus to a greater extent on making people feel content - for example, by viewing ambition as a mental health problem and making medications freely available to treat it.