‘Australia in 2010-11 offered the best conditions for human
existence on planet earth, a sweet spot indeed.’
The quote is from Peter Hartcher’s book, ‘The Sweet Spot’,
published in November last year. Hartcher bases his view that Australia is the
sweet spot on well-being indexes such as the UN’s Human Development index and
the OECD’s Better Life Index. That view seems to me to be soundly based. As I
noted on this blog last year, Australia is ranked highly even when the
weighting given to the criteria incorporated in the OECD index is changed to
reflect differing priorities with respect to income, social and environmental
objectives.
The great strength of ‘The Sweet Spot’, in my view, is that
it provides historical perspective on how Australia came to be where it is now.
This helps the author to get across the message of the sub-title: ‘Australia
made its own luck and could now throw it away’.
Hartcher argues that Australia has become the sweet spot
because it eventually found a good balance between opportunity and security, or
between free markets and collectivism. A central focus of the book is the
evolution and later dismantling of what Paul Kelly referred to as ‘the
Australian settlement’, which led to what Donald Horne referred to as ‘the
racket’. The Australian settlement, which was largely established around the
time of federation, involved a consensus in favour of racially-based
restrictions on immigration (the white Australia policy), trade protectionism, national
wage regulation (the arbitration system) and government paternalism,
underpinned by a belief that Australian prosperity was underwritten by the
British Empire.
Donald Horne argued in his book, ‘The Lucky Country’,
published in 1964, that Australia’s good fortune in terms of natural resources
had become an excuse and perhaps even a licence for complacency. Hartcher
reminds readers:
‘Horne had detected and foreshadowed Australia’s slide from
the top ranks of the world’s richest countries, arguing that luck and
complacency were poor substitutes for originality and investment. “Can the
racket last?” he asked, immediately responding with a resounding “NO”. He was,
of course, correct, and it was a slippage that gathered pace in the ‘70s and
80’s.’
The subsequent chapters tell the story of how Australia
opened up to the rest of the world, moved away from a rent-seeking culture and
reformed its economy. In my view the story has been told fairly, with
appropriate acknowledgement of the immigration reforms introduced by Whitlam,
the influx of refugees from Vietnam during the time of the Fraser government,
the floating of the Australian dollar, industry assistance reforms and the
beginning of wider ranging economic reforms during the Hawke-Keating years and
the privatisations, tax reforms and labour market reforms (subsequently
aborted) of the Howard-Costello period of government. Hartcher makes the point
that while the general thrust of these reforms was to give markets a greater
role in the Australian economy, they were achieved, for the most part, without
the rancour that accompanied the reforms of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and
Ronald Reagan in the United States. He attributes this to greater reliance on
consultation and consensus-building in Australia, in contrast to more overtly
ideological approaches adopted by the UK and US governments. I would have like
to have seen more attention given to the role of the policy advice processes
adopted in Australia (but my view about the importance of the role played by
the IAC and Productivity Commission might not be objective).
Let us now jump to 2007, by which time the economic strength
which is reflected in Australia’s current ranking in quality of life indexes would
have been established. I don’t think Peter Hartcher actually mentions it, but
in October 2007 Paul Kelly announced
the arrival of a “new Australian settlement engineered by political leaders
during the past generation and a half”. He noted that the policies of the major
parties had converged. For example, economic policy had become more pro-market,
foreign policy had converged on a strategic outlook of simultaneously deepening
ties with East Asia and the US, and immigration policies had converged on
acceptance of increased immigration accompanied by a deeper commitment to
Australian citizenship. A few weeks later, former Labor leader Mark Latham
observed that the policies that the major parties had put forward in the
election campaign then being conducted were virtually indistinguishable. He
suggested that the policies of the major parties had converged to address the
concerns of the middle classes. I can remember this because in April 2008 I
posted an article on this blog entitled: Do we now have a new Australiansettlement? I agreed with Kelly and Latham, but subsequent events suggest that
we were all wrong. Rather than a sensible convergence on policies that build on
the strong legacy left by Hawke, Keating, Howard and Costello we now seem to be
drifting in the opposite direction.
I don’t agree entirely with Peter Hartcher’s assessment of the
political sins of the main political players over the last few years. I think
he is far too kind to Kevin Rudd and Wayne Swan. Nevertheless, that doesn’t
prevent me from agreeing with him that neither Gillard nor Abbott ‘seems to be
the leader to take Australia into its next golden era of national improvement’.
I also agree with Hartcher’s
qualification to that judgement: ‘Leaders change, and perhaps one, or both, can
develop the agenda and skills to lead the country in the national interest’.
In my view ‘The Sweet Spot’ is a fine example of big picture
journalism. It deserves to be as widely read and influential as ‘The Lucky
Country’. With a bit of luck this book might help prevent a return of the rent-seeking
culture that saw Australia’s relative living standards slip so dramatically
during the 1970s and 80s.