‘The assumption that agents are rational provides the
intellectual foundation for the libertarian approach to public policy: do not
interfere with the individual’s right to choose, unless the choices harm
others’ – Daniel Kahneman, ‘Thinking Fast and Slow’, Penguin, 2011.
I feel as though I am being somewhat churlish in protesting
about Kahneman’s comments on libertarianism, which amount to only a few pages near
the end of a 400 page book. In my view Kahneman’s book deserves high praise and
it has indeed been widely praised (for example, even in a post on his blog by David Friedman, who describes himself as an anarchist-anachronist-economist). Having thought slowly
about the matter, however, it seems to me that it is important to try to
prevent paternalists from getting a free kick from the reasoning that Kahneman
develops in this book.
Much of Kahneman’s book is a discussion of research findings
relating to biases in intuitive thinking. The view presented is that intuitive
thinking (fast thinking) tends to be much more influential than we realize – it
is responsible for many of the choices and judgements that we make.
The confidence we have in our intuitions is usually justified, but they can
lead us badly astray on issues that require deliberation (slow thinking). For example, most people have particular
difficulty in making judgements that require an understanding of probabilities.
Kahneman is not optimistic that people can easily learn to recognize when they
are in a cognitive minefield in which they need to slow down and question their
intuitions. When people feel the stress of having to make a big decision, more doubt
is likely to be the last thing they want.
My intuitions tell me that Kahneman may be too pessimistic
about our ability to recognize when we are about to enter a cognitive minefield.
It seems to me that many people have developed emotional systems that provide
ample warnings when they are about to enter cognitive minefields. Since I am
feeling such warning signals right now, however, my intuitions about this could
well be wrong. I should confine my remarks to matters about which I can write
with some confidence.
When I set out to write this post the plan in the back of my
mind was to refer to some earlier posts in which I distance myself from the
rational actor model employed by people like Gary Becker (whose theory of
rational addiction is cited by Kahneman) and then to proceed to demonstrate
that the classical foundations of libertarianism do not require the assumptions
of that model. However, my early warning system suggested to me that it might
be a good idea to check whether Becker actually bases his defence of
libertarianism on the rational actor model. It turns out that in the defence of libertarianism
that I found, Becker actually distances himself from rational actor assumptions. (This
is a post he wrote on the Becker-Posner blog in 2007 on the peculiar concept of
libertarian paternalism - supported by Kahneman, but advocated originally by Cass
Sunstein and Richard Thaler.)
Becker presents the view that I had planned to present more
eloquently than I could, so I will quote him:
‘Classical arguments for libertarianism do not assume that
adults never make mistakes, always know their interests, or even are able
always to act on their interests when they know them. Rather, it assumes that
adults very typically know their own interests better than government
officials, professors, or anyone else ... . In addition, the classical
libertarian case partly rests on a presumption that being able to make mistakes
through having the right to make one's own choices leads in the long run to
more self-reliant, competent, and independent individuals. It has been
observed, for example, that prisoners often lose the ability to make choices
for themselves after spending many years in prison where life is rigidly
regulated. In effect, the libertarian claim is that the "process" of
making choices leads to individuals who are more capable of making good choices’.
Arnold Kling’s views on the implications of the cognitive
biases documented by Kahneman are also worth quoting:
‘If social phenomena are too complex for any of us to
understand, and if individuals consistently overestimate their knowledge of
these phenomena, then prudence would dictate trying to find institutional
arrangements that minimize the potential risks and costs that any individual
can impose on society through his own ignorance. To me, this is an argument for
limited government.
Instead of using government to consciously impose an
institutional structure based on the maps of cognitively impaired individuals,
I would prefer to see institutions evolve through a trial-and-error process.
People can be “nudged” by all manner of social and religious customs. I would
hope that the better norms and customs would tend to survive in a competitive
environment. This was Hayek's view of the evolution of language, morals, common
law, and other forms of what he called spontaneous order. In contrast, counting
on government officials to provide the right nudges strikes me as a recipe for
institutional fragility.
If Kahneman is correct that we have “an almost unlimited
ability to ignore our own ignorance,” then all of us are prone to mistakes. We
need institutions that attempt to protect us from ourselves, but we also need
institutions that protect us from one another. Limited government is one such
institution’ (‘The PoliticalImplications of Ignoring Our Own Ignorance’, The American, December 2011).
In responding to comments on his post, David Friedman has made a similar point that on
balance Kahneman's work may actually favour the libertarian position that
market decision processes are superior to political decision processes:
‘The arguments suggest that people are more nearly rational when they use the
slow mind than the fast and, since the slow mind's attention is a scarce
resource, they are more likely to use it the more important getting a decision
right is. My market decisions are almost always more important to me than my
political decisions, since the former directly affect outcomes for me, the
latter do not. That suggests that people will be less rational in their
political decisions than their market decisions.’
It is also worth noting that we do not have to choose between relying on our own individual thinking processes and relying on governments to guide us. In those areas of decision-making where we may not be able to rely on our intuitions and deliberations we have family, friends, representatives of voluntary organizations of various kinds and paid professionals who may be willing to act as our advisers or our agents (as well as the social norms and customs mentioned by Kling). If I need an agent to make decisions for me, it seems to me to be preferable to appoint one to act as my servant than to appoint one to act as my master.
Finally, we should also recognize that when governments make paternalistic laws to criminalize stupidity they don't necessarily stop people from behaving stupidly. They may just add to the problems of the people they are trying to help.