Which is the more appropriate policy objective: opportunity or contentment?

Carol Graham’s new book, ‘The Pursuit of Happiness’, makes an important contribution to consideration of the relevance of happiness research to government policy because it considers explicitly which dimensions of happiness are most relevant as public policy objectives. Happiness researchers have previously argued in favour of particular definitions of happiness - for example positive feelings, emotional well-being, satisfaction with life, capability or opportunity – without much consideration of the relevance of their favoured definitions to public policy.

Early in the book, Carol suggests: ‘A plausible assumption is that most societies would be interested in maximizing the number of citizens who believed they were leading purposeful lives but less concerned about how often people had smiled yesterday. Yet even that statement reflects normative priors that might not apply to all cultures and societies, some of which might emphasize the importance of contentment in day-to-day living more’ (p.30).

Near the end, she comes to the conclusion that a policy that aims to guarantee contentment to all citizens, rather than the opportunity to pursue a fulfilling life, ‘might be unacceptable in most societies’ (p 122). Carol also acknowledges that measures of subjective well-being can contribute to better government policies by making policy process better informed, irrespective of whether any particular dimension of happiness is pursued explicitly as a national objective.

The public policy choice between pursuit of contentment and widespread opportunity is characterised in this book as a choice between Bentham and Aristotle, with Bentham in favour of maximizing the contentment (or pleasure) of the greatest number and Aristotle in favour of maximizing the number of people who have the opportunity to lead a meaningful life (i.e. to flourish). This might be a little unfair to Bentham, who held that utility includes anything that ‘tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness’, which would certainly encompass the opportunity to lead a meaningful life. Nevertheless, many Benthamites have tended to equate happiness with pleasure and even J S Mill, who sought to distinguish between the merits of higher and lower pleasures, saw both tranquillity (contentment) and excitement as the main constituents ‘of a satisfied life’.

The opportunity to lead a meaningful life implies agency, which Carol defines as ‘the capacity to make choices and act on them’ (p 41). She perceives individual agency to be limited by income, education and information constraints as well as institutional constraints, i.e. by all factors that limit individual opportunity.

So, doesn’t greater agency or opportunity lead to greater contentment? Not necessarily. Carol points out that people with limited wealth often report being very happy while people who are in the process of obtaining higher levels of wealth (frustrated achievers) often report feeling miserable. She suggests that the way people answer happiness questions in surveys is to a large extent determined by their agency. The process of acquiring agency may produce short term unhappiness because of uncertainty associated with the adjustment process (e.g. in relocation away from family and friends) and if expectations of a more fulfilling life do not materialize this could result in lasting unhappiness.

Doesn’t this make contentment a more appropriate objective than agency? If the peasants are happy with their lives as they are, why seek to improve the opportunities available to them? I think Carol provides a good answer to these questions. She points out that while adaptation to circumstances is usually positive from an individual psychological perspective, it can lead to collective tolerance for a bad equilibrium. For example, crime and corruption have less effect on subjective well-being in countries where crime and corruption have become an entrenched feature of society. This should not make it any less desirable to reduce crime and corruption in such places.

The numerous examples that Carol draws from her research experience to illustrate the points she is making help make this book a pleasure to read. Readers are told about happy peasants and frustrated achievers in Latin America; about survey respondents in Afghanistan who are apparently happier than the world average despite objective conditions that are markedly worse; about migrants who are markedly less happy than the average for the countries they have migrated to; and about obese people who are less happy than the non-obese, but much less unhappy when there are more obese people around them.

My only reservation about the book is that I am not persuaded that the unhappy growth paradox – lower average happiness in countries with relatively high rates of economic growth after controlling for per capita income levels – is largely attributable to unhappiness associated with the process of acquiring agency. As I have suggested before, I think the unhappy growth phenomenon might disappear if researchers could control for wealth rather than income levels. The appearance of unhappy growth might largely reflect the influence on well-being of wealth (reflected in quality of housing, financial assets, human capital, public infrastructure, social capital etc.) which may take several decades to accumulate.

However, that is a minor reservation. I have no hesitation in recommending this book to anyone who is interested in the role of government in the pursuit of happiness.

Postscript:
A recent conference presentation by Carol Graham on 'Happiness around the World: The Paradox of Happy Peasants and Miserable Millionaires' is available here.

Is the social fabric stronger when a high proportion of the population identify with helping the people nearby?

In my last post I presented some evidence that people who do not identify strongly with ‘always behaving properly’ nevertheless tend to identify strongly with helping the people nearby if they feel a great deal of freedom and control of their own lives (i.e. if they have strong feelings of individual agency).


Does an identification with helping the people nearby have a positive effect on the social fabric or, to use an Australian expression, is it just about ‘looking after your mates’? In some contexts, helping the people nearby could even be corrupt behaviour. Fortunately, it is possible to test the relationship between identifying with helping the people nearby and attitudes toward corruption using data from the World Values Survey. This survey asks respondents to rate their view on whether it is ‘justifiable for a person to accept a bribe’ on a scale from 1 to 10, where a rating of 1 means that it is never justifiable and a rating of 10 means that it is always justifiable. (As before, I am basing my analysis on cross-tabulations for about 80,000 respondents in 57 countries from the 2005 Survey.)

The relationship between identifying with helping the people nearby and attitudes toward corruption is shown in the chart below. (The percentages shown in the chart add to 100 per cent along the horizontal axis.)

It is clear from the chart that people who identify with helping the people nearby have less tolerant attitudes toward corruption. Similar analyses show that these people are also less tolerant of social security and tax fraud, and fare evasion on public transport. It seems clear that the social fabic is stronger when a high proportion of the population identify with the importance of helping the people nearby.

Do you have to be a goody-goody to identify strongly with helping others?

No! People who feel a great deal of freedom and control of their own lives identify strongly with helping others even if they don’t see themselves as goody-goodies. People with strong feelings of individual agency identify strongly with the proposition ‘it is important to help the people nearby’ even if they don’t identify at all with the proposition ‘it is important to always behave properly’.


Before I present a chart showing this, I should provide some background information. I ended my last post wondering whether people who feel little freedom in their own lives might tend to be more likely to engage in anti-social activities if they give high priority to having a good time and feel little control over their own lives. However, when I looked at World Values Survey data on people who identify strongly with the proposition ‘it is important to this person to have a good time’ I found that they tend to identify much more strongly than average with helping others, even when they feel little control over their own lives. (I am basing these observations on cross-tabulations for about 80,000 respondents in 57 countries from the 2005 Survey.)

So, I decided to see if this is also true of people who identify strongly with the proposition ‘it is important for this person to be rich’. It is. It is also true of people who identify strongly with ‘being very successful’, ‘thinking up new ideas and being creative’, ‘being adventurous and taking risks’, ‘looking after the environment’, ‘living in secure surroundings’, ‘tradition’ and ‘always behaving properly’. It seems that people who identify strongly with just about any proposition about the importance of a particular value in their own lives tend to identify strongly with helping others, even when they feel little control over their own lives.

It is hardly surprising that people who identify strongly with the proposition ‘it is important to this person to always behave properly’ would identify with helping others. What about those who see themselves as being a bit naughty – the people who say that proposition ‘is not like me, or not at all like me’? I gave the answer in the first paragraph. It is also shown in the chart below.

I’m not sure of the implications of the finding that people who do not see themselves as giving importance to behaving properly tend nevertheless to identify strongly with helping others if they have strong feelings of personal agency. Perhaps feelings of personal freedom and control of their lives help individuals to behave responsibly even when they prefer to see themselves as being fallible rather than virtuous. This deserves further study.

How much do we know about the relationship between freedom and human flourishing?

I have been thinking about this subject for a long time. I have blogging about various aspects of it for more than 3 years and I have just written a conference paper entitled ‘Some Observations on the Relationship between Freedom and Well-Being’. Yet I still don’t feel as though I know enough about the relationship between freedom and individual flourishing.


My interest in this topic stemmed partly from the questioning by some influential people of the economist’s traditional assumption that adult individuals of sound mind are the best judges of their own interests. There seems to have been an increasing tendency to question whether people make good use of opportunities available to maintain or improve their well-being and that of their families. There seems to be increasing support for paternalistic restrictions on freedom in an effort to discourage behaviour that is harmful to health (e.g. smoking) and financial well-being (e.g. gambling).

A priori reasoning can take us some distance in establishing the importance of self-direction and autonomy to human flourishing. As discussed in the paper referred to above, a strong case can be made that humans are creatures that cannot fully flourish unless they are responsible for the way they live their lives. Respect for individual autonomy also provides the basis for social cooperation. It is difficult to help other people to flourish – or even to live in peace with them – if we do not respect their autonomy.

Empirical analysis of the relationships between various aspects of freedom and dimensions of well-being also suggest a positive relationship between freedom and well-being. At a subjective level, feelings of individual agency – feelings about the amount of freedom and control that people have over the way their lives turn out – are closely related to life satisfaction. There is evidence that feelings of individual agency are influenced by institutions relating to democracy, freedom of expression and economic freedom. There is also evidence of a positive relationship between economic freedom and various subjective and objective measures of well-being.

The paper also looks at evidence on the question of whether strong feelings of individual agency are associated with more selfish behaviour. It concludes that, if anything, the opposite seems to be the case.

So, we have strong grounds to argue that self-direction and autonomy are important and that people do tend, in general, to make good use of the opportunities available to improve their well-being and that of their families.

Why do we need to know more than that about the relationship between freedom and flourishing?

One important reason has to do with way many of us tend to respond to the fact that some people use the opportunities available to them in ways that are harmful to their own well-being or that of other people. We often have tendency to support policy responses that seek to reduce temptations of vulnerable people, by restricting freedom, rather than to consider why such people have become vulnerable and how they might be helped to resist temptations. (I use the words ‘us’ and ‘we’ in this context because of my previous support for policies that I thought would reduce availability of harmful drugs when my children were in their teens.) I think that we tend to resort too readily to paternalistic interventions that attempt to remove temptations because we don’t know enough about what makes people vulnerable to temptations or how their vulnerability is affected by the institutional environment.

I think we also need a better understanding of the causes of anti-social activities, such as those associated with binge drinking, if we are to avoid attempts to deal with such problems without further restricting the liberty of innocent people. It might be helpful to know, for example, to what extent people behave irresponsibly because of the feeling that nothing they do has much effect on the way their lives turn out, in combination with of the priority they give to having a good time. It might also be useful to know whether such feelings and attitudes are more prevalent in some countries than others and, if so, why.

Postscript 1
I am intending to add postscripts to keep track of findings of additional research on this topic.

I now reject the hypothesis implicit in the last paragraph above. When I looked (here) at World Values Survey data on people who identify strongly with the proposition ‘it is important to this person to have a good time’ I found that they tend to identify much more strongly than average with helping others, even when they feel little control over their own lives. It seems that people who identify strongly with just about any proposition about the importance of a particular value in their own lives tend to identify strongly with helping others, even when they feel little control over their own lives.

As noted above, strong feelings of individual agency tend not to be associated with selfish behaviour. Further research (reported in the post linked above) suggests that people who have strong feelings of individual agency tend to identify strongly with the proposition ‘it is important to help the people nearby’, even if they don’t identify at all with the proposition ‘it is important to always behave properly’.

Does identification with helping the people nearby have a positive effect on the social fabric? Findings reported in another post suggest that people who identify with helping the people nearby have less tolerant attitudes toward corruption, are also less tolerant of social security and tax fraud, and fare evasion on public transport.

Where to from here? The general question I want to explore further is whether feelings of agency interact with various beliefs and values in ways that might help to explain self-destructive and anti-social behaviours. For example, do people with low feelings of agency generally tend to have more cynical attitudes toward factors leading to wealth and success in life and is this associated with different attitudes toward helping others, corruption and desirable child qualities?

Postscript 2
I have discussed the question of whether attitudes towards success, wealth accumulation and competition are  linked to feelings of individual agency in this post.

Why do some people use the opportunities available to them in ways that are harmful to their own well-being or that of other people? In my view view the best place to look for an answer is in terms of their sense of identity and the satisfaction they obtain from acting in accordance with their sense of identity. Various posts with the 'Identity' label are relevant in this context.

From a public policy perspective it is important to ask how government actions are likely to impact on an individual's sense of identity. For example, are they likely to encourage the individuals to perceive themselves as productive members of society.

From the perspective of individual self-improvement it is relevant for everyone to ask themselves what kind of person they want to be. Steven Stosny has an interesting post on this topic on the Psychology Today blog.