Readers of this blog will know that I am attracted to a developmental view of individual well-being. I have previously argued that if happiness is viewed as a positive emotional state (involving, for example, peace of mind, optimism, uncompression, exuberance, flow, joy and cheerfulness) then well-being cannot be the same thing as happiness. Well-being also involves other factors - including personal security and security of property, health and longevity, access to goods and services – as well as a positive emotional state. (See: What are the links between freedom and flourishing?) The kind of life that is best for all humans is a life of flourishing - one that follows a pattern of psychological and physical growth filled with enjoyment.
What does a developmental view of individual well-being have to say about the relationship between well-being and the satisfaction of preferences? Richard Kraut’s questions whether a more preferred outcome is necessarily a better outcome for an individual, even if it satisfies her properly informed and rational desires. His point is that it is possible to have properly informed and rational desires that are not good for us.
One example Kraut gives is a desire for fame:
“There is no way to criticize the desire for fame except to say that its object is not something that it is good to have. But it should not be at all surprising that human beings sometimes have desires whose objects fall into this category. Nature has not installed in us some wonderful mechanism that guarantees that what propels us forward and focuses our minds on certain courses of action will bring us to something that it is good for us to have. Somehow or other, we have to take steps to learn about what is good for us, and even to care about what is good for us; that is not a topic about which we inevitably come to have tacit knowledge merely by virtue of having desires” (“What is good and why”, p 185).
Daniel Hausman and Michael McPherson note that if well-being is not the same as preference satisfaction then the normative significance that economists attach to preference satisfaction would appear to be without foundation. These authors then offer a new partial defence of welfare economics based on the view that if people are more or less self-interested with respect to certain alternatives, then economists can use their preferences to make inferences concerning what they believe will benefit them. This means that if it is reasonable to suppose that individuals are good judges of what will benefit them, then economists can use people’s preferences as evidence concerning what in fact makes them better off (‘Preference satisfaction and welfare economics’, Economics and Philosophy: 25 (2009).
What happens if we are dealing with policy issues where evidence has accumulated that individuals are often poor judges of what will benefit them? Does this mean that paternalistic government intervention will produce better outcomes? No. The argument that imperfections in individual judgement justify government intervention is just as fallacious as the old argument that departures from perfect competition in markets justify government interventions to increase competition.
In order to consider whether intervention is warranted it is necessary to consider the consequences of alternative institutions, or rules of the game. The judgements that governments make on behalf of individuals may be worse than the judgements that people make on their own behalf. For example, compulsory superannuation in Australia forces some young people to begin to save for their retirement at a time of their life when they would probably be better off saving to buy a house.
In addition, it is important to consider the consequences of government interventions that displace personal responsibility. It is good for adult humans to accept responsibility for decisions affecting their own well-being because this contributes to their personal development and self-respect.
Friday, November 6, 2009
Tuesday, October 27, 2009
Should we expect the rules of a good society to be good for everyone?
In my view, we should expect the rules of a good society to have the assent of nearly everyone but that does not mean that these rules are good for everyone. In particular, the law of liberty – preventing people from interfering with the protected domain of others – cannot be expected to be good for everyone even though it serves the good of all.
A good place for me to begin to explain the point I am trying to make is with Richard Kraut’s suggestion that under certain conditions norms, rules and laws do not serve the good of all (“What is Good and Why”, p31). The example he gives is of a situation in which our confidence that it is wrong to steal could possibly be diminished because “the property system may make it impossible for some to have the material resources they need to maintain their health ...”. Kraut asks: “What objection can be made to taking what is not yours if you need it to sustain the health of your children, and the person from whom you take it has so much that it would do him no good?” The point he is making is that the rule against taking what is not yours “must be evaluated as a component of the social system in which it is embedded”.
I agree that the rule must be evaluated as a component of the social system, but I don’t think we need to be assured that the social system functions in a way that is good for all members before we can endorse laws prohibiting theft. Does Kraut’s example demonstrate that we could expect people to flourish to the same extent in a society with large wealth disparities in which there are no rules against theft as in a similar society where there are rules against theft? I don’t think so. If there were no rules against theft some resources currently devoted to mutually beneficial activities would be allocated to theft and to the protection of property against theft. Those who have a particular aptitude for stealing might benefit, but the costs to other people would clearly outweigh the benefits to thieves.
Some might argue, however, that our disapproval of theft should allow exceptions in circumstances where the thief has great needs and the victim is relatively unaffected. We might approve of such redistributions if we were to choose behind a veil of ignorance about our chances of being in a situation where we might be tempted to steal or of becoming a victim of theft. In the real world, however, how could a potential thief be sure that a potential victim would be relatively unaffected by the theft of any particular item? Even people who wear their wealth lightly can still own items that have great sentimental value.
Such considerations suggest to me that nearly everyone would agree that theft should be prohibited. I think it is likely that support for such a prohibition would be widespread even among population groups whose members have reason to be aggrieved about their treatment under the prevailing social system. In this sense disapproval of theft may be widely considered to be for the good of all, or at least widely considered to be likely to produce better outcomes than would an ambivalent attitude toward theft.
Does it change matters when the redistribution is undertaken by governments rather than by thieves? There are similarities between theft and rent seeking - the competing efforts of various individuals and interest groups to use the coercive powers of the state to have income redistributed to themselves at the expense of other groups in the society (for example through government budget allocations, provision of services, trade protection and other forms of industry assistance). The involvement of governments is an important difference, however, because the decision-making processes of governments may be widely viewed as having greater legitimacy than those of thieves. In addition, the information required to implement modest redistributions that might be given nearly universal assent behind a veil of ignorance – for example, provision of a welfare safety net – is available to governments responsible for implementing such redistributions.
The considerations involved seem to be similar when we come to paternalistic interventions to prevent adults from harming themselves. Norms, rules and laws protect individuals from all kinds of interference by other people, including well-meaning interference to prevent people from harming themselves. It is possible, however, to construct examples where our confidence that it is wrong to interfere is diminished. Richard Kraut gives us the example of a person who has fallen into an acute but curable despondency who proposes to kill himself even though he has many good years ahead of him (p 238). The argument that it is wrong to coerce a person for his own good because this is inconsistent with living in peace with him (see my last post) loses some force if the powers of judgement of the person concerned are obviously impaired.
However, the circumstances in we would condone people coercing others for their own good are extremely limited. We might have somewhat more confidence in intervention by government agencies than by individuals whom we have no reason to trust, but substantial moral hazards are involved whoever is permitted to intervene. Regulation might be more permissible than ad hoc interventions.
Behind a veil of ignorance just about everyone might support regulations that restrict freedom to a minor extent in order to protect vulnerable people whose judgement is obviously impaired. But in the real world it is difficult to frame such regulations to achieve the right balance. For example, in its draft report on gambling the Australian Productivity Commission has recently published draft recommendations that the maximum bet limit on most gaming machines should be set at one dollar and the maximum amount of cash allowed to be inserted into a gaming machine at one time should be $20. While I claim no expertise in this area I think such limits could significantly inconvenience gamblers who want to minimize the time they spend playing mind-numbing machines, without doing much to protect problem gamblers. No matter how low the limits are set, they will not be low enough to prevent some vulnerable people from harming themselves.
This is true of all forms of regulation designed to protect vulnerable people from making bad choices. The rule that is good for all – the rule that nearly everyone would agree to behind a veil of ignorance about their own particular interests and vulnerabilities – will not be good for everyone. We should not expect the rules of a good society to be good for everyone.
A good place for me to begin to explain the point I am trying to make is with Richard Kraut’s suggestion that under certain conditions norms, rules and laws do not serve the good of all (“What is Good and Why”, p31). The example he gives is of a situation in which our confidence that it is wrong to steal could possibly be diminished because “the property system may make it impossible for some to have the material resources they need to maintain their health ...”. Kraut asks: “What objection can be made to taking what is not yours if you need it to sustain the health of your children, and the person from whom you take it has so much that it would do him no good?” The point he is making is that the rule against taking what is not yours “must be evaluated as a component of the social system in which it is embedded”.
I agree that the rule must be evaluated as a component of the social system, but I don’t think we need to be assured that the social system functions in a way that is good for all members before we can endorse laws prohibiting theft. Does Kraut’s example demonstrate that we could expect people to flourish to the same extent in a society with large wealth disparities in which there are no rules against theft as in a similar society where there are rules against theft? I don’t think so. If there were no rules against theft some resources currently devoted to mutually beneficial activities would be allocated to theft and to the protection of property against theft. Those who have a particular aptitude for stealing might benefit, but the costs to other people would clearly outweigh the benefits to thieves.
Some might argue, however, that our disapproval of theft should allow exceptions in circumstances where the thief has great needs and the victim is relatively unaffected. We might approve of such redistributions if we were to choose behind a veil of ignorance about our chances of being in a situation where we might be tempted to steal or of becoming a victim of theft. In the real world, however, how could a potential thief be sure that a potential victim would be relatively unaffected by the theft of any particular item? Even people who wear their wealth lightly can still own items that have great sentimental value.
Such considerations suggest to me that nearly everyone would agree that theft should be prohibited. I think it is likely that support for such a prohibition would be widespread even among population groups whose members have reason to be aggrieved about their treatment under the prevailing social system. In this sense disapproval of theft may be widely considered to be for the good of all, or at least widely considered to be likely to produce better outcomes than would an ambivalent attitude toward theft.
Does it change matters when the redistribution is undertaken by governments rather than by thieves? There are similarities between theft and rent seeking - the competing efforts of various individuals and interest groups to use the coercive powers of the state to have income redistributed to themselves at the expense of other groups in the society (for example through government budget allocations, provision of services, trade protection and other forms of industry assistance). The involvement of governments is an important difference, however, because the decision-making processes of governments may be widely viewed as having greater legitimacy than those of thieves. In addition, the information required to implement modest redistributions that might be given nearly universal assent behind a veil of ignorance – for example, provision of a welfare safety net – is available to governments responsible for implementing such redistributions.
The considerations involved seem to be similar when we come to paternalistic interventions to prevent adults from harming themselves. Norms, rules and laws protect individuals from all kinds of interference by other people, including well-meaning interference to prevent people from harming themselves. It is possible, however, to construct examples where our confidence that it is wrong to interfere is diminished. Richard Kraut gives us the example of a person who has fallen into an acute but curable despondency who proposes to kill himself even though he has many good years ahead of him (p 238). The argument that it is wrong to coerce a person for his own good because this is inconsistent with living in peace with him (see my last post) loses some force if the powers of judgement of the person concerned are obviously impaired.
However, the circumstances in we would condone people coercing others for their own good are extremely limited. We might have somewhat more confidence in intervention by government agencies than by individuals whom we have no reason to trust, but substantial moral hazards are involved whoever is permitted to intervene. Regulation might be more permissible than ad hoc interventions.
Behind a veil of ignorance just about everyone might support regulations that restrict freedom to a minor extent in order to protect vulnerable people whose judgement is obviously impaired. But in the real world it is difficult to frame such regulations to achieve the right balance. For example, in its draft report on gambling the Australian Productivity Commission has recently published draft recommendations that the maximum bet limit on most gaming machines should be set at one dollar and the maximum amount of cash allowed to be inserted into a gaming machine at one time should be $20. While I claim no expertise in this area I think such limits could significantly inconvenience gamblers who want to minimize the time they spend playing mind-numbing machines, without doing much to protect problem gamblers. No matter how low the limits are set, they will not be low enough to prevent some vulnerable people from harming themselves.
This is true of all forms of regulation designed to protect vulnerable people from making bad choices. The rule that is good for all – the rule that nearly everyone would agree to behind a veil of ignorance about their own particular interests and vulnerabilities – will not be good for everyone. We should not expect the rules of a good society to be good for everyone.
Friday, October 23, 2009
Why is it wrong to coerce people for their own good?
In his recent book, “What is good and why”, Richard Kraut argues that pure antipaternalism is in a weak position because it cannot say why it is wrong to coerce someone to prevent him from doing himself harm. I think there is a very good reason why coercion is wrong under such circumstances, but first I want to quote some passages that I agree with.
I particularly like the following passages that seem to me to capture the developmental approach to well-being presented in the book:
“For human beings, no less that other living things, it is always good to flourish; and if a human being is flourishing in all ways, both physical and psychological, he is doing very well indeed” (p. 133).
“Speaking in the broadest possible terms, there is one kind of life that is best for all human beings – a life of flourishing, one that follows a pattern of psychological and physical growth filled with enjoyment. But it is no less true that the concrete realization of such a pattern differs enormously from one person to another” (p. 140).
Having recognized the importance of individual differences, it is hardly surprising that Kraut is quite positive about the value of autonomy to human flourishing: “Since our well-being consists in the exercise of our powers, and among these powers are those involved in reasoned choice, it is bad for us when matters that we can decide about, on our own, and take pleasure in controlling are taken out of our control” (p. 197). In the end, however, his endorsement of autonomy is qualified: “Important as it is, autonomy is only one good among many, and its value must not be exaggerated” (p. 201). Kraut suggests that since people often make poor choices about matters such as marriage partners we can’t be dogmatic that institutions such as arranged marriages are never good for people.
It seems to me that the problem here is that the author’s discussion of autonomy places too much emphasis on exercising the powers to make choices rather than on self-direction and responsibility. We do not harm our chances of flourishing by seeking advice in order to augment our limited capacity for reasoned choice when making important decisions. But a person can hardly be said to be fully flourishing if important personal decisions are taken out of her control, so that she does not bear responsibility for them.
This brings me to antipaternalism. Kraut writes: “There is no merit in the general idea that we should all be allowed to do whatever we choose. So why suppose that there is some merit in the idea that an adult should not be coerced, when the grounds for doing so appeal solely to his well-being? Why is that, in principle, never a good enough reason for coercion? Pure antipaternalism cannot advert to the bad consequences that would occur were this the only basis for bypassing someone’s will. It must say instead that this is simply wrong, but it cannot say why it is wrong” (p. 237).
In my view it is wrong to coerce a person to prevent him from doing himself harm simply because this is inconsistent with living in peace with him. In a good society coercion would be strictly limited to situations where it is necessary to prevent the actions of different individuals from interfering with each other. As I argued in my last post, if we perceive living in peace to be a necessary condition for a good society then we must accept the primacy of liberty.
I particularly like the following passages that seem to me to capture the developmental approach to well-being presented in the book:
“For human beings, no less that other living things, it is always good to flourish; and if a human being is flourishing in all ways, both physical and psychological, he is doing very well indeed” (p. 133).
“Speaking in the broadest possible terms, there is one kind of life that is best for all human beings – a life of flourishing, one that follows a pattern of psychological and physical growth filled with enjoyment. But it is no less true that the concrete realization of such a pattern differs enormously from one person to another” (p. 140).
Having recognized the importance of individual differences, it is hardly surprising that Kraut is quite positive about the value of autonomy to human flourishing: “Since our well-being consists in the exercise of our powers, and among these powers are those involved in reasoned choice, it is bad for us when matters that we can decide about, on our own, and take pleasure in controlling are taken out of our control” (p. 197). In the end, however, his endorsement of autonomy is qualified: “Important as it is, autonomy is only one good among many, and its value must not be exaggerated” (p. 201). Kraut suggests that since people often make poor choices about matters such as marriage partners we can’t be dogmatic that institutions such as arranged marriages are never good for people.
It seems to me that the problem here is that the author’s discussion of autonomy places too much emphasis on exercising the powers to make choices rather than on self-direction and responsibility. We do not harm our chances of flourishing by seeking advice in order to augment our limited capacity for reasoned choice when making important decisions. But a person can hardly be said to be fully flourishing if important personal decisions are taken out of her control, so that she does not bear responsibility for them.
This brings me to antipaternalism. Kraut writes: “There is no merit in the general idea that we should all be allowed to do whatever we choose. So why suppose that there is some merit in the idea that an adult should not be coerced, when the grounds for doing so appeal solely to his well-being? Why is that, in principle, never a good enough reason for coercion? Pure antipaternalism cannot advert to the bad consequences that would occur were this the only basis for bypassing someone’s will. It must say instead that this is simply wrong, but it cannot say why it is wrong” (p. 237).
In my view it is wrong to coerce a person to prevent him from doing himself harm simply because this is inconsistent with living in peace with him. In a good society coercion would be strictly limited to situations where it is necessary to prevent the actions of different individuals from interfering with each other. As I argued in my last post, if we perceive living in peace to be a necessary condition for a good society then we must accept the primacy of liberty.
Wednesday, October 21, 2009
Are the institutions of a "good society" the same as those of the "great society"?
In my last post I suggested that nearly everyone would agree that a good society has the following characteristics:
· institutions that enable its members to live in peace;
· institutions that provide opportunities for members to flourish; and
· institutions that provide members with security against various threats to flourishing e.g. foreign military threats and economic misfortune.
There is substantial overlap between the institutions of a good society and the institutions of the “great society” or “open society”, as discussed by Friedrich Hayek.
Hayek emphasized that “only the observance of common rules makes the peaceful existence of individuals in society possible” (LLL, I: 72). He argued that the aim of the rules of just conduct is to define “the protected sphere” of each person in order to prevent, as much as possible, “the actions of different individuals from interfering with each other” (LLL, I: 108). He observed: “The Great Society arose through the discovery that men can live together in peace and mutually benefiting each other without agreeing on the particular aims which they severally pursue” (LLL, II: 109). Hayek went on to make the point that in the great society we all “contribute not only to the satisfaction of needs of which we do not know, but sometimes even to the achievement of ends of which we would disapprove if we knew about them (LLL, II: 109-10). In the great society we have no way of knowing the purposes for which others will use the goods we supply.
If we perceive living in peace to be a necessary condition for a good society then I think we must accept the primacy of liberty - individual freedom and rules that determine the boundaries of the domains of freedom (the protected spheres of each person) are necessary conditions of a good society.
The implications of the primacy of liberty might be more profound than they appear at first sight. For example, a society in which the majority of people flourish could hardly be viewed as a good society if it has laws that cause individuals to be denied liberty if they pursue lifestyles that are offensive to the majority, even though those individuals have done nothing to infringe the protected spheres of other people. The majority might argue, perhaps with good reason, that the individuals concerned would have a better chance of flourishing if they were put in jail, but this does not justify the use of force to make them change their lifestyles.
Other aspects of the relationships between particular sets of institutions and opportunities for human flourishing and security against threats to flourishing seem to be of a more empirical nature. I would argue, for example, that high levels of economic freedom tend to provide greater opportunities for human flourishing, but that is a testable hypothesis. Some relevant discussion is here. Similarly, I would argue that governments have an important role in providing members of society with security, but the extent to which such a role might be warranted involves empirical questions.
The institutions of a good society may differ from those of the great society in relation to personal income security. Hayek argued that the provision of some kind of welfare safety net was not only “a wholly legitimate protection against a common risk to all, but a necessary part of the Great Society in which the individual no longer has specific claims on the members of the small group into which he was born” (LLL, III: 55). He recognized, however, that national safety nets that would be higher in wealthier countries would necessitate restrictions on migration. In my view such considerations may make it necessary for the institutions of a good society – one that its good for its members - to depart to some degree from the liberal principles of the great society.
· institutions that enable its members to live in peace;
· institutions that provide opportunities for members to flourish; and
· institutions that provide members with security against various threats to flourishing e.g. foreign military threats and economic misfortune.
There is substantial overlap between the institutions of a good society and the institutions of the “great society” or “open society”, as discussed by Friedrich Hayek.
Hayek emphasized that “only the observance of common rules makes the peaceful existence of individuals in society possible” (LLL, I: 72). He argued that the aim of the rules of just conduct is to define “the protected sphere” of each person in order to prevent, as much as possible, “the actions of different individuals from interfering with each other” (LLL, I: 108). He observed: “The Great Society arose through the discovery that men can live together in peace and mutually benefiting each other without agreeing on the particular aims which they severally pursue” (LLL, II: 109). Hayek went on to make the point that in the great society we all “contribute not only to the satisfaction of needs of which we do not know, but sometimes even to the achievement of ends of which we would disapprove if we knew about them (LLL, II: 109-10). In the great society we have no way of knowing the purposes for which others will use the goods we supply.
If we perceive living in peace to be a necessary condition for a good society then I think we must accept the primacy of liberty - individual freedom and rules that determine the boundaries of the domains of freedom (the protected spheres of each person) are necessary conditions of a good society.
The implications of the primacy of liberty might be more profound than they appear at first sight. For example, a society in which the majority of people flourish could hardly be viewed as a good society if it has laws that cause individuals to be denied liberty if they pursue lifestyles that are offensive to the majority, even though those individuals have done nothing to infringe the protected spheres of other people. The majority might argue, perhaps with good reason, that the individuals concerned would have a better chance of flourishing if they were put in jail, but this does not justify the use of force to make them change their lifestyles.
Other aspects of the relationships between particular sets of institutions and opportunities for human flourishing and security against threats to flourishing seem to be of a more empirical nature. I would argue, for example, that high levels of economic freedom tend to provide greater opportunities for human flourishing, but that is a testable hypothesis. Some relevant discussion is here. Similarly, I would argue that governments have an important role in providing members of society with security, but the extent to which such a role might be warranted involves empirical questions.
The institutions of a good society may differ from those of the great society in relation to personal income security. Hayek argued that the provision of some kind of welfare safety net was not only “a wholly legitimate protection against a common risk to all, but a necessary part of the Great Society in which the individual no longer has specific claims on the members of the small group into which he was born” (LLL, III: 55). He recognized, however, that national safety nets that would be higher in wealthier countries would necessitate restrictions on migration. In my view such considerations may make it necessary for the institutions of a good society – one that its good for its members - to depart to some degree from the liberal principles of the great society.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)