In his recent book, “What is good and why”, Richard Kraut argues that pure antipaternalism is in a weak position because it cannot say why it is wrong to coerce someone to prevent him from doing himself harm. I think there is a very good reason why coercion is wrong under such circumstances, but first I want to quote some passages that I agree with.
I particularly like the following passages that seem to me to capture the developmental approach to well-being presented in the book:
“For human beings, no less that other living things, it is always good to flourish; and if a human being is flourishing in all ways, both physical and psychological, he is doing very well indeed” (p. 133).
“Speaking in the broadest possible terms, there is one kind of life that is best for all human beings – a life of flourishing, one that follows a pattern of psychological and physical growth filled with enjoyment. But it is no less true that the concrete realization of such a pattern differs enormously from one person to another” (p. 140).
Having recognized the importance of individual differences, it is hardly surprising that Kraut is quite positive about the value of autonomy to human flourishing: “Since our well-being consists in the exercise of our powers, and among these powers are those involved in reasoned choice, it is bad for us when matters that we can decide about, on our own, and take pleasure in controlling are taken out of our control” (p. 197). In the end, however, his endorsement of autonomy is qualified: “Important as it is, autonomy is only one good among many, and its value must not be exaggerated” (p. 201). Kraut suggests that since people often make poor choices about matters such as marriage partners we can’t be dogmatic that institutions such as arranged marriages are never good for people.
It seems to me that the problem here is that the author’s discussion of autonomy places too much emphasis on exercising the powers to make choices rather than on self-direction and responsibility. We do not harm our chances of flourishing by seeking advice in order to augment our limited capacity for reasoned choice when making important decisions. But a person can hardly be said to be fully flourishing if important personal decisions are taken out of her control, so that she does not bear responsibility for them.
This brings me to antipaternalism. Kraut writes: “There is no merit in the general idea that we should all be allowed to do whatever we choose. So why suppose that there is some merit in the idea that an adult should not be coerced, when the grounds for doing so appeal solely to his well-being? Why is that, in principle, never a good enough reason for coercion? Pure antipaternalism cannot advert to the bad consequences that would occur were this the only basis for bypassing someone’s will. It must say instead that this is simply wrong, but it cannot say why it is wrong” (p. 237).
In my view it is wrong to coerce a person to prevent him from doing himself harm simply because this is inconsistent with living in peace with him. In a good society coercion would be strictly limited to situations where it is necessary to prevent the actions of different individuals from interfering with each other. As I argued in my last post, if we perceive living in peace to be a necessary condition for a good society then we must accept the primacy of liberty.
Friday, October 23, 2009
Wednesday, October 21, 2009
Are the institutions of a "good society" the same as those of the "great society"?
In my last post I suggested that nearly everyone would agree that a good society has the following characteristics:
· institutions that enable its members to live in peace;
· institutions that provide opportunities for members to flourish; and
· institutions that provide members with security against various threats to flourishing e.g. foreign military threats and economic misfortune.
There is substantial overlap between the institutions of a good society and the institutions of the “great society” or “open society”, as discussed by Friedrich Hayek.
Hayek emphasized that “only the observance of common rules makes the peaceful existence of individuals in society possible” (LLL, I: 72). He argued that the aim of the rules of just conduct is to define “the protected sphere” of each person in order to prevent, as much as possible, “the actions of different individuals from interfering with each other” (LLL, I: 108). He observed: “The Great Society arose through the discovery that men can live together in peace and mutually benefiting each other without agreeing on the particular aims which they severally pursue” (LLL, II: 109). Hayek went on to make the point that in the great society we all “contribute not only to the satisfaction of needs of which we do not know, but sometimes even to the achievement of ends of which we would disapprove if we knew about them (LLL, II: 109-10). In the great society we have no way of knowing the purposes for which others will use the goods we supply.
If we perceive living in peace to be a necessary condition for a good society then I think we must accept the primacy of liberty - individual freedom and rules that determine the boundaries of the domains of freedom (the protected spheres of each person) are necessary conditions of a good society.
The implications of the primacy of liberty might be more profound than they appear at first sight. For example, a society in which the majority of people flourish could hardly be viewed as a good society if it has laws that cause individuals to be denied liberty if they pursue lifestyles that are offensive to the majority, even though those individuals have done nothing to infringe the protected spheres of other people. The majority might argue, perhaps with good reason, that the individuals concerned would have a better chance of flourishing if they were put in jail, but this does not justify the use of force to make them change their lifestyles.
Other aspects of the relationships between particular sets of institutions and opportunities for human flourishing and security against threats to flourishing seem to be of a more empirical nature. I would argue, for example, that high levels of economic freedom tend to provide greater opportunities for human flourishing, but that is a testable hypothesis. Some relevant discussion is here. Similarly, I would argue that governments have an important role in providing members of society with security, but the extent to which such a role might be warranted involves empirical questions.
The institutions of a good society may differ from those of the great society in relation to personal income security. Hayek argued that the provision of some kind of welfare safety net was not only “a wholly legitimate protection against a common risk to all, but a necessary part of the Great Society in which the individual no longer has specific claims on the members of the small group into which he was born” (LLL, III: 55). He recognized, however, that national safety nets that would be higher in wealthier countries would necessitate restrictions on migration. In my view such considerations may make it necessary for the institutions of a good society – one that its good for its members - to depart to some degree from the liberal principles of the great society.
· institutions that enable its members to live in peace;
· institutions that provide opportunities for members to flourish; and
· institutions that provide members with security against various threats to flourishing e.g. foreign military threats and economic misfortune.
There is substantial overlap between the institutions of a good society and the institutions of the “great society” or “open society”, as discussed by Friedrich Hayek.
Hayek emphasized that “only the observance of common rules makes the peaceful existence of individuals in society possible” (LLL, I: 72). He argued that the aim of the rules of just conduct is to define “the protected sphere” of each person in order to prevent, as much as possible, “the actions of different individuals from interfering with each other” (LLL, I: 108). He observed: “The Great Society arose through the discovery that men can live together in peace and mutually benefiting each other without agreeing on the particular aims which they severally pursue” (LLL, II: 109). Hayek went on to make the point that in the great society we all “contribute not only to the satisfaction of needs of which we do not know, but sometimes even to the achievement of ends of which we would disapprove if we knew about them (LLL, II: 109-10). In the great society we have no way of knowing the purposes for which others will use the goods we supply.
If we perceive living in peace to be a necessary condition for a good society then I think we must accept the primacy of liberty - individual freedom and rules that determine the boundaries of the domains of freedom (the protected spheres of each person) are necessary conditions of a good society.
The implications of the primacy of liberty might be more profound than they appear at first sight. For example, a society in which the majority of people flourish could hardly be viewed as a good society if it has laws that cause individuals to be denied liberty if they pursue lifestyles that are offensive to the majority, even though those individuals have done nothing to infringe the protected spheres of other people. The majority might argue, perhaps with good reason, that the individuals concerned would have a better chance of flourishing if they were put in jail, but this does not justify the use of force to make them change their lifestyles.
Other aspects of the relationships between particular sets of institutions and opportunities for human flourishing and security against threats to flourishing seem to be of a more empirical nature. I would argue, for example, that high levels of economic freedom tend to provide greater opportunities for human flourishing, but that is a testable hypothesis. Some relevant discussion is here. Similarly, I would argue that governments have an important role in providing members of society with security, but the extent to which such a role might be warranted involves empirical questions.
The institutions of a good society may differ from those of the great society in relation to personal income security. Hayek argued that the provision of some kind of welfare safety net was not only “a wholly legitimate protection against a common risk to all, but a necessary part of the Great Society in which the individual no longer has specific claims on the members of the small group into which he was born” (LLL, III: 55). He recognized, however, that national safety nets that would be higher in wealthier countries would necessitate restrictions on migration. In my view such considerations may make it necessary for the institutions of a good society – one that its good for its members - to depart to some degree from the liberal principles of the great society.
Sunday, October 18, 2009
What are the characteristics of a good society?
In my last post, (Is there such a thing as a good society?) I suggested that a good society would have good institutions – norms and laws that are good for its members.
In thinking about the characteristics of a good society different people tend to emphasise different things that they consider to be important e.g. egalitarianism, personal freedom, moral values and spirituality. Rather than just agreeing to differ I think it might be useful to try to identify some characteristics of a good society that nearly everyone would agree to be important. Then it would be possible to consider what evidence might be available about the nature of the institutions that would foster those characteristics. This might enable us to develop a view about the nature of the institutions of a good society that would be widely accepted.
So, what are the characteristics of a good society? First, as I suggested in my last post, the most important characteristic of a good society is a set of institutions that enable its members to live together in peace. This entails an absence of major threats to persons or property such as those associated with civil war, high levels of corruption and absence of rule of law. The institutions should also prevent use of the coercive powers of the state by despots or influential interest groups to enrich themselves at the expense of others or to restrict the freedom of others to choose how they will live their lives. Institutions that promote the peaceful co-existence of individuals and groups with differing interests and values are obviously a necessary condition for human flourishing.
Second, nearly everyone would agree that a good society would provide its members with opportunities to flourish – to have more of the things that are good for humans to have. This would include opportunities to live long and healthy lives, economic opportunities, opportunities for educational and cultural pursuits, opportunities to make important decisions affecting themselves and their families and opportunities to participate in political processes.
Why focus on opportunities rather than outcomes? Good institutions can make it possible for humans to flourish but humans can’t be made to flourish – for much the same reasons as you can lead a horse to water but can’t make it drink. Human flourishing is an inherently self-directed process. The best we can hope for is a set of institutions that will maximize the probability that any individual chosen at random will be a flourishing individual.
Third, I think there would be widespread agreement that a good society would provide its members with a degree of security against potential threats to individual flourishing. For example it would endeavour to maintain good foreign relations and provide national defence capability sufficient to deter foreign aggression; it would maintain safeguards against government corruption and misuse of the coercive powers of the state (e.g. processes that make it difficult for narrow interest groups to acquire or maintain disproportionate influence in policy-making processes and processes for removal of governments that do not have popular support); it would maintain appropriate machinery to prevent or deal with environmental disasters; it would prevent “the tragedy of the commons” by maintaining appropriate institutions for ownership, pricing and use of natural resources; and it would provide members with a degree of personal economic security against misfortunes such as accidents, ill-health and unemployment.
What evidence do we have about the institutions that tend to foster these characteristics of a good society? An attempt to answer that question will be left to a later post.
Postscript 1:
The best place to look for further discussion by me of the concept of a good society is Chapter 6 of my book Free to Flourish, which is instantly available for a very modest price.
In thinking about the characteristics of a good society different people tend to emphasise different things that they consider to be important e.g. egalitarianism, personal freedom, moral values and spirituality. Rather than just agreeing to differ I think it might be useful to try to identify some characteristics of a good society that nearly everyone would agree to be important. Then it would be possible to consider what evidence might be available about the nature of the institutions that would foster those characteristics. This might enable us to develop a view about the nature of the institutions of a good society that would be widely accepted.
So, what are the characteristics of a good society? First, as I suggested in my last post, the most important characteristic of a good society is a set of institutions that enable its members to live together in peace. This entails an absence of major threats to persons or property such as those associated with civil war, high levels of corruption and absence of rule of law. The institutions should also prevent use of the coercive powers of the state by despots or influential interest groups to enrich themselves at the expense of others or to restrict the freedom of others to choose how they will live their lives. Institutions that promote the peaceful co-existence of individuals and groups with differing interests and values are obviously a necessary condition for human flourishing.
Second, nearly everyone would agree that a good society would provide its members with opportunities to flourish – to have more of the things that are good for humans to have. This would include opportunities to live long and healthy lives, economic opportunities, opportunities for educational and cultural pursuits, opportunities to make important decisions affecting themselves and their families and opportunities to participate in political processes.
Why focus on opportunities rather than outcomes? Good institutions can make it possible for humans to flourish but humans can’t be made to flourish – for much the same reasons as you can lead a horse to water but can’t make it drink. Human flourishing is an inherently self-directed process. The best we can hope for is a set of institutions that will maximize the probability that any individual chosen at random will be a flourishing individual.
Third, I think there would be widespread agreement that a good society would provide its members with a degree of security against potential threats to individual flourishing. For example it would endeavour to maintain good foreign relations and provide national defence capability sufficient to deter foreign aggression; it would maintain safeguards against government corruption and misuse of the coercive powers of the state (e.g. processes that make it difficult for narrow interest groups to acquire or maintain disproportionate influence in policy-making processes and processes for removal of governments that do not have popular support); it would maintain appropriate machinery to prevent or deal with environmental disasters; it would prevent “the tragedy of the commons” by maintaining appropriate institutions for ownership, pricing and use of natural resources; and it would provide members with a degree of personal economic security against misfortunes such as accidents, ill-health and unemployment.
What evidence do we have about the institutions that tend to foster these characteristics of a good society? An attempt to answer that question will be left to a later post.
Postscript 1:
The best place to look for further discussion by me of the concept of a good society is Chapter 6 of my book Free to Flourish, which is instantly available for a very modest price.
Postscript 2:
In March 2024, I decided that my view that peacefulness is a characteristic of a good society does not actually depend on the degree of support for that view in any society. Please see: Why should peacefulness be viewed as a characteristic of a good society?
Sunday, October 11, 2009
Is there such a thing as a good society?
Margaret Thatcher famously said that there is no such thing as society. What she was actually reported as saying was that some people "are casting their problems at society. And, you know, there's no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look after themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and then, also, to look after our neighbours."
I think that Mrs Thatcher probably meant that human societies consist of nothing more than individual humans and the relationships between them. Society is not some kind of magic pudding that has an existence that is separate from the individuals that comprise it.
Human societies are characterized by patterns of relationships among individuals who share distinctive institutions. It seems reasonable to suppose that a good society would have good institutions.
Good for whom? If our focus is on humans, there are two possible answers: those outside the society and those within it. It might make sense to think of a good society as one that acts in ways that benefit people outside it, for example by fostering peaceful relations and trade. But it seems more relevant to focus on the way the culture and institutions affect the lives of those within the society and the quality of their relationships with one another.
What are the characteristics of a society that is good for the people who live within it? Different views have been expressed. For example, John Cruddas and Andrea Nahles write: “The good society is about solidarity and social justice. Solidarity creates trust, which in turn provides the foundation of individual freedom. Freedom grows out of feelings of safety, a sense of belonging, and the experience of esteem and respect.”
The main problem I have with this approach is that social justice tends to be a divisive concept. Even if there is widespread agreement that a lot of people deserve higher incomes and better health care and education etc than they obtain at present, the people who would have to pay higher taxes to make this possible through government intervention often feel, with some justification, that they deserve to keep the incomes they have earned. Policies to achieve social justice tend to increase distributional conflict.
Some authors suggest that the concept of a good society is inherently subjective. For example, in attempting to provide an answer to the question of what is a good society Lyndsay Connors writes: “Our answers to this question will always draw upon our personal values and describe the kind of society in which we could feel a sense of well-being.”
The personal values of Walter Lippmann, the famous journalist who wrote a book entitled “The Good Society” in 1937, are evident in his perception of the good society. Lippmann saw the good society as being synonymous with “the liberal, democratic way of life at its best” (“Essays in the Public Philosophy”, 1955, p.96). He also wrote: “The ideals of the good life and of the good society fall far short of perfection, and in speaking of them we must not use superlatives. They are worldly ideals, which raise no expectations about the highest good. Quite the contrary. They are concerned with the best that is possible among mortal and finite, diverse and conflicting men. Thus the ideals of freedom, justice, representation, consent, law, are of the earth, earthy. They are for men who are still (as Saint Paul says in Timothy I, 9-10) under the law. (op cit, p. 142-3).
However, it seems to me that there are objective characteristics of a good society, that nearly everyone would agree on. The most important characteristic of a good society – one that is good for the people living in it – is that the institutions of the society should enable those people to live in peace. In an earlier post I have discussed Friedrich Hayek’s view of what living in peace entails. In broad terms, it requires the ideals that Walter Lippmann identified.
I think that Mrs Thatcher probably meant that human societies consist of nothing more than individual humans and the relationships between them. Society is not some kind of magic pudding that has an existence that is separate from the individuals that comprise it.
Human societies are characterized by patterns of relationships among individuals who share distinctive institutions. It seems reasonable to suppose that a good society would have good institutions.
Good for whom? If our focus is on humans, there are two possible answers: those outside the society and those within it. It might make sense to think of a good society as one that acts in ways that benefit people outside it, for example by fostering peaceful relations and trade. But it seems more relevant to focus on the way the culture and institutions affect the lives of those within the society and the quality of their relationships with one another.
What are the characteristics of a society that is good for the people who live within it? Different views have been expressed. For example, John Cruddas and Andrea Nahles write: “The good society is about solidarity and social justice. Solidarity creates trust, which in turn provides the foundation of individual freedom. Freedom grows out of feelings of safety, a sense of belonging, and the experience of esteem and respect.”
The main problem I have with this approach is that social justice tends to be a divisive concept. Even if there is widespread agreement that a lot of people deserve higher incomes and better health care and education etc than they obtain at present, the people who would have to pay higher taxes to make this possible through government intervention often feel, with some justification, that they deserve to keep the incomes they have earned. Policies to achieve social justice tend to increase distributional conflict.
Some authors suggest that the concept of a good society is inherently subjective. For example, in attempting to provide an answer to the question of what is a good society Lyndsay Connors writes: “Our answers to this question will always draw upon our personal values and describe the kind of society in which we could feel a sense of well-being.”
The personal values of Walter Lippmann, the famous journalist who wrote a book entitled “The Good Society” in 1937, are evident in his perception of the good society. Lippmann saw the good society as being synonymous with “the liberal, democratic way of life at its best” (“Essays in the Public Philosophy”, 1955, p.96). He also wrote: “The ideals of the good life and of the good society fall far short of perfection, and in speaking of them we must not use superlatives. They are worldly ideals, which raise no expectations about the highest good. Quite the contrary. They are concerned with the best that is possible among mortal and finite, diverse and conflicting men. Thus the ideals of freedom, justice, representation, consent, law, are of the earth, earthy. They are for men who are still (as Saint Paul says in Timothy I, 9-10) under the law. (op cit, p. 142-3).
However, it seems to me that there are objective characteristics of a good society, that nearly everyone would agree on. The most important characteristic of a good society – one that is good for the people living in it – is that the institutions of the society should enable those people to live in peace. In an earlier post I have discussed Friedrich Hayek’s view of what living in peace entails. In broad terms, it requires the ideals that Walter Lippmann identified.
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