This post provides some further thoughts on the question of why people who label themselves as being on the right of the political spectrum tend to be happier than those who label themselves as on the left.
In my last post on this subject (here) I discussed some research by Jaime Napier and John Jost which suggests that some of the association between political orientation and subjective well-being is accounted for by beliefs about inequality. The authors conclude that liberals tend to be less happy than conservatives because “they lack ideological rationalizations that would help them frame inequality in a positive (or at least neutral) light”.
Andrew Norton commented on his blog: “I think there is a better theory, one that is more consistent with the subjective well-being literature, which explains this result: that both lower average happiness and leftism have a common link to a weaker sense of personal control and optimism. Both these attributes are strongly correlated with happiness; and one of the tasks of the ‘positive psychology’ movement (the clinical side of subjective well-being research) is to try to enhance these senses” (here).
I responded:
“My first thought was that a weak sense of personal control is likely to be more of a problem for low-income earners and the non-religious. Beliefs about inequality seem to be shown up as significant even in studies that control for both income levels and church attendance.
However, I am attracted to James Buchanan’s argument that the strongest motivation for big government these days is that people are afraid to be free (references here). It seems to me that may be just another way of saying that a lot of people lack a sense of personal control.It is possible that beliefs about inequality and a sense of lack of personal control could both be relevant in explaining why those who self-identify as left are less happy. Arthur Brooks seems to combine both factors (see ‘Gross National Happiness’, pp 30-33). It would be interesting to see research which seeks to identify their relative importance.”
Having thought about this further I now doubt whether it would be possible to disentangle the effects of the relative importance of beliefs about inequality and feelings of lack of personal control to assess their relative importance as determinants of happiness. It might be more appropriate to view these factors as components of a syndrome – a combination of opinions, behaviour etc. .
I have come to this view after re-reading a section of “Gross National Happiness” in which Arthur Brooks discusses links between beliefs about upward mobility, feelings about inequality and happiness (pp 140-151). There is strong evidence that people on the left do tend to be pessimistic about upward mobility. In the case of people on below average incomes it makes sense that such beliefs would tend to result in feelings of lack of personal control (e.g. that nothing that they do makes any difference) and relatively low satisfaction with life, combined with leftish political views.
It is more difficult to see why pessimism about mobility should affect the happiness of people on above-average incomes. They might see lack of mobility as a social problem but they are not personally affected. Arthur Brooks suggests that these people tend to make themselves unhappy by repeating depressing messages about the perceived unfairness of income inequality. I suppose that is possible, but I have some difficulty in accepting that concerns about income inequality would, by themselves, have significant adverse effects on the happiness of people who have above-average incomes.
One possible explanation is that pessimism about income mobility might be just representative of a collection of beliefs (including for example beliefs about the environment) that would tend to reduce the happiness of people with above average incomes who have leftish views. When asked how happy they are these people might be inclined to think about the problems of the world and their perceived inability to do anything about those problems.
Wednesday, July 23, 2008
Monday, July 21, 2008
Why are conservatives happier than liberals?
I have written on this subject before in comments on the book “Gross National Happiness” by Arthur Brooks (here) and in relation to some quick-and-dirty research I have undertaken myself.
To recap briefly, survey data show that Americans who label themselves as conservatives are nearly twice as likely to say they are very happy as are those who label themselves as liberals. This gap has persisted for 35 years and apparently cannot be explained in terms of income differences. Religion and marriage account for some but not all of this happiness gap. My research suggests that the finding that conservatives are happier than liberals also applies to other countries: a higher proportion of the population are satisfied with life in countries where people tend to position themselves toward the right of the political scale (here). It also suggests that differences between the happiness of high and low income people is influenced by differences in their political beliefs and in their beliefs about the importance of money and material things (here).
An article by Jaime Napier and John Jost (kindly brought to my attention by Andrew Norton) seems to me to shed light on the reasons why political beliefs influence happiness (‘Why are conservatives happier than liberals?’, Psychological Science, 19 (6), 2008). The study suggests that some of the association between political orientation and subjective well-being is accounted for by beliefs about inequality. The authors examined the effect of introducing ideological variables - relating to beliefs about inequality and meritocracy- in regression analyses explaining life satisfaction in the U.S. and nine other countries. They found that when the ideological variable was introduced into the analysis it took some of the explanatory power away from the political variable. The authors also report on a study which suggests that the gap in happiness between conservatives and liberals in the U.S. tends to become wider when the degree of income inequality rises.
The authors conclude that “inequality takes a greater psychological toll on liberals than on conservatives, apparently because liberals lack ideological rationalizations that would help them frame inequality in a positive (or at least neutral) light”. What they presumably mean is that people who label themselves as conservatives are less likely to worry about income inequality and this partly explains why they are happier than those who label themselves as liberals.
What are the implications of the finding that beliefs about income inequality influence happiness levels? It seems to me that when concerns about inequality are apparently having an adverse effect on happiness of large numbers of people we need more research to know more precisely what these people are concerned about and whether their concerns have a factual basis.
To recap briefly, survey data show that Americans who label themselves as conservatives are nearly twice as likely to say they are very happy as are those who label themselves as liberals. This gap has persisted for 35 years and apparently cannot be explained in terms of income differences. Religion and marriage account for some but not all of this happiness gap. My research suggests that the finding that conservatives are happier than liberals also applies to other countries: a higher proportion of the population are satisfied with life in countries where people tend to position themselves toward the right of the political scale (here). It also suggests that differences between the happiness of high and low income people is influenced by differences in their political beliefs and in their beliefs about the importance of money and material things (here).
An article by Jaime Napier and John Jost (kindly brought to my attention by Andrew Norton) seems to me to shed light on the reasons why political beliefs influence happiness (‘Why are conservatives happier than liberals?’, Psychological Science, 19 (6), 2008). The study suggests that some of the association between political orientation and subjective well-being is accounted for by beliefs about inequality. The authors examined the effect of introducing ideological variables - relating to beliefs about inequality and meritocracy- in regression analyses explaining life satisfaction in the U.S. and nine other countries. They found that when the ideological variable was introduced into the analysis it took some of the explanatory power away from the political variable. The authors also report on a study which suggests that the gap in happiness between conservatives and liberals in the U.S. tends to become wider when the degree of income inequality rises.
The authors conclude that “inequality takes a greater psychological toll on liberals than on conservatives, apparently because liberals lack ideological rationalizations that would help them frame inequality in a positive (or at least neutral) light”. What they presumably mean is that people who label themselves as conservatives are less likely to worry about income inequality and this partly explains why they are happier than those who label themselves as liberals.
What are the implications of the finding that beliefs about income inequality influence happiness levels? It seems to me that when concerns about inequality are apparently having an adverse effect on happiness of large numbers of people we need more research to know more precisely what these people are concerned about and whether their concerns have a factual basis.
Thursday, July 17, 2008
Do you want the government to give you a nudge?
This post continues my comments on “Nudge”, by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein. For earlier comments, see here.
In his comments on “Nudge”, Julian Sanchez, refers (here) to James Buchanan’s concept of ‘parentalism’. Whereas paternalism refers to the attitudes of elitists that sometimes people - other people - need to be restrained for their own protection from making poor choices, parentalism refers to the attitudes “of persons who seek to have values imposed on them by other persons, by the state or by transcendental forces” (James Buchanan, ‘Afraid to be free ...’, “Public Choice”, 2005, p 23).
Buchanan suggests that “many persons do not want to shoulder the final responsibility for their own actions. Many persons are, indeed, afraid to be free”. He argues that parentalism will be a more important “motivation for maintenance and extension of control over the activities of persons through collective institutions” during the first half of this century than other, more familiar, sources of socialism – managerial socialism, paternalistic socialism and distributionalist socialism.
If Buchanan is correct the classical liberal vision is likely to remain no more than a vision in the foreseeable future. In that context it becomes relevant to consider whether libertarian varieties of paternalism (or parentalism) are preferable to more coercive varieties. It seems to me that provisions enabling people to opt out of the nanny state are particularly important for people who do not want to have nanny’s values imposed upon them. Those who are at present content to accept the default options provided by the government’s choice architects may also benefit from being able to observe how other people fare when they opt to choose for themselves.
The question remains, however, of how libertarians could persuade other people to think twice before voting in favour of the use of choice architecture by governments to help them make better decisions in areas currently relatively free of government regulation. In this context it seems to me that Will Wilkinson makes a good point when he suggests that although Sunstein and Thaler may wish to design the presentation of choices to bias decisions in favor of, say, happiness, “other choice architects may be more interested in biasing our choices toward virtue or toward participation in great collective projects”. Wilkinson suggests that “political choice architecture may do a great deal to shape us, even if, in its libertarian paternalist incarnation, it makes a show of leaving the ultimate choice open to individuals” (here).
It seems to me that it is just as important for people to be vigilant in dealing with choice architects in government - who are attempting to serve many masters with differing objectives - as it is to be vigilant in dealing with choice architects in the private sector who have a clear responsibility to serve the interests of the shareholders of the firms they work for.
In his comments on “Nudge”, Julian Sanchez, refers (here) to James Buchanan’s concept of ‘parentalism’. Whereas paternalism refers to the attitudes of elitists that sometimes people - other people - need to be restrained for their own protection from making poor choices, parentalism refers to the attitudes “of persons who seek to have values imposed on them by other persons, by the state or by transcendental forces” (James Buchanan, ‘Afraid to be free ...’, “Public Choice”, 2005, p 23).
Buchanan suggests that “many persons do not want to shoulder the final responsibility for their own actions. Many persons are, indeed, afraid to be free”. He argues that parentalism will be a more important “motivation for maintenance and extension of control over the activities of persons through collective institutions” during the first half of this century than other, more familiar, sources of socialism – managerial socialism, paternalistic socialism and distributionalist socialism.
If Buchanan is correct the classical liberal vision is likely to remain no more than a vision in the foreseeable future. In that context it becomes relevant to consider whether libertarian varieties of paternalism (or parentalism) are preferable to more coercive varieties. It seems to me that provisions enabling people to opt out of the nanny state are particularly important for people who do not want to have nanny’s values imposed upon them. Those who are at present content to accept the default options provided by the government’s choice architects may also benefit from being able to observe how other people fare when they opt to choose for themselves.
The question remains, however, of how libertarians could persuade other people to think twice before voting in favour of the use of choice architecture by governments to help them make better decisions in areas currently relatively free of government regulation. In this context it seems to me that Will Wilkinson makes a good point when he suggests that although Sunstein and Thaler may wish to design the presentation of choices to bias decisions in favor of, say, happiness, “other choice architects may be more interested in biasing our choices toward virtue or toward participation in great collective projects”. Wilkinson suggests that “political choice architecture may do a great deal to shape us, even if, in its libertarian paternalist incarnation, it makes a show of leaving the ultimate choice open to individuals” (here).
It seems to me that it is just as important for people to be vigilant in dealing with choice architects in government - who are attempting to serve many masters with differing objectives - as it is to be vigilant in dealing with choice architects in the private sector who have a clear responsibility to serve the interests of the shareholders of the firms they work for.
Should the government nudge people to improve their decisions?
What is a nudge? In their book, “Nudge”, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein define a nudge as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing economic incentives” (p 6).
Thaler and Sunstein claim that nudges are consistent with libertarianism because they don’t involve coercion but they readily acknowledge that nudges are paternalistic. They advocate "libertarian paternalism".
An example might help to clarify what a nudge involves. If the government were to invest a certain proportion of your income in a superannuation fund on your behalf this would amount to a nudge (rather than a push or a shove) if you were allowed to withdraw the funds at any time to use as you wished. There is evidence that as a result of a tendency for people to avoid choices (or to choose the default options) such an arrangement would result in much more investment in superannuation than one that relied solely on tax incentives. It would do this without the interference in personal choice that is involved in compulsory superannuation, such as exists in Australia.
After reading “Nudge” I decided to read some reviews by other people to help clarify my own views. The basic idea that people’s behaviour can be influenced by so called “choice architects” seems to be widely accepted by reviewers. This does not surprise me because there is no real conflict between the conventional view of economists (as argued, for example by Tim Harford in “The Logic of Life”) that people respond to incentives and the view of psychologists and behavioral economists (for example, Dan Ariely) that people are “predictably irrational”. For elaboration, see here.
Some reviewers taking what seems to me to be a predictably irrational approach, attack Thaler and Sunstein for rejecting coercion. For example, in the New York Review of Books. John Cassidy argues: “Once you concentrate on the reality that people often make poor choices, and that their actions can harm others as well as themselves, the obvious thing to do is restrict their set of choices and prohibit destructive behavior” (see here). The fallacy in this argument was aptly described by Harold Demsetz as “the grass is always greener” fallacy (‘Information and efficiency: another viewpoint’, Journal of Law and Economics, 1969) . Cassidy seems to be claiming that if outcomes are imperfect when choices are not restricted they must necessarily be better when choices are restricted. Social experiments with prohibition of alcohol early last century and Keynesianism from World War II until the stagflation of the1970s should have taught everyone that government interventions do not always result in better outcomes.
Some other reviewers attack Thaler and Sunstein for being paternalistic. For example David Gordon of the Mises Institute argues: “Those who wish to preserve liberty must take people's actions as they find them, not substitute for them "better" or more "rational" actions, based on an assessment of what people "really" want.” He suggests that: “Those who find convincing the explanations of bad choices put forward by Thaler and Sunstein are free to make arrangements with others that will alleviate these problems. If you think that sudden impulses when confronted with tempting food will lead you to fall off your diet, you may contract with a friend to forfeit money should you fail to meet certain weight requirements. But, in a free society, doing so is up to you; the state may not nudge you into this sort of contract” (see here).
Although I have a great deal of sympathy for Gordon’s line of argument, I don’t think it settles the question. Even though I vote to preserve my liberty - and am prepared to accept the consequences - that doesn’t stop the majority of people from voting in favour of government action to nudge their decisions (and mine) in particular directions. I will consider the implications of this in my next post.
Thaler and Sunstein claim that nudges are consistent with libertarianism because they don’t involve coercion but they readily acknowledge that nudges are paternalistic. They advocate "libertarian paternalism".
An example might help to clarify what a nudge involves. If the government were to invest a certain proportion of your income in a superannuation fund on your behalf this would amount to a nudge (rather than a push or a shove) if you were allowed to withdraw the funds at any time to use as you wished. There is evidence that as a result of a tendency for people to avoid choices (or to choose the default options) such an arrangement would result in much more investment in superannuation than one that relied solely on tax incentives. It would do this without the interference in personal choice that is involved in compulsory superannuation, such as exists in Australia.
After reading “Nudge” I decided to read some reviews by other people to help clarify my own views. The basic idea that people’s behaviour can be influenced by so called “choice architects” seems to be widely accepted by reviewers. This does not surprise me because there is no real conflict between the conventional view of economists (as argued, for example by Tim Harford in “The Logic of Life”) that people respond to incentives and the view of psychologists and behavioral economists (for example, Dan Ariely) that people are “predictably irrational”. For elaboration, see here.
Some reviewers taking what seems to me to be a predictably irrational approach, attack Thaler and Sunstein for rejecting coercion. For example, in the New York Review of Books. John Cassidy argues: “Once you concentrate on the reality that people often make poor choices, and that their actions can harm others as well as themselves, the obvious thing to do is restrict their set of choices and prohibit destructive behavior” (see here). The fallacy in this argument was aptly described by Harold Demsetz as “the grass is always greener” fallacy (‘Information and efficiency: another viewpoint’, Journal of Law and Economics, 1969) . Cassidy seems to be claiming that if outcomes are imperfect when choices are not restricted they must necessarily be better when choices are restricted. Social experiments with prohibition of alcohol early last century and Keynesianism from World War II until the stagflation of the1970s should have taught everyone that government interventions do not always result in better outcomes.
Some other reviewers attack Thaler and Sunstein for being paternalistic. For example David Gordon of the Mises Institute argues: “Those who wish to preserve liberty must take people's actions as they find them, not substitute for them "better" or more "rational" actions, based on an assessment of what people "really" want.” He suggests that: “Those who find convincing the explanations of bad choices put forward by Thaler and Sunstein are free to make arrangements with others that will alleviate these problems. If you think that sudden impulses when confronted with tempting food will lead you to fall off your diet, you may contract with a friend to forfeit money should you fail to meet certain weight requirements. But, in a free society, doing so is up to you; the state may not nudge you into this sort of contract” (see here).
Although I have a great deal of sympathy for Gordon’s line of argument, I don’t think it settles the question. Even though I vote to preserve my liberty - and am prepared to accept the consequences - that doesn’t stop the majority of people from voting in favour of government action to nudge their decisions (and mine) in particular directions. I will consider the implications of this in my next post.
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