Why should we be interested in the links between freedom and flourishing?

Policy choices in democracies are to a large extent choices between individual freedom and state paternalism that is intended to enhance the well-being of citizens. Alexis de Tocqueville referred to this apparently “provident and mild” encroachment on liberty (in “Democracy in America” published in 1835) as the “despotism that democratic nations have to fear”. He suggested that that it would be “like the authority of a parent if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for manhood; but it seeks, on the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood” (Volume II, Section 4, the Henry Reeve Translation).

Such policy choices would be unnecessary if everyone wanted to be free from the coercive power of others and viewed others as moral equals. Under those circumstances everyone would share the classical liberal vision. As James Buchanan, founder of ‘public choice’ economics and a recipient of the Nobel Prize in economics, has pointed out, the vision of classical liberalism – “we can all be free” rests ultimately on the proposition that a structure of social interaction is possible in which no person exerts coercive power at the expense of others (“Why I, too, am not a conservative”, Edward Elgar, 2005, p 58).

This vision depends on perceived links between freedom and human flourishing only insofar as individuals want freedom so that they, and their loved ones, might flourish. In order for this vision to prevail, however, it needs to command widespread support. As Buchanan has acknowledged, to achieve the classical liberal vision “a sufficient number of persons must be willing to be left alone, to trust in their own abilities to determine their own destinies”. Buchanan has identified a critical factor as the existence of institutions that enable “a sufficient number of persons” to choose to “become or remain free of dependency status” (p14).

It seems to me that the political choices that people make between freedom and state paternalism depend to a large extent on their beliefs about the links between freedom and human flourishing. Those who want greater freedom to pursue their own destinies are not likely to achieve this unless they can persuade a lot of other people that they would have potential to flourish to a greater extent if government played a smaller role in their lives.

What does flourishing mean?

People who are flourishing are happy, but not all happy people are flourishing. It is possible for a person to be happy if kept in perpetual childhood, but he/she wouldn’t be flourishing.

In their book, Norms of Liberty, social philosophers, Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl, define human flourishing as consisting of:
“activities that both express and produce in a human being an actualization of potentialities that are specific to its natural kind – that is specific to the kind of thing a human being is. These activities constitute the achievement of a human being’s natural end or telos” (p 128-9).

Abraham Maslow viewed self actualization as a basic human need and an aspect of healthy human functioning. Nevertheless, the notion that it is good for us to actualize our potentialities as humans is a value judgement rather than a statement of fact.

Is flourishing a mental state? In his Nobel lecture, Amartya Sen argued against concentrating on mental state comparisons when considering personal well-being. He suggested that because people tend to adapt to their circumstances, some may feel satisfied with life even when destitute. Sen argues that it is important to consider whether people have “the capability to live well”.

Does this mean that flourishing is just about having desirable personal attributes (being healthy and intelligent) and abundant material goods, and being admired or respected by others? Julia Annas, a philosopher, writes about an experiment in which an associate asked business students what they thought a happy life consisted of. She reports: “All mentioned material things like a large salary, a nice home, an SUV, and so on. Well, he said, suppose that you find in the mail tomorrow that an unknown benefactor has left you lots of money, so that these material things are now yours for the having. Would this make you happy? Overwhelmingly they said no” (‘Happiness as achievement’, Daedalus 133 (2), Spring 2004).

The point that Annas is making is that when people are led into a discussion about what constitutes a happy life they are inclined to think of it as one in which they have “made something of their lives”, so that the material things are “an appropriate reward for their effort, ambition and achievement”.

The importance of earning rewards also shows up in brain research. In his book, “Satisfaction”, Gregory Burns notes that actively working to achieve a monetary reward results in more striatal activity than getting money passively (p 44).

The ideas of flourishing discussed above seem to be broadly consistent with the well-known view of the psychologist, Abraham Maslow, that humans have a hierarchy of needs. When basic physiological and safety needs are satisfied, higher needs such as love and esteem tend to monopolize consciousness and become active motivators of behaviour. Maslow argued that as people satisfy those needs they become motivated increasingly by the need to develop and actualize their fullest potentialities and capacities.

Postscript: I now doubt whether it is possible for people to be happy if kept in perpetual childhood. See subsequent posts that discuss Dan Haybron's views on the nature of happiness. (The search facility on this blog is a very good way to find things.)

Would more involvement in political decision-making make people happier?

Like many economists, I admit to being fond of the concept of rational ignorance. This explains why most people are not very good at giving accurate answers to factual questions about politics. It is not rational for voters to spend much time informing themselves about politics because their individual vote is most unlikely to have much influence on the outcome of an election. For example, even if there is only a 10 vote difference between the main contenders in an election it would make no difference to the outcome if one voter changed his/her vote.

Another concept that is close to the heart of many economists, including myself, is revealed preference. This refers to the view that people tend to get more satisfaction from the things they choose to do than from the things they choose not to do. For example, if a person chooses to go for a walk rather than to go for a swim it seems reasonable to presume that this person obtains greater satisfaction from walking than from swimming at that time.

So, how can we interpret the fact that many people vote in elections under systems where voting is not compulsory? The logic that lies behind the concept of rational ignorance suggests that individuals have no incentive to vote because it is highly unlikely that their individual vote will decide the outcome. The logic behind the concept of revealed preference suggests, however, that if people spend time voting they must get some satisfaction from this activity.

Research by Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer (“Happiness and Economics”, Princeton Univ. Press, 2002) suggests that increased possibilities of direct participation in public decision-making via popular referenda and decentralization of power do increase reported levels of well-being of survey participants. The research suggests that people gain satisfaction from participation in political processes, irrespective of the outcome.

The research was undertaken using Swiss data, taking advantage of the differential reliance on referenda and differing degrees of local autonomy in the 26 cantons in Switzerland, as well as of different voting rights of nationals and foreigners who are subject to equal treatment in other respects. In terms of techniques used, this is one of the nicest pieces of research that I have seen using happiness data.

How should we respond to the results of this research?

Some politicians might be tempted to suggest that it is not worth trying to satisfy the desire of citizens for greater political involvement because this desire is insatiable. However, there is evidence that this is not so in the percentages of survey respondents in different countries who view having more say in government decisions as a more important aim for their country than maintaining order, fighting inflation or protecting freedom of speech. The percentages in Australia, New Zealand and the United States were 40%, 38% and 32% respectively in 2000 (using data from R Inglehart et al, “Human Beliefs and Values”, 2004). By contrast, the corresponding figure for Switzerland, where citizens have much greater opportunities for direct participation in political decision-making, was only 16%. Moreover, the percentage who rated the political system as bad was much lower in Switzerland than in Australia and New Zealand.

Other politicians might suggest that because of rational ignorance voters may be too easily swayed toward choices that are not in their own best interests. I admit to some sympathy with this view. However, greater involvement of citizens in public decision-making may encourage them to become better informed about public policy issues. If greater citizen involvement in political decision-making resulted in a bias toward bad choices we would not expect average income levels in Switzerland to have remained among the highest in the world.

Perhaps politicians should find a way to become comfortable with the idea of greater citizen participation in political decision-making.

Does imagination help us to choose between alternative futures?

My "inner economist" did not even feel bruised after I finished reading Daniel Gilbert's book, "Stumbling on Happiness".
By the end of the book the author seems to acknowledge that individuals can use their imagination to choose better futures for themselves. He even offers advice on how people can make better choices. Read more .