Will machine intelligence threaten life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness?

This post has nothing to do with the influence of political party machines on current election campaigns.

As some readers will already know, Nick Bostrom’s book, Superintelligence, discusses the challenge presented by the potential for machine brains to surpass human brains in general intelligence. Bostrom does not claim that is imminent, but he suggests it is somewhat likely to happen sometime this century. After AI has surpassed human intelligence, the author fears that an initial superintelligence might soon afterwards obtain a decisive strategic advantage and pose a threat to human life. There have been several good reviews of Superintelligence, including one by Ronald Bailey in Reason.

How could a machine programmed by humans come to threaten human life? Some examples mentioned by Bostrom imply that it would be quite easy for that to occur by accident. For example, a machine that was given the simple objective of maximizing the production of paperclips could seek to acquire an unlimited amount of physical resources and to eliminate potential threats, including humans who are likely to try to prevent it from achieving its goal.

People like Bill Gates and Elon Musk, who could not be viewed as technophobes, argue that the threats posed by superintelligence should be taken seriously. That didn’t stop me asking myself why anyone in their right mind would program a machine to maximize the number of paperclips. Any sensible businessman would ensure that the machine was programmed with a profit-making objective, rather than a production objective. I have to acknowledge, however, that would still leave the problem of ensuring that the superintelligence doesn’t use unethical means to eliminate competitors. 

There is also the problem that some of the people developing AI might be crazy, or antipathetic towards humans. For example, it does not seem beyond the bounds of possibility that a group of extreme Greenies might seek to develop a superintelligence that would pursue the selfless goal of restoring the natural environment to its condition prior to the Anthropocene.

Most of Superintelligence is devoted to a discussion of the difficulty of designing superintelligence so that it would not be a threat to humans. While reading the book I felt that at times I was reading about the problems of designing a god – an enormously powerful entity that would govern our lives. For example, if the AI is given the seemingly innocuous goal of making us all happy it might arrange for us to have electrodes implanted in the pleasure centres of our brains, or perhaps even upload our minds to computers and then administer the digital equivalent of a drug to make us ecstatically happy all the time.

At other times I felt the problems being discussed were more like those which might be involved in establishing the characteristics of a good society. Bostrom seems to favour AI being given a goal such as maximizing our coherent extrapolated volition (CEV). As I understand it the CEV concept implies that if we knew more and thought faster our individual views about the nature of a good society would converge, so that a consensus could be discovered. The author explains that the CEV approach does not require that all ways of life, moral codes, or personal values be blended together into a stew. The CEV dynamic “is only supposed to act when our wishes cohere”.

The CEV concept has some appeal to me because it seems consistent with my own efforts to describe the characteristics of a good society in the most popular post on this blog. However, it does not require superintelligence to identify those characteristics. It would not be difficult to establish through existing survey methods that the vast majority of humans want to live in peace, to have opportunities to live for a happy lives and to have some degree of security to protect against misfortunes. The problem is in ensuring that a superintelligence would interpret such objectives in a manner consistent with individual human flourishing.

The main reservation I have about Superintelligence is that it does not contain much discussion about defence against malevolent AI. As I see it, it is probably worthwhile to undertake collaborative efforts to avoid the accidental development of machine intelligence in ways that might not be benign. But such efforts are not likely to prevent the AI being used unethically by people with nefarious objectives. Our defences against cyber-attack will need to be strengthened to protect against malevolent AI.

We need a Superintelligence dedicated to defending our individual rights. But we should be careful what we wish for! Once upon a time, a few centuries ago, some enlightened people set about establishing forms of government dedicated to protecting life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. We ended up with warfare/welfare states.

What is the "bourgeois deal" and why should you care?

The ‘bourgeois deal’ is a term used frequently by Deirdre McCloskey in Bourgeois Equality, the third book of her trilogy which aims to show that it is ethical and rhetorical change that has enabled most humans today to be much better off than their forebears. The bourgeois deal refers to societal acceptance of innovations that compete with and displace old ways of doing things in exchange for widespread improvements in living standards.

Big deal? This has been a huge deal. Deirdre argues persuasively that trade-tested betterment associated with the bourgeois deal was responsible for the massive improvement in living standards enjoyed by vast numbers of people that began over 200 years ago and has now spread to most parts of the world (as shown in the accompanying chart prepared by Max Rosser using Angus Maddison’s data).

There are two aspects to the rhetorical-ethical revaluation discussed in Bourgeois Equality:

• A change in prevailing attitudes gave greater respect to people engaged in commercial activities.
• The development of rhetorically open societies – involving freedom of conscience and greater freedom of speech – propelled the French and Scottish Enlightenments, science, experimentation and invention, journalism, the spread of technical knowledge, and the economic and political dignity of ordinary people.

In emphasizing the importance of trade-tested betterment to economic growth, Deirdre McCloskey’s views are consistent with the mainstream view of economists, who, for the last half century at least, have acknowledged the important role of technological progress (and technological catch-up) in the economic growth process. Anyone who persists in espousing alternative explanations such as imperialism, or capital accumulation by itself, might benefit from reading Deirdre’s demolition of such theories.

The author seeks to differentiate her views from those of neo-institutionalists, such as Douglass North, who have sought to explain economic growth as stemming from institutional change i.e. changes in economic incentives associated with changes in the rules of the game in society (social norms as well as constitutions, laws and regulations). She succeeds in dismissing some factors, including property rights, previously emphasized by the neo-institutionalists. Property rights were reasonably secure in England for centuries prior to the industrial revolution. 

Nevertheless, institutional change was necessary to enable intellectual innovation to be protected from the violent responses that had previously been meted out to heretics and innovators who were perceived to constitute a threat to long-established patterns of production, distribution and exchange.

Some components of relevant rhetorical and ethical changes do not fit under the heading institutional change. For example, changes in perceptions of personal identity that enabled some individuals to take on entrepreneurial roles seem to have been closely related to rhetorical change, but probably had little to do with changes in rules or incentives. Similarly, changes in the rules can have an independent economic impact that does not fit easily under the heading of rhetorical and ethical change. For example, political leaders sometimes get ahead of public opinion e.g. in promoting free trade or privatisation of government owned enterprises.

Perhaps we should be lumping rhetorical, ethical and institutional change together. The author cites an example which seems to involve all three elements. The reduced willingness of courts in England to support the restrictiveness of the craft guilds, from the early 17^th century onwards, has been described by Eric Jones as attributable to “the national shift in elite opinion, which the courts partly shared”. In many instances, however, relevant rhetoric has been directed specifically toward changing the rules of the game. Adam Smith’s influential discussion of the appropriate role of government in Wealth of Nations comes to mind.

Hopefully, some of you - those who are still reading - will be wondering why the bourgeois deal is relevant to you. (I wonder whether any of those who stopped reading before this point will read the 650 pages of text in Bourgeois Equality. It seems to be a big ask to get anyone to read even 600 words these days.)

We should all care about the bourgeois deal because we are confronted with choices among a menu of different deals. Deirdre points out that, after 1848, the Bourgeois deal was challenged by the utopian Bolshevik deal and the Bismarckian (or Beveridge) deal.

The Bolshevik deal promised that all the problems associated with nasty concentrations of power in property owned by the bourgeoisie would be resolved by government ownership of the means of production and that the nature of man would change with the arrival of socialism. That deal was taken off the menu in 1989 (everywhere except North Korea) after it became too obvious that it was an extraordinarily bad deal for everyone except Communist party officials.

The Bismarckian deal stemmed from Bismarck’s scheme to steal the thunder from his socialist enemies by introducing a welfare state. Deirdre describes it thus:

“The deal is that the welfare state will substitute for your own and your family’s voluntary provision for old age or unemployment or medical care, and you will come to view the present state as your noble and benevolent lord” (p 604).

The Bismarckian deal lives on, coexisting uneasily with the Bourgeois deal because the high taxes required to support it act as a disincentive to trade-tested betterment. That is my judgement; I imagine Deirdre would agree, but I can’t see where at the moment. Like all good libertarians (the bleeding heart variety) she supports the provision of a welfare safety net directed specifically toward assisting those in need.

In my view we are now confronted with a third deal, which could be described as the doomsday deal, or if you want to personalise it, the Paul Ehrlich deal (after the biologist Paul Ehrlich who, like many other sect leaders who prophesy imminent doom, seems to have managed to maintain the loyalty of many of his followers even though the doom he predicted did not happen). Deidre describes such prophesies as the “eighth pessimism of our times”, rather than a deal. I see the doomsday deal as offering us the hope of being saved from an imaginary environmental doom if only we are prepared to forgo further economic betterment. Those who accept the doomsday deal deny that the bourgeois deal can be compatible with sensible measures to avert environmental disasters.

We should care about the bourgeois deal because it is constantly under threat. As Deidre McCloskey puts it in the table of contents for her book:

“Rhetoric made us, but can readily unmake us”.


Postscript:

Deirdre McCloskey has provided the following comment:

What an intelligent and penetrating discussion!  You clarify for me what I dislike most about neo-institutionalism, namely, that is always, every time, about incentives.  Humans respond to incentives.  I admit it (I am after all an economist).  But other matters than cost and benefit move people, too.  The Anzac men going over the top at Gallipoli cannot be summarized as responding to incentives alone.

I like your supplement to the Bismarckian Deal--Beveridgean!  

Is economics becoming a branch of psychology?

I began pondering this question while reading Misbehaving, Richard Thaler’s entertaining and somewhat triumphalist account of his career in helping to establish behavioral economics. The fact that Thaler was made president of the American Economic Association in 2015 might signal growing acceptance within the profession that economics should be built on the insights that psychology provides about human motivation and behaviour, rather than on conventional neoclassical assumptions about individual rationality. For those who accept Lionel Robbins famous definition of economics as “a science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” and consider the rise of behavioral economics in that context, it would not involve a huge leap to suggest that all economics is behavioral economics, and therefore a branch of psychology.

It is acknowledged that behavioral economists seem to behave in many respects more like economists than psychologists, but that could, perhaps, be interpreted as a clever use of psychology. In the absence of behavioural economics, it would have been easy for economists to continue to ignore psychologists who suggest that the it is not realistic to assume that individuals maximize utility. It has been much more difficult for economists to ignore one of their number who makes the same point, while suggesting that the assumption that humans behave like mythical Econs should be retained as a benchmark against which actual human behaviour should be assessed. Early in the book Thaler writes:

“Theories based on the assumption that everyone is an Econ should not be discarded. They remain useful as starting points for more realistic models” (p7).

When it suits his purpose I think Thaler also uses the conventional utility maximizing assumption as a normative benchmark (just as many economists have wrongly used the concept of perfect competition as a normative benchmark). Although he claims that it “has never been my point to say that there is something wrong with people”, a lot of his efforts have been directed toward suggesting that humans make systematic cognitive errors that can be ameliorated by the “nudges” provided by wise government agencies. I have previously argued (here and here) that while the libertarian paternalism Thaler advocates is preferable to coercive paternalism, people need to be vigilant to ensure that they not being nudged toward choices that are contrary to their interests. We need apps to advise us whether or not to accept the default options offered to us by “choice architects”.

I cannot resist feeling bemused that during the period while psychology was gradually being welcomed into economics, like a Trojan horse, neoclassical economists were widely held to be behaving like imperialists, invading the subject matter of other social sciences, following the leadership of Gary Becker. Paradoxically, using the neoclassical assumption of individual welfare maximization, economists have been able to provide some useful insights to the study crime, the family, education and many other topics. Even when disciplinary overreach was fairly obvious, as in the theory of rational drug addiction, it has been plausibly argued that people like Becker challenged researchers to develop alternative theories and to confront those theories with data. The challenge of economists’ imperialism lives on in popular discourse, such as Freakonomics, as well as universities.

Perhaps the Trojan horse of behavioural economics will thrive within the broad domain of economic imperialism. We might see a convergence of psychology and economics in the study of a wide range of issues.

However, as I see it, the fundamentals of economics will continue to remain largely unaffected by both behavioural economics and the conventional neoclassical assumptions about individual welfare maximization. The theory of choice is worthy of study, but it is not as central to economics as it has commonly been claimed to be. Lionel Robbins definition of economics as being about solving allocative problems has tended to distract from the more important role of economists in studying “the propensity in human nature” to “truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another” and how this promotes “general opulence” or human flourishing.  The quoted words were, of course, used by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations.

In his article “What should economists do?”, published in 1964, James Buchanan argued that the theory of choice should be removed from “its position of eminence in the economist’s thought processes”. He suggested that economists should concentrate their attention on human behaviour in market relationships and other voluntaristic exchange processes, and upon the various institutional arrangements that can arise as a result of this form of activity.

Since Vernon Smith has studied how such institutions can emerge in experimental settings, it is fitting that he should be given the last word here:

“Individual choice … is not where the action is in understanding economic performance and human achievement. … The main work of socioeconomic systems is in specialization and the exchange systems that make possible the wealth they create, not the minutiae of choice and preference representation. The functioning of these systems is far beyond the field of vision of the individual, but it should not be beyond the vision of economic science” (Rationality in Economics, p 156). 

Postscript:

By coincidence, not long after I had finished writing this post I was enjoying my daily quota of Bourgeois Equality by Deirdre McCloskey, when came across this:

“Nowadays the behavioral economics of, say, Dan Ariely does a job of demolishing claims of individual rationality in moderns. Yet it too commits the Weberian mistake of focusing on individual psychology instead of group sociology and market economics. The experimental economics of Vernon Smith, Bart Wilson, Erik Kimbrough, and others, by contrast, works always with groups, showing that a wisdom of crowds often prevails over psychological shortsightedness and calculative confusion. And by the way, it makes a good case that property arises without the help of the state or the nudging of the clerisy” (p 282).

Why has Australia prospered much more than Argentina?

In the first half of the 19^th Century the Australian and Argentinian economies were similar in many respects. Both countries were being settled by European migrants and their economies were heavily dependent on pastoral activities. Around 1900, per capita GDP levels in Argentina were thought to be not far below those in Australia (see the chart below). Since then, while Australia has prospered to much the same extent as other relatively wealthy countries, Argentina has slipped behind.

Ian McLean’s attempt to explain why Australians have prospered to a much greater extent than Argentinians is to my mind the most interesting feature of his book, Why Australia Prospered (2013).

Part of Ian’s explanation did not come as a surprise to me, but nevertheless deserves to be repeated - often! There have been periods during the last century when inappropriate institutions and policies have threatened to retard the improvement of Australian living standards (e.g. the 1970s) but long-run stagnation was avoided because appropriate economic reforms were made and sustained. As Ian comments: “This contrasts with the historical record of Argentina” (p 252).

A deeper, and more novel, aspect of Ian’s explanation is his speculation that the past willingness of Australians to change institutional arrangements when future prosperity has been threatened is linked to the emergence among 19^th century Australians of a democratic and egalitarian temperament, and its persistence since then. Ian notes that there were strong economic forces opposed to the emergence of such culture in Australia because the initial distribution of ownership of pastoral land - the principal basis of wealth in the economy - was highly unequal. In terms of the analysis of Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokolov, the economic power acquired by the wealthy elite could have been expected to have been employed to shape political and social institutions as occurred in Latin American countries, entrenching inequality and resulting in ongoing growth-stunting distributional conflict. According to Ian’s speculations, Australia avoided a long period of squattocracy (oligarchic government by wealthy land owners) only because the British were still in control at the critical point in the 1850s and were able to determine the nature and timing of self-government.

This story challenges some of my preconceptions. I like to think of the squatters as heroes of free enterprise rather than as oligarchic rent-seekers. But I guess few humans are able to resist the temptation to exercise political power in their own interests when the opportunity presents itself. The squatters would have had little difficulty in believing that they were serving the common good by seeking to entrench their dubious property rights and encourage ongoing importation of cheap labour for use on their properties.

The idea that the British government was acting in Australia as an enlightened force promoting democratic ideals might require some explanation.  Ian points out that British attitudes and policies towards the colonies had been shaped by the loss of American colonies and by political instability in Canada. He also notes the existence of domestic pressures for institutional change:

“The attitudes and aspirations of the flood of immigrants arriving after the discovery of gold reflected those of mid-Victorian Britain where reform of the corrupt and class-based political system and concern at social and economic inequalities were much in evidence” (p 252).

Ian McLean’s account of Australian economic history shows that it would be as difficult to sustain the view that Australia has prospered because the heroes of free enterprise have consistently won political battles against the proponents of egalitarianism, as it would be to sustain the view that Australia has prospered because government interventions have consistently been benign in this country. Early establishment of democratic institutions seems to have acted as an important safety valve reducing the potential for distributional conflict, even though it brought with it restrictions on economic freedom, such as trade protectionism, that were later to hinder economic growth. Over the long term, a democratic and egalitarian culture has so far helped Australians to restore and maintain sufficient economic freedom to ensure their ongoing prosperity. 

Is Australian housing more than 40% over-valued?

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics

A recent article in The Economist suggests that “housing appears to be more than 40% overvalued in Australia, Britain and Canada” (“Hot in the city”, April 2, 2016 - possibly gated). This claim is based on the extent that the ratios of prices to disposable incomes and prices to rents are above their long term averages in those countries. By contrast, according to The Economist, housing prices in the United States are currently at “fair value” because those indicators are close to their long run average.

When they talk about “fair value” I guess what the authors of The Economist article have in mind is an equilibrium price that may differ from current market prices.  That raises some thorny conceptual issues, but I am prepared to accept that markets are sometimes affected by the irrational exuberance or pessimism of large numbers of investors.

The Economist has been using the same methodology for quite a few years now to suggest that housing prices are overvalued in countries in which they have risen strongly since the GFC.

When I wrote in 2011 about a previous article in The Economist using this methodology I pointed out that it was unrealistic to expect average rental yields (the inverse of the house price to rent ratio) in Australia to return to its long term average over the period since 1975 because over the first half of that period high nominal interest rates were suppressing demand for housing. As inflation rates and interest rates came down, housing affordability improved markedly during the 1990s, but this led to increased demand for housing, a sharp rise in house prices and a decline in rental yields. What we were seeing was a return to normality rather than the emergence of a house price bubble.

The Economist has published an infographic (ungated) which neatly illustrates how the ratios of prices to disposable incomes and prices to rents are currently above their long term averages in Australia, Britain and Canada. However, their infographic also illustrates the potential for large errors to be made by assuming that long term averages of house price to rent and house price to income ratios represent equilibrium prices. If you look at movements in the ratios of prices to disposable incomes and prices to rents over the whole period 1970 to 2016, you will notice that those ratios for Australia and Canada were well below the corresponding ratios for the US in the 1970s and ‘80’s. The same was true for Britain in the ‘90s. Even if actual price to income and price to rent ratios were currently the same in all four countries, the ratios for Australia, Canada and Britain could still be expected to be above their long run averages.

So, what does a comparison of actual ratios for Australia, Canada, Britain and the United States show? I haven’t attempted a complete assessment, but the latest data from Global Property Guide (GPG) on gross rental yields suggests yields of 4.4% for Australia (Sydney), 4.4% for Canada (Toronto), 3.2% for the UK (London) and 3.9% for the US (New York). The GPG data for the US relates to Manhattan which might be perceived by investors to offer better prospects for capital gains than most other localities in the US. The Economist’s data on price to rent ratio’s for the US implies a much higher gross rental yield for New York (about 7%) and even a somewhat higher yield for San Francisco (about 5%).

Given current and prospective interest rate levels, those comparisons do not seem to provide much evidence of irrationality in housing prices in any of those countries. It seems to me that there is no more reason to think housing investors in Australia, Canada and Britain have been irrationally exuberant in recent years than to think those in the United States have been irrationally pessimistic.  

What is the objective of superannuation?

This post is prompted by the Australian government’s discussion paper entitled “Objective of Superannuation” released yesterday. The government is raising the matters as part of a consultation process prior to introducing legislation to specify the objective of superannuation in legislation. The discussion paper uses the word “enshrine”, rather than “specify”, but that seems inappropriate.

Unfortunately, the paper fails to point out that in specifying the objective of super the government is (or should be) focused on public policy, rather than the wide range of different objectives of different individuals and firms with an interest in super. Some people use super to build wealth to pass to their children. Some people use it to save for retirement. I expect that many people don’t have a clear objective in mind, but view super as a useful savings mechanism. Employers may view super as a way of attracting staff or ensuring that valued staff are able to live comfortably after retirement. The financial institutions that provide superannuation products have different objectives again.

The question the legislation should be trying to clarify is:  What is the objective of government legislation with respect to superannuation?  If we have an answer to that question we may be in a better position to consider questions such as whether there might be a case for individuals to continue to be encouraged, nudged or even compelled (as at present) to save via superannuation .

The government proposes to legislate the objective recommended by the Financial System Inquiry:

“To provide income in retirement to substitute or supplement the Age Pension”.

In my view that is a sensible public policy objective. The government should be encouraging people to become more self-reliant rather than expecting taxpayers to support them in their old age. This is particularly important given the projected increases in the government spending on pensions in coming decades and the many other burdens being placed on taxpayers.

The subsidiary objectives raised for discussion tend to cloud the issues. For example, “facilitating consumption smoothing over the course of an individual’s life” is presumably also an objective of the age pension, unemployment benefits and other welfare payments. Some other suggested subsidiary objectives relate to prudential regulation and fiscal policy.

A potential problem I see with the proposed clarification of the objective is that pursuit of that objective in isolation could result in a less efficient tax system than we currently have. 

Even though they do not do as much as they should to substitute or supplement the aged pension, the current tax concessions for super do reduce the bias against savings and investment under the income tax system. The concessions reduce the extent that individuals who save, and re-invest income from their savings, pay a higher lifetime tax bill than people with similar earnings who choose to save less. The bias against savings and investment will be exacerbated if super tax concessions are reduced without more fundamental reforms being taken to improve incentives for savings and investment.

I was also concerned about this when writing about the potential for tax reform on this blog in April last year. Whilst suggesting that it made sense to include reductions in super tax concessions as part of a tax reform package, I hoped that the government did not forget to obtain a substantial reduction in tax on capital incomes as a quid pro quo.

It will be interesting to see whether specifying a sensible objective for superannuation policy helps to achieve a better overall tax policy outcome.

Was the great tax debate worth having?

The great tax debate began about a year ago when Joe Hockey, the former Treasurer, released a discussion paper prepared by Treasury. Rather than suggesting a small range of options for consideration, the discussion paper put 66 questions on the table.

The answer that the authors were hoping to be given to some questions was, nevertheless, fairly obvious. For example, when they asked how important is it to reform taxes to boost economic growth, it was fairly obvious that the authors were hoping to told it was important. When they asked how should Australia respond to the global trend toward reduced corporate tax rates, they were probably hoping to be told that Australia should seek to have a tax system that would not deter foreign investment. Information provided in the report implied fairly clearly that there could be economic gains from relying less heavily on company taxes and stamp duties levied by State governments and more heavily on GST and taxes on labour income.

However, the debate had hardly begun before Tony Abbott, the former prime minister, began taking options off the table. He might have had good reasons for that, but he kept them to himself. So, by the time Malcolm Turnbull took over as prime minister, the great tax debate was becoming a fiasco.

Not long after prime minister Turnbull declared that all options were back on the table, the Labor opposition began to claim that the government was intending to raise and/or broaden the GST. The pressure became so intense that the government announced a decision on the matter prior to announcing the tax policy reform proposals it plans to take to the next election. The PM stated:

"After you take into account all of the compensation that you would need to ensure the change was equitable, it simply is not justified in economic terms."

That has elicited a range of responses from economic commentators. The most general response seems to have been that if a GST increase is ruled out, that removes the potential for the government to go to the election with a major tax reform program that would encourage economic growth. Some commentators have suggested that such an outcome was predictable in any case, so there was no point in having the great tax debate.

I don't think either of those responses is appropriate. 

Time will tell whether the government is able to come up with a credible tax reform package that will encourage economic growth. There is potential to do so, but it will require the Commonwealth to transfer back to the States the responsibility for raising more of the revenue required to pay for schools and hospitals. The politics of the federation probably require the Commonwealth to take a leading role in the tax reforms required at state level to enable that to happen. The potential exists for the Commonwealth to play a leading role because the payroll tax was once a Commonwealth tax before being given to the States, in the forlorn hope that they would use it as a growing source of revenue and become less dependent on Commonwealth grants.

Even if the conclusion of the great tax debate is that there are no easy tax switch options to encourage economic growth, that doesn’t mean that the debate was not worth having. If enough people had read and understood the stuff I was writing on this blog (here and here) around this time last year, they might have concluded at that point that there are  no costless taxes and that the focus of the debate should be on how to reduce government spending. Other people were writing similar things - more people probably read and understood some of their contributions - but they still had a negligible impact on understanding of the issues by the general public.

The great tax debate was worth having as a public education exercise. In order for people to persuade themselves to think seriously about ways to reduce government spending they need to bring themselves to understand that there are no costless ways to raise additional government revenue. 

Postscript:
When I wrote this a couple of days ago I had assumed that after the government rejected their proposal to increase GST in order to reduce the company tax rate the Business Council of Australia (BCA) had probably picked up its bat and ball and gone home to sulk for another decade or so . Yesterday, however, they have come back into the game stronger than before. The BCA has now proposed a tax reform agenda that will be difficult for this government to sweep off the table. It is well worth taking a look. 

Could Larry Summers be half-right about secular stagnation?

When I read ‘The age of secular stagnation’ by Lawrence H Summers (published in Foreign Affairs (March/April 2016) I was pleasantly surprised to find that I agreed with part of his analysis.

I agree that economic growth has been relatively weak in most developed countries in recent years because levels of investment have been low, despite high levels of saving and low real interest rates. That is not quite how Summers puts it; he talks about “excess savings”. He might have reasons for that, but it makes his argument seem convoluted.

I tend to agree with Summers when he writes:

“Absent many good new investment opportunities, savings have tended to flow into existing assets, causing asset price inflation”.

My agreement is qualified because I think the absence of investment opportunities is more about perception than reality. Why I think that will become clearer later.

The solution Summers offers to the problem of low investment is an expansionary fiscal policy pursued through public investment. Writing about the United States he argues:

“A time of low real interest rates, low materials prices, and high construction unemployment is the ideal moment for a large public investment program. It is tragic … that net government investment is lower than at any time in nearly six decades”.

It is obviously problematic to be proposing an expansion in public investment at a time when rising government debt has been imposing a significant burden on later generations. But there may be ways around such concerns. In its article, ‘Fighting the next recession’ The Economist (Feb. 20) gave some prominence to the New South Wales Government model of privatising assets such as ports to fund public investment. I had not previously thought of the efforts of the NSW government to raise some cash for infrastructure spending as a model that might have wider application.

However, there are limits to the extent that additional public sector investment is likely to stimulate further private investment. Additional public investment in most economic sectors competes with private investment. If governments confine their investments to sectors where public investment might have a comparative advantage, they will, before long, end up investing in projects that have no hope of yielding even a modest return on investment. Such misallocations seem more likely to add to secular stagnation than to help overcome it. Japan’s efforts to stimulate economic growth by building roads to nowhere may be a good example of such counterproductive public investment.

Before proposing solutions to the problem of secular under-investment it would be a good idea to try to understand why it is occurring. In his recent article, ‘U.S. secular stagnation?’ Steve Hanke pointed to Robert Higgs’ concept of “regime uncertainty” as a possible explanation of the long term downward trend in net private domestic business investment as a percentage of GDP since the beginning of the 1970s. An index of economic policy uncertainty developed by Scott Baker, Nicholas Bloom and Steven Davis suggests that economic policy uncertainty is currently very high - at similar levels to the 1930s, and much higher than in the 50s and 60s.

An increase in policy uncertainty is also consistent with the observation by Kevin Lane and Tom Rosewall (RBA Bulletin 2015) that the hurdle rates of return that firms use to evaluate investment projects has not declined along with declines in interest rates that have occurred since the 1980s. This implies that profitable investment opportunities are being foregone because of greater uncertainty about future after-tax returns and costs. OECD researchers suggest that policy uncertainty (concerning regulation, macro policy and taxation policy) is one factor causing the hurdle rate that companies apply to capital spending to be higher than that applied by financial investors (Business and Financial Outlook 2015, p 60).

My conclusion is that Larry Summers might be about half right in his observations about secular stagnation. Investment has been too low, but the long-run solution can't lie in increased public investment. Governments should be thinking about how they can make businesses feel confident that regulatory and tax burdens are not likely to be further increased over the lifetime of new investments.

How did you react to the appointment of a Minister for Happiness in the UAE?

I chuckled. My initial reaction was that the appointment didn’t seem to be the kind of thing that should be taken seriously. But I wondered what the motives of the UAE government might be.

Some commentators have suggested that the appointment of a Minister for Happiness in the UAE was Orwellian. That sent me looking to see whether Orwell had a Ministry of Happiness in Nineteen Eighty-Four. He didn’t. He had ministries of love, peace, plenty and truth. The distinguishing characteristic of each those ministries was the pursuit of policies that were the opposite of what was implied by the label. For example, the Ministry of Love pursued enforced loyalty to Big Brother through policies of fear and repression.

If North Korea establishes a Minister for Happiness it would be reasonable to presume an Orwellian motive, but I doubt that applies to the UAE.

I am not sure that the Orwellian motive even applies to the establishment of a Ministry of Supreme Social Happiness by president Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela in 2013. His motive was probably to distract people from the decline in their economic well-being, occurring even then as a consequence of the government’s economic mismanagement. It is unlikely that the Ministry is helping people to feel any less miserable as the Venezuelan economy now collapses around them, with falling crude oil prices adding to their woes.

Given the fall in oil prices over the last year, the distraction motive might also help to explain the appointment of a happiness minister in the UAE. The IMF has reduced its growth forecasts for the UAE, even though it is more diversified than many other oil-producing countries in the Middle East. The fall in oil prices is causing fiscal deficits to rise and the government is responding by reigning in government spending. The flow-on effects of this might make life more difficult for the large expatriate community (83.5% of the population) most of whom are from South Asia.

In announcing the appointment of a minister for happiness, the UAE prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, claimed that the objective was to "align and drive government policy to create social good and satisfaction". The appointed minister, Ahood Al Roumi, was previously Director-General of the prime minister’s department and will apparently retain that position.

The appointment is part of a government shake-up involving appointment of more young ministers and more females. Women now make up more than one-third of all ministers in the government. The government of the UAE has previously announced the vision for their country to be among the best in the world in the Human Development Index HDI and to be “the happiest of all nations”. The UAE currently ranks 41st of the 188 countries included in the HDI.

It is tempting to dismiss all that as window dressing, but there is a chance that the government of the UAE is actually trying to find a way forward toward a better society. In terms of the “good society” indicators I used in Free to Flourish there is a lot of room for improvement in the UAE, even though it stacks up better than a lot of other countries. Of the 110 countries included in the analysis, the UAE ranks 39^th in terms of peacefulness, 24^th in terms of opportunity and 17^th in terms of economic security.

It will be interesting to observe whether Ahood Al Roumi attempts to use her new role to make the UAE a better society. 

Should foreigners be allowed to buy agricultural land in Australia?

Cartoon by Nicholson from “The Australian” newspaper: www.nicholsoncartoons.com.au

I am surprised by the frequency with which concerns about foreign ownership of land in Australia are being expressed to me by friends who have fairly sensible views on most other issues. It is almost as though rationality disappears whenever foreign ownership and agricultural land become linked in their minds.

My response has been along the lines that foreign ownership of land in Australia isn’t something we should be worried about because it has been occurring since the beginning of European settlement and, these days, accounts for a small proportion of total agricultural land. (ABS data indicate that about 99% of Australian farm businesses are fully Australian owned and about 90% of farmland is fully Australian owned.) 

That usually provokes the assertion that Chinese ownership is new and worrying. 

When I suggest that the new owners can’t take the land home with them, I am asked to justify why foreigners should be able to buy land in Australia, when Australians are not allowed to buy land in their countries. My reply has been that Australia should adopt economic policies that serve the interests of Australians rather than following the policies that other countries adopt. 

At that point I am asked to explain how foreign ownership of agricultural land in Australia serves Australian interests.

That might seem like a reasonable question to ask, but it is actually a debating trick that puts the onus of proof in the wrong place. The basis of a market economy is that economic transactions are undertaken because they are mutually beneficial to sellers and buyers. If some third party considers that a particular kind of transaction should not take place, the onus should be on that party to make the case. 

If an Australian wants to buy the property at a lower price, that is not a legitimate argument for preventing the property from being sold to a foreigner. If their sole objection to the transaction is that the purchaser is foreign, why is that relevant?

Unfortunately, the views I have presented above tend not to have been particularly persuasive. My friends seem to want me to explain how Australians can benefit from foreign ownership of agricultural land. Well, now I have now calmed down a little, I will try to do that.

The most obvious way Australians benefit from foreign land ownership is from associated investments which create increased employment opportunities, and generate additional wealth, some of which adds to government revenues and enables more services to be provided to Australians. 

So, what about the situation where the foreign owner does not undertake any new investment? In that situation it is quite likely that the former owner will invest the proceeds of the sale in ways that will generate additional income. It is also likely that the new owner will find ways to use the resources more productively, perhaps by using better management practices. The fact that a new owner is prepared to pay more than the former owner’s reserve price usually implies that the new owner can see potential to generate more income from the property than the former owner.

Is there any more reason to question the benefits to Australians of foreign investment in agricultural land than any other foreign investment, or of new investment in agricultural land by Australians? I don’t think so, but various arguments to the contrary are raised. It has been suggested that ownership that is encouraged by foreign governments to improve food security may endanger future food security of Australians. It has also been suggested that enclaves of foreign ownership could have a deleterious cultural impact on rural communities. The people who promote those views seem to overlook the fact that foreign ownership or agricultural land in Australia is a small proportion of the total.

The opponents of foreign ownership of agricultural land also raise such issues as whether foreign firms pay tax, whether they are able to import foreign labour more easily, and whether they can be trusted to comply with Australian labour and environmental regulations. Those arguments seem to me to be scraping the barrel. It is hard to see why Australian tax and regulatory authorities should have any greater difficulty in dealing with foreigners than with Australians.

As far as I can see there is no case for foreign ownership of agricultural land in Australia to be subjected to more stringent regulation than any other foreign investment in this country.

How should researchers combine different aspects of happiness into a single measure?

A recent paper by Gus O’Donnell and Andrew Oswald considers the question of how to combine measures of different aspects of subjective well-being into a single overall measure.

The authors focused specifically on the four aspects of well-being measured in annual surveys by the UK Office of National Statistics. These are:

• how satisfied you are with your life nowadays;
• to what extent you feel that the things you do in your life are worthwhile;
• how happy you felt yesterday; and
• how anxious you felt yesterday.

All aspects are measured on an 11 point scale from 0 to 10.

The approach taken by O’Donnell and Oswald in their exploratory study implies that all aspects of happiness should be weighted according to their “social importance” as determined by the average weight given to them by citizens in opinion surveys. The specific method they employ involves asking people to allocate 100 points across the four measures. For example, if all four measures were considered to be equally important, 25% would be allocated to each measure.

This method of developing weights seems to me to be much better suited to combining well-being indicators such as those included in the OECD’s Better Life index (e.g. income, education, health, environment) than to combining survey data relating to different aspects of subjective well-being.

I feel uneasy about the method adopted because I don’t think individual citizens are equipped to make judgments about the “social importance” of the feelings of others. For example, the majority view about the “social importance” of feelings of anxiety might understate the impact of anxiety on the well-being of people who suffer from anxiety.

The authors have reported results from the use of their method of obtaining weights from four different samples: economics students, MBA students, professional economists, and a wider group of citizens chosen using web-based methods. All groups gave anxiety the lowest average weight, but apart from that there is not much common ground in the views of the different groups. The wider group of citizens gave happiness the greatest weight, but the other groups all gave life satisfaction the greatest weight. The economics and MBA students gave “doing worthwhile things” a much higher weight than happiness, but professional economists gave it about the same weight as happiness.

It seems to me that a better way to proceed would be to attempt to estimate the well-being of individuals by using weighting systems that individuals consider to be relevant to their own lives. There are potentially several ways to do that.

First, there is the approach adopted by Daniel Benjamin et al in their paper, “Beyond Happiness and Satisfaction”, discussed on this blog, in which people were asked to choose between hypothetical situations using different measures of happiness and a range of different ratings.

Another possible approach would to ask survey respondents questions along the following lines: “If you were offered an opportunity that would add a 1 point improvement in your feeling that the things you do in life are worthwhile, how much life satisfaction would you be willing to forgo in order to obtain that benefit?” When I ask myself that question the answer I obtained seemed to make sense, but my mind went blank when I ask myself how much life satisfaction I would be willing to forgo in order to obtain a 1 point increase in happiness. The same happened when I asked myself how much happiness I would be willing to forgo in order to obtain a 1 point increase in life satisfaction. So I can hardly recommend that approach!

The third approach is to simply ask survey respondents to allocate 100 points across the four measures according to the weight that they consider should give to the different measures in assessing changes over time in their own personal well-being. That approach has the virtue of being simple and directly related to estimation of relevant weights.

In order to obtain an accurate overall impression of subjective well-being at a national level it is important to know to what extent the weights that individuals consider to be relevant to assessment of their own personal well-being vary according to the circumstances of their lives.

What would self-actualizing politics look like?

It is difficult to observe democratic politics without getting the impression that it brings out the worst in people. We frequently see politicians elbowing each other out of the way as they struggle to gain power and influence. We often see them make promises they are not likely to be able to keep. We see some of them endlessly repeating slogans whose only virtue is that they once appealed to our basest instincts. We see others stating the obvious with great gravitas. We see quite a few advancing their personal interests at the expense of the people they are meant to serve.

So, how come there has been so much economic and social progress in the western democracies over the last century or so? If democratic politics brings out the worst in people, wouldn’t you expect outcomes to have been are a lot worse than they have been?

The findings of Christian Welzel’s research - which I reviewed on this blog- suggests that as a consequence of economic development people in an increasing number of countries have been able to climb an emancipation ladder (Welzel refers to it as a utility ladder of freedoms) analogous to Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. As economic development has proceeded in an increasing number of societies, people in those societies have tended to adopt emancipative values reflecting concern about such matters as personal autonomy, respect for the choices people make in their personal lives, having a say in community decisions, and equality of opportunity.

In an article published in Policy in 2014 I considered whether emancipative values might be morphing into an ‘entitlement culture’ that could threaten economic freedom and material living standards. My research left me feeling optimistic that if such a tendency exists, there is a good chance that it will be remedied by democratic political processes.

If my optimism about the future outcomes of democratic politics in high-income countries is well grounded the impression that politics brings out the worst in people cannot be entirely accurate. Actually, that cynical impression doesn’t even stand up to scrutiny when I consider the behaviour of some politicians I have met.

Those thoughts came to mind when I was reading Michael Hall’s Political Coaching:Self-Actualizing Politics and Politicians, published last year. Michael is a psychologist who writes about and teaches an approach to personal development strongly related to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. I have read many of his books and attended a couple of his seminars, so I thought it might be interesting to see how he applied his ideas to politics.

Michael describes the political ideal as follows:

“Politics is designed to cultivate the good life. We create politics so that people in our social group can live the kind and quality of lives that they wish to live – to satisfy the basic human needs and then to fulfil the highest of human dreams and potentials. The design of politics is to create a human system whereby people can develop their own powers and freely use those powers in appropriate ways that simultaneously facilitates their highest and best and that supports the same for all in the community” (p15).

Immediately afterwards he acknowledges that the ideal he has described is not what immediately comes to mind when most people think of politics.

Michael argues that politics is inevitable because humans are social beings. The problem is not with the existence of politics but with how we do our politics. That depends on the quality of our relationships with each other, which in turn depend on our understandings, beliefs, meanings and experiences. He implies that a change in political culture can only occur if more people engaged in politics become self-actualizing.

I think the book is at its best in discussing principles for positive political conversations (Chapter 11). These principles include: showing willingness to listen to opposing views; approaching issues in a spirit of respectful inquiry; trying to understanding where other people are coming from; and looking for positive intentions and values in opposing views.

Unfortunately, Michael Hall doesn’t discuss the potential role of social media in promoting more positive political conversations and a better political culture. In my view social media has potential to make a large contribution to lifting the quality of political debate. However, that will not happen until more participants who are capable of lifting the quality of discussions actually seek to do so. I should be making more of an effort to lift my own performance in that regard.

What does economics tell us about making New Year's resolutions?

Opportunity cost was the first thing that came to mind the other day after the thought occurred that I should perhaps consider making a New Year’s resolution. That was probably because I just happened to be paying attention on the day the concept of opportunity cost was explained when I was at university many years ago. 

Opportunity cost is just a label. If you haven’t had the benefit of studying economics you might still be aware that the time and effort you spend making resolutions and trying to keep them could possibly be spent doing something more enjoyable. You may also be aware that there are emotional costs associated with making resolutions and then failing to keep them.

On the other hand, by now some of you will be thinking that opportunity costs are just excuses for inaction. You might want to urge me to consider the potential satisfaction of making resolutions that might enable me to become a healthier or better person.

That is why my mind now turns to the law of diminishing marginal utility. That law says, more or less, that as you obtain more of any good, the additional happiness you obtain from each additional unit tends to diminish. Every wine drinker should know that a larger increment of happiness is likely to be obtained from the first glass of wine than from the second, and a larger increment of happiness from the second than from the third, and so on. If the truth of that observation is not obvious to you on New Year’s eve, it might well become very obvious on New Year’s day.

It seems to me that the law of diminishing marginal utility applies to New Year’s resolutions in much the same way as to other goods. For example, a person who swears a great deal might gain some satisfaction if she can refrain from using foul language in the presence of children. The further increment she obtains from refraining from swearing in front of people whom she knows to be disgusted by the behaviour, might be somewhat smaller. The increments in satisfaction could be expected to become progressively smaller as she adds further classes of people or situations.

All this brings to mind the image of a scissors diagram, regarded as a thing of great beauty by many economists of my vintage. The downward sloping line in the diagram below represents the declining marginal utility of resolutions and the upward sloping lines represent the rising marginal cost of resolutions (expressed in utility terms). If you are having difficulty viewing the quantity of resolutions as a homogenous good, think of the horizontal axis as measuring the extent to which you might consider reducing your use of a particular swear word over the next year. 

I have drawn two cost curves in the diagram to illustrate how the optimal investment in resolutions would change if it became less costly to make and keep resolutions. The initial optimum is at point A, where our subject makes a relatively small investment in New Year’s resolutions. If it became less costly to make resolutions, the optimum would move to point B. At that point she would make more resolutions - and her total utility would be higher.

So, what does economics have to tell us about how to reduce the costs associated with New Year’s resolutions? An obvious place to look is behavioral economics. It is not difficult to find articles on the internet suggesting how we can use behavioral economics to help us to stick to our resolutions. Much of the underlying research is more in the field of psychology than economics, such as the work of Roy Baumeister on willpower (which I discussed here).

In my view the area of economics that has most potential to help us to understand and reduce the costs associated with making and keeping resolutions is ‘identity economics’. The key idea of identity economics – as explained in a book of that name by George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton - is that individuals gain satisfaction when their actions conform to the norms and ideals of their identity. In the way Kranton and Akerlof develop the concept, identity is determined to a large extent by the groups to which individuals belong. 

However, when you think about your own identity, as an autonomous individual, you are free to think of it as being defined by the qualities you value most highly - or identify with. (There is some relevant discussion in a recent post in which I reviewed Russ Harris’s book, The Happiness Trap.) Recent research by Anthony Burrow and Nathan Spreng, which suggests that having a purpose in life tends to impede impulsivity, points to the potential benefits of keeping in mind the qualities we value most highly.

This brings to mind the potential to draw a possibilities diagram showing trade-offs between some of the things I value. On one axis is excellence and on the other axis is tranquility. I will leave it to your imagination.

Postscript

On reflection, it doesn’t seem to make much sense to think in terms of trade-offs between excellence and tranquility. It might make more sense to think in terms of a trade-off between satisfaction with professional achievement and satisfaction with relationships, as shown below. An investment in emotional health might expand the possibilities available.

Why wish everyone a Merry Christmas?

Why not? It is that time of the year again. It is a custom I grew up with. It is a widespread practice in the country in which I live.

So, does that mean my seasonal good wishes are intended to apply only to people who share a similar cultural heritage?

Actually, when I think about it, most of those who share a similar cultural heritage will probably think I am just hoping that they enjoy the customary things that many of us enjoy at this time of year - attending parties, going on holidays, preparing for celebrations, meeting with family members, exchanging gifts, feasting, getting “merry” etc.

Even if none of that applies to you, I still wish you a merry Christmas.  No-one is excluded from the sentiments of the Christmas message: Peace on earth and goodwill to all. (That might or might not be an accurate translation of relevant scripture, but it is the one I read on Christmas cards – and it is good enough for a non-church-goer like me.)

Christmas gives me a convenient excuse to express my hope for you to enjoy tranquility and opportunities to flourish in all aspects of your life.