Showing posts with label individualism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label individualism. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 18, 2024

Should Libertarians be Attempting to Influence Culture: A Discussion with Winton Bates and Chris Matthew Sciabarra (II)

 


As the graphic might suggest, the focus of the second edition of our collaborative efforts is Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s view of the role of culture in the relations of power in modern societies. However, before Chris presents his view on that topic, it is appropriate to review comments on the first edition that have been left on our respective Facebook pages: Chris Matthew Sciabarra and Winton Bates.

Comments on the first edition

We are pleased that our efforts have attracted interest and perceptive comments from people who have visited our Facebook pages. The comments fall into three broad categories: differing views of thick libertarianism; whether it is possible to influence culture directly; and the distinction between the question of whether libertarianism (as a political philosophy) should be attempting to change culture and the question of whether libertarians (as individuals) should be attempting to influence culture.

Thick libertarianism

Roderick Tracy Long: I'm recalling an exchange I had with Walter Block over "thick libertarianism," the idea that libertarians should think of the struggle for liberty as bound up with the promotion of other values not strictly entailed by libertarian principles but entangled with them either causally or conceptually (locus classicus is Charles Johnson's piece). Walter said that thick libertarianism was dangerous because the attention to other values might distract or tempt libertarians away from libertarian consistency. I said: "So you think opposition to thick libertarianism is itself an additional value, not strictly entailed by libertarian principle, that libertarians qua libertarians nevertheless ought to embrace because of its causal connection with the libertarian goal?" He said yes! I thought I'd trapped him in a reductio, but for him my reductio was merely a modus ponens.

Jim Peron: I don't see how one can achieve a libertarian society without the wider range of values that underpin it. One indication is how utterly unlibertarian evangelicals are compared to others. I should say that it's been years since I read it but the Edward Banifeld books "The Heavenly City" and "The Heavenly City Revisited” were influential in this regard, as were my basic psychology classes in university. Also of influence was "Under Development is a State of Mind" by Lawrence Harrison. [This is the first paragraph of Jim’s comment. Please see Chris’s Facebook page for the remainder.]

Possibility of influencing culture

Boris Karpa: There are, of course, two issues:

1. It's very difficult to come up with a strategy to deliberately influence a culture (and to what extent some progressives have succeeded it was because they already had large institutional inertia).

2. It's not entirely clear how this is going to work even on the basic level. Either of us can name any number of libertarian or semi-libertarian writers, for example, who are reasonably talented, or at least as talented as any published mass-market writer. But writing is an 'industry' with a low barrier of entry. Of these many libertarian and semi-libertarian writers, how many of these writers have had a movie or a show made out of their works? Or a PC game? How are these writers treated by literary awards, etc.?

It's not that I'm suggesting that it's impossible to influence culture, it's that I'm suggesting that I'm not sure how it is possible to influence it in a *deliberate manner* beyond just 'create art that reflects your values and hope for the best'.

Political philosophy versus individual action

Douglas B. Rasmussen: Is there not a difference between saying libertarianism qua political philosophy should attempt to change culture and saying that a libertarian concerned in advancing libertarianism should attempt to change culture? The former concerns what the political/legal order should do, and the latter concerns what individuals should do.

Ed Younkins: The legitimation or justification of a minimal state that protects and defends freedom does not depend upon the existence of a particular type of moral-cultural order. Such a political order is objectively based on the nature of human beings who need a protected moral sphere for the possibility of self-direction.

Although a political order of metanorms is not necessarily coincidental with, nor dependent upon, a particular moral-cultural system, the establishment and support of such a political order would be easier to bring about if there were widely shared beliefs and articulations with respect to its underpinning political principles as well with certain moral principles. It follows that we should work as individuals, and in concert with others, to build a freedom-friendly culture of moral and virtuous people who strive to create a good life, to flourish, and to be happy.

Replies by Bates and Sciabarra

Please see our Facebook pages for our immediate responses to those comments and to additional exchanges. Our views on power relations in the cultural context of individual flourishing are presented below.

Winton Bates’s view of culture

My book, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing, contains a brief discussion of cultural change in Chapter Nine, “The Evolving Context of Human Flourishing” (pp 184-190). As the chapter title suggests, my focus was primarily on the nature of changes that individuals have to contend with rather than on what individuals might do, in concert with others, to influence the cultural context. Nevertheless, readers would have no difficulty in discerning that I strongly support what Steven Pinker has described as Enlightenment humanism:

Emancipative values can also be viewed as an outcome of Enlightenment humanism, a term used by Steven Pinker, to encompass the ideas of thinkers like Hobbes, Spinoza, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Astell, Kant, Beccaria, Smith, Wollstonecraft, Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton and Mill. As I see it, a stronger case can be made for the emergence of a general consensus supporting Enlightenment humanism among leaders of political opinion, than for the existence of a coherent philosophy shared by a group of intellectuals. While the classical liberals would probably have seen little merit in the political views of rationalistic thinkers, and vice versa, many conservative and progressive political leaders have seen varying degrees of merit in different viewpoints and have sought to reconcile and assimilate them in developing their own views.

“Over time, it seems that Enlightenment humanist values have approached the status of a coherent world view, which is broadly supported by public opinion in the democracies, despite large differences between conservative and progressives on some important issues.  The process seems to be one in which disparate political philosophies, often going back centuries, act as tributaries to the broad streams of thought that flow into the rivers of public opinion. Enlightenment humanism is one of those broad streams of thought. The color of the water in the streams and the rivers changes over time, depending on relative contributions from the different tributaries.

“Such a picture is complicated by the existence of postmodernism, as a competing stream of thought, which has origins traceable to some of those Enlightenment thinkers. Whilst Enlightenment humanism has a preoccupation with reason and reality, postmodernism has a preoccupation with the use of power. Postmodernism’s disrespect for truth is often associated with the narratives presented by radical progressives but it is also present in the narratives of unprincipled populists of a more conservative disposition. Fortunately, persuasive rhetoric that influences the views of some people in ways contrary to reason and reality tends to provoke widespread opposition.” (p 186)

In retrospect, my view that Enlightenment humanist values are broadly supported by public opinion may have been too optimistic. I should also make clear that the problem I have with power relations has to do with preoccupation with the use of power, rather than with attempts to understand power relations in society.

Chris has made an important contribution to the understanding of power relations.

 

Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s view of culture

I greatly appreciate the comments that Winton and I received from our first installment in this series of discussions. In this section, I’ll discuss the Tri-level Model of Power Relations, which was first derived from my reconstruction of Ayn Rand’s critical analyses of social problems, outlined in Part Three of Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical. The model focuses our attention on the various reciprocally related levels of generality through which social relations of power are manifested. It is a model that I have adopted in my own analysis of various social problems and the systemic and historical contexts within which they are embedded.

Winton suggests that Enlightenment humanism has been preoccupied with reason and reality, while postmodernism has been preoccupied with the use of power. Hence, it is startling that Rand, who most certainly placed herself in the reason and reality camp, also emerged with a critique of power relations. Rand criticized modernism for its crippling dualities. She rejected the modernist dichotomies of mind and body, reason and emotion, fact and value, the moral and the practical, and so forth. Ironically, she developed a multidimensional critique of social relations of power that echoes many of the themes found in postmodernism.

The full case for this can’t possibly be presented in this installment, so I’ll do my best to summarize the implications of the Tri-Level Model illustrated above. This summary comes not from Russian Radical but from Chapter Nine of Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism, “The Dialectical Libertarian Turn” (pp. 379-383).

The model provides different levels of generality by which to interpret social relations. The personal, the cultural, and the structural can only be abstracted and isolated for the purposes of analysis, but never reified as wholes unto themselves. They are preconditions and effects of one another.

On Level 1 (LI), the personal level of analysis, social relations are examined from the vantage point of personal ethical practices and implicit or tacit methods of awareness (what Rand called “psycho-epistemological” practices). On Level 2 (L2), the cultural level of analysis, social relations are examined from the vantage point of language, education, ideology, and art. On Level 3 (L3), the structural level of analysis, social relations are examined from the vantage point of political and economic structures, processes, and institutions.

We can trace the implications of this model by grouping the levels into three distinct forms, in which the level placed at the center provides a specific analytical and strategic focus. Because these levels are abstractions from the whole, each reveals key dynamics even as it obscures others.

L1-L2-L3: Focusing on The Cultural

From this point of view, the cultural level is brought to the foreground of our analysis. This perspective allows us to investigate and evaluate the various cultural traditions, institutions, and practices that help to sustain the existing social system.

How does culture perpetuate existing social conditions? This is achieved through linguistic, educational, and ideological means, among others. Distortions in language—through the use of anti-concepts, for examplewill tend to undermine rational discourse, while serving the needs of the powerful. Certain educational institutions and pedagogical practices will tend to undermine autonomy, perpetuate conformity, inculcate obedience to authority, and subvert the development of critical thinking. Stultifying, rigid, intolerant, racist, sexist, or tribalist ideologies or belief systems (including dogmatic religious beliefs) will tend to foster exclusionary “thinking within a square.” Such cultural practices can undermine those humanist, cosmopolitan characteristics consistent with the development of human freedom and personal flourishing.

But a sole focus on dominant cultural traditions and practices tends to lessen our regard for people’s abilities to alter their ethical or psycho-epistemological habits (LI). Additionally, this focus minimizes the importance of the political and economic structures (L3) that both perpetuate and require a certain constellation of cultural practices.

Cultural contextualism—that is, paying attention to the importance of cultural context in the struggle for social change—is important. Indeed, as Hegel once declared: "No one can escape from the substance of his time any more than he can jump out of his skin” (Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 112). That said, cultural contextualism is not cultural determinism. Though we are situated in a particular context of time and place, we are also creative, efficacious social beings capable of shifting that context over time.

L2-L1-L3: Focusing on the Personal

From this point of view, the personal level is brought to the foreground. This analytical focus emphasizes the importance of personal ethical and psycho-epistemological practices, which tend to perpetuate the dominant cultural and structural institutions.

Remember that even though this level is called personal, it is still a means of viewing social relations through a particular prism. Rand’s inspiring maxim—"Anyone who fights for the future, lives in it today”—carries enormous weight here, as each person adapts certain virtues in pursuit of certain values, given their own unique and dynamic social context. Even if our struggle for autonomy and authenticity takes place within authoritarian social systems that are “airtight,” there is still a need for self-engagement and self-fulfillment. Living authentically requires introspection, the ability to articulate our thoughts, to accept our emotions, to experience psychological visibility and various degrees of intimacy in our engagement with others, to comprehend the nature of our actions, and to take personal responsibility for the social consequences generated by those actions.

But an exclusive focus on the personal level tends to diminish the importance of cultural and structural factors, which provide the context for, and have a powerful effect on, people’s abilities to achieve autonomy and authenticity. Certain cultural attitudes and tacit practices are so deeply embedded in our lives that it is extremely difficult—if not practically impossible—to call these into question. Likewise, any given set of political and economic realities will tend to constrain our ability to act autonomously. Folks who repeat the mantra, “free your mind and the rest will follow” (with apologies to En Vogue), fall victim to Level 1 thinking, divorced from Levels 2 and 3.

L1-L3-L2: Focusing on the Structural

From this point of view, the personal (LI) and cultural (L2) levels of analysis recede to the background, and the political and economic structures, institutions, and processes become the primary focus. This perspective makes transparent the dominant political and economic practices—the regulations, prohibitions, or guns—that constrain us. But exclusive attention to oppressive structural policies and practices tends to reduce the importance of, and need for, people to alter their ethical or psycho-epistemological habits. It also tends to obscure the importance of culture, which has a powerful effect on the kinds of politics and economics that are practiced.

Those who believe that it is possible to enact a nonaggression principle by edict are reifying a Level 3 analysis. An attack centered solely on the state in the absence of a supporting edifice of personal and cultural practices is doomed to fail. It will likely replace one form of tyranny with another.

With the aid of this Tri Level Model, our shifting points of view help to reveal the depth and breadth of the problems we face. By filtering virtually every social problem through the same multidimensional analysis and tracing the interconnections among social problems, we will be led to reject one-sided resolutions as partial and incomplete.

A couple of additional points must be kept in mind, however. All systems are mixed to some degree and no set of power relations is monolithic. Even within totalitarian systems, pockets of resistance and parallel institutions exist. Hence, each level of our analysis focuses attention on dominant tendencies within any given social system. Moreover, no social system is hermetically sealed from the rest of the world. The Tri Level model is one that must be adapted to different systemic and historical contexts. And it requires sensitivity to differences within cultures and among cultures—especially when we are faced with such an abundance of illiberal tendencies in our own society and across the globe.

I should add too that there is no “One Size Fits All” strategic approach to social change. Considering the unique conditions of any given context, it takes effort to investigate and examine the kinds of cultural formations that may nourish—or impede—both personal flourishing and an emancipative politics.

**

The authors welcome comments on the relevance of the Tri Level model in considering current illiberal tendencies in the cultures of the liberal democracies. We have in mind that the next instalment of this exchange will focus on that topic.


Wednesday, September 4, 2024

Should Libertarians be Attempting to Influence Culture? A Discussion with Winton Bates and Chris Matthew Sciabarra (I)

 


I have asked Chris Matthew Sciabarra to present his views on the question posed above because he has possibly thought more deeply than any other living person about the relevance of social context to the pursuit of libertarian ideals. The depth of Chris’s thinking on these matters became apparent to me when I recently reviewed his trilogy of books on the dialectics of liberty:

Marx, Hayek, and Utopia, State University of New York Press, 1995.

Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical, second edition, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2013. (The first edition was published in 1995.)

Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000.

My review has been published on “The Savvy Street”.

In his dialectical approach, Chris emphasizes the importance of contextual analysis across time. The most relevant example is his discussion of Murray Rothbard’s views. Rothbard held that nonaggression is all that is required of a libertarian society, and that could be assured through adoption of a libertarian law code after government ceased to exist. Chris argues that the experience of political freedom is not likely to be fully efficacious in the absence of a supporting edifice of cultural and personal practices.

Before asking Chris for his contribution to the discussion, I outlined why I am reconsidering my views on the question of whether libertarians should be seeking to influence culture.

Why am I reconsidering my views?

Until recently, I was definitely opposed to J S Mill’s position in the passage quoted above. It seemed to me to be woolly thinking to suggest that the sanctions imposed by “prevailing opinion and feeling” were akin to tyranny. I have argued in the past that libertarians should focus on reducing the tyranny of the legal order. It seemed to me that while individual libertarians might take a position supporting or opposing particular elements of cultural change, in their role as advocates of liberty they should focus on issues specifically related to government e.g. constitutions, laws, regulations, and actions of government officials.

I began to reconsider my views before reviewing Chris’s books. After reading The Individualists, an excellent history of libertarian ideas Matt Zwolinski and John Tomasi, I was prompted to write on this blog on the question: Where is the soul of libertarianism? That question stems from the subtitle of the book: “Radicals, Reactionaries, and the Struggle for the Soul of Libertarianism”, and from the discussion, in the final chapter, of the battle between bleeding heart libertarians, left libertarians and paleolibertarians for control of the Libertarian Party in the United States. The Individualists left me wanting to promote the view that the soul, or essence, of libertarianism stems from the nature of human flourishing. I suggested that I would have preferred to see the book end by acknowledging that libertarians are engaged in an ongoing struggle against authoritarianism, as people on opposing sides of the culture wars seek to enlist the coercive powers of the state to pursue their interests.

Another reason for reconsidering my views is because it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between the actions of governments and those of some other organisations.  For example, when interest groups lobby private businesses to adopt particular environmental or social policies, there is an increasing tendency for political parties to become involved by threatening regulation either in support of or in opposition to interest group advocacy. There also seems to be increasing acceptance that governments should take an active interest in codes of conduct adopted by organisations that have traditionally been viewed as independent of government (e.g. universities) particularly if they receive substantial government funding. Another example is the non-transparent influence of governments on the publication policies of social media outlets. It has become increasingly difficult for free speech advocates to distinguish between government censorship and the editorial policies of media proprietors.  

The only reason I can think of right now why libertarians should not be attempting to influence culture is the difficulty they would have in agreeing on what kinds of cultural change they would like to promote. Libertarians are, almost by definition, independently minded people.

With that thought in mind, I will now hand over to Chris.

Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s view

I want to thank Winton Bates for inviting me to participate in this ongoing dialogue, which began with his discussion of my Dialectics and Liberty Trilogy. Next year, I will formally mark the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of the first two books of that trilogy—Marx, Hayek, and Utopia and Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical—and the twenty-fifth anniversary of its finale, Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism. I will devote more attention to each of these books as we approach their birthdays!

My appreciation notwithstanding, I’m somewhat overwhelmed by Winton’s view that I have “possibly thought more deeply than any other living person about the relevance of social context to the pursuit of libertarian ideals.”

Recently, several articles have been published, lamenting the state of libertarianism—how it has lost its relevance and practicality, how it has lost its way. I can attest to the fact that whatever libertarianism is today, it is not what it was when I first encountered it in the late 1970s. As a twentieth-century offshoot of liberalism, libertarianism emphasized the centrality of individual rights. But this was not a purely propertarian vision. It was a liberal ideal that situated intellectual, political, and economic freedom within an inclusive cosmopolitan social framework.

I often heard the mantra that libertarianism was about getting the government out of the boardroom and the bedroom. I took seriously Ayn Rand’s view that a “new intellectual” movement was necessary to unite the “homeless refugees” in American politics: the nontotalitarian “liberals” and the nontraditional “conservatives.” I took seriously Murray Rothbard’s call “for a new liberty” that transcended the limitations of left and right.

Even more importantly—and in complete agreement with Winton—I took seriously the neo-Aristotelian perspective that any struggle for human freedom is simultaneously a commitment to the project of personal flourishing. Each implies the other. Each requires the other. And each depends upon a culture that nourishes both.

Alas, we are facing a political climate here in America—and in many other countries throughout the world—in which there is a struggle between competing forms of illiberalism on both the left and the right. I have not concealed my view as to which is the greater threat. But illiberalism of any kind anywhere is a threat to human freedom and personal flourishing everywhere.

The opening epigraph of John Stuart Mill hints at the importance of focusing on how power manifests itself in reciprocally reinforcing ways. The approach of so-called “thin libertarians”—that is, those who have argued that freedom does not require a robust defense of anything beyond a nonaggression principle—is so myopic that it collapses in on itself. Somehow, someway, such “thin libertarians” have ushered in, through the backdoor, cultural presuppositions that they believe are necessary to the achievement and sustenance of human freedom.

Indeed, even Murray Rothbard, who once declared the sole importance of the nonaggression “axiom,” notably shifted his support toward what he called “Liberty Plus.” This was an acknowledgement that some kind of cultural matrix was necessary to nourish the freedom project. Rothbard argued that the paleoconservative values of a Christian culture, a “shared ethnicity,” and a “shared religion” were the only bulwark against the “modal” libertines who had taken up the banner of freedom. Hans-Hermann Hoppe furthered this view with a vengeance, arguing that libertarianism could not survive the conditions of “moral degeneracy and cultural rot” brought on by those who engaged in what he saw as the sordid promiscuity, vulgarity, obscenity, and illegitimacy of alternative lifestyles (in other words: anyone who identified as LGBT+).

Given that anarcho-capitalists like Hoppe advocate a society based on the creation of private propertarian fiefdoms, in which property owners can expel any groups upholding non-approved religious, cultural, or sexual practices, or even people whose skin color they don’t like, the very idea of a cosmopolitan liberal order was anathema. In other words, such libertarianism simply dispensed with liberalism, the very tapestry from which it emerged.

That’s not what I signed up for.

I believe that it is partially because of these developments in some libertarian circles that the radical liberal project remains stillborn, despite the gallant efforts of so many fine thinkers who have worked so hard to make the more robust case for freedom and flourishing. That project requires us to examine the systemic nature of tyranny and oppression—that is, the ways in which power relations are manifested on multiple levels in any given society. The cultural level is perhaps the most crucial of all.

And make no mistake about it: Power is not a purely political phenomenon. As Mill suggests, “prevailing opinion and feeling,” can be just as tyrannical as anything political. Indeed, James Madison warned that liberty could be destroyed from the top-down by political compulsion and from the bottom-up by the cultural imposition of conformity. Madison understood that liberty thrives on diversity.

So, in response to the question, “Should Libertarians be Attempting to Influence Culture?”, I can only say that this presupposes an understanding of more basic issues. First, libertarians should be focused on exploring the role of culture in shaping political and social outcomes. And in a global context, this also entails exploring how different cultures may or may not support the radical liberal project.

I have championed the dialectical method because, as the art of context-keeping, dialectics demands that we examine any problem, issue, or event on different levels of generality and from different vantage points. By shifting our perspective on any problem, issue, or event, we emerge with a fuller understanding of the varied ways in which these phenomena manifest themselves. We can then begin piecing together how the parts interrelate and function in a system examined across time.

I will have a lot more to say about these issues in forthcoming exchanges. For now, I’m delighted that Winton has invited me to participate in this unfolding dialogue.

Addendum:

Chris Mathew Sciabarra has also posted this discussion on his blog, Notablog. Please take a look at Chris’s blog.


Monday, August 5, 2024

Why has "Norms of Liberty" made a lasting impression on me?

 


Norms of Liberty is a work of political philosophy written by Douglas B Rasmussen and Douglas J Den Uyl, and published in 2005.

The blurb on Amazon provides a good description of what the book is about:

“How can we establish a political/legal order that in principle does not require the human flourishing of any person or group to be given structured preference over that of any other? Addressing this question as the central problem of political philosophy, Norms of Liberty offers a new conceptual foundation for political liberalism that takes protecting liberty, understood in terms of individual negative rights, as the primary aim of the political/legal order.” 

Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue for construing individual rights as metanormative principles. These principles establish the political/ legal conditions under which full moral conduct can take place.

The authors distinguish metanormative principles from normative principles that provide guidance for moral conduct within the ambit of normative ethics. This crucial distinction allows them to develop liberalism as a metanormative theory rather than as a guide for moral conduct.

The authors show that the moral universe can support liberalism without either being minimized or requiring morality to be grounded in sentiment or contracts. Rather, liberalism can be supported, and many of its internal tensions avoided, with an ethical framework of Aristotelian inspiration―one that understands human flourishing to be an objective, inclusive, individualized, agent-relative, social, and self-directed activity.

Readers who are looking for a more expansive synopsis should read Ed Younkins’s essay, ‘Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Trilogy of Freedom and Flourishing’, published on The Savvy Street.

Some explanation of the authors’ use of the term ‘liberalism’ might be helpful at this point. As well as defending classical liberalism and libertarianism, the authors seek to defend other types of political liberalism (as the term is used in the United States) which still subscribe to some of the tenets of classical liberalism e.g. that people should be free to pursue their own conceptions of the good life.   

My purpose here is not to review the book but to explain why the book has made a lasting impression on me. First, I will explain why I thought the book made an important contribution when I first read it in 2007. Then, I will explain why I still think the book provides the most appropriate framework in which to consider the rights of individuals.

My initial impression

Rasmussen and Den Uyl advanced their argument for construing individual rights as metanormative principles in large part as a response to communitarian and conservative critics who claimed that liberalism had undermined its own principles.

I had read some communitarian literature prior to reading Norms of Liberty but I was more concerned about the threat to individual rights posed by people who wanted to make happiness a goal of national economic policy. The people concerned wanted to use survey data on average life satisfaction to monitor achievement of that goal. I was concerned that responses to life satisfaction surveys don’t give appropriate weight to everything that is important to people and that using such surveys to pursue a national happiness goal would interfere with individual choice. (I wrote an article about such matters in 2004. It can be found here.)

I read Norms of Liberty at a time when I was ready to move beyond utilitarianism. The welfare economics that I had been imbued with decades earlier seemed to imply that it would be good for governments to adopt aggregate welfare as an over-arching policy goal if only it was possible to measure individual utility in a manner suitable to be aggregated (or averaged) in some way. However, after some economists began to claim that life satisfaction surveys provided a way to do that, the potential conflict with individual liberty could not be ignored. It seemed wrong for liberty to be viewed as just an element in an individual’s utility function. But how could one avoid viewing liberty in that way if the sole goal of individuals is to maximize utility functions?

The answer that Norms of Liberty provided to me was that I needed to step aside from a framework in which all goals of individuals could be summarised neatly in terms of maximizing a nebulous concept referred to as “utility”. I needed to think more broadly in terms of individual flourishing as a multidimensional process. Liberty is integral to individual flourishing because individual flourishing is an inherently self-directed process.

I began blogging soon after reading Norms of Liberty. Some of my initial posts reflect the favourable impression the book had on me soon after I had read it. For example:  What does flourishing mean? , and Is Freedom and necessary condition for human flourishing?

 Later views

Over the years, I have discussed many different things on this blog.  Blogging has been a learning process. I cannot claim that the views I have expressed have always been philosophically coherent.  

Nevertheless, I claim a degree of consistency in advocating for a political/legal order which protects the possibility of individual self-direction, and ensures that the flourishing of any person or group is not given structural preference over any other. I also claim consistent optimism about the potential for the vast majority of individuals to flourish – with help from family and friends – if governments protect their natural rights and refrain from interfering with the manner of their flourishing. (I don’t deny that government assistance has helped some people to flourish but I observe that government assistance is often offered in a manner that encourages people to languish.)

Those ideas are also themes of my book, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing, as well as being reflected in many of the essays on this blog.

While re-reading Norms of Liberty a few days ago, I was struck by its relevance to recent political developments in many of the countries often referred to as western liberal democracies. When I first read the book, I had the impression that groups who sought to have their modes of flourishing given structural preference over others lacked the political power to implement their policies. At that time, the main threat to individual self-direction seemed to come from well-meaning paternalists who wanted to use the coercive powers of the state to make people happy.

More recently, it seems to me that some groups are increasingly seeking to use the coercive powers of the state to have their modes of flourishing given structural preference over others. I don’t see this tendency as being confined to any one religious or political group, although some are more prone than others to advocate restrictions on liberty.

One development that seems to me to be of particular concern is the increasing prevalence of the idea that freedom of speech should be restricted to protect people from being offended by what others may say about their ethnicity, religious views etc. If the legal system gives people greater incentives to take offence at what others say, it is reasonable to predict an increase in the extent to which people take offence, leading to demands for further restriction of freedom of speech. Threats of violence should be prohibited because they are incompatible with peaceful coexistence. Beyond that, however, restriction of freedom of speech is a slippery slope that is likely to increase, rather than lessen, conflict between different community groups.

Conclusion

My purpose in writing this essay has been to explain why Norms of Liberty, by Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl, has made a lasting impression on me.

At the time I first read Norms of Liberty, in 2007, I was particularly concerned about threats to liberty posed by the proposals of some utilitarians who want to make happiness a goal of national economic policy and to use survey measures of average life satisfaction to monitor achievement of that goal. I was concerned that average life satisfaction doesn’t adequately account for liberty. That provided the context in which I was ready to step aside from the idea that all the goals of individuals could be summarized in terms of utility maximization. It made more sense to think of individual flourishing as a multidimensional process which is largely self-directed and to think of liberty as the metanormative principle that protects the possibility of individual self-direction.

I still think the best defence of liberty is to view it as the means of protecting the possibility of individual self-direction, and ensuring that the flourishing of any person or group is not given structural preference over any other. While re-reading Norms of Liberty it struck me that since the book was written, groups seeking to have their modes of flourishing given structural preference over others have come to pose an increasing threat to liberty in the western liberal democracies. Peaceful coexistence among different groups is likely to break down if norms of liberty are not adequately defended.


Monday, June 17, 2024

Can discourse ethics help us to assess ideas about justice?


This essay focuses mainly on the discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas.

Habermas, who will be 95 years old tomorrow, developed a theory of communicative rationality based on the argument that all speech has an inherent goal of mutual understanding and that humans possess the communicative competence to bring about such understanding.

Habermas is a public intellectual, but I haven’t followed his contributions to discussion of topical issues closely enough to judge whether they exemplify the discourse ethics that he advocates. My main reason for interest in Habermas’s discourse ethics is the apparent influence he has had on other philosophers, including Hilary Putnam and Amartya Sen.

In this essay I briefly outline the principles of Habermas’s discourse ethics, the ideological background and motive for his focus on communication, and similarities and differences between his communication ethics and those of Michael Polanyi and Ayn Rand, before briefly discussing whether his discourse ethics offers a normative basis to assess ideas about justice.

Principles

Habermas’s two principles of discourse ethics relate to the philosophical justification of a moral standpoint. The first concerns consensus (or possible consensus):

Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.

The second is a generalizability rule, or principle of universalization:

All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities).  

(For references, please see the entry on Habermas in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.)

Ideological background and motive


The context in which Habermas developed his ideas about communication has been explained by Chris Sciabarra in Marx, Hayek, and Utopia. Sciabarra explains Habermas’s project as an outgrowth of the Frankfurt school, which “attempted to recapture the dialectical method of Marx, while maintaining a Marxist faith in the human triumph over unintended consequences” (Chapter 7)

Friedrich Hayek argued that any attempt by an individual or group of individuals to produce social change would inevitably have unintended consequences. Hayek argued that achievement of Karl Marx’s historical projection of a communist utopia would require a different kind of species capable of total knowledge of the consequences of their actions, rather than humans who are only capable of partial knowledge.

Sciabarra presents Habermas’s ideas about communication as a reconstruction of Marx’s project to focus on empirical conditions under which people could engage in practical, transformative social action. Habermas’s ideal society is one based on non-exploitative social relations. He views all social systems as networks of communicative actions, and argues that the institutions of power depend on and perpetuate a distorted form of social communication.

Habermas argues that if people could master ideal speech they would move towards the goals of truth, freedom and justice. One of the important characteristics of ideal speech is that the speaker must want to express his intentions truthfully so that the hearer can believe in (or trust) the utterance of the speaker. Participants learn to trust one another and share value orientations when speech is free from deception and other forms of communicative distortion. Habermas suggests that social consensus will emerge as people achieve communicative competence. (My intention is to convey the gist of Habermas’s argument without distorting it but my account has all the limitations of a summary of a summary.)

Comparison with Polanyi and Rand

Michael Polanyi was a polymath whose understanding of the importance of tacit knowledge was largely endorsed by Hayek. Sciabarra presents a quote from Polanyi which suggests that his position on communication differs little from that of Habermas. Both emphasised the importance of trust in communication and the potential for shared values to emerge from dialogue. However, Sciabarra also notes a crucial difference between them. While Habermas argued that the tacit component of dialogue could be fully articulated, Polanyi held that this was not possible.

Habermas argues that depth hermeneutics, a form of psychoanalysis, could make explicit the tacit causal connections that take place in an individual’s subconscious, overcoming blocks to consciousness, and enabling a reintegration to occur. One goal of this process is intersubjectivity – enabling participants in discussions to exchange roles with one another in expressing their needs and interests.


Sciabarra discusses the similarity and differences between Ayn Rand’s communication ethics and those of Habermas in Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical. Rand recognized that honesty is an essential component of rational human relations and fully understood the exploitive nature of strategic forms of communication. Rand’s followers emphasize that self-deception is distortive of an individual’s efficacy and communicative competence.

Sciabarra suggests that an “emphasis on communicative truthfulness, self-awareness, and “de-repression” is as crucial to the Randian project as it is to Habermasian discourse theory”. (293) He suggests that “she sustained a belief in a conflict-free society of individuals united by their common love for the same values” (355). However, Rand’s values differed from those of Habermas: She “would have vehemently rejected Habermas’s emphasis on “intersubjectivity” and the social consensus of norms”. (291)

Relevance to ideas about justice

If we are seeking to reach agreement with others it seems obvious that we should seek to understand the basis for their points of view. For example, if a person is engaged in a discussion with his or her spouse about who should cook dinner, agreement is more likely if each party understands why the other might or might not want to cook on a particular day.

In the example I have just given, both parties have a strong incentive to reach agreement to enable a harmonious relationship to continue. It is also possible to think of contexts at a societal level where people have a strong incentive to reach agreement and are willing to set aside differences in current interests in making collective decisions. James Buchanan and Gordon Tulloch suggested that when individuals are considering constitutional rules that they expect to be in place for a long time, they may be able to set aside current interests because they are uncertain about what their interests will be in any of the long chain of collective choices made according to those rules. (The Calculus of Consent) I wonder if Habermas would approve if the participants in a constitutional convention agreed to rules protecting individual rights to property ownership.

This brings me to a fundamental problem with Habermas’s generalizability rule. Douglas Rasmussen pointed this out. (‘Political legitimacy and discourse ethics’, International Philosophical Quarterly, March 1992) According to Habermas, the “moral point of view” requires one to consider the satisfaction of one’s own needs and interests from an impersonal point of view – from a point of view which treats the fact that some needs and interests are uniquely yours as being of no consequence. Rasmussen points out that this so called “moral point of view” is not compatible with the moral reasoning of real people in real situations:

“One cannot even recognize his own life as his and his own reasoning as his very own if in order to play the moral game one must forgo all special attachments to ends that are uniquely one’s own.” (30)

Rasmussen concludes by noting that values associated with modernity, including recognition of the inherent worth of the individual human being, are inconsistent with Habermas’s “moral view”:

“Such a modern view, then, does not call for theoretical attempts to paper over the real and legitimate differences among the values and projects of individuals by attempting artificially to induce consensus through a generalizability of interests rule or by appealing to the so called “moral point of view”. Rather, it requires that one accept the moral propriety of pluralism and individualism, and from this starting point attempt the difficult task of constructing a theory of justice.” (34)

Conclusions

Jürgen Habermas has proposed that principles of discourse ethics can provide a normative basis to assess ideas about justice.

Habermas developed his principles of discourse ethics while reconstructing Marx’s project. He envisaged that the potential for “ideal speech” could enable a social consensus to emerge for movement towards the goals of truth, freedom, and justice.

Habermas’s discourse ethics is similar in some respects to the views of communication ethics advocated by Michael Polanyi and Ayn Rand. However, unlike Polanyi, Habermas argued that the tacit component of dialogue could be fully articulated. Unlike Rand, Habermas argued for intersubjectivity, which amounts to adoption of an impersonal point of view.

There is a fundamental problem in applying Habermas’s principles of discourse ethics to assess ideas about justice. Habermas’s generalizability rule seeks to artificially induce consensus by papering over legitimate differences among values held by individuals. 


Addendum

Readers may also be interested in Chris Sciabarra's discussion of possible libertarian applications of Habermas's view in a section on "Dialogical Models" in libertarian thought, in Chapter 9 of "Total Freedom". That section surveys various thinkers in Austrian and libertarian traditions. 

Sunday, June 9, 2024

How different were the views of Hayek and Rand on the role of reason?

 


I think many people who have some knowledge of the views of Ayn Rand and Friedrich Hayek have the impression that they had vastly different opinions on the role of reason. I certainly had that impression until recently.


I have changed my mind since reading Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical, by Chris Sciabarra.

In what follows, I begin by explaining why I had the impression that Rand and Hayek had vastly different views about reason, then outline why Sciabarra considers their views are similar in some respects, and follow that by attempting to identify the most important area of difference between them.



Opposing views?

The best way to explain why I thought Ayn Rand and Friedrich Hayek had vastly different views about reason is via some quotes.

Rand wrote:

“Rationality is man’s basic virtue, the source of all his other virtues.”

“The virtue of Rationality means the recognition and acceptance of reason as one’s only source of knowledge, one’s only judge of values and one’s only guide to action.” (Quotes from The Virtue of Selfishness, 1961, 31)

Hayek wrote:

“Like all other values, our morals are not a product but a presupposition of reason, part of the ends which our intellect has been developed to serve. At any one stage of our evolution, the system of values into which we are born supplies the ends which our reason must serve.” (The Constitution of Liberty, 1960, 63)

Chris Sciabarra notes that Rand recognized that individuals tacitly absorb the dominant values and ideas of the culture in which they live. (193) They develop the essentials of a “subconscious philosophy” from the earliest impressions of their childhood. (298) However, she saw each individual’s articulation of values and attitudes as a means towards rational integration or alteration, and analysis of values and attitudes at a social level as a means toward their explicit articulation or transcendence. (299)

While Hayek argued that reason helps us to observe social rules that enable us to get along with one another, he also argued that coercion to ensure compliance with those rules should be minimal. That was not only because coercion as such is bad, but because it is often desirable that social rules “should be observed only in most instances and that the individual should be able to transgress them when it seems to him worthwhile to incur the odium which this will cause”. He saw the system of values into which we are born as having emerged via social evolution. (COL, 58-9) He noted that “the existence of individuals and groups simultaneously observing partially different rules provides the opportunity for the selection of the more effective ones”. (COL, 63)

Hayek also recognized that “we must always strive to improve our institutions”, thus allowing for the possibility that conscious efforts in that direction could be successful. However, he suggested that we “can never synthetically construct a new body of moral rules” and “must take for granted much that we do not understand”. (COL, 63)

It seems to me that although Rand was more optimistic than was Hayek about the role of reason in enabling improvements in cultural values, their views about the role of reason were not diametrically opposed. Both recognized that individuals may have good reasons to question the dominant values of the culture in which they live.

Similar views about rationalism

Chris Sciabarra notes that Ayn Rand saw knowledge as the product of a conceptual integration of the facts of reality. She agreed with rationalists that human awareness is distinctly conceptual but departed from their view because they based their analyses on “floating abstractions” – dogmatic acontextual premises - rather than on concepts with perceptual roots. Leonard Peikoff, Rand’s close associate, has argued that rationalists pretend to have omniscience.

 Sciabarra suggests that Rand and her intellectual allies would have agreed with Hayek’s assessment that constructivist rationalism – the belief that deliberately planned social constructions produce outcomes that are superior to those of the spontaneous order of a free society - is an inappropriate extension of the Enlightenment faith in reason. He suggests that the crux of both Rand’s and Hayek’s critique of rationalism is as follows:

“The failure of rationalism was not a failure of reason. By ascribing to human beings the attributes of an omniscient deity, and then condemning human reason for not fulfilling this ideal, rationalists attack the genuine legitimacy of human cognition. Rand argued that this destructive pattern is reproduced by the advocates of altruism, who erect an impossible, self-abnegating standard of morality and then indict humanity for not being able to live up to it.” (212)

Hayek observed that constructivist rationalists tend to base their case on the synoptic delusion, “the fiction that all the relevant facts are known to some one mind, and that it is possible to construct from this knowledge of the particulars a desirable social order”. There is additional discussion of Hayek’s view of constructivist rationalism my recent essay: Did Hayek acknowledge the importance of individual self-direction in his vision of spontaneous order?

The most important difference?

I think the most important difference between Hayek and Rand about the role of reason concerns their differing views about the desirability of articulation of the rules underlying skills and customs of thought. As Sciabarra explains, Hayek acknowledged that the articulation of principles can be useful in transmitting know-how but noted that people often pass on know-how from generation to generation without being able to articulate the underlying principles involved. He quotes Hayek:

“Man has more often learnt to do the right thing without comprehending why it was the right thing, and he is still more often served by custom than by understanding.” (197-8)

Sciabarra points out that Rand believed that the articulation process was essential in the realm of morality because it enabled individuals not only to do the right thing but to know why it was the right thing to do. Rand held that an articulated philosophy is necessary for efficacious living: to live efficaciously it is necessary to choose, to choose it is necessary to define values, to define values it is necessary to know one’s own nature and the nature of the world. (200)

Rand proclaimed that the standard of value of the Objectivist ethics is “man’s life, or that which is required for man’s survival qua man”:

“Man has to be man—by choice; he has to hold his life as a value—by choice; he has to learn to sustain it—by choice; he has to discover the values it requires and practice his virtues—by choice.” (The Virtue of Selfishness, 28)

Personal perspective

I think Ayn Rand went too far in her assertions about choice and Friedrich Hayek went to too far in his assertions about the limits of human understanding.

I find it difficult to comprehend Rand’s assertion that humans have to choose to live. Does a new-born baby choose whether to accept the nourishment being offered by his or her mother? 

Some of Rand’s followers have attempted to explain that the choice to live is a fact inherent in the conditional nature of human life itself, but that seems to me to cloud the meaning of choice, and make it difficult to distinguish a choice from a survival instinct.

As I see it, rather than choosing whether to live or not live, it is more in accord with human nature for individuals to seek to discover or recognize what it means to be a human. As Henry Veatch wrote:

“We could say that this natural end or natural disposition of a human being is something pre-rational or pre-intelligent: it is just a fact that reason can do no more than recognize. And yet – and here is the decisive point – having come to recognize this pre-rational and pre-intelligent end, our human intelligence then sees that it is man’s natural end and hence the proper end for a human being to seek. It thus becomes an end which we do not seek merely in fact and automatically, toward which we are impelled uncritically and unreflectingly, but rather an end that we see that we have reason to seek and which we recognize as being the right and proper end for us as human beings.” (Rational Man, 79)

It is necessary to be aware of your natural end as a human being before making choices about what that potential means for the way you live your life.

In my recent post about Friedrich Hayek, referred to earlier, I suggested that he sometimes went too far in downplaying the ability of humans to understand the significance of abstract rules. I argued that most people are capable of understanding the purposes served by rules of just conduct and that it makes more sense to explain those purposes than to suggest that reverence for the traditional should be sufficient reason for compliance.

Conclusions

The views that Ayn Rand and Friedrich Hayek held about the role of reason are not as far apart as I had thought them to be prior to reading Chris Sciabarra’s book, Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical.

Rand was more optimistic than Hayek about the role of reason in enabling improvements in cultural values but they both recognized that individuals may have good reasons to question the dominant culture in which they live.

Sciabarra argues that Rand’s intellectual allies would agree with Hayek’s denunciation of the constructivist rationalism of those who believe they knew enough about human nature to plan a perfect society. Rand’s allies also condemn rationalists for ascribing to humans the attributes of an omniscient deity.

In my view, the most significant difference between the views of Rand and Hayek concerns the desirability of articulation of reasons for adherence to moral rules. I agree with Rand on that point.

Despite my disagreements with some of the views of both Rand and Hayek on the role of reason, I agree with what I see as the central elements of their views on this topic. I strongly support Rand’s view that it is necessary for individuals to have an articulated philosophy if they are to live efficaciously, and I strongly support Hayek’s denunciation of constructivist rationalism.


Tuesday, May 21, 2024

Did Hayek acknowledge the importance of individual self-direction in his vision of spontaneous order?

 


One of the reasons why Friedrich Hayek’s vision of spontaneous order is more attractive than collectivist alternatives is because it offers individuals greater opportunities for self-directed flourishing. However, the question arises of whether Hayek may have undermined the appeal of his vision by presenting a view of the limitations of human reason that leaves little room for individual self-direction.

In exploring this question, I sketch out the importance of self-direction to human flourishing, Hayek’s objections to constructivist rationalism, Hayek’s reverence for tradition and social evolution, Hayek’s attitude to free will, and the role of human agency in Hayek’s account of spontaneous order.

Importance of self-direction

 In helping make the case that “self-direction is the central necessary constituent or ingredient of human flourishing” Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen quote Aristotle and Henry Veatch, a leading neo-Aristotelian of the 20th century. Veatch writes:

“Is it not evident that not only does a human being not attain his natural end by an automatic process of development and maturity after the manner of a plant or animal? In addition, no human being ever attains his natural end or perfection save by his own personal effort and exertion. No one other than the human individual – no agency of society, of family, of friends, or of whatever can make or determine or program an individual to be a good man, or program him to live the life that a human being ought to live. Instead, attaining one’s natural end as a human person is nothing if not a ‘do-it-yourself’ job.” (The Perfectionist Turn, 51-2)

The errors of constructivist rationalists

Chris Sciabarra makes an important point about Hayek’s anti-rationalistic beliefs:

“His enemy is not reason but the constructivists who have “historically again and again given birth to a revolt against reason”. (Total Freedom, 131)

Hayek observes that constructivist rationalists - enthusiasts for a deliberately planned society - tend to base their case on the synoptic delusion, “the fiction that all the relevant facts are known to some one mind, and that it is possible to construct from this knowledge of the particulars a desirable social order”. (LLL, v1, 14) Hayek argues that by over-estimating the powers of reason, constructivist rationalism has given birth to a revolt against the wisdom embodied in abstract rules, including rules of just conduct, which tell us what not to do. (LLL, V1, 31-34) The abstract rules protect individuals from arbitrary violence by others and enable them to try to build for themselves a protected domain with which nobody else is allowed to interfere and within which they can use their own knowledge for their own purposes. (LLL, V3, 163)

Hayek’s reverence for tradition and social evolution

In my view, Hayek sometimes went too far in downplaying the ability of humans to understand the significance of abstract rules. For example, in one instance he claimed that “submission to undesigned rules and conventions whose significance we largely do not understand, this reverence for the traditional, that the rationalistic mind finds so uncongenial, … is indispensable for the working of a free society”. (COL, 63) It seems to me that most people are capable of understanding the purposes served by rules of just conduct. It makes more sense to explain those purposes than to suggest that reverence for the traditional should be sufficient reason for compliance.

The emphasis which Hayek placed on group selection in the evolutionary process also downplays the potential role of reason. Hayek argues that rules of just conduct evolved because the groups which practiced them were more successful and displaced others. (LLL, V1, 18) James Buchanan pointed out that there is no reason to believe that group survival will always lead to a more beneficial state of affairs. Chris Sciabarra makes the same point, also noting that Hayek does not provide an objective standard by which to judge as desirable or undesirable the consequences of spontaneous orders. (Total Freedom, 131)

Buchanan suggests that Hayek’s skepticism about the ability of humans to rationally design social institutions, including constitutions, precludes any attempt at reform. In their excellent discussion of this point, Peter Boettke and Scott King suggest that the issue has been confused by conflating the question of the origin of institutions with questions relating to the development and improvement of institutions. They note that Hayek is open to attempts to improve spontaneous orders through small revisions in the overall rules. (I refer to the chapter entitled ‘Hayek and the Hayekians on the Political Order of a Free People’, in Hayek’s Tensions: Reexamining the Political Economy and Philosophy of F. A. Hayek, edited by Stefanie Haeffele, Solomon M. Stein, and Virgil Henry Storr.)

Hayek’s attitude to free will

Discussions of Hayek’s attitude to free will often begins with his venture into theoretical psychology in The Sensory Order, published in 1952. When I read the ‘Philosophical Consequences’ chapter of that book, about 30 years ago, I gained the impression that Hayek was an advocate of free will. Hayek certainly rejects the idea that it is possible to explain why people hold particular views, at particular moments, from knowledge of their material circumstances. Immediately afterwards, in discussing free will more explicitly, Hayek asserts:

“To us human decisions must always appear as the result of the whole human personality – that means the whole of the persons mind – which, as we have seen, we cannot reduce to something else.” (See page 250 of “The Essence of Hayek”, 1984 by W. Glenn Campbell (Foreword), Kurt R. Leube (Editor), Chiaki Nishiyama (Editor).

Hayek based his argument against microphysical reductionism on the belief that the human brain can never fully explain its own operations. Paul Lewis has suggested that if Hayek had relied more fully on the ideas of organismic biologists he would have been able to develop an emergentist argument against microphysical reductionism, thus providing a stronger basis for use of concepts such as goals and purposes. (See Lewis’s chapter entitled ‘Tensions and Ambiguities in Hayek’s Social Theory’ in Hayek’s Tensions, cited above. Those who are interested in reading a philosophical emergentist argument for free will can find one in the The Metaphysics of Emergenceby Richard Campbell. I reviewed the book here.)

In The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek offers a potted summary of the free will debate. He notes that the concept of universal determinism that dominated 19th century science seemed to eliminate the possibility of free will. He also notes that physicists have now abandoned universal determinism but doubts that this affects “the puzzle about the freedom of the will”. He then states:

“It appears that the assertion that the will is free has as little meaning as its denial and that the whole issue is a phantom problem, a dispute about words in which the contestants have not made clear what an affirmative or negative answer would imply.”

However, Hayek’s subsequent discussion of the conclusions generally drawn by determinists and voluntarists about their respective positions leaves little doubt about where he stands:

“The determinists usually argue that, because men’s actions are completely determined by natural causes, there can be no justification for holding them responsible or praising or blaming their actions. The voluntarists, on the other hand, contend that, because there exists in man some agent standing outside the chain of cause or effect, this agent is the bearer of responsibility and the legitimate object of praise and blame. Now there can be little doubt that, so far as these practical conclusions are concerned, the voluntarists are more nearly right, while the determinists are merely confused.” (COL, 72-73)

In discussing the difference between “inner freedom” and the absence of coercion, Hayek had already made clear his belief that it is possible for a person to be guided by “considered will”, “reason or lasting conviction, rather than by momentary impulse or circumstance”. He adds:

“If a person does not succeed in doing what, after sober reflection, he decides to do, if his intentions or strength desert him at the decisive moment and he fails to do what he somehow wishes to do, we may say that he is ‘unfree,’ the slave of his passions.” (COL, 15)

Later, Hayek asserts:

“The recognition that each person has his own scale of values which we ought to respect, even if we do not approve of it, is part of the conception of the value of the individual personality. (COL, 79)

The role of individual human agency

In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek wrote:

“Freedom to order our own conduct in the sphere where material circumstances force a choice upon us, and responsibility for the arrangement of our own life according to our own conscience, is the air in which alone moral sense grows and in which moral values are daily re-created in the free decision of the individual. Responsibility, not to a superior, but to one’s conscience, the awareness of a duty not exacted by compulsion, the necessity to decide which of the things one values are to be sacrificed to others, and to bear the consequences of one’s own decision, are the very essence of any morals which deserve the name.” (231-2)

That statement seems to me to be broadly consistent with the do-it-yourself job of being a good person, as described by Henry Veatch. However, some of the things that Hayek wrote later give a different impression. In The Constitution of Liberty, he advocated submission to rules and conventions, quoting David Hume’s assertion that “the rules of morality are not the conclusions of our reason”. (63) In Law, Legislation and Liberty, Hayek writes:

“Man is as much a rule-following animal as a purpose-seeking one.”

Mario Rizzo has suggests (in a paper entitled, F.A. Hayek and the Rationality of Individual Choice’) that Hayek’s mature views about rationality should be understood in terms of a general framework acknowledging that humans are both purposeful agents and rule-followers. In emphasizing the importance of rule-following behaviour, Hayek didn’t abandon individual rationality. Even at the purely individual level, leaving aside the need to coordinate plans with others, rule-following makes sense because we live in a world of uncertainty and because our minds have limited capacities to know and compute.

Hayek seems to have rarely considered individual agency apart from the spontaneous order. The following paragraph provides a good summary of his perspective:

“What makes men members of the same civilization and enables them to live and work together in peace is that in the pursuit of their individual ends the particular monetary impulses which impel their efforts towards concrete results are guided and restrained by the same abstract rules. If emotion and impulse tells them what they want, the conventional rules tell them how they will be able and be allowed to achieve it.”

Personal perspective

Did Friedrich Hayek undermine the appeal of his vision by presenting a view of the limitations of human reason that leaves little room for individual self-direction? In his efforts to counter constructivist rationalism, I think Hayek inadvertently understated the role of human reason in individual flourishing. However, if individuals have greater potential for self-directed flourishing than Hayek thought possible, that makes spontaneous order a more attractive option.

In assessing Hayek’s views on the role of self-direction in individual flourishing it is important to recognize that advising individuals how best they could flourish was incidental to his main purpose. One way to illustrate that is by reference to my book, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing. I draw fairly extensively upon Hayek’s wisdom in the first part of that book in discussing topics such as the definition of liberty, rules of just conduct, transmission of ancient law to the modern world, and evolution of social norms.

I only mention Hayek’s contribution once in the chapter discussing the challenge of self-direction. His views are referred to in that context not to emphasize the difficulty of self-direction but to counter the view that we (humans) are prone systematically to make serious mistakes in the individualized pursuit of happiness. I draw attention to the fact that Hayek urged respect for social norms that embody the experience of generations in advocating a legal and social order consistent with pursuit of happiness by individuals. (150-1)

In retrospect, I could also possibly have drawn on Hayek to point out implications of the fact that reasoning is cognitively demanding. In pursuing our personal goals it often makes more to sense for us to choose rules (norms) to follow, based on our own previous experience and the experience of others, than to attempt to reason our way through life by treating every issue that arises as though nothing similar has ever previously been encountered in human history.