Why did Aristotle view leisure as a fundamental aspect of a well-lived life?

 

Leah Goldrick answers the question posed above in this guest essay. The essay was first published on Common Sense Ethics, Leah’s excellent blog.

Leah writes:

I've just finished reading Aristotle's Way: How Ancient Wisdom Can Change Your Life, by classicist Edith Hall. It's a great book that I would recommend for my readers, as Hall capitalizes on popular interest in ancient philosophy and substantive self-help. Aristotle addresses the issue of how to live a good life in his Politics, and Nicomachean Ethics, written in the fourth century BC. In Aristotle's Way, Hall codifies Aristotle's most important ideas on how we should live, addressing topics such as happiness, love, communication, and mortality, among others. 

Chapter Seven of Aristotle’s Way is all about Aristotle’s philosophy of leisure, which I think is one of the most interesting chapters, and that's what I'll be writing about in this post. If you want to read a review of the entire book, I recommend this one by Donald Robertson, since I'm focusing on only a part of it here. 

​Aristotle’s philosophy of leisure is tied to his broader understanding of human flourishing. Aristotle thought that most people tend to misuse leisure time if they haven’t learned how to spend it meaningfully, preferring instead to spend their non-working hours on trivial pleasures and amusements. However, learning to use leisure time for growth oriented pursuits can greatly improve our lives. Let's examine that idea in depth in the next sections.  
​

What is Aristotelian Leisure?

​Aristotelian leisure encompasses not just what we might think of as recreational activities today like hobbies and sports, but rather, everything broadly we do outside of work. This includes relaxation after work, eating and fulfilling other bodily functions, and amusements to avoid boredom. It also includes forming relationships with others, enjoying the arts, spending time on exercise and intellectual contemplation, crafts, civic association, and other beneficial and meaningful activities. For Aristotle, leisure isn’t simply about taking breaks or escaping from work; it's a fundamental aspect of a well-lived life.

At the core of Aristotle’s ethics is the concept of eudaimonia, translated as "flourishing" or "well-being." The ultimate human goal is living in accordance with reason and achieving a life of virtue. To reach eudaimonia, one must engage in activities that are fulfilling, meaningful, and promote personal growth. Leisure, in this context, is not a passive activity but is deeply connected to the active cultivation of one's intellect and virtues. In the Nichmeachean Ethics (Book X, 1176b) Aristotle writes: “To be always seeking after amusement is a sign of levity and not of a serious purpose.”

In today’s world, where leisure is often viewed as idle entertainment or seen merely as a break from work, the concept of Aristotelian leisure offers a richer and more profound understanding of what we should be doing with our time; leisure involves reflection, growth, and the pursuit of intellectual and moral development, not just passive distraction. Aristotle argues that leisure is the time in which we can engage in these activities, which allow us to connect to the highest aspects of our human nature. This could include philosophical conversation, artistic creation, or scientific inquiry. These activities are seen as valuable in themselves—not just as means to an end.

In essence, Aristotle’s view of leisure encourages us to think of it as time for self-improvement, exploration, and the cultivation of virtues, rather than merely a time to "rest" from work. Aristotle also believes that leisure is essential for cultivating friendships, which are vital for living a good life. In a sense, leisure time allows for the development of meaningful relationships, as people have time to engage in shared activities that promote mutual flourishing.

Work, Leisure and the Good Life

Aristotle obviously acknowledged that work and productive labor are necessary for survival, and most people in the ancient world that Aristotle inhabited worked tremendously hard. Aristotle also thinks that work can be virtuous if done with the right intentions.

Still, work is secondary to leisure in the Aristotelian sense. Moreover, work should not dominate a person’s life to the point where there is no room for leisure, because without leisure, a person is unable to engage in the activities that lead to personal fulfillment and virtue. Thinking about leisure this way can be a helpful antidote to the burnout many experience in the modern, work-centered culture.

From an Aristotelian perspective, you need not be defined by your job or career, but rather by what you choose to do with your non-working hours. This is good news for several reasons. First, the reality is that only a minority of people are lucky enough to be able to make a living doing what they love. Most of us will have work to get by, but it’s leisure that is truly important for a good life. So, it doesn’t matter if you aren’t totally satisfied with your career.

Best of all, even if you work a lot, you likely have more leisure time available to you than the average person in Aristotle's day. In ancient Greece, everything, even basic chores, had to be done by hand. By contrast, most people in the developed world today enjoy access to modern appliances and conveniences which free up more of our time for meaningful leisure.  

To wrap up the post here, Aristotle thought that how we spend our non-working hours defines who we are, the kind of life we will have, and the type of society we build. From this perspective, our leisure choices are more significant than we may realize. Spending our leisure time meaningfully helps us make sense of the world, experience growth, and contribute to something larger than ourselves. 

If you'd like to learn more about Aristotle's ideas on how to live well, I highly recommend reading Aristotle's Way.  

What does Don Lavoie tell us about the implications of the knowledge problem for the plans of political entrepreneurs?

One of the questions that I have been contemplating in recent months is whether the tariff policies of President Trump could be part of a coherent economic plan. Can his policies be rationalized in terms of revenue raising objectives, the optimum tariff argument, provision of appropriate incentives to manufacturing industries to meet defence or employment objectives, or the pursuit of foreign policy objectives? Is it possible that he is assigning policy instruments to objectives in a manner consistent with a rational plan?

The presumption underlying such questions is that it is preferable for political entrepreneurs to endeavor to ensure that their economic plans are coherent rather than unprincipled, unpredictable, and capricious. Although that may be a reasonable presumption, there is another other option that should be considered. Perhaps it is appropriate for political entrepreneurs to refrain from engaging in economic planning.

I was reminded of that while reading Don Lavoie’s book, National Economic Planning: What is Left?  Don Lavoie was an economics professor at George Mason University, where he taught from 1981 until his death in 2001. This book was originally published by the Cato Institute in 1985 and was reprinted by the Mercatus Center in 2016.

In this book Don Lavoie explains, among other things, that political entrepreneurs are confronted with a fundamental knowledge problem when they seek to plan economic activities, The epigraph quoted above (from page 181) encapsulates an important implication of the knowledge problem.

Lavoie’s explanation of the information problem begins with the insights of F. A. Hayek. The data that a planning agency would require to engage in rational economic planning resides in the separate minds of millions of people. The data exists only in a dispersed form that cannot be fully extracted by any single agent in society. The only way that knowledge can be used effectively is by relying on competitive struggles in a market system.  (p. 56)

The most obvious implication is that it is impossible for markets to be replaced by comprehensive economic planning. However, more modest attempts to steer the market towards particular outcomes also obstruct the source of knowledge which is essential to rational decision-making. (p. 56-7)

Lavoie points out that the only way we can know whether we are squandering resources by over- or underinvesting in microprocessors or steel, for example, is via “the messages contained in the relative profitability of rival firms in these industries”. He adds:

“But this is precisely the information we garble when we channel money toward one or another of the contenders. Deprived of its elimination process, the market would no longer be able to serve its function as a method for discovering better and eliminating worse production techniques. Without the necessity of responding to consumers’ wants or needs, businesses would never withdraw from unprofitable avenues of production.” (p.181)

Lavoie notes that advocates of industry policy disagree on the directions in which the market should be steered. For example, Felix Rohatyn wanted to funnel aid to sunset industries while Robert Reich wanted to funnel it to sunrise industries. He sums up:

“It is the main conclusion of the argument that I have called the knowledge problem … that there are no rational grounds on which Reich could ever convince Rohatyn or vice versa on such matters as are involved in economic change. As a result, such battles are sure to be fought with weapons other than carefully reasoned argument.” (p. 200-201)

Lavoie notes that Rohatyn and Reich both argued that it is the responsibility of a strong leader to coordinate the actions of the rest of us. (p.190) The coordination they had in mind seems to be more akin to the coordination that military leaders impose by giving orders to subordinates than the coordination among individuals that occurs voluntarily and spontaneously in a free market.

Lavoie argues that economic planning is inherently militaristic: “The practice of planning is nothing but the militarization of the economy”. In making that point he notes that the theory of economic planning was from its inception modeled after feudalistic and militaristic organizations. (p. 230)

Some would argue that a degree of militarization is a price worth paying, or even desirable, to achieve a range of national objectives. Indeed, the conventional theory of democracy seems to entail top-down direction. Prior to elections, political leaders tell voters about their plans for education, health, social security etc. and are expected to implement those plans after they are elected.  

I am not aware of anything that Lavoie wrote that discusses the legitimacy of the concept of national objectives and the question of whether planning (and militarization) may be necessary in the pursuit of social objectives. However, he provided a highly relevant discussion of the concept of democracy in a book chapter entitled, ‘Democracy, Markets, and the Legal Order: Notes on the Nature of Politics in a Radically Liberal Society’. (The book is: Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (Eds.) Liberalism and the Economic Order, Cambridge University Press, 1993.)

In that chapter Lavoie notes that Western liberals tend to view democracy and markets “as in some sort of necessary tension with one another”. We tend to think that “taking democracy too far undermines markets and that taking markets too far undermines democracy”. He attributes that view to “liberalism’s gradual drift into compromises with conservatism and socialism”.

Lavoie argues that liberalism needs to reinterpret its notions of markets and democracy so that they are seen to be essentially complementary. Our economics needs to take account of the cultural underpinnings of markets and our politics “needs to move beyond the model of the exercise of some kind of unified, conscious democratic will and understand democratic processes as distributed throughout the political culture”. The force of public opinion is best perceived as the distributed influence of political discourses throughout society rather than as “a concentrated will”.

Lavoie suggests that what we should mean by democracy is a distinctive kind of openness in society rather than a theory about how to elect the personnel of government:

“Democracy is not a quality of the conscious will of a representative organization that has been legitimated by the public, but a quality of the discursive process of the distributed wills of the public itself.” (p.111).

It seems to me that those who see merit in Lavoie’s view of democracy have good reasons to be skeptical about the worth of top-down planning to achieve national objectives. Individuals have different priorities and objectives that deserve to be recognized. National plans cannot solve the knowledge problem entailed in giving appropriate recognition to individual differences. 

Is it too soon to be asking in what part of the world will the next golden age be located?

 

The question posed above occurred to me as I was reading the final pages of Johan Norberg’s latest book, Peak Human: What We Can Learn from the Rise and Fall of Golden Ages.

Johan Norberg is a senior fellow at the Cato institute. He is a historian of ideas and a prolific author. If Norberg has a fan club, I might qualify for honorary membership. I have written about some of his previous books on this blog (here and here) and have read others.

Norberg explains what he means by a golden age in these terms:

“A golden age is associated with a culture of optimism, which encourages people to explore new knowledge, experiment with new methods and technologies, and exchange the results with others. Its characteristics are cultural creativity, scientific discoveries, technological achievements and economic growth that stand out compared with what came before and after it, and compared with other contemporary cultures. Its result is a high average standard of living, which is usually the envy of others, often also of their heirs.”

The author suggests that the most important precondition for a golden age is “an absence of orthodoxies imposed form the top about what to believe, think and say, how to live and what to do.” He doesn’t present the golden ages he has identified in utopian terms. He acknowledges that countries concerned all practiced slavery, denied women basic rights and “took great delight in exterminating neighbouring populations”.

As implied in the epigraph, Norberg argues that civilizations decline when they lose cultural self-confidence. He suggests that episodes of creativity and growth are often terminated because of the perceived self-interest of people who fear change and feel threatened by it. Free speech is replaced by orthodoxies and free markets are replaced by increased economic controls. The fears of those seeking stability and predictability often become self-fulfilling.

 In my view, Norberg has done an excellent job in explaining why golden ages have emerged and disappeared at different times in different parts of the world.

However, I think there may be an omission in the author’s identification of golden ages. I will briefly discuss that before focusing on the question of whether the Anglosphere is in decline.

Identifying golden ages

Norberg discusses seven golden ages in his book. Since he doesn’t provide a summary timeline showing their duration, I asked ChatGPT to construct the following:

• Athens: 480–404 BC
• Rome: 27 BC–AD 180
• Abbasids: 750–950
• Song dynasty: 960–1279
• Renaissance Italy: 1490–1527
• Dutch Republic: 1609–1672
• Anglosphere: c. 1688 onward.

If that timeline is broadly correct, it suggests that the largest gap between golden ages occurred between the end of the golden age of Rome and the beginning of the golden age of the Abbasids. What was happening at that time? Although the golden age of Rome may have ended around 180, following the death of Marcus Aurelius, the decline and fall of the Roman empire took a few more centuries. The last emperor of the Western Roman empire was deposed in 476. Plato’s Academy in Athens apparently continued to function until 532, when the seven last philosophers left to seek refuge with the Persian king. Interest in Greek philosophy grew in Persia during the 6^th and 7^th centuries, partly because of the presence of scholars associated with schismatic Christian sects.

As I was pondering what was happening between 180 and 750, I began to wonder whether India’s golden age might have been worth discussing in this book. While visiting India last year I read William Dalrymple’s book, TheGolden Road: How Ancient India Transformed the World. As well as discussing India’s impact on religion and culture throughout much of Asia, Dalrymple. points out that over the period from about 250BC to AD 1200, India was an important centre of commerce and trade, and an innovator in fields such as astronomy and mathematics.

India was the source of the numerical system with 10 digits including zero, that we use today. Norberg mentions that important contribution, but Dalrymple discusses it at greater length.

Another fascinating topic discussed by Dalrymple is the close relationship between the merchant classes of early India and the Buddhist monastic movement. Dalrymple emphasizes the importance of trade between India and the Roman empire. He notes that as the Roman empire crumbled, India’s trade with Europe was replaced by expansion of its trade with south-east Asia.

Is the Anglosphere in decline?

The Anglosphere refers to those nations where the English language and cultural values are dominant. Few would dispute that over the last couple of centuries the Anglosphere, first led by Britain and then the United States, played a leading role among nations in demonstrating the benefits of liberal democracy, free markets, technological innovation, and free international trade. Life in the Anglosphere has been far from ideal even in respect of those criteria, but there can be no doubt that we have been living in an age of widespread prosperity that is without historical precedent. As Norberg points out, the whole world has benefited from the spread of golden-age conditions fostered by the Anglosphere, with global extreme poverty declining from 38 to 9 percent in just the period since 1990.

However, Norberg notes that “many ominous signs of decline are clearly present in our time”. He mentions the “hubristic overreach” of U.S. attempts to reshape the Middle East through military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the financial crash of 2008, and the growth of “crippling public debt”. He suggests that a series of crises, including the Covid pandemic, have fostered “a sense that the world is dangerous and that we need to protect ourselves from it”. He writes:

“Most worryingly, rich counties have experienced a major backlash against globalization and trade, and immigrants have become scapegoats, just as they were in so many other eras of decline, potentially shutting us out from our most potent source of constant revitalization.”

Norberg notes that both China and Russia “have recently taken a totalitarian turn and are working hard to devastate neighbours”. He suggests, nevertheless, that Russia and China will have a hard time trying to challenge the Anglosphere-led world order because it will be difficult for them to find reliable friends among advanced states. 

Unfortunately, in the short time since the book was written, the government of the United States has adopted an international stance that seems to be inconsistent with the continued existence of an Anglosphere-led world order. Countries that have long regarded themselves as allies of the U.S. are now forced to contemplate seriously how they can best protect their own interests if the U.S. pursues isolationist policies.

The book ends on a somewhat optimistic note. The author observes that there are roughly fifty prosperous, open societies around the world. If one of them fails, “that will not stop others from picking up the torch”. He adds:

“That prompts the question of where the next golden age will come from.”

After considering various possibilities, however, he suggests that “perhaps this is the wrong way to look at it because we now have a “truly global civilization” in which every literate person anywhere in the world can draw upon the accumulated knowledge of humanity and learn skills in any field. In that context, “no one country can hold a monopoly on the ideas that can make them prosper”.

I agree with the general thrust of that argument. The technology required for future golden ages is not deposited in a library that can be easily destroyed. However, the geographical location of societies that are open and prosperous is still an issue worth considering. It isn’t much consolation for citizens in the United States, Britain or Australia to know that their children and grandchildren may be able to draw upon the accumulated knowledge of humanity and learn skills in any field, if institutional change impinges adversely on their incentives to do such things. Opportunities for human flourishing depend on whether political entrepreneurs will restore and maintain sufficient economic freedom.

It is in that context that I ask: Is it too soon to be asking where the next golden age will be located?

I suggested an optimistic answer to that question in Chapter 6 of Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing. Looking beyond looming economic crises, I am still optimistic that the governments of most liberal democracies will eventually introduce institutional reforms to enable the drivers of progress to restore growth of opportunities.

What do Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives tell us about Flourishing Individualism?

 

This is a guest essay by Dr Theodore N. (Ted) Pauls.

Ted Pauls holds a Doctorate in Higher Education Administration and serves as a Professor of Business at Bethany College (Bethany, West Virginia). He has 32 years of college teaching experience including Bethany, Wheeling Jesuit University, and West Liberty University. He also currently serves as the President of the Brooke County Board of Education. Prior to entering academe, Ted served as a Marketing Director for a privately held corporation and as a stockbroker.

In my view, the topic of Ted’s essay is highly relevant to people who live in the liberal democracies. I often hear people claim that the priority given to personal freedom in those societies has caused them to become excessively individualistic. How can defenders of individual liberty respond to those who claim that excessive individualism has contributed to narcissistic behaviour, social isolation, and mental illness? We can’t deny that many individuals lack integrity in their dealings with others. We can’t deny that many individuals live lonely lives, lacking positive relationships with others. We can’t deny that many individuals seek to escape from reality and that some of them end up delusional.

However, we can explain that it is wrong to jump to the conclusion that the solution to those problems lies in further restricting opportunities for individual self-direction. We can explain that humans cannot fully flourish unless they have opportunities to exercise the practical wisdom and integrity required to direct their own lives in accordance with goals they choose and values they endorse. And we can also explain that the kind of individualism that we endorse is the flourishing individualism that Ted Pauls writes about in the following essay.

Ted writes:

 Flourishing individualism is a philosophical vision that places the rational, morally responsible individual at the center of ethics, politics, and human life. It is an ideal that affirms the dignity of the person, the objectivity of value, and the necessity of freedom—not merely as a constraint on power, but as the essential condition for human excellence. This article develops a theory of flourishing individualism by integrating key insights from three related and foundational works:

• Leonard Peikoff’s Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (1991),
• Edward W. Younkins’s Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society: Toward a Synthesis of Aristotelianism, Austrian Economics, and Ayn Rand’s Objectivism (2011), and
• Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen’s The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics (2016).

Each of these works contributes to a shared theme: the defense of individual flourishing as the core moral aim and the view that political society exists to enable, not direct, that flourishing. Peikoff articulates Ayn Rand’s Objectivist ethics and politics as a fully integrated philosophical system grounded in reason, egoism, and laissez-faire capitalism. Younkins seeks to synthesize Aristotelian virtue ethics, Austrian economics, and Objectivist principles to argue that human happiness and social cooperation are best achieved in a free society. Den Uyl and Rasmussen develop a metanormative liberalism in which the moral diversity of flourishing individuals is protected by political principles that are themselves ethically grounded but non-perfectionist in character.

The result of their combined perspectives is a powerful moral and political framework that answers the challenge of modern pluralism without surrendering the objectivity of value. It is a theory that preserves the ethical centrality of virtue and the reality of human goods while insisting on the primacy of liberty and individual responsibility. This article unfolds this framework in five parts: (1) the moral foundations of individual flourishing, (2) the structure of virtue and self-perfection, (3) the social context of flourishing, (4) the political principles that protect freedom, and (5) the philosophical implications of flourishing individualism for contemporary thought.

The Moral Foundations of Flourishing

At the heart of flourishing individualism is the idea that human life has an objective standard of value and that each individual must discover and pursue their own good through rational action. This view stands in opposition to both subjectivist relativism and collectivist moralities that subordinate the individual to external purposes.

Peikoff Explains Rand on Reason and on Life as the Standard of Value

Leonard Peikoff, in Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand presents a moral framework that begins with the facts of human nature. This book is the first comprehensive statement of Rand’s philosophy. Peikoff discusses Rand’s views on metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, politics, and aesthetics. Rand’s philosophy asserts that existence exists independently of consciousness, that reason is the primary means of understanding the world and one’s place in it, and that individuals should act in pursuit of their own self-interest. Ayn Rand’s ethics, as he explains, holds that value is that which one acts to gain or keep, and that the fundamental alternative at the base of value is life versus death. Since human beings do not survive automatically, but by the use of reason, the standard of value is not mere survival, but rational flourishing—living as the kind of being one is.

This leads to a morality of rational egoism. The purpose of morality is not to sacrifice the self for others, nor others for the self, but to guide each individual in achieving their own happiness through the use of reason. Moral principles are principles of self-perfection, of the kind of character and action required to live a fully human life.

Objectivist ethics is thus neither altruistic nor hedonistic. It affirms the individual as an end in himself and views the pursuit of one’s own rational interests as both morally right and practically necessary. It calls for independence, integrity, productivity, and pride—virtues that are both personally fulfilling and socially beneficial.

Rand’s Objectivism holds that an individual’s choice to live is required for ethical obligations to exist. On the other hand, Younkins, Den Uyl, and Rasmussen all maintain that there is an ethical obligation to choose life because life is one’s natural end and good and therefore choiceworthy.

Younkins on Flourishing and Human Nature

Edward W. Younkins, in Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society, expands on this foundation by situating it within the broader tradition of Aristotelian eudaimonism. He argues that human beings have a nature with specific potentials and that morality consists in actualizing these potentials over the course of a lifetime. Flourishing (or eudaimonia) is an activity of the soul in accordance with reason and virtue.

Younkins draws on Aristotle, Rand, contemporary neo-Aristotelian philosophers, Austrian economists, and others to argue that flourishing is not reducible to pleasure, wealth, or external success. It is a state of integrated self-realization involving rationality, moral character, purposeful work, and meaningful relationships. It requires that individuals make choices consistent with their nature and long-term well-being.

Crucially, flourishing cannot be given or imposed—it must be chosen and achieved. This emphasis on agency echoes Objectivism’s moral individualism while adding a richer account of the variety and depth of human goods. The good life is not a fixed pattern but a dynamic process of self-perfection.

He also explains that Objectivist claims of value objectivity and claims of Austrian economists are compatible because that involve different levels of analysis. Rand’s sense of value-objectivity complements the Austrian sense of value-subjectivity because personal flourishing on an objective level transcends subjective value preferences.

Younkins’s book presents the essentials of a potential paradigm or conceptual framework for individual human flourishing in a free society. It is an attempt to forge an understanding from various disciplines and to integrate them into consistent, coherent, and systematic whole. His goal is to have a paradigm in which the views of reality, human nature, knowledge, values, action, and society make up an integrated whole. He recognizes that his potential framework will grow and evolve as scholars engage and extend its ideas.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen on Individualistic Perfectionism

Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen, in ThePerfectionist Turn, argue that ethical theory must return to a teleological and perfectionist framework that recognizes the centrality of human flourishing. Against dominant trends in analytic philosophy that treat ethics as a matter of rules, duties, or utility, they insist that the good life is the ultimate standard of evaluation.

Their contribution lies in developing a concept of “individualistic perfectionism”: the view that the good is self-perfection, but that this perfection takes diverse forms based on individual contexts, capacities, and choices. Flourishing is not a single ideal life but a framework in which many legitimate variations of the good life are possible.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen define human flourishing as objective, inclusive, individualized, agent-relative, self-directed, and social. A person’s flourishing is desired because it is desirable and choice-worthy.

This view preserves the objectivity of morality while respecting the uniqueness of persons. It sees ethics as aspirational, not prohibitive—as a guide to excellence rather than a list of constraints. And it affirms the value of individual agency, creativity, and responsibility in moral development.

 Den Uyl and Rasmussen defend a template of responsibility, rather than a template of respect, as a framework within which to based one’s self-perfection. This agent-centered template recognizes the existential condition that each responsible and choosing individual must make a life for himself. Under this template self-direction and integrity are central to morality because personal responsibility for one’s life is primary.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen explain that political philosophy is unavoidably tethered to deeper, more foundational. and comprehensive perspectives and frameworks regarding reality, human nature, and ethics, Championing the tethered character of political philosophy, Den Uyl  and Rasmussen advocate individualistic perfectionism and the template of responsibility for a person’s self-perfection.

The Virtues of Flourishing: Self-Perfection in Practice

Flourishing individualism depends not only on abstract principles but on the cultivation of character. Virtue is the bridge between human nature and human flourishing: it is the habitual excellence of the soul in action.

All of these thinkers agree that virtues are not mere social conventions or rules of obedience but rational habits that support an individual’s life and happiness. While they differ in terminology and emphasis, they converge on a core set of traits that enable a flourishing life.

Objectivist Virtue Theory

Peikoff identifies seven cardinal virtues in Ayn Rand’s ethics: rationality, independence, integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, and pride. Each of these is a rational requirement of life, rooted in the objective needs of human survival and flourishing.

• Rationality is the primary virtue: it is the commitment to reason as one’s only source of knowledge and guide to action.
• Independence follows from rationality: it is the reliance on one’s own judgment rather than on the beliefs or authority of others.
• Integrity is fidelity to one’s rational principles.
• Honesty is the refusal to fake reality.
• Justice is the principle of judging others objectively and giving them what they deserve.
• Productiveness is the creation of material values.
• Pride is moral ambitiousness—a commitment to achieving one’s moral worth.

These virtues are not sacrifices but achievements. They are the means by which an individual shapes a life worth living.

Younkins on Integrated Living

Younkins expands this list by emphasizing the integration of mind, body, and character. He argues that flourishing involves not just isolated traits but the harmonious development of the whole person. This includes intellectual virtues like wisdom and understanding, moral virtues like courage and benevolence, and practical virtues like industry and perseverance.

He also stresses the importance of purposeful work and the creation of value. Echoing Rand and the Austrians, Younkins sees economic activity not as a separate sphere but as an expression of human creativity and agency. Work is not a mere means to leisure; it is part of the good life.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen on the Diversity of Excellence

Den Uyl and Rasmussen agree that virtue is central but emphasize that virtue must be contextualized. Because flourishing is individualized, the specific content of virtue can vary with personal identity, role, and situation. What prudence or courage demands may differ between a soldier, a scholar, and an entrepreneur.

They resist reducing virtue to rule-following or to a fixed ideal life. Instead, they see it as a dynamic and developmental concept: excellence in the use of practical reason to navigate the world in pursuit of self-perfection. This view aligns with Aristotle’s emphasis on phronesis (practical wisdom) as the master virtue guiding others.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen add practical wisdom (prudence) to the Objectivist list of virtues. They explain that reason is a self-directing activity and that practical wisdom is the excellent use of practical reason and the central integrating virtue of a flourishing life.

The Social Context of Flourishing

Flourishing is personal, but it is not solitary. Human beings are social by nature, and many goods—friendship, love, trade, knowledge—require the presence of others. The moral vision of flourishing individualism recognizes this fact without collapsing the individual into the collective.

The Role of Trade and Civil Society

Peikoff emphasizes that trade—both economic and spiritual—is the proper mode of human interaction. In a society of rational individuals, people deal with one another by mutual consent for mutual benefit. Force, fraud, and parasitism are morally and practically incompatible with a flourishing life.

Younkins adds that civil society—the network of voluntary institutions, markets, and communities—is the natural habitat for human flourishing. Drawing on Austrian economics, he shows how spontaneous order arises from the free choices of individuals pursuing their own goals. Markets are not chaotic or amoral but forms of cooperation that reflect human values.

Younkins explains that an entrepreneur attains wealth and his other objectives by providing people with goods and services that further flourishing on earth. He views entrepreneurs as specialists in prudence—the virtue of applying one’s talents to the goal of living well. In turn, Den Uyl and Rasmussen see a parallel between entrepreneurship and moral conduct. They discuss the creativity of human beings both in producing wealth and in building moral character, two enterprises that require alertness, insight, and evaluation and are parts of a flourishing life. They explain that both ethical wealth and economic wealth are a function of one’s actions taken to produce a good life.

Virtue and Community

While the state must not impose virtue, communities and relationships play an essential role in cultivating it. Younkins, Den Uyl, and Rasmussen all stress the importance of cultural norms, moral education, and social practices that support character development. Families, friendships, institutions of learning, and the arts all contribute to the conditions of flourishing.

But these institutions must be voluntary and diverse. The ethical pluralism of flourishing individualism requires a social order that permits experimentation, innovation, and personal growth.

Political Philosophy and the Framework for Flourishing

Ethics identifies the good life for the individual; political philosophy identifies the kind of social order that makes the pursuit of that life possible.

Peikoff, Rand, and Objectivism: Rights as Moral Principles

Peikoff and Rand emphasize that because human beings survive by reason, and because reason is a volitional faculty, freedom is the political condition required for moral agency. Rights are objective principles that protect the individual’s freedom to act.

The proper political system, therefore, is laissez-faire capitalism: a system that protects rights and bans the initiation of force. It is not morally neutral but grounded in the recognition that each individual has a moral right to live for their own sake.

Younkins: Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Civil Society

Younkins explains that the natural negative right to liberty is concerned with regulating conditions for human flourishing They are not directly concerned with promoting the attainment of flourishing. He agrees with Den Uyl and Rasmussen’s long held view that rights are metanormative principles that protect self-directedness, a universal requirement to all manifestations of human flourishing.

He also demonstrates that political freedom enables the emergence of complex, adaptive systems—markets, associations, cultural norms—that support flourishing. He draws on Austrian insights to argue that no central planner can substitute for the decentralized knowledge and creativity of individuals.

This view also entails limits on political authority. The state must be constrained by rule of law and dedicated to protecting liberty—not managing outcomes or mandating virtues.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen: The Metanormative Structure of Liberalism

Unlike Rand, Den Uyl and Rasmussen (as well as Younkins) distinguish between normative and metanormative principles. Ethics is normative: it guides individuals in living well. Politics is metanormative: it defines the conditions under which individuals can peacefully pursue diverse goods.

This leads to a perfectionist yet non-perfectionist liberalism: one that values flourishing and virtues but refrains from legislating them. The liberal order is justified not by neutrality but by its compatibility with ethical pluralism and moral agency.

Philosophical Implications and the Future of Flourishing Individualism

Flourishing individualism reconciles objectivity with freedom, pluralism with virtue, and individuality with community.

It offers:

• Objectivity without authoritarianism: Morality is real, but political authority is limited.
• Pluralism without relativism: There are many good lives, but not all lives are equally good.
• Agency in a world of systems: Individuals are not products of structures but shapers of their own destiny.
• A humanistic ideal: The individual is not a cog in the machine but a creator of values.

In a time of cultural fragmentation and political overreach, this philosophy offers a bold and humane alternative. It calls on us to build a society that respects liberty, cultivates virtue, and honors the rationality and free will of each person.

Together, these books by Peikoff, Younkins, and Den Uyl and Rasmussen provide essential  ideas for a robust framework for understanding flourishing individualism—a life of rational self-interest, virtue, and freedom.

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References

Den Uyl, Douglas J., and Douglas B. Rasmussen. The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016.

Peikoff, Leonard. Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. New York: Dutton, 1991.

Younkins, Edward W. Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society: Toward a Synthesis of Aristotelianism, Austrian Economics, and Ayn Rand’s Objectivism. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2011.

What role has political entrepreneurship played in changes in human freedom this century?

 

For the purposes of this exercise, I have used the Human Freedom Index, published by Cato and the Fraser Institute, to identify which countries have experienced greatest change in human freedom this century.

In my view, this index provides the best available information on the state of liberty throughout the world. The latest publication in this series, The Human Freedom Index 2024, by Ian Vásquez, Matthew D. Mitchell, Ryan Murphy, and Guillermina Sutter Schneide, provides measures of personal and economic freedom in 2022 for jurisdictions covering 98% of the world’s population. The accompanying data set enables change in personal and economic freedom to be assessed for 157 countries over the period from 2000 to 2022.

This study is associated with my recent research efforts directed toward attempting to understand the role of political entrepreneurship in institutional change. The research reported here links most directly to some previous research which suggests that levels of personal and economic freedom in some countries have been more strongly influenced by political entrepreneurship than by underlying cultural values of the people.

The idea behind the current study is that if we can identify the countries that have experienced greatest change in economic and personal freedom and know a little about the recent political history of those countries, we will better placed to make judgements about the factors responsible for institutional change. The question I ask myself is whether changes in freedom can be attributed to the efforts of a political entrepreneur with an ideological mission, as opposed to other factors such as cultural change in the broader community, responses to economic crises, and external factors including advice of foreign governments and international agencies.

In this essay, I first consider the above graph which shows changes in personal and economic freedom this century for the full data set (157 countries) and then consider a second graph showing the same data for countries with above median human freedom in 2022.

Jurisdictions with greatest change in human freedom

The human freedom index reflects the combined impact of economic freedom and personal freedom. In the graph shown above, the 10 countries with greatest improvement in human freedom are labelled and identified with a green marker and the 10 countries with the greatest decline in human freedom are labelled and identified with a red marker.

An initial point worth noting about the graphs is the relatively small number of countries in the bottom right quadrant with an increase in personal freedom accompanied by a decline in economic freedom. That result is consistent with Milton Friedman’s observation that economic freedom “promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in this way allows the one to offset the other.” Hopefully, the people in counties in the top left quadrant, who have experienced substantial increases in economic freedom under oppressive governments, will subsequently be able to experience greater personal freedom as well.

It is not difficult to identify political entrepreneurs who have made a major contribution to repression of liberty in jurisdictions that have experienced the greatest declines in human freedom since 2000. Peronism remained a dominant force in Argentinian politics in the first two decades on this century, even though Juan Peron died in 1974. The political landscape in Venezuela was dominated by Hugo Chavez and Nicholas Maduro, who have both pursued policies inimical to economic and personal freedom. In Venezuela, Daniel Ortega held the presidency for extended periods. Chad was subject to authoritarian rule by Idriss Deby Itno until his death in 2021. Iranian politics has been dominated by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei since 1989. Much of the decline in economic and personal freedom in Egypt has occurred since 2014, under the presidency of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. In Turkey, economic and personal freedom have also declined substantially since 2014, when Recep Erdogan came to power. The ruler of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, imposed substantial additional restrictions on personal freedom following the outbreak of civil war in 2011. Personal freedom in Hong Kong has been increasingly restricted since 2012 when Xi Jinping came to power in China. The decline in personal freedom in Bahrain since 2010 reflects the response of the government of King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa to an upsurge of political opposition.

It is more difficult to identify political entrepreneurs who have made a major contribution to expansion of liberty in jurisdictions that have experienced the greatest improvement in human freedom since 2000. That may partly reflect poor media coverage of good news stories in Africa. Substantial improvements in human freedom occurred in Liberia under the political leadership of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and in Gambia, under the leadership of Adama Barrow.

Some of the other countries that have experienced substantial improvements in human freedom have had governments that have tended to favour free markets consistently. Countries in that category include Lebanon, Armenia, Sierra-Leone and Colombia.

In some countries, including Timor-Leste, international agencies have played an important role in encouraging policies to strengthen government institutions and reduce corruption.

Many of the countries that have experienced substantial increases in human freedom have improved from a low base and still have human freedom levels well below the world average. Countries in that category include Angola, Lebanon, Laos and Sierra-Leone.

 Changes in freedom in relatively high freedom countries

 

When we focus on countries which currently have relatively high levels of freedom, a substantially different set of countries emerges as the 10 with largest declines or increases in economic freedom. Argentina is the only country with reduced human freedom which is common to both groups. Timor Leste and Armenia are the only countries with increased human freedom that are common to both groups.

Among countries with reduced human freedom, political entrepreneurs who have played a prominent role in implementing restrictive policies include Victor Orban in Hungary, Pravind Jugnauth in Mauritius, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Andrzej Duda in Poland.

The decline in human freedom in Guyana, Greece, France, UK, and USA seem to have occurred mainly via gradual slippage rather than deliberate policy. In addition, restrictions on freedom imposed in those countries during the coronavirus epidemic had not been fully removed in 2022.

It is difficult to identify political entrepreneurs who have played a prominent role in promoting economic and personal freedom in the countries with greatest increases in human freedom. However, Maia Sandu played a prominent role in Moldova. Bidzina Ivanishvili has played a prominent role in politics in Georgia since 2012, during a period of improvement in human freedom, but it is unlikely that his more recent political endeavours have had a positive influence on human freedom.

The countries with greatest increase in human freedom generally have policies which strongly favour free markets. The main exceptions seem to be the governments of Malawi and Timor Leste, which have been less supportive of economic freedom.

Conclusion

This essay has focused on countries that have experience substantial changes in human freedom over the period from 2000 to 2020 in an endeavour to assess the role of political entrepreneurship in those changes.

The Human Freedom Index, published by Cato and the Fraser Institute, has been used to identify countries with greatest changes in freedom levels. Information on the recent political history of those countries has then been used to assess whether the changes could be attributed to the influence of political entrepreneurs with an ideological mission.

The study first considered changes in freedom in the full data set of 157 countries and then at changes in freedom for countries with above median freedom levels.

My general conclusion is that, at least during the period considered, political entrepreneurship has played a larger role in bringing about substantial declines in human freedom than in bringing about substantial improvements in human freedom.

Where did Carl Schmitt go wrong in his critique of democracy?

 

I first became aware of Carl Schmitt about 30 years ago while reading Friedrich Hayek’s book, Law, Legislation and Liberty. At that stage I was left with the impression that while Schmitt still had influence among German legal philosophers, his views were mainly interest to people wondering how a respected academic could become a Nazi. Over the last year or so, however, I seem to be coming across increasing references to the relevance to contemporary politics of Schmitt’s views about friend-enemy distinctions and the autonomy of the political.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides the following biographical information about Schmitt:

“Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) was a conservative German legal, constitutional, and political theorist. Schmitt is often considered to be one of the most important critics of liberalism, parliamentary democracy, and liberal cosmopolitanism. But the value and significance of Schmitt’s work is subject to controversy, mainly due to his intellectual support for and active involvement with National Socialism.”

My reading of the full entry about Schmitt in the Stanford Encyclopedia (written by Lars Vinx) reinforced the impression I previously had that Schmitt’s political philosophy is inherently authoritarian. However, the conclusion that Peter C. Caldwell reached in his literature review is ambivalent:

“What Schmitt’s real message is remains disputed. Fifty years after the first reflections on his work began to appear, his interpreters still battle over whether he was primarily a brilliant lawyer and theorist of constitutional democracy or a gravedigger of democracy and apologist for authoritarianism; an intellectual adventurer and opportunist or a serious analyst of modernity; a conservative trying to save what could be saved of the European heritage or an antisemite and Nazi.”

(‘Controversies over Carl Schmitt: A Review of Recent Literature’, The Journal of Modern History 77, June 2025)

The focus of this essay has been determined largely by a couple of books that I have read recently. I focus on three aspects of Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy. First, I consider Adrian Vermeule’s synthesis of Catholic integralism and Carl Schmitt’s view that politics is war. Second, I consider the link between entangled political economy and Carl Schmitt’s concept of the autonomy of the political. Finally, I reconsider Friedrich Hayek’s view of Carl Schmitt’s legal philosophy.

Vermeule’s synthesis of integralism and Schmittian illiberalism

My initial source for the discussion of integralism was Kevin Vallier’s book, All the Kingdom’s of the World (2023). I recently reviewed Vallier's book in an essay entitled, ‘Are integralists opposed to natural rights?’, but neglected to mention Vermeule’s affinity with the political philosophy of Carl Schmitt.

Vallier refers to Vermeule’s article, The Ark of Tradition, which is a review of Schmitt’s book, Roman Catholicism and Political Form. Vermeule writes:

“My suggestion, which is consistent with Schmitt’s vision, but goes beyond what he articulates, is that the Church serves as a kind of ark, whose vocation is to preserve the living tradition of the Verbum Dei amidst the universal deluge of economic-technical decadence, and the eventual self-undermining of the regime.”

He goes on to quote Schmitt:

“Should economic thinking succeed in realizing its utopian goal and in bringing about an absolutely unpolitical condition of human society, the Church would remain the only agency of political thinking and political form. Then the Church would have a stupendous monopoly: its hierarchy would be nearer the political domination of the world than in the Middle Ages.”

My understanding of what Schmitt meant by “an absolutely unpolitical condition of human society”, is a condition in which people would no longer be interested in drawing “friend-enemy distinctions”. Schmitt claimed that life in a completely de-politicized world would be shallow, insignificant, and meaningless.

Such views seem to me to be mistaken and to have potential to cause a great deal of unnecessary misery. In fields of human endeavour such as business and sport, friendly rivalry obviously helps to make life meaningful for many people. However, friendly rivalry does not require friend-enemy distinctions. Opportunities for human flourishing are enhanced in societies where individuals tend to seek mutual benefit from voluntary (and friendly) interactions with other people, rather than seeking to benefit from the friend-enemy distinctions associated with coercive political processes.  

Lars Vinx notes: 

“Some interpreters have explained Schmitt’s hostility towards liberal de-politicization as being grounded in the view that a willingness to distinguish between friend and enemy is a theological duty.”  

That made me wonder, very briefly, whether a theologian could argue that it is necessary for Christians to be able to distinguish between friend and enemy in order to follow Jesus’s exhortation to love one’s enemies. Before wasting too much time, however, I reminded myself of Erasmus’s message about refraining from wars over theology, which seems to me to remain as relevant today as at the time of the Protestant Reformation. (If further explanation is required, please read something I wrote about Erasmus a few years ago.)

Autonomy of the political

In my recent essay entitled “How does entangled political economy help us to understand political entrepreneurship?”, I drew heavily on Richard E. Wagner’s book, Politics as a Peculiar Business,. However, that essay doesn’t discuss the link that Wagner draws between entangled political economy and Carl Schmitt’s concept of the autonomy of the political.

The concept of autonomy of the political describes power relations and the behaviour of those who hold political power in society. The surface impression is that a small number of rulers dominate larger masses of citizens, but power is ever present in society and can be manifested in a variety of different ways. Wagner’s concept of entangled political economy “rests on the twin autonomies of the political and the economic in society, and the interaction between those autonomies being a source of turbulence within society.”   

Wagner writes:

“For Schmitt, the autonomy of the political rested on exceptional circumstances and the friend–enemy distinction. Exceptional circumstances mean that a rule of law cannot be articulated that will cover every possible point of decision that might arise. The presence of exceptions is a point where the autonomy of the political enters into society. The friend–enemy distinction is a feature of the crooked timber of humanity that surely intensifies with increases in societal complexity and the hierarchical ordering in terms of status that comes in the wake of growing complexity.”

Schmitt argued that even if constitutional arrangements are crafted to support private ordering of societal interaction, the autonomy of the political will assert itself in the guise of exceptional circumstances. As the scale of the polity expands, consensual action tends to give way to factional action, wherein some factions gain at the expense of others. For example, whereas application of general rules and principles might require a few pages of tax codes, factional action to achieve concessions generates thousands of pages of tax codes.

To consider Schmitt’s proposed remedies for factional politics, I have looked beyond the references to Schmitt in Wagner’s book. My main source is the Stanford Encyclopedia entry written by Lars Vinx.

Schmitt’s views about the problems of democracy and the need for strong political leadership are similar to those of Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter (discussed in earlier essays, here and here). However, while Weber and Schumpeter defend liberty, Schmitt regards constitutionally guaranteed freedoms as concessions of the state to the individual.

Weber and Schumpeter emphasize the importance of constitutional procedures, but Schmitt’s view of constitutions seems ambivalent. Schmitt understands democracy as the self-rule of the people. He argues, however, that since the will of the people is not necessarily reflected in the majority view, representative government is not necessarily any more intimately connected with the principle of democracy than a dictatorship in the name of the people. 

Schmitt denies the possibility of changing the fundamental nature of an established constitution via use of rules contained within it. Nevertheless, he acknowledges the possibility of suspending a constitution through a sovereign decision on the exception. He also acknowledges that a people, in a renewed exercise of their constituent power, might legitimately choose a non-liberal and non-parliamentarian form of democracy. 

Friedrich Hayek’s view

Hayek held similar views to Schmitt concerning the ability of the majority in a representative assembly with unlimited powers “to confine its activities to aims which all members of the majority desire, or even approve of”. The majority can only be kept together by “paying off each of the special groups by which it is composed”. (LLL, V3, 138)

In a footnote to that passage, Hayek suggested that in the 1920s “the weakness of the government of an omnipotent democracy was very clearly seen by the extraordinary German student of politics, Carl Schmitt.” However, Hayek added that “Schmitt regularly came down on what to me appears both morally and intellectually the wrong side.” (LLL, V3, 194-5)

The passage quoted in the epigraph at the top of this essay appears in Volume 1 of Law, Legislation and Liberty (p 71). It is immediately followed by the assertion that “long before Hitler came to power” Carl Schmitt “devoted all his formidable intellectual energies to a fight against liberalism in all its forms”. (Hayek’s perception that Schmitt was so clearly opposed to all forms of liberalism has been disputed. Some of Schmitt’s writings apparently give the impression that he was trying to save Europe’s liberal heritage.)

Later in the same paragraph, Hayek explains that Schmitt’s final formulation of his central belief about the law entailed “concrete order formation”. Schmitt posits that law is fundamentally a form of political and social organisation grounded in a community’s values, and that the state is the embodiment of the community’s legal order. Hayek argues that under that view of law, individuals are “made to serve concrete purposes”.

Hayek contrasts Schmitt’s view of law with his own view that law consists of “abstract rules which make possible the formation of a spontaneous order by the free action of individuals through limiting the range of their actions.”

While Schmitt saw the state as giving expression to the values of the dominant community group, Hayek saw law as consisting of rules of just conduct that have evolved to protect individual liberty.

Conclusions

Carl Schmitt is remembered as a prominent German legal and political theorist who became a Nazi. However, Schmitt’s political affiliations have not prevented frequent reference being made to views about friend-enemy distinctions and the autonomy of the political in contemporary discussions about political institutions.

This essay has focused on three aspects of Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy: Adrian Vermeule’s synthesis of Catholic integralism and Carl Schmitt’s view that politics is war; the link between Richard Wagner’s concept of entangled political economy and Carl Schmitt’s concept of the autonomy of the political; and Friedrich Hayek’s view of Carl Schmitt’s legal philosophy.

Schmitt argued that if economic liberalism succeeded in bringing about an absolutely unpolitical condition of society – a condition where people were no longer interested in making friend-enemy distinctions – the Catholic church would be able to dominate the world. He reasoned that that this religious organisation would dominate in those circumstances because it would be the only agency still engaged in political thinking. I am puzzled as to why he thought a religious organisation would be last to abandon the habit of making friend-enemy distinctions. It seems to me that criminal organisations would be likely to pose a greater obstacle to establishing an unpolitical utopia because friend-enemy distinctions are more intrinsic to their activities.

Schmitt presented a valid argument that constitutional arrangements crafted to support private ordering are prone to corruption by interest group politics. The autonomy of the political exerts itself as some groups argue for exceptions to general rules to obtain benefits at the expense of others.

Other political theorists have proposed stronger executive government as a remedy for problems that interest groups pose for the functioning of liberal democracies. However, Schmitt proposed more extreme remedies. For example, he suggested that under exceptional circumstances a government could make a “sovereign decision” to suspend a constitution.

Friedrich Hayek acknowledged that Schmitt had clearly seen the weakness of omnipotent democracy in the 1920s, but suggested that he “regularly came down on the wrong side” in proposing remedies.

Hayek argued that under Schmitt’s final formulation of his beliefs about the law, individuals are made to serve concrete purposes determined by the state. By contrast, Hayek viewed law in terms of abstract rules of just conduct that have evolved to protect individual liberty.

In my view Schmitt went wrong in his critique of democracy by seeking authoritarian remedies rather than changes in the rules of the game to address the specific problems that he identified.