How can the study of human nature help us to reach normative conclusions in political philosophy?

When I read the sentence quoted in the epigraph above, the thought crossed my mind that Aristotle would have agreed with it. Aristotle based his philosophy on his observation of human nature. The reason why Aristotle came to mind will become apparent as you read the essay.

The quoted sentence written by Gerry Gaus is from the Preface of The Open Society and its Complexities (p.x). I have previously written about this book in an essay entitled: What does Gerry Gaus tell us about the implications of the knowledge problem for political entrepreneurship?

I have three objectives in writing this essay:

• The first is to outline Gaus’s discussion of the social evolution of human nature and how that provides a basis for his normative conclusions about the desirability of an Open Society.
• The second is to consider what we need to know about human nature to reach normative conclusions about the desirability of an Open Society.
• The third is to consider whether Gaus’s approach helps us to defend the intuition that natural rights exist.

The evolution of human nature  

Gaus argues that human nature has been shaped by evolution, including cultural evolution. Humans are a norm-guided species. Social norms are predominantly a cultural phenomenon – a product of cultural evolution. The norms associated with different types of social order differentially encourage some aspects of human nature while discouraging others. Gaus suggests that “the truly outstanding feature of our evolved moral psychology is our ability to follow a wide variety of sharing and fairness norms in different circumstances and cultures”. (p.86)

Gaus suggests that the common view that publicly justified moral rules are a modern Western invention fails to appreciate that public justification has been a fundamental feature of moral life from the beginning:

“From the very beginning, human morality has relied on public justification: the rules of the group must be such that the members’ personal normative convictions and interests align with them.” (p.50)

Gaus is critical of the “tribal collectivist” view that humans “are simply, at bottom, natural egalitarian collectivists”. He begins his evolutionary story with conjectures about the complex social life of ancestral Pan – the posited common ancestor of humans, chimps and bonobos. Concern for personal autonomy may have its roots in a social life where individuals displayed a keen sense of self-interest in competition for alpha status, and in rebelling to avoid dominance.

Gaus acknowledges that Late Pleistocene (LPA) hunter-gather societies engaged in egalitarian meat-sharing. That was a means of reducing the variance in food intake, but it also reflects successful efforts by subordinates to control would-be bullies and upstarts. Under that interpretation, the egalitarian ethos of LPA societies was not inherently collectivist. LPA societies “appear characterized by a near-obsession with resisting the authority of would-be dominators”. LPA societies also exerted immense social pressure against innovators who sought to introduce new techniques to improve their own lot. This may have been an effective way to protect distributive shares.

People in LPA societies had a strong ethic of reciprocation – they engaged in the conditional cooperation that enables markets to function. Social support was more readily available to those who had a reputation for being willing to assist others.

Social norms developed in LPA societies as some moral rules became internalized because large majorities developed an emotional attachment to them and willingly complied with them. The exercise of self-control in conforming to social rules was a highly prized virtue in many small hunter groups.

About 17,000 years ago, there was a rise in inequality brought about by the development of forager clans, leading to creation of hierarchical states. The state’s organization gave it a decisive military advantage over more egalitarian groups. Grain-based monoculture may be the creation of hierarchical states rather than a cause of it.

Gaus presumably adopts F. A. Hayek’s view of the Open Society (or Great Society) as a society in which coercion of some by others has been reduced as far as possible and individuals are free to use their own knowledge for their own purposes. He argues that the morality of the Open Society scales up the norms of reciprocity and fairness while incorporating the ancient concern with autonomy and personal freedom: “the core rights of person and property become universal”. (p.133)

The recent emergence of WEIRD morality (the morality of Western Educated Industrialized Rich Democracies) may have occurred as a consequence of teachings of the Catholic Church opposed to incest, which was once defined so broadly that it led to the breakup of kin- and clan-based morality. Gaus notes Jonathan Haidt’s data (The Righteous Mind, 2012) indicating that the moral reasoning of WEIRD populations is largely focused on individuals and centres on the dimensions of liberty-oppression, care-harm, and fairness-cheating.  In contrast, most other moral systems, including those of conservatives in WEIRD societies give greater emphasis to loyalty-betrayal, authority-subversion, and sanctity-degradation.

Gaus suggests:

“Extending core morality beyond kin-based networks may have been the critical development of WEIRD morality, but WEIRD morality too manifests a push toward expansion of the impartial network and pulling back by kin and ethnic markers and the power of social proximity. Human social life is defined by this constant tension between the push to wider moral relations and the pulling back of familiarity and social proximity. To describe human morality as either tribalistic or an ever-expanding circle is evocative but fundamentally distorting.” (p. 90)

Gaus goes on to suggest that although cultural evolution does not render humans unfit for the Open Society, they may well be unfit for Millean liberalism (and by implication, WEIRD morality). He argues that Millean progressivism “is a recipe for drastically reducing social learning (aka imitation), throwing us back on our cognitive capacities. That, however, is in turn a recipe for undermining ultra-social cooperation, and would probably make any significant system of social rules dysfunctional”. (p.102)

The Open Society is characterized by self-organized social morality, entailing moral rules that lead toward extended cooperation rather than conflict and division. Diversity of moral perspectives is fundamental to the moral life of the Open Society. Thus, the existence of increasingly diverse moral perspectives can enhance justification of the Open Society and public justifications of those moral rules must be as accommodating to diversity as possible. (pp. 164-167)

Gaus concludes:

 “a variety of different moral perspectives can, counterintuitively, enhance the ability of a society to secure public justification of shared moral rules. Each has his own opinion of the point and value of these rules, yet each can particulate in, and indeed enhance a social process that can generate a self-organized social morality.” (p. 167)

That description of an important characteristic of an Open Society seems to be as close as Gaus comes to reaching a normative conclusion about the desirability of an Open Society.

What do we need to know about human nature to reach normative conclusions supporting an Open Society?

I don’t think we need an evolutionary account of the shaping of human nature to reach normative conclusions supporting an Open Society. Gerry Gaus could have argued that humans have a variety of different moral perspectives by merely referring to evidence such as that presented by Jonathan Haidt. He didn’t need his interesting account of the evolution of human nature to make the point that moral rules can only secure “public justification” if they are as accommodating to diversity as possible.

That is not intended as a criticism. Gaus made clear that his primary intention in providing the evolutionary account was to counter the view (attributed to Hayek among others) that our evolved moral sentiments constantly cause us to rebel against the Open Society and resort to a “tribal” moral outlook.

Gaus’s discussion of the evolution of moral norms helped him to focus on some aspects of human nature that are relevant to assessment of politico-legal orders. However, it seems to me that Gaus overlooked other relevant aspects of human nature such as the importance to individual flourishing of the exercise of practical wisdom and self-direction. The relevance of those aspects might have been given more prominence if Gaus had considered some studies with an individualistic focus on virtues and values.

The study by Martin Seligman and Christopher Petersen of virtues that are ubiquitous and valued in every culture is relevant in this context. By reading the basic writings of all the major religious and philosophical traditions, the researchers found that six virtues were endorsed by “almost every single one” of these traditions: wisdom and knowledge, courage, love and humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence. That list incorporates the ancient cardinal virtues of practical wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice and the Christian virtues of faith, hope and love. Seligman and Petersen identified 24 character strengths that they viewed as the routes by which the virtues can be achieved. One aim of the study was to assist people to identify their own character strengths. The study recognizes that individuals who have different character strengths have potential to flourish in different ways. (The study is described in Martin Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 2012, pp. 125-161.)

Another relevant approach is Shalom Schwartz’s theory of basic values. The findings of his surveys suggest that the value priorities in 82 countries exhibit a similar hierarchical order, despite substantial differences in the value priorities of individuals within those countries. The 10 basic values identified in that study were self-direction, universalism, benevolence, conformity, tradition, security, power, achievement, hedonism, and stimulation. (See: Schwatz, S.H., 2012, ‘An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values’, Online Readings in Psychology and Culture.)

There are no doubt other empirical studies that identify the importance of practical wisdom and self-direction to individual flourishing.

However, as Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl (often referred to as the Dougs) have pointed out, “the character of human flourishing is not discovered solely by a scientific study of human nature. Considerations of the requirements and conditions for human volition and action, cultural and social practices, and commonsense observations are part of the process”. The Dougs add: “The point of entry for such reflection most often occurs when we examine our lives as a whole and wonder what they are for”. (Norms of Liberty, 2005, p.116).

The Dougs present a Neo-Aristotelian account of human flourishing in which the human good is explained to be objective, inclusive, individualized, agent-relative, self-directed and social. After providing that explanation, the authors conclude:

“Regardless of whether or not the forgoing outline of human flourishing meshes with Aristotle’s, it clear that human flourishing is, for our theory of individualistic perfectionism, something plural and complex, not monistic and simple. As we have noted, this view of human flourishing amounts to a version of moral pluralism because there are many goods that help to define human flourishing. Further, there is no single good or virtue that dominates all others and reduces them to mere instrumental values.” (p.143)

The Dougs do not refrain from declaring that human flourishing is good. Flourishing occurs when individuals actualize their natural potential to be good humans. (p.122)

The Dougs note that the individualized and agent-relative character of human flourishing poses the problem of how it can be possible for individuals to flourish in different ways without the flourishing of some individuals or groups being given structural preference over that of others. They explain that recognition of individual rights solves that problem because it enables individuals to flourish in different ways provided that they do not interfere with the rights of others. (pp. 76-96)

I hope that this brief outline of Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl’s discussion of human flourishing provides sufficient evidence that their normative conclusions in political philosophy are based on their study of human nature.

Does Gaus’s evolutionary discussion help us to defend intuitions that natural rights exist?

In my book, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing, I noted that, since ancient times, some philosophers have recognized that there is a foundation in human nature for intuitions about natural rights. I noted Haidt’s moral foundations theory and Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution but most of my discussion focused on Robert Nozick’s discussion of the evolution of norms and intuitions related to social cooperation for mutual benefit and the ethics of respect. (pp. 26-28) Nozick’s discussion is in his book, Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World, published in 2001.

Gaus’s discussion of cultural evolution overlaps considerably with Nozick’s, but there are differences of emphasis. As noted above, Gaus’s discussion emphasizes that public justification has always been a fundamental feature of moral life of humanity and that some moral rules become internalized as large majorities developed an emotional attachment to them. I think public justification is also implied in Nozick’s discussion of the merits of voluntary cooperation to mutual benefit because voluntary cooperation requires public justification.  (Nozick, p.259)

One difference of emphasis arises because of Nozick’s interest in the question of why conscious self-awareness was selected for in evolutionary processes. Nozick suggests that “if the function of conscious self-awareness was selected for because it makes us capable of ethical behaviour, then ethics, even the first layer of the ethics of respect, truly is what makes us human”. (p.300) Gaus is more interested in issues of public justification of norms and the question of “how we can live without oppression and subjugation in a complex and deeply divided world”.

I think Gaus’s evolutionary discussion is helpful to an understanding of why it is common for people to have intuitions that rules that restrain individual action require public justification to ensure that, as far as is possible, they are aligned with the personal normative convictions of community members.  Perhaps the intuition that people have a natural right to public justification of rules that restrain individual action is just as widespread and as strong as the intuition that individuals have a natural right to respect for their persons and property.

 Conclusions

This essay was prompted by my reading of Gerry Gaus’s book, The Open Society and its Complexities.

Gaus’s discussion of the evolution of human nature emphasizes the following points:

• Public justification of rules and concern for personal autonomy were a fundamental feature of moral life even before the evolution of modern humans.
• The evolved moral psychology of humans has allowed a wide variety of fairness norms to be followed in different circumstances and cultures.
• Human nature is neither fundamentally tribalistic nor is it characterized by an ever-expanding circle of moral relationships. There is constant tension between tendencies toward expansion of moral concerns and pulling back to familiarity and social proximity.
• The Open Society is characterized by self-organized social morality and diversity of moral perspectives.

Gaus argues that diversity can enhance the ability of a society to secure public justification of shared moral rules.

I think the points that Gaus emphasizes about human nature are helpful in considering the merits of an Open Society but I would have liked to have seen him give consideration to the relevance of other aspects of human nature such as the widespread view that exercise of practical wisdom is a virtue and the value that people place on self-direction. Consideration of practical wisdom and self-direction would have required consideration of studies with an individualistic focus as well as those that focus on social norms.

 It is possible to obtain insights about human nature from commonsense observations, introspection and reasoning, as well as from scientific research. On the basis of their observations and reasoning Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl were able to explain (in Norms of Liberty) that the human good is individualized, agent-relative and self-directed, as well as social. Their understanding of the nature of human good and individual flourishing provided a foundation for their normative conclusion that it is necessary for the politico-legal framework to recognize individual rights. Rights recognition makes it possible for individuals to flourish in different ways without the flourishing of some individuals or groups being given structural preference over that of others.

It is appropriate for conclusions about the rights of individuals to be based on the study of human nature rather than intuitions. Nevertheless, the intuition that humans have rights that should be respected is an important factor influencing individual behaviour. That influence could be expected to be stronger when people believe that individual rights are natural, in the sense of having a foundation in human nature. It seems to me that evolutionary theory supports that belief.

Gaus’s book left me thinking that the intuition that individuals have a natural right to public justification of the rules that restrain their actions may be as widespread and as strong as the intuition that they have a natural right to respect for their persons and property. More generally, it may be that humans tend to have strong intuitions that natural justice itself is a natural right.

How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?

 This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins.

Ed is Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. He is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. My review of that trilogy is included among references listed among suggestions for further reading at the end of Ed’s essay.

Ed has numerous other publications, including an essay reviewing books by David L. Norton, which was published here in January and a review of Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s book “Total Freedom” published here in July. 

Ed Younkins writes:  

The pursuit of human flourishing—what Aristotle termed eudaimonia—stands as a central concern of both philosophical inquiry and economic science. At first glance, the Austrian economic tradition, with its emphasis on subjective value and methodological individualism, might appear incompatible with neo-Aristotelian philosophies like Ayn Rand's Objectivism and Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J.  Den Uyl's "individualistic perfectionism," which assert the objectivity of human values. Yet, upon deeper examination, these traditions reveal profound compatibilities and complementary insights that provide a more robust framework for understanding human freedom, social cooperation, and the conditions for prosperity. This synthesis offers a powerful intellectual foundation for what could be termed "flourishing individualism"—the view that individuals possess an objective nature whose perfection requires specific social, political, and economic conditions, most notably freedom.

The Austrian School of economics and the neo-Aristotelian philosophy of freedom and flourishing share profound philosophical and methodological affinities. Both frameworks emphasize individual agency, moral responsibility, and the dynamic process of human flourishing in a world of uncertainty and choice. Although Austrian economists such as Ludwig von Mises typically maintain that values are subjective, and neo-Aristotelians assert that values are objective in a moral sense, these positions are not incompatible when understood as operating on different levels of analysis: the praxeological versus the ethical. Both perspectives converge on the centrality of rational agency, the importance of practical wisdom, and the moral necessity of liberty for human flourishing. This essay explores these convergences, demonstrating that Austrian economics and the neo-Aristotelian ethical framework together form a mutually enriching paradigm of freedom and flourishing.

 The Foundations of Austrian Economics

Austrian economics emerged in the late nineteenth century with Carl Menger’s Principles of Economics (1871), which emphasized methodological individualism, subjectivism, and the causal-realistic method. Menger held that value originates in the human mind’s recognition of the usefulness of goods for achieving desired ends. Later thinkers such as Ludwig von Mises (1949), Friedrich Hayek (1948), and Israel Kirzner (1973) expanded this foundation, emphasizing purposive human action (praxeology), the coordinating role of the price system, and the discovery process of entrepreneurship. Mises’s Human Action presents economics as a deductive science grounded in the axiom that “man acts purposefully” (Mises 1949). Human action, for Mises, is always rational in the instrumental sense—it involves the use of means to achieve chosen ends under conditions of uncertainty.

Israel Kirzner added to this framework by introducing the concept of entrepreneurial alertness. Entrepreneurs notice opportunities for profit that others have overlooked, thereby correcting market errors and coordinating dispersed knowledge. Kirzner’s entrepreneur is a creative, forward-looking agent who exercises alertness, judgment, and initiative—traits that closely parallel the Aristotelian notion of phronesis, or practical wisdom (Kirzner 1973). In both frameworks, knowledge, creativity, and prudence are essential for navigating the complexities of real-world decision-making.

Neo-Aristotelian and Objectivist Ethics of Flourishing

The neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Rasmussen and Den Uyl, articulated in Norms of Liberty (2005), The Perfectionist Turn (2016) and The Realist Turn (2020) seeks to develop a liberal political order grounded in the ethics of individual perfectionism. They argue that moral value is objective and grounded in human nature: flourishing (eudaimonia) is the natural end of human beings as rational and social agents. Moral principles are thus derived from the requirements of human flourishing, not from arbitrary preferences. Rand’s Objectivism similarly holds that reason is man’s means of survival, that values are objective, and that rational self-interest is the proper moral code (Rand 1964).

Rasmussen and Den Uyl distinguish between self-perfection—the moral ideal of living rationally and virtuously—and self-directedness, the political condition that makes self-perfection possible. Rights, in their account, protect the liberty necessary for individuals to pursue their own perfection in diverse ways. Their framework, like Rand’s, integrates metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics to yield a view of human beings as rational, volitional agents who must exercise practical reason to flourish.

 Subjective and Objective Value: Distinct Spheres of Analysis

One of the most frequently discussed issues in relating Austrian economics to neo-Aristotelian ethics concerns the apparent conflict between Misesian subjectivism and Aristotelian or Objectivist views about value. Mises maintains that “value is subjective,” meaning that economic value arises from individual preferences and choices; there are no objective economic values apart from subjective evaluations by acting persons. Rand and Rasmussen and Den Uyl, by contrast, hold that moral values are objective because they are grounded in the requirements of human life and flourishing. However, as Kathleen Touchstone (2015) and I (2011) have argued, these positions refer to different levels of analysis and are not contradictory.

This subjectivism is epistemological and economic, not moral. Mises did not claim that values are morally relative; rather, he argued that economics must remain value-free to maintain scientific rigor. Mises’s subjectivism pertains to the preferences individuals express in their actions, not to the truth or falsity of moral claims. Austrian economics thus provides a descriptive account of human behavior, focusing on how individuals allocate scarce resources to achieve their goals.

In the praxeological sense, subjectivity refers to the agent-relative nature of preference: each individual chooses based on his or her own hierarchy of ends. In the ethical sense, objectivity refers to the fact that some ends are objectively better than others for human flourishing. Austrian economists do not deny that there may be objective criteria for human well-being; rather, economics as a value-free science abstains from ethical judgments. Thus, Austrian subjectivism is methodological, not moral. Neo-Aristotelian philosophies,  in turn, concern moral evaluation, not economic explanation. The two frameworks, therefore, are compatible and complementary.

In contrast to the Austrian position, Rand's Objectivism maintains that values are objective, meaning they are "determined by the nature of reality, but to be discovered by man's mind."  Values are not created by whim or social convention but are discovered through rational inquiry into the requirements of human life. As Peikoff (1991) explains Rand's ethics, "the fundamental alternative at the base of value is life versus death. Since human beings do not survive automatically, but by the use of reason, the standard of value is not mere survival, but rational flourishing."  From this perspective, something is objectively valuable if it genuinely promotes human life and flourishing according to man's nature as a rational being.

Similarly, Rasmussen and Den Uyl's individualistic perfectionism, while acknowledging the diversity of flourishing paths, maintains that human flourishing serves as an objective standard for ethics. They define human flourishing as objective, inclusive, individualized, agent-relative, self-directed, and social. A person's flourishing is desired because it is desirable and choice-worthy.  The objectivity resides in the factual requirements for human flourishing, while the specific instantiation varies according to individual circumstances, talents, and choices.

The resolution to this apparent contradiction lies in recognizing that these theories operate at different levels of analysis. The Austrian subjective theory of value explains how economic calculation and market prices emerge from individual preferences in the context of scarcity. The neo-Aristotelian objective theory of value explains how certain goods, virtues, and institutions reliably promote human flourishing given human nature. The neo-Aristotelian sense of value-objectivity complements the Austrian sense of value-subjectivity because personal flourishing on an objective level transcends subjective value preferences.

 Entrepreneurship, Practical Wisdom, and Eudaimonia

The Austrian entrepreneur and the Aristotelian practically wise person share deep conceptual similarities. Kirzner’s entrepreneur acts under uncertainty, perceives opportunities, and exercises judgment and creativity—traits essential to human flourishing. Likewise, Aristotelian phronesis involves rational deliberation about means and ends in the pursuit of eudaimonia. Both require sensitivity to context, adaptability, and the courage to act amidst uncertainty.

Rasmussen and Den Uyl (2005) describe flourishing as a self-directed activity of reason, while Kirzner (1973) and Mises (1949) describe the market process as an open-ended discovery procedure. Both perspectives view human action as purposive and guided by reason. The Austrian view of entrepreneurship provides a dynamic understanding of how individuals realize their plans within institutional frameworks, which aligns with the Aristotelian conception of practical wisdom as context-sensitive, agent-centered reasoning.

Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Individualistic Perfectionism builds on Aristotelian ethics to defend a liberal political order. They argue that human flourishing (eudaimonia) is agent-relative and pluralistic, requiring liberty for individuals to pursue their own good. Their philosophy emphasizes practical wisdom (phronesis), the capacity to deliberate well about how to live.

Rand’s rational egoism and Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s agent-relative flourishing both affirm the moral legitimacy of self-interest. Austrian economics shows how self-interest, when channeled through markets, leads to mutual benefit. As Kathleen Touchstone argues, “Practical reason can be aligned with self-interest in a way that promotes both personal and social good.” This alignment reinforces the idea that liberty is not only economically efficient but morally justifiable.

This aligns closely with Austrian economists’ view of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs exercise alertness and judgment in navigating uncertainty and making context-sensitive decisions. As Benjamin Powell and Rosolino Candela (2014) have shown, entrepreneurial action is a form of practical reasoning, akin to Aristotelian phronesis. Both traditions recognize that flourishing requires freedom, creativity, and contextual judgment.

In both frameworks, success depends on alertness to opportunity—economic or moral. The morally flourishing individual, like the entrepreneur, must remain open to new information, creatively respond to change, and act on rational insight. This parallel suggests that the Aristotelian notion of practical wisdom and the Austrian idea of entrepreneurial alertness describe complementary dimensions of human rationality: moral and economic.

Both traditions recognize that practical wisdom and entrepreneurial judgment are necessary precisely because human beings face genuine uncertainty and operate with limited knowledge. The Austrian emphasis on the market as a discovery procedure for mobilizing dispersed knowledge complements the neo-Aristotelian recognition that human flourishing requires practical wisdom precisely because we cannot have algorithmic certainty about how to live well. As Kathleen Touchstone observes in her comparison of Rand and the Austrians, the recognition of death's inevitability plays a crucial role in establishing life as the ultimate value, highlighting the finitude that makes choice meaningful.  Our limited time and knowledge make both economic and ethical judgment necessary and meaningful.

Liberty as the Political Prerequisite for Flourishing

Both Austrian economists and neo-Aristotelians maintain that liberty is the indispensable precondition for human flourishing. For Mises and Hayek, economic freedom allows individuals to coordinate dispersed knowledge and discover better ways to achieve their goals. For Rand, Rasmussen, and Den Uyl, moral self-perfection requires the freedom to act on one’s rational judgment without coercion. The rule of law and private property thus provide the institutional context within which individuals can exercise moral and entrepreneurial agency.

Many economists have shown that economic liberty correlates strongly with prosperity and well-being, but beyond material benefits, liberty also enables moral growth, Freedom is valuable not only as a means but also as a necessary condition for self-responsibility and virtue. The Austrian and neo-Aristotelian perspectives converge in seeing liberty as both an epistemic and a moral requirement—a framework that respects the dignity of human choice and the moral significance of self-directedness.

The Austrian understanding of the market as a spontaneous order—an emergent pattern of cooperation that results from human action but not human design—provides an economic justification for the political framework defended by neo-Aristotelian philosophers. The result of these combined perspectives is a powerful moral and political framework that answers the challenge of modern pluralism without surrendering the objectivity of value. It is a theory that preserves the ethical centrality of virtue and the reality of human goods while insisting on the primacy of liberty and individual responsibility.

 Human Action, Rational Agency, and the Unity of Knowledge

Austrian economics and the neo-Aristotelian philosophy share a common anthropological foundation: human beings as rational, purposive agents. Mises’s praxeology and Aristotle’s practical philosophy both begin from the recognition that action is purposeful and intelligible. Barry Smith (1990) has argued that Mises’s praxeological categories correspond closely to Aristotelian metaphysical concepts: means, ends, causality, and teleology. This correspondence suggests that Austrian economics, though methodologically individualist, is compatible with a broader realist metaphysics of human nature.

Rand’s Objectivism likewise rests on a realist ontology and a teleological conception of life. Human reason is a means of survival, and moral virtue is the consistent choice to act in accordance with reason. Rasmussen and Den Uyl (2016) extend this insight by emphasizing that the moral self is a “self-perfecting agent” whose flourishing requires both internal rational order and external social liberty. The Austrian theory of the market as a spontaneous order complements this moral vision: both rely on the creative, adaptive rationality of individuals operating within an open-ended, complex world.

Self-Interest, Practical Reason, and Moral Responsibility

In both Austrian and neo-Aristotelian thought, self-interest is rational and morally legitimate. For Mises, self-interest is inherent in human action: individuals act to remove felt uneasiness and improve their conditions. For Rand, self-interest is the moral expression of the objective requirements of human life. Rasmussen and Den Uyl reinterpret self-interest in terms of self-perfection: the pursuit of moral virtue and excellence as expressions of one’s nature as a rational being.

Practical reason (phronesis) guides this pursuit by integrating knowledge, experience, and judgment in concrete circumstances. Similarly, the Austrian entrepreneur uses reason to identify and pursue profit opportunities, which represent the coordination of subjective values through voluntary exchange. This coordination process can be seen as a form of social learning in which individual discovery contributes to mutual benefit. Both frameworks thus ground moral and economic order in the creative, purposive activity of rational agents.

 Harmony Between Ethics and Economics

Austrian economics and neo-Aristotelian ethics are not separate silos but complementary aspects of a unified understanding of human life. Economic science explains how individuals interact within markets to achieve their diverse ends, while ethical philosophy clarifies which ends are worthy of pursuit. Together they yield a comprehensive view of the human person as a self-responsible, rational being whose flourishing depends on freedom, virtue, and creativity.

It could be argued that integrating these perspectives results in a “humanomics” of flourishing—a science of man that recognizes the inseparability of moral and economic dimensions of action. (Rasmussen 2024-25) Freedom provides the institutional framework; virtue provides the moral compass; entrepreneurship provides the practical engine of progress. Each reinforces the others in a mutually supportive system.

Conclusion: Toward a Paradigm of Freedom and Flourishing

The intellectual convergence between Austrian economics and neo-Aristotelian philosophy represents more than an academic curiosity. It offers a comprehensive framework for understanding human flourishing under conditions of freedom that integrates insights from ethics, economics, and political theory. Their complementarity arises from addressing different but interconnected aspects of the human condition: the Austrian tradition explaining how social cooperation emerges from individual choices under specific institutional arrangements, and the neo-Aristotelian tradition explaining what constitutes a well-lived life for the individual choosing agent.

Rand admired Mises and the Austrian school, praising their defense of capitalism and critique of central planning. She ranked Mises among history’s intellectual giants and featured favorable reviews of his works in her publications. However, she rejected Mises’s value subjectivism, insisting that values must be grounded in objective reality. For Rand, values are not arbitrary preferences but facts of reality that reflect the requirements of human life.

Yet, as scholars like Robert Tarr have noted, this apparent conflict dissolves when we recognize that Mises and Rand operate at different levels of analysis. Mises’s subjectivism pertains to economic behavior, while Rand’s objectivism addresses moral philosophy. As Tarr puts it, “The Austrian and Objectivist views of value are not contradictory but complementary when properly contextualized.” Austrian economics describes how individuals act; Objectivism prescribes how they ought to act.

The resolution of the apparent conflict between subjective and objective value through different levels of analysis enriches both traditions, allowing economists to acknowledge the purpose-serving nature of market activity while enabling philosophers to recognize the institutional prerequisites for virtue. The connection between entrepreneurial judgment and practical wisdom highlights the moral dimension of economic creativity while acknowledging the cognitive demands of both economic and ethical excellence. The defense of political and economic freedom as essential for human flourishing provides a shared normative foundation for evaluating social institutions.

This synthesis finds eloquent expression in the work of scholars who explicitly aim to forge an understanding from various disciplines and to integrate them into consistent, coherent, and systematic whole. The goal is to have a paradigm in which the views of reality, human nature, knowledge, values, action, and society make up an integrated whole. This integrated perspective acknowledges what Rasmussen and Den Uyl (2016) identify as the "tethered character of political philosophy" to deeper metaphysical and ethical frameworks.

Perhaps most importantly, this integrated perspective reminds us that economics and philosophy ultimately serve the same end: understanding and promoting the conditions for human flourishing. The economic creativity unleashed by markets and the ethical excellence cultivated through virtue represent complementary aspects of what can be identified as flourishing and happiness in a free society.  By recognizing their compatibility and complementarity, we can move closer to an integrated understanding of human freedom that enables individuals to realize their highest potential through reason, practical wisdom, and voluntary cooperation.

The convergence of Austrian economics and neo-Aristotelian perfectionism reveals a coherent philosophical paradigm that integrates economics, ethics, and politics around the concept of rational human agency. Austrian economics contributes a dynamic, subjectivist understanding of market coordination and entrepreneurial discovery. Neo-Aristotelian and Objectivist ethics provide an objective, normative account of human flourishing and moral responsibility. Far from being incompatible, the subjective and objective dimensions of value illuminate different aspects of the same reality: human beings as valuers and choosers in a world of possibilities.

By recognizing their compatibility, scholars can move toward a richer, interdisciplinary synthesis—one that unites Misesian praxeology with Aristotelian virtue ethics, Kirznerian entrepreneurship with practical wisdom, and Randian self-interest with moral responsibility. This synthesis provides a powerful conceptual framework for understanding human life as a process of rational self-direction within a free society. It is, ultimately, a paradigm of freedom and flourishing.

 Recommended Reading

Bates, Winton. 2024. “The Vision of Ed Younkins’s Trilogy on Freedom and Flourishing” The Savvy Street.  (May 15).

Block, Walter. 2005. “Ayn Rand and Austrian Economists: Two Peas in a Pod” The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol.6 No 2; 259-269.

Boettke, Peter J. 2019. “Mises, Rand, and the Twentieth Century” in Gregory Salmieri and Robert Mayhew, Foundations of a Free Society: Reflections on Ayn Rand’s Political Philosophy.  Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Candela, Rosolino A. 2018. “The Socialist Calculation Debate and its Normative Implications in Austrian Economics” The Next Generation: 29-44

Den Uyl, Douglas J. and Douglas B. Rasmussen. 2016. The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Ebeling, Richard M. 2021. “The Case for Freedom in Ludwig von Mises, F.A. Hayek, and Ayn Rand”.  Future of Freedom (January).

Johnsson, Richard C. B..2005. “Subjectivism, Intrinsicism and Apriorism: Rand Among the Austrians”. The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol.6 No.2: 317-335.

Kirzner, Israel M. 1973. Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Menger, Carl. 1871. Principles of Economics. Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller.

Mises, Ludwig von. 1949. Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Pauls, Theodore N. 2025 “What Do Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives tell us about Flourishing Individualism?” Freedom and Flourishing (June 24).

Peikoff, Leonard. 1991. Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. New York: Dutton

Powell, Benjamin and Rosolino Candela. 2014. “Markets as Processes of Moral Discovery” Studies in Emergent Order. Vol.7: 258-272.

Rand, Ayn. 1964. The Virtue of Selfishness. New York: Signet.

Rasmussen, Douglas B. 2024-25 “Homo Agens and Homo Moralis in Humanomics”. The Independent Review. (Winter).

Rasmussen, Douglas B., and Douglas J. Den Uyl. 2005. Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Douglas J. Den Uyl. 2020, The Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism Palgrave Macmillan.

Smith, Barry. 1990. “Aristotle, Menger, Mises: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Economics.” History of Political Economy 22 (3): 683–706.

Tarr, Robert. 2019."Economic Theory and the Conceptions of Value: Rand and the Austrians versus the Mainstream”. In Gregory Salmieri and Robert Mayhew, Foundations of a Free Society: Reflections on Ayn Rand’s Political Philosophy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 327-380.

Touchstone, Kathleen. 2015. “Rand and the Austrians: The Ultimate Value and the Non-interference Principle”. Libertarian Papers. 7 No.2, 169-204.

Touchstone, Kathleen. 2020.  Freedom, Eudaemonia, and Risk: An Inquiry into the Ethics of Risk-Taking.  Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Younkins, Edward W. 2005. ‘Menger, Mises, Rand, and Beyond” The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 6 no.2 Spring: 337-74.

Younkins, Edward W. 2011. Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society: Toward a Synthesis of Aristotelianism, Austrian Economics, and Ayn Rand’s Objectivism. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Why did Aristotle view leisure as a fundamental aspect of a well-lived life?

 

Leah Goldrick answers the question posed above in this guest essay. The essay was first published on Common Sense Ethics, Leah’s excellent blog.

Leah writes:

I've just finished reading Aristotle's Way: How Ancient Wisdom Can Change Your Life, by classicist Edith Hall. It's a great book that I would recommend for my readers, as Hall capitalizes on popular interest in ancient philosophy and substantive self-help. Aristotle addresses the issue of how to live a good life in his Politics, and Nicomachean Ethics, written in the fourth century BC. In Aristotle's Way, Hall codifies Aristotle's most important ideas on how we should live, addressing topics such as happiness, love, communication, and mortality, among others. 

Chapter Seven of Aristotle’s Way is all about Aristotle’s philosophy of leisure, which I think is one of the most interesting chapters, and that's what I'll be writing about in this post. If you want to read a review of the entire book, I recommend this one by Donald Robertson, since I'm focusing on only a part of it here. 

​Aristotle’s philosophy of leisure is tied to his broader understanding of human flourishing. Aristotle thought that most people tend to misuse leisure time if they haven’t learned how to spend it meaningfully, preferring instead to spend their non-working hours on trivial pleasures and amusements. However, learning to use leisure time for growth oriented pursuits can greatly improve our lives. Let's examine that idea in depth in the next sections.  
​

What is Aristotelian Leisure?

​Aristotelian leisure encompasses not just what we might think of as recreational activities today like hobbies and sports, but rather, everything broadly we do outside of work. This includes relaxation after work, eating and fulfilling other bodily functions, and amusements to avoid boredom. It also includes forming relationships with others, enjoying the arts, spending time on exercise and intellectual contemplation, crafts, civic association, and other beneficial and meaningful activities. For Aristotle, leisure isn’t simply about taking breaks or escaping from work; it's a fundamental aspect of a well-lived life.

At the core of Aristotle’s ethics is the concept of eudaimonia, translated as "flourishing" or "well-being." The ultimate human goal is living in accordance with reason and achieving a life of virtue. To reach eudaimonia, one must engage in activities that are fulfilling, meaningful, and promote personal growth. Leisure, in this context, is not a passive activity but is deeply connected to the active cultivation of one's intellect and virtues. In the Nichmeachean Ethics (Book X, 1176b) Aristotle writes: “To be always seeking after amusement is a sign of levity and not of a serious purpose.”

In today’s world, where leisure is often viewed as idle entertainment or seen merely as a break from work, the concept of Aristotelian leisure offers a richer and more profound understanding of what we should be doing with our time; leisure involves reflection, growth, and the pursuit of intellectual and moral development, not just passive distraction. Aristotle argues that leisure is the time in which we can engage in these activities, which allow us to connect to the highest aspects of our human nature. This could include philosophical conversation, artistic creation, or scientific inquiry. These activities are seen as valuable in themselves—not just as means to an end.

In essence, Aristotle’s view of leisure encourages us to think of it as time for self-improvement, exploration, and the cultivation of virtues, rather than merely a time to "rest" from work. Aristotle also believes that leisure is essential for cultivating friendships, which are vital for living a good life. In a sense, leisure time allows for the development of meaningful relationships, as people have time to engage in shared activities that promote mutual flourishing.

Work, Leisure and the Good Life

Aristotle obviously acknowledged that work and productive labor are necessary for survival, and most people in the ancient world that Aristotle inhabited worked tremendously hard. Aristotle also thinks that work can be virtuous if done with the right intentions.

Still, work is secondary to leisure in the Aristotelian sense. Moreover, work should not dominate a person’s life to the point where there is no room for leisure, because without leisure, a person is unable to engage in the activities that lead to personal fulfillment and virtue. Thinking about leisure this way can be a helpful antidote to the burnout many experience in the modern, work-centered culture.

From an Aristotelian perspective, you need not be defined by your job or career, but rather by what you choose to do with your non-working hours. This is good news for several reasons. First, the reality is that only a minority of people are lucky enough to be able to make a living doing what they love. Most of us will have work to get by, but it’s leisure that is truly important for a good life. So, it doesn’t matter if you aren’t totally satisfied with your career.

Best of all, even if you work a lot, you likely have more leisure time available to you than the average person in Aristotle's day. In ancient Greece, everything, even basic chores, had to be done by hand. By contrast, most people in the developed world today enjoy access to modern appliances and conveniences which free up more of our time for meaningful leisure.  

To wrap up the post here, Aristotle thought that how we spend our non-working hours defines who we are, the kind of life we will have, and the type of society we build. From this perspective, our leisure choices are more significant than we may realize. Spending our leisure time meaningfully helps us make sense of the world, experience growth, and contribute to something larger than ourselves. 

If you'd like to learn more about Aristotle's ideas on how to live well, I highly recommend reading Aristotle's Way.  

How can dialectics help us to defend liberty?

 

This guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins is a review of Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s book “Total Freedom”, which was published 25 years ago. The epigraph is from page 354 of that book.

Ed Younkins is Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. He is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. Ed has numerous other publications, including an essay reviewing books by David L. Norton, which was published here in January.    

 Ed Younkins’s review was previously published in 2001 in “Le Québécois Libre”. 

There are two reasons why it is appropriate for it to be re-published now.

First,“Total Freedom” deserves more attention, and the 25^th anniversary of its publication is a particularly appropriate time for that to occur.

Second, in the light of declining economic and personal freedom in many parts of the world, the defense of liberty has become more urgent than it was 25 years ago. Ian Vásquez and his colleagues responsible for measurement of human freedom for Cato and the Fraser Institute have noted that on a world-wide basis, and using a population weighted comparison, a high point for freedom occurred in 2005–2007, followed by a steady decline through 2019, and a precipitous descent in 2020 through 2021 associated with government responses to the Covid virus (“The Human Freedom Index 2024, pp. 21-25). The latest data suggest although some recovery has occurred since, human freedom remains lower than in the year 2000.

Younkins ended his review by noting that he was “looking forward to seeing what Sciabarra will offer us next that will contribute toward the development of a comprehensive defense of freedom.” Chris Sciabarra has continued to make important contributions in this field even though illness has somewhat constrained his efforts.

Here is Ed Younkins’s review of:

Sciabarra, Chris Matthew, Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism (Pennsylvania State University Press: 2000).

In Total Freedom, Chris Matthew Sciabarra offers a provocative, scholarly, and original work in social theory for the analysis of society and human liberty. The author aims to reclaim the dialectical method, the art of context keeping, in the name of liberty and from the authoritarian left in order to make it the foundation for a radical (i.e., one that goes to the root) defense of libertarianism.

The necessity of context

Sciabarra is convinced that a successful libertarian project must stress the necessity of context – the totality of systemic and dynamic connections among social problems. More specifically, the libertarian ideal cannot be isolated from the context upon which it depends and freedom cannot be defended successfully when separated from its broader requisite conditions. The author proposes in Total Freedom a metatheoretical foundation upon which to construct a comprehensive libertarian social theory. Rather than making a convincing argument for liberty, he offers a means for structuring the methodology of social inquiry. The book is about how a context-sensitive methodology can be used to defend freedom. In order to think about freedom, people need to grasp the totality of its prerequisites and implications. Emphasizing the indivisible unity of theory and practice, Sciabarra says that any effort to understand or change society requires an analysis of its many related aspects.  

Sciabarra explains that dialectics emphasizes the centrality of context in the intertemporal analysis of systems. It is a thinking style that stresses the contextual analysis of systems across time. Dialectics may be viewed as a method of analysis, a mode of inquiry, or a type of meta-methodological orientation or set of assumptions about how we approach the object of our study. Dialectics is an approach to thinking that attempts to grasp the full context of a philosophy or social problem. Dialectical thinking endeavors to understand the whole through differential vantage points and levels of generality and by a systemic and dynamic extension of analytical units. 

The author emphasizes that dialectical thinking necessitates that we do not engage in context dropping, but instead make every possible effort to see interconnections between seemingly disparate branches of knowledge. Such an approach compels scholars to investigate empirically the potential connections between various spheres in an effort to attain integrated knowledge of the full context. Since people are not omniscient, understanding a complex world thoroughly requires an on-going investigation of its many interrelated facets from shifting vantage points. 

Down to earth dialectics

As a methodological orientation, dialectics has been employed in the analysis of systems of argumentation, philosophy, ethics, linguistics, history, culture, psychology, social theory, political economy, etc. One of Sciabarra's goals is to capture the essence of the many dialectical approaches that have appeared throughout intellectual history. He argues that in its origins dialectics is not an especially Hegelian or Marxian tradition, but rather in its inception it is firmly Aristotelian. 

Sciabarra explains that, although the pre-Socratics and Plato were the earliest practitioners of dialectics, it was Aristotle, the true father (or fountainhead) of dialectical inquiry, who first articulated its theoretical principles and techniques. Plato had connected dialectics to an idealist ontology that entailed the search for comprehensive transcendent truth. Plato's unrealistic epistemological standard was for human beings to somehow attain a synoptic perspective on the whole society. 

Aristotle brought the dialectic down to earth by severing its principles from their Platonic-idealist formulation. The Aristotelian idea of dialectics eliminates cosmology from philosophy and relies on a minimalist metaphysics that states that existence is what it is, that consciousness is our means for understanding it, and that everything that exists is part of one reality. The history of dialectics is filled with battles between the synoptic Platonic idealist conception and the contextual Aristotelian realist understanding. As a dialectical reality, Sciabarra tells us that we should rightfully criticize those who form dialectical abstractions with no regard for their relationship to the facts of reality. 

Sciabarra explains that Aristotle advocates shifting our viewpoints on any object of study in order to illuminate different aspects of it. In this way, Aristotle keeps the Platonic predilection for organic unity, but acknowledges the central importance of context. Aristotle's principles of inquiry call for us to constantly shift our perspective on any object of study. Each point of view provides a different context of meaning. It is by piecing together the various perspectives that a person can gain a comprehensive understanding of the full context of the object. 

Like Aristotle, the Medieval Scholastics applied dialectical principles to the argumentative arts. Sciabarra observes that they brought dialectics to the consideration of Biblical texts and thus began the centuries-long journey toward the secularization of the human mind because they were brave enough to subject the scriptures to analysis, something that was disapproved of for centuries before.  

Sciabarra argues that Hegel's conception of the dialectic harks back to the Ancient Greek ideal of organic unity and to the Platonic penchant for the divine. In turn, Marx anchored dialectics to investigations of the real world. However, Marx's vision presumed god-like planning and control of many nuances, tacit practices, and unintended consequences of social action. He also presumed a total grasp of history and often attempted to study the present as if from an imagined future. When Marxists suggest that history can lead to a victory over human ignorance, they are implying privileged access to total knowledge of future social conditions. This is inherently utopian and undialectical since it is unbounded by the context that exists and is based on a « synoptic delusion, » a belief that one can live in a world in which every action produces consistent and predictable outcomes.

The art of context keeping

 If dialectics is the art of context keeping, then historical materialism proposes a theory of history that places the theoretician outside the context of the human condition. The problem occurs when Marx steps into the future to evaluate the present. He assumes the information needed by future planners will be available despite the fact that these planners will have destroyed the context (i.e., the price system), which permits such information to be generated and socially traded. By holding this incorrect assumption, Marx is placing himself outside the historical process that he analyzes. Sciabarra observes that it is as though Marx is permitting himself privileged access to information about a future that is ontologically and epistemologically impossible. Such a Utopian way of viewing the world is essentially an a-contextual, a-historical search for human ideals with no understanding of the limits or nature of reason. It is as if people can step outside the bounds of culture and society to re-create the world. 

Sciabarra goes on to explore the manifestations of dialectics among those from the liberal tradition including Herbert Spencer, Carl Menger, Mises, Hayek, Rand, and especially Murray Rothbard. The author's goal here is to show how classical liberal and modern libertarian approaches embody conflicting orientations. He also describes how these thinkers have been richer, more complex, and more context-sensitive than their critics have been willing to acknowledge. Total Freedom documents how a contextual-dialectical approach informed many of the classical liberal, and libertarian thinkers of the 19th and 20th centuries. 

A large portion of the second half of Sciabarra's work involves a comprehensive case study of the writings of Murray Rothbard, one of the major libertarian thinkers of the 20th century. Sciabarra attempts to identify the dialectical and undialectical aspects of Rothbard's wide-ranging anarcho-capitalist analytical model. Rothbard's work is used to expose and analyze the dialectical strengths and nondialectical weaknesses that are typical in modern libertarian social theory. 

Sciabarra observes that Rothbard, for most of his life, believed that libertarianism did not require a theory of culture. Rothbard appeared to think that his axiom of non-aggression could resolve social and political problems by itself. Like many other libertarians, he simply dropped the larger context which freedom requires in order to flourish and stressed libertarian goals without considering the problem of meeting them. He insisted that libertarianism was a political philosophy that could accommodate any culture. For example, Rothbard believed that men could simply use their reason to develop a permanently fixed Libertarian Law Code in accordance with anarcho-capitalist principles.  

Sciabarra questions the efficacy of such an imposition because it does not take into account the philosophical, cultural, and historical context upon which libertarian principles depend. The acceptance of a Libertarian Law Code in the real world would require a deeper understanding of personal and cultural factors. Rothbard had abstracted a single principle of non-aggression and created a dualistic tension between theory and reality by declaring that state institutions are at odds with human nature. This led Rothbard to universalize the market as a means of destroying the state.  

Sciabarra points out that later Rothbard realized that proponents of a free society needed a fully articulated theory of culture, since some cultures foster, while others threaten, a free society. Rothbard's later greater dialectical sensibility is exhibited in his theory of structural crisis which was simultaneously historical, political, economic, and sociological and in the foundations of his non-Marxist theory of class struggle. 

In need of an effective strategy

Toward the end of his book, Sciabarra briefly surveys the growing dialectical trend among libertarians such as Peter Boettke, Douglas Den Uyl, Don Lavoie, Douglas Rasmussen, Mario Rizzo, and others. Sciabarra is convinced that libertarianism as a social theory is valuable and offers a valid perspective on the nature of the crisis in modern society and that voluntary social relations, with all their preconditions and effects, are morally and consequentially preferable to the status quo and to statism in all its varieties. However, he does not believe that libertarian theorists have presented the best formulations and arguments in the context of social conditions that exist. Freedom cannot be defended successfully when severed from its broader requisite conditions. Libertarians must pay greater attention to the broader context within which their goals and values can be realized.

Sciabarra's message is that libertarians need an effective strategy that recognizes the dynamic interrelationships between the personal, political, historical, psychological, ethical, cultural, economic, etc., if they are to be successful in their quest for a free society. He explains that attempts to define and defend a non-aggression axiom in the absence of a broader philosophical and cultural context are doomed to fail. Libertarians must pay greater attention to the broader context within which their goals and values can be realized. The battle against statism is simultaneously structural (political and economic), cultural (with implications for education, race, sex, language, and art) and personal (with connections to individuals' tacit moral beliefs, and psycho-epistemological processes).

The author wants people to understand both the necessity for objective conceptual foundations for a free society and the need for cultural pre-requisites in the battle for the free society. The fight for freedom is multidimensional and takes place on a variety of levels with each level influencing and having reciprocal effects on the other levels. Dialectics require that people take into account and pay attention to all the levels and structures that a politics of freedom depends upon. Sciabarra contends that it is possible to look at society from different angles and on different levels of analytical generality in order to obtain an enriched portrait of its total form. Change must occur on many different levels and cannot be dictated from the realm of politics – it must filter through all the various levels.

The goals of Total Freedom are to defend the need for a dialectical libertarianism that synthesizes multiple disciplines and to reclaim dialectics as a viable methodology for libertarian social theory. The author accomplishes this in his well-documented, innovative, and academic treatise. He offers libertarianism as a valid and valuable perspective that is preferable to the status quo and to statism in all its varieties. However, Sciabarra stops short of developing his own substantive dialectical libertarian social theory. 

His work is primarily methodological and only articulates the view that a dialectical libertarianism is essential to the future of both dialectics and libertarianism. He has taken the first step by offering a metatheoretical structure for social inquiry, rather than a comprehensive argument for liberty. Sciabarra cautions that much work needs to be done to test the validity of various libertarian theories. I am looking forward to seeing what Sciabarra will offer us next that will contribute toward the development of a comprehensive defense of freedom.

Addendum

Readers may also be interested in an essay that Chris M. Sciabarra recently published to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the first two books in his "Dialectics and Liberty Trilogy": "Marx, Hayek, and Utopia" and "Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical," and the twenty-fifth anniversary of "Total Freedom." This "Trilogy Anniversary" essay can be found on both Notablog and Medium:

https://notablog.net/2025/06/09/a-trilogy-anniversary/

https://medium.com/@cm.../a-trilogy-anniversary-6265b10c1258