In The Community of
Advantage, which I reviewed in my last post, Robert Sugden observes that when individuals participate in market
transactions it is possible for them to be motivated by mutual benefit, rather
than personal benefit or even by the potential to use proceeds for altruistic
purposes. They may see virtue in voluntary transactions that enable people to
get what they want by benefiting others.
Sugden points out that being motivated by mutual benefit is
consistent with Adam Smith’s famous observation that we do not rely on the
benevolence of shopkeepers to provide us with the goods we need. The shop
keepers don’t sacrifice their own interests to provide us with goods, but they
may act with the intention of playing their part in mutually beneficial
practices.
Sugden suggests that adoption of the principle of mutual benefit
has implications for personal responsibility:
“According to that principle, each person should behave in
such a way that other people’s opportunities to realize mutual benefit are
sustained. But beyond that, no one is accountable to anyone else for his
preferences, intentions, or decisions. Individuals relate to one another, not
as one another’s benefactors, guardians, or moral judges, but as potential
partners in the achievement of their common interests".
Individuals decide how to use the opportunities that are
available to them, and accept sole responsibility for the consequences.
Sugden’s discussion of ethics includes responses to the
virtue-ethical critique of the market of philosophers, such as Elizabeth
Anderson and Michael Sandel, who argue for collective action by citizens to
impose limits on the scope of markets - on the grounds that motivations of
market participants are inherently non-virtuous and therefore liable to corrupt
social interactions.
However, some virtue ethicists have adopted a much more
market-friendly approach. I have in mind, particularly, the template of
responsibility proposed by Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen in The Perfectionist Turn.
Den Uyl and Rasmussen suggest that “the fact that one must
make a life for oneself is an existential condition”. To be a person is to have
self-responsibility. Each person is primarily responsible for her or his own
flourishing. Human flourishing involves “an actualization of potentialities
that are specific to the kind of living thing a human being is and that are
unique to each human being as an individual”.
Actualization “is dependent on the self-directed exercise of our
rational capacities”. Flourishing amounts to the same thing as “the exercise of
one’s own practical wisdom”.
As noted in an earlier article on this blog, an
entrepreneurial analogy is used by Den Uyl and Rasmussen to describe what a
flourishing life involves. Flourishing is activity rather than a passive state.
It involves discovery of opportunities, and alertness to new opportunities
amidst changing circumstances, rather than merely efficient use of the means at
our disposal.
The authors suggest that if we accept that human flourishing
is the goal of ethics, then we should learn from exemplars. People who have
flourished in difficult circumstances may provide us with useful models of
action. Of course, the idea that it can be helpful to personal development to
identify and emulate the values that drive heroes has been around for a long
time. It seems to work best for people who are sufficiently self-authoring to
be able to recognise that famous people are not always good exemplars of human
flourishing.
Den Uyl and Rasmussen argue that the ultimate value of the
template of responsibility is integrity, which “signifies a coherent, integral
whole of virtues and values, allowing for consistency between word and deed and
for reliability in action”. They suggest that integrity expresses itself
interpersonally in honour. Although acknowledging that honour may be “too
old-fashioned a term for today’s usage”, they maintain that it does “capture
the sense of what it means to greet the world with integrity”.
An alternative term, that captures some of that meaning, is
trustworthiness. Den Uyl and Rasmussen briefly discuss the question of why they
consider opportunistic participation in untrustworthy behaviour to be
inconsistent with individual flourishing. They argue that such opportunism puts
“the relationship we have with ourselves as a whole in disequilibrium by
eroding what we ought to be in our relations with others generally”.
I have a vague idea of what that means. We can’t flourish if
our behaviour is inconsistent with our values. Peoples’ consciences are often
troubled when they engage in untrustworthy behaviour. When confronted with an
opportunity to benefit unfairly at the expense of another person we sometimes
hear people say, “I couldn’t live with myself if I behaved in that way”. I am
not sure whether those sentiments are best explained in terms of evolved moral intuitions, internalisation of norms of reciprocity during the maturation
process, a combination of both, or something else. Perhaps it doesn’t matter
much how such sentiments are explained; the important point is to recognize
that humans generally view untrustworthy behaviour to be inconsistent with
their values.
Results of the trust game suggests that in a world we live
in there seems to be a widespread expectation that even people we don’t know may
be somewhat trustworthy. The trust game is a once-off game played between
anonymous strangers (A and B). A is given $10. She can choose to keep it all or
send some to B. B receives 3 times the amount sent by A. B can choose to keep
all the money she has received, or send some back to A. In the results of games
reported by Robert Sugden, A players sent on average $5.16 and received back
$4.66, with B players keeping $10.82.
Sugden suggests that the willingness of A players to send
any money to B players can explained in terms of their expectation that B players
can be trusted to play their part in producing mutual benefits.
In real world interactions, people have greater knowledge of
the trustworthiness of others. Sugden points out that the principle of mutual benefit
requires trustworthiness:
"In an economy in which there is a general tendency for
people to act on the Principle of Mutual Benefit, it is in each person’s
interest that other people expect him to act on that principle”.
He explains:
“In choosing whether or not to enter a trust relationship,
each individual is free to judge for herself whether or not that will be to her
benefit, taking account of the possibility that other participants may be
untrustworthy. To the extent that some person, say Joe, can be expected to act
on the Principle of Mutual Benefit, he can be seen by others, and sought out by
them, as a potential partner in mutually beneficial interactions that those
others are free to enter or not enter, as they choose. Thus, Joe’s being seen
in this way allows him to access opportunities for benefit that would be closed
off if his potential partners expected him always to act on
self-interest."
That reasoning might suggest to some readers that it is more
important to establish a reputation for trustworthiness than to have an
intention to be trustworthy. A lot of commercial advertising seems to make that
presumption. Fortunately, there is some evidence that individuals’ dispositions
toward trustworthiness are translucent. When people have face-to face
interactions with others they are quite successful in predicting who will
cooperate and who will defect. On that basis, Sugden suggests that having a
disposition to act on the principle of mutual benefit makes it more likely that
other people will expect you to act in this way.
Summing up, accepting responsibility for making something of
one’s own life is an integral part of what it means to be a human, and seeking
mutual benefit in interactions with others follows naturally from that. Integrity
in our behaviour toward others is of central importance to flourishing because
we cannot flourish if we don’t live according to our values, and because we
cannot flourish unless other people trust us sufficiently to seek mutually beneficial
interactions with us.
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