The Constitution
of Australia, like that of the United States, mandates free trade – up to a
point! Both constitutions mandate free trade between the states, and leave federal
governments free to impose barriers to international trade to the extent that they
wish.
It is
debatable whether a constitutional requirement for free international trade
would have made a huge difference to trade policy in either country. The
requirements for free trade between the states have not guaranteed free trade between
the states - judges have not always ruled against trade barriers imposed by
states to protect local interests. Many judges seem to capable of being highly
imaginative in their interpretation of concepts such as free trade.
The relevant
constitutional question is whether free trade is mandated by the real constitution - the set of
dispositions that influence what most citizens will accept as legitimate
actions by politicians and bureaucrats who make up the government. That depends
ultimately on the views of individual citizens.
Why should
your constitution mandate free trade? I hope you share with me the belief
that individuals have a natural right to engage freely in mutually beneficial
transactions with one another, even though third parties may be disadvantaged. If
so, you would probably consider it to be objectionable for a government to levy
a discriminatory tax on the sales of the producer from whom you wish to
purchase, in order to encourage you to purchase from a rival producer. You may
well assert that you have a right to choose to buy from whatever source you
wish, for whatever reasons you might have, free from any such third-party
interference.
The logic of
this argument does not cease to apply merely because buyers and sellers may be
separated by national borders. National borders are artificial constructs that
do not alter the natural right of individuals and firms to engage in mutually
beneficial transactions. Donald Boudreaux has written persuasively on this
topic: “International Trade Is Simply One Manifestation of Competition”.
Should an
exception be made in situations where foreign governments subsidize their
exports? No, if foreigners are sufficiently misguided to subsidize their
exports there is no reason why domestic consumers should not benefit from any
price reduction that this causes. In a market economy, if foreign subsidies
result in an expansion of total imports, this can reasonably be expected to
result in exchange rate and relative price adjustments to make exporting more
profitable and bring about an expansion of exports. Production for the domestic
market that is displaced by increased imports will be offset by increased
export production.
Some
economists still, no doubt, maintain that unilateral free trade is not optimal
on grounds such as the optimal tariff argument, and the potential for the use
of existing trade barriers as bargaining chips to obtain better access to
foreign markets. Policy advisors who recommend departure from free trade to
obtain such gains risk opening the way for much larger economic losses because
they are dealing with fallible real-world governments, rather than the
omniscient and benevolent governments assumed to exist in their economic models.
In the real world of politics every departure from a simple rule opens up
opportunities for interest groups to advance their interests at the expense of
the broader community.
However, there
is one argument that makes it difficult for the real constitution to mandate free trade. With great reluctance, I
am now willing to concede that it may be becoming more difficult for politicians
to endorse free trade because many people are choosing
to cast their votes for candidates who oppose it. Even though the gains from
free trade vastly outweigh the losses, the uneven distribution of losses makes the
outcomes of free trade seem unfair to many people. A substantial proportion of
voters in many countries now seem to be saying that their disposition is to favour
protection of existing jobs rather than the opportunities that free trade
offers.
Over the
longer term, the pursuit of policies to preserve existing jobs will, of course,
be inimical to the specialization and technological progress which provide the
basis for everyone’s future prosperity. Nevertheless, many voters and their
representatives seem to be more concerned to preserve existing jobs than to
promote future prosperity. Our democratic systems seem to be mutating from systems
of social cooperation to promote the interests of everyone, to arenas for the “war
of each against all” that Thomas Hobbes imagined as the only alternative to an
all-powerful dictator “to keep them all in awe”. Are we powerless to prevent
this war of each against all?
This poses
the kind of constitutional dilemma discussed by one of the 20th
Century’s best economists, James M Buchanan, in The Limits of Liberty:
Between Anarchy and Leviathan, 1975.
Buchanan wrote:
“If there
exist potential structural changes in legal order which might command
acceptance by all members of the society, the status quo represents a social
dilemma in the strict game-theoretic terminology. Even if we consider ourselves
far removed from the genuine Hobbesian jungle, where life is brutish and short,
the status quo contains within it elements or features that are in principle
equivalent. Life in the here and now may be more brutish than need be, and
certainly more nasty. If after examination and analysis, no such potential for
change exists, the legal-constitutional order that we observe must be judged to
be Pareto optimal, despite the possible presence of discontent among specific
members in the body politic”.
Buchanan was
particularly concerned about ways to reform the rules of the political game to
promote fiscal responsibility. That problem has worsened since the 1970s. The type
of reforms he hinted at involved agreement by those who sense that they are
vulnerable to having wealth expropriated via the political process to a
mechanism for limited wealth transfer on condition that others agree to rules
that overtly limit governmentally directed fiscal transfers.
I doubt
whether rules to promote fiscal responsibility are feasible in the absence of a
broad consensus concerning the role of government in distribution of the
benefits from economic progress. Perhaps that is also a context in which the real constitution can mandate free trade.
Current proposals being advanced in various quarters for guaranteed minimum incomes
are relevant to this discussion. It seems to me, however, that proposals to
ensure widespread opportunities for those displaced by import competition and
technological change to improve their skills, and earn higher incomes, are probably
more deserving of support. I might try to spell out reasons for that view in a later
post.