In a recent post I suggested that government guarantees of
bank deposits tend to encourage banks to become highly geared because they make
depositors less cautious about depositing their funds with banks that are at
greater risk of default. Such guarantees could be expected to make it possible
for highly geared banks to obtain access to deposits at lower cost than would
otherwise be possible.
A regular reader of the blog, kvd, objected to my reasoning. In his comments he suggested:
I would not seek in any way to regulate or limit the rich investing their money
in any way they wish. But government failure to differentiate between the basic
needs of their populace, and the desires of a relatively small, select group of
players - that I find a complete abrogation of a basic government role - more
specifically, a responsibility.
By all means let's limit government involvement and guarantee - but let's first
more clearly delineate what it is that government should be obliged to protect.'
In the subsequent discussion kvd clarified that what
offended against his beliefs was the idea that depositors should be expected to
take account of differences in the risks involved in placing their funds in
different institutions.
He explained his position further in a later comment:
While I would be the last to suggest any of the 'big four' are in danger of
collapse, I do think that in your higher level analysis of 'marketplaces' and
'risk assessment' it begs the question as to just what is represented by the
20+% of unsecured creditors (because that's effectively how depositors'
funds are treated; and that's why there were recent queues outside various high
street banks and building societies in the UK) which I termed
'transactors'.
My simple point remains that these funds should be regarded more as the old
fashioned 'Trust Fund' one sees in any solicitors' practice. Yet that is not
where they presently sit in calculation of leveraging. Within that they are
subsumed in those funds available to satisfy any higher-secured obligation.
Except for shareholders, they are in fact last in the queue, along with any
other trade creditor.
When one thinks of such funds, Winton mentions the 'mum and dad investor'; the
implication being that the sums are small, difficult to manage, an annoyance
really in terms of transaction costs. [Editorial note: I didn't intend to imply
that the sums are small or an annoyance to banks.]
But when I think of those funds I'm referring to my working cheque account … . These funds are sloshing around in the
banking system, available (God forbid) at any time for our banks to satisfy
secured creditors. Come a crunch, my funds are essentially an unsecured
interest free loan to my bank, available for them to pursue (did you term it?)
enhanced shareholder returns.
Too much regulation involved to protect such funds? I'd suggest a
reclassification of such funds as first charge government backed liability.
Would that would necessitate a recalculation of the risk attaching to other
funding sources? Yes, and so be it; the market will decide that.'
Before considering the question of bank guarantees, I will
first attempt to consider whether it would be possible or sensible to make the
status of bank deposits more like that of solicitor's trust funds. I write
'attempt' because my knowledge of the law concerning solicitor's trust funds is
rudimentary. My understanding is that solicitor' trust funds remain the
property of the client. There is a great deal of regulation about what
solicitors can do with those funds but I expect that they would normally be deposited
in a trust account at a bank. That would probably be the safest thing to do with
them, even though the funds might still be at risk in the event of bank failure.
Perhaps that risk might be covered by solicitor's insurance, I don't know.
The underlying point that kvd is making seems to be that, in
the event of default, depositors should be accorded the same ranking as secured
creditors. My immediate reaction was that it might be difficult to give
depositors a lien over a bank's loan portfolio, but further thought led me to
the view that there is nothing to prevent bank deposits from being secured by a
lien over other bank assets such as holdings of government securities.
The idea of giving a class of depositors a lien over a
bank's holdings of a particular class of assets makes a lot of sense to me. In
the absence of government guarantees, this could be expected to be most
attractive in relation to transaction accounts of those depositors who are most
concerned about security. As at present, such deposits would earn little or no
interest and transactions charges would apply. The important point is that these
deposits could be expected to be fully covered against loss in the event of bank
default – unless, of course, shits are trumps and bank default is caused by default
by governments (in which case, government guarantees would also be worthless).
So, let us now consider whether the government guarantee of
deposits should remain in place. Some recent history might help.
Banking in Australia functioned without a government
guarantee of deposits prior to the global financial crisis. The Wallis report
into the financial system (1997) recommended against the introduction of government-backed
deposit insurance on the grounds that it 'was not convinced that such a scheme
would provide a substantially better approach or additional benefits compared
with the existing depositor preference mechanism' (p355). According to Wallis, the
depositor preference mechanism 'provides that the assets of a bank shall be
available to meet depositor liabilities prior to all other liabilities of the
bank' (p 354).
An article on
depositor protection by Grant Turner (RBA Bulletin 2011) suggests that the recommendation
against deposit insurance by the Wallis inquiry 'reflected concerns that
introducing deposit insurance could weaken incentives to monitor and manage
risk' (p 49).
In my view such concerns are warranted. I can understand
that depositor guarantees were considered desirable in the midst of the global
financial crisis, but it would be good to be rid of them as soon as possible. The
best way to phase out such guarantees would be to make them unnecessary by ensuring that
governments will never be called upon to honour them. Could that be achieved by
requiring that the guarantees will apply only to deposits that are secured by a
lien on government securities held by deposit-taking institutions?
Postscript:
I have had second thoughts on the question of how the
deposit guarantee should be removed.
My further discussion with kvd, see comments below, makes it
clear that in the absence of the guarantee, deposits would rank after secured
liabilities in the event of bank liquidation. This has become particularly important
since the guarantee was made 'permanent' because the existence of the guarantee
has been used as an excuse to allow banks to raise funds using covered bonds
(i.e. secured liabilities).
It is probably reasonable to expect that if the deposit
guarantee was removed, the market would eventually find a way to give demand
deposits the highest priority in the event of bank liquidation. However, it
might take some time before banks began to see it as in their interests to provide
sufficient asset backing to demand deposits to enable that to occur.
It seems unlikely that any government would remove the
guarantee unless it considered depositors to be adequately protected. I think
that could be achieved by giving demand deposits the priority that is currently
accorded to APRA in order to recover funds it pays to depositors under the
current guarantee arrangement. As I understand the situation, the Banking Act
gives debts and liabilities to APRA the highest priority in the event of bank
liquidation.
In my view, legislation should give demand deposits the
highest priority in the event of bank liquidation in order to maximize the
potential for banks to be able to honour the promises that they make to allow depositors
to withdraw such funds on demand.