I have been having a discussion with Jim Belshaw about the
meaning of entitlement, stemming from my recent post ‘What are Australians angry about?’ On Saturday Jim wrote:
‘It seems to me that that word entitlements has become, to
use an ugly but useful modern term, a code word for a much broader ideological
debate. Entitlements used to mean the fact of having a right to something or
the amount to which a person has a right. This is the neutral meaning. Now it
has acquired a heavy semantic overload’.
I agree. When I wrote: ‘I think the problem is the growth of
a sense of entitlement to be looked after by governments’, I was referring to
growth in what I see as an unwarranted
sense of entitlement.
It seems to me that we have almost reached a stage where
people say: ‘I’m unhappy, so what’s the government going to do about it?’ Governments
seem only too willing to encourage this. A recent government intervention in
Australia involves screening kids for mental illness at three years of age. No
doubt doctors will discover that a lot of kids are unhappy and then ‘aorta politics’ will take over. We will soon hear a lot more people saying ‘aorta’ be
doing more to help us.
However, people are sometimes justified in expressing a
sense of entitlement – or righteous indignation - when something they value is
taken away from them. It would probably be reasonable to guess that moral
intuitions about natural rights stem from the efforts of our tribal ancestors
to protect their food supplies. (Incidentally, this doesn’t seem to be covered
by Jon Haidt’s schema of moral foundations discussed in my last post.) A sense
of entitlement is also related to our sense of fairness and our desire to
punish people (including political leaders) who have shown themselves to be
untrustworthy.
It seems to me that the central issue in considering whether
a sense of entitlement is justified is whether the expectations involved are
reasonable. It might be useful to attempt to rank expressions of entitlement in
terms of the reasonableness of the expectations involved.
Property rights deserve high ranking in terms of the reasonableness
of expectations that they will be protected. There is even a constitutional
provision, as readers who have seen ‘The Castle’ would know, that when the
Commonwealth acquires property compensation must be ‘on just terms’. Property
rights are constrained in various ways. Land owners do not usually own the
minerals beneath their land in this country, so it is hardly reasonable for
them to expect to be able to prevent mining on their properties. But it is
reasonable for them to expect compensation for the costs and inconveniences
they experience when mining takes place. I would have thought land owners could
have a reasonable expectation of being able to do what they wish with trees
growing on their properties, but governments have taken a different view.
Another area deserving high ranking in terms of
reasonableness of expectations concerns contractual obligations entered into by
governments. Australian governments have a good reputation of meeting interest and repayment
obligations when they borrow money (despite Jack Lang's efforts to tarnish this reputation in the 1930s). Australians can have a
reasonable expectation that governments in this country will meet obligations
to employees. Until recently, Australian governments also had a pretty good
record in not raising mineral royalty charges beyond levels agreed with mining
companies prior to mining, but sovereign risk has escalated since the Commonwealth government has
acted to appropriate an additional slice of mineral rents. In my view mining
companies have justification for their sense of entitlement to the rents that
have been taken from them. It is reasonable for households who have installed
solar heating in response to excessively generous incentive programs to expect government
agencies to meet their contractual obligations. In my view, householders in New
South Wales had justification to be enraged the plans of the newly elected O’Farrell
government to renege on those contracts.
Further down the ranking in terms of reasonableness of
expectations - although still deserving fairly high ranking in my view - are the
political obligations accepted by governments over many decades for provision
of various social welfare programs. Age pensions are a prime example. It would
be unreasonable, however, to expect that governments would never under any circumstances
reduce the benefits provided under such programs. The assistance provided must be
limited ultimately by what the community can afford.
Further down the ranking there are programs like the
provision of tariff assistance to industries. This arose as a result of
rent-seeking by industry, misguided government planning and a view fostered by
governments over many decades that assistance would be provided to all industries
on a ‘needs basis’. It is the best example of a government-fostered entitlement mentality that I
can think of in Australia. Yet, it is understandable that many of those who
benefited from this assistance would feel a sense of grievance when it was
withdrawn. The assistance regime stayed in place for many decades with little
complaint – except for a few people in efficient export industries that were
adversely affected, some academics and civil servants, and one politician (Bert
Kelly). When assistance was reduced, the culpability of governments in
fostering the unreasonable expectation that ‘infant industry’ and ‘temporary’
protection could last forever was recognized by making reductions gradual (over
about half a century in the case of the car industry) and providing adjustment
assistance in some instances.
As we go further down the ranking of reasonable expectations
we come to incentive programs of various kinds. One example that comes to mind
is the provision of taxation benefits to encourage investment in private
superannuation. I noted in 2010 that this had resulted in total government
support for retirees being remarkably similar across a wide range of income
levels, despite means testing of pensions. The taxation arrangements for superannuation
provide perverse incentives for people to retire early, splurge lump sums and
live off accumulated wealth until they become eligible for the aged pension. There is no basis for anyone to have a reasonable
expectation that such rorts would be allowed to continue indefinitely. It seems
to me that those complaining about recent government action to limit the tax
concession are showing an unwarranted sense of entitlement.
Election promises are at the bottom of my ranking of reasonable expectations. However, some election promises do appear to
encourage reasonable expectations of what a government might do or not do. For example, Julia
Gillard’s promise that ‘there will be no carbon tax under a government I lead' did not sound like a ‘non-core
promise’ (to use a phrase made famous by John Howard). At the very bottom of
the ranking of reasonable expectations, in my view, are the expectations
fostered by a statement by Barry O’Farrell that his party had ‘no plans’ to
privatise various things. Rather than a promise, that form of words seems
intended to convey a refusal to make a promise.
Having completed this ranking, I now wonder whether election
promises deserve higher ranking. The ranking provided above is largely in terms
of what seems reasonable to expect on the basis of experience. Political
promises probably deserve higher ranking in terms of the standards it should be
reasonable to expect of our politicians. I don’t think that people are displaying
an unwarranted sense of entitlement when they express disgust with politicians
who break promises.
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