Is Character Education Compatible with Individualistic Perfectionism?

 This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other publications, including several published on this site. (Please see the list after the end of this essay.)  

 

 Interest in Aristotelian ethics has produced diverse accounts of flourishing, virtue, and moral development. Kristján Kristjánsson has emerged as a contemporary defender of virtue ethics applied to psychology and education (Kristjánsson, 2015 and 2019). Meanwhile, Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl have developed a distinctive neo-Aristotelian liberalism centered on individualistic perfectionism and metanormative political theory (Rasmussen and Den Uyl, 2005 and 2020 and Den Uyl and Rasmussen, 2016).

This essay examines two distinct but complementary projects within a framework of neo-Aristotelian freedom and flourishing. While both projects share a commitment to human flourishing (eudaimonia) as an objective, naturalistic end, they diverge markedly in their primary focus—one on the normative ethics of character development, the other on the metanormative foundations of political liberty. This essay first summarizes Kristjánsson’s core arguments concerning character, practical wisdom, and education. It then critically evaluates his project before comparing it with Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s theoretical architecture of Individualistic Perfectionism. The article concludes by discussing how Kristjánsson’s developmental insights can potentially be integrated with a liberty-centered perfectionist framework. It does this by assessing their compatibility and exploring how aspects of Kristjánsson’s educational and character-focused framework might enrich and build upon the political philosophy of Rasmussen and Den Uyl.

 Aristotelian Character Ethics and Moral Psychology

 Kristjánsson (2015) defends a conception of moral character grounded in Aristotelian virtue ethics. He rejects reductive behaviorist or situationist interpretations of moral psychology, arguing instead that virtues constitute integrated dispositions involving cognition, emotion, motivation, and action. Virtue, on this account, is not mere conformity to external rules but stable excellence of character.

Central to this framework is practical wisdom (phronesis), which Kristjánsson describes as the coordinating capacity that enables agents to deliberate well about particular circumstances. Practical wisdom integrates moral perception, emotional regulation, and rational judgment. It allows ethical flexibility without collapsing into relativism.

Kristjánsson further defends an objective but pluralistic conception of flourishing. Flourishing is grounded in human nature and rational agency, yet admits multiple instantiations shaped by personal talents, cultural contexts, and life projects. This position preserves moral realism while accommodating diversity.

He develops an account of virtue that emphasizes its cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions. The practical ramifications are thoroughly explored. Kristjánsson considers whether and how schools can counteract the effects of a poor upbringing, the role of teacher training in fostering virtue, and specific methodologies for classroom practice. He rejuvenates the Aristotelian idea that virtue is developed through guided practice, habituation, emotional attunement, the emulation of exemplars, virtue literacy, deliberative dialogue, and Habituation framing the school as a crucial polis for moral development.

Guided practice involves modeling appropriate responses, providing structured opportunities for practice, and offering corrective feedback. Habituation combines behavioral repetition with reflective endorsement where virtues are practiced in a variety of contexts such as classroom discussions, group projects, conflict resolution, and community service. Emotion education teaches that virtues imply states of character involving both right reason and rightly ordered emotions (i.e., affective cultivation). The goal is to align reason and feeling using practical tools such as classroom dialogue, literature discussions, and reflective journaling. The emulation of moral exemplars provides images of flourishing with reference to historical figures, literary characters, community leaders, or teachers themselves. Virtue literacy is concerned with providing students with a moral vocabulary and helping them to identify and differentiate virtues. Deliberative dialogue is connected to virtue literacy and involves students examining cases and reasoning together about what a virtuous agent would do. Finally, the creation of a whole-school ethos or culture supportive of virtue development is another potential methodological emphasis. Such a culture embeds virtues in school policies, reward systems, disciplinary procedures, extracurricular activities, mentoring systems, honor codes, and so on. This book thus provides an interdisciplinary framework, drawing from philosophy, education, psychology, and sociology, to argue for character education as the foundational process for initiating young people into a life of virtue.

 Flourishing as the Aim of Education 

In Flourishing as the Aim of Education, Kristjánsson (2019) extends Aristotelian ethics into educational theory. He criticizes technocratic schooling models that emphasize standardized performance metrics at the expense of moral development. Instead, he argues that education should aim at cultivating virtuous, practically wise, and autonomous individuals capable of responsible self-direction.

Kristjánsson proposes an integrated model of moral education combining habituation, reflective understanding, and autonomy-supportive pedagogy. Students should internalize moral reasons rather than merely conform to behavioral expectations. He introduces the concept of “virtue literacy,” emphasizing moral vocabulary, ethical reasoning skills, and practical application. 

Importantly, Kristjánsson situates education within a broader moral ecology. Schools, families, peer cultures, and social institutions jointly shape moral development. Effective character education therefore requires institutional coherence between stated values and organizational practices.

Flourishing as the Aim of Education represents an expansion and deepening of Kristjánsson’s earlier work. Explicitly an outgrowth of his previous monograph, this book shifts the focus from character per se to the overarching aim it serves: student flourishing. Taking the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia as its basis, Kristjánsson develops a theoretical study of flourishing that goes beyond Aristotle’s approach.

Kristjánsson contends that education’s ultimate purpose is to contribute to the student’s “good life.” This good life, however, must involve more than moral virtue or subjective happiness. He introduces the “Flourishing–Happiness Concordance Thesis” to critically examine the relationship between objective flourishing and subjective well-being, questioning whether they always align. He observes that these don’t always go hand in hand He contends that, yes, one can have happiness with flourishing but one can also happiness with no flourishing, no happiness with flourishing, and, of course, no happiness with no flourishing.  A significant and novel argument in the book is that even “supreme moral virtue” is insufficient for full flourishing. Kristjánsson proposes that flourishing requires engagement with “self-transcendent ideals” and the cultivation of “awe-filled enchantment”.

This leads him to incorporate elements often overlooked in standard character education literature: contemplation, wonder, awe, and what he terms “epiphanies”—transformative moments of moral and existential insight. He also extends the theory of exemplarity, arguing for the emulation of moral exemplars as a pathway to flourishing that moves beyond traditional models. By allowing for social, individual, and educational variance within the concept of flourishing, Kristjánsson provides a nuanced framework that engages with socio-political and spiritual issues, making it relevant for diverse educational contexts. Each chapter concludes with practical “food for thought” for educators, bridging theory with classroom practice. 

Critical Evaluation

While Kristjánsson’s synthesis is philosophically sophisticated and empirically informed, several limitations warrant scrutiny. First, his framework occasionally under-theorizes political constraints on institutional moral authority. Although he emphasizes autonomy-supportive education, he remains relatively silent on the legitimacy boundaries between education and moral governance.

From a flourishing individualist perspective, this raises concerns about value imposition. Even well-intentioned character education programs risk homogenizing moral outlooks and undermining pluralism. Kristjánsson’s emphasis on shared virtues requires careful specification to avoid transforming education into ideological socialization.

In addition, Kristjánsson’s reliance on institutional coordination presupposes cooperative alignment among cultural actors. In highly pluralistic societies, such coherence is unlikely. Without robust protections for parental choice and civil society autonomy, flourishing-oriented education may become politically contested.

Nevertheless, these limitations do not undermine the core contribution of Kristjánsson’s work. Rather, they highlight the need for integration with political theories that safeguard moral agency while enabling character development.

 Rasmussen and Den Uyl: Individualistic Perfectionism and Metanormativity

Rasmussen and Den Uyl articulate a distinctive neo-Aristotelian framework grounded in their philosophy of Individualistic Perfectionism. Flourishing is agent-relative: individuals pursue objective goods in diverse ways shaped by personal context and responsibility. Ethical objectivity does not entail uniform life plans. 

Their political theory is structured around metanormativity. In Norms of Liberty (2005), they argue that rights function as higher-order norms that protect the social space necessary for flourishing without prescribing substantive moral ends. Political institutions should enable flourishing conditions rather than enforce ethical ideals.

Norms of Liberty addresses what the authors term “liberalism’s problem”: how to establish a political/legal order that does not preferentially structure the conditions for one person’s or group’s flourishing over another’s. Their brilliant solution is the distinction between normative and metanormative principles.

Normative principles guide individual moral conduct—they are the virtues and goods that constitute a flourishing life. Metanormative principles, in contrast, concern the political/legal framework that makes the pursuit of diverse moral lives possible. Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that individual rights (understood as negative liberties) are metanormative principles. Their function is not to directly promote human flourishing but to “create a space for each person to pursue a different and distinct form of life” by protecting the possibility of self-directed activity. Rights are thus “context-setting”; they establish the conditions under which moral conduct can occur, recognizing that coerced action can never be moral.

This allows them to advocate for a “perfectionist basis for non-perfectionist politics.” A neo-Aristotelian perfectionist ethics (which holds that flourishing is an objective, individualized telos) supports a non-perfectionist politics that refrains from legally mandating any particular vision of the good life.

In The Perfectionist Turn  (2016),  Rasmussen and Den Uyl shift from defending liberalism to fleshing out the “individualistic perfectionism” in ethics that undergirds their political theory. They challenge the assumption that a neo-Aristotelian ethical framework cannot support liberal politics by detailing the features of this alternative ethical system.

Individualistic Perfectionism maintains that while human flourishing is an objective end grounded in human nature, its concrete realization is uniquely individualized for each person. Generic goods (e.g., knowledge, friendship, health) and virtues (e.g., rationality, justice, courage) are necessary but must be integrated by individual practical wisdom (phronesis) in light of one’s specific circumstances, talents, and relationships. This ethics is agent-relative and anti-constructivist; moral truth is discovered in reality, not constructed by rational agreement. The book positions this framework as a major alternative to prevailing constructivist approaches in contemporary ethics.

 

In The Realist Turn (2020), they further emphasize responsibility and moral agency as central components of human flourishing. Flourishing requires self-directed practical reasoning within institutional frameworks that respect individual sovereignty.

The Realist Turn completes the trilogy by defending the metaphysical realism required for both individualistic perfectionism and natural rights. The authors argue that the entire project rests on the conviction that “man and the world exist apart from our cognition of them, and that people can know their nature”.

They launch a sustained critique of constructivism—the view that moral principles are determined by idealized rational procedures rather than discovered facts about reality. Constructivism, they contend, severs ethics from metaphysics, leading to a procedural, rule-governed, “one-size-fits-all” approach that cannot account for the individualized, context-sensitive nature of flourishing. In contrast, metaphysical realism holds that values are “fact-based” and discovered through rational engagement with the world. This realist turn is presented as essential for a proper comprehension and defense of freedom, as it grounds rights in the natural order of things.

Compatibility with Kristjánsson

Kristjánsson’s Aristotelian psychology essentially aligns with Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s ethical foundations. All emphasize objective flourishing, rational agency, practical wisdom, and character development. Kristjánsson’s developmental account of how virtues emerge complements Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s more abstract normative framework.

However, tensions arise regarding institutional authority. Kristjánsson’s educational perfectionism contrasts with Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s insistence on metanormative neutrality. A synthesis would reinterpret Kristjánsson’s insights through voluntary institutional contexts: families, private schools, community organizations, and civil associations rather than centralized state programs.

Kristjánsson and Rasmussen and Den Uyl share fundamental philosophical commitments that make their projects broadly compatible within the neo-Aristotelian tradition.

1. Objective Flourishing: Both affirm that human flourishing (eudaimonia) is an objective, naturalistic end, not a mere subjective preference.

2. The Role of Virtue: Both see moral virtue as a central constituent of the good life. Kristjánsson’s entire educational project is built on this premise, while Rasmussen and Den Uyl list virtues and generic goods necessary for any individualized flourishing.

3. Anti-Constructivism: Both reject constructivist approaches to ethics. Kristjánsson grounds character in a realist anthropology, and Rasmussen and Den Uyl make the critique of constructivism a centerpiece of their metaethical and metaphysical arguments.

4. The Social Nature of Flourishing: Both acknowledge that flourishing is inherently social. Kristjánsson emphasizes the educational community, while Rasmussen and Den Uyl view friendship as a constituent good and sociality as a necessary condition.

5. The Need for Practical Wisdom (Phronesis): Both emphasize the role of individual judgment. For Kristjánsson, students must develop practical wisdom to navigate moral life. For Rasmussen and Den Uyl, phronesis is the faculty that integrates generic goods into a unique, individual life plan.

Despite shared ground, their focal points create significant divergences.

1. Primary Focus: Normative vs. Metanormative: This is the most fundamental difference. Kristjánsson’s work operates at the normative level: How do we become good and flourish? His subject is the content and process of moral education. Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s work is primarily metanormative: What political framework allows different answers to the normative question to coexist? Their subject is the context for moral activity, not the activity itself.

2. The Role of Politics and the State: Rasmussen and Den Uyl rigorously limit the state’s role to securing rights (the metanormative framework), arguing politics is “not suited to making men moral”. Kristjánsson, while not prescribing a state-led curriculum, inherently sees public education as a key institution for normative character formation. A tension arises: if the state funds and regulates schools, can it do so without violating the “non-perfectionist” principle by endorsing a particular (Aristotelian) vision of the good?

3. The Sufficiency of Moral Virtue: Kristjánsson’s later work argues that moral virtue is necessary but not sufficient for flourishing, requiring awe, wonder, and self-transcendence. Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s list of generic goods is more traditional and inclusive, but their framework might accommodate Kristjánsson’s “enchanted” elements as legitimate aspects of an individualized flourishing life. However, their emphasis on self-direction and agent-relativity might view prescribed “spiritual” elements in education with more caution.

4. Scope of the “Social”: For Kristjánsson, the educational community is a direct vehicle for moral formation. For Rasmussen and Den Uyl, sociality is a good, but the political/legal order must be neutral among the diverse forms of social life individuals choose. The “open-ended” nature of sociality in their framework prioritizes voluntary association over the structured community of the school.

 Toward a Synthesis

Integrating the ideas of Kristjánsson with those of Rasmussen and Den Uyl has the potential to yield a richer framework of neo-Aristotelian freedom and flourishing. Kristjánsson provides the psychological and pedagogical mechanisms by which individuals acquire moral competence. Rasmussen and Den Uyl supply the political architecture that protects moral freedom.

Such a synthesis supports a decentralized moral ecology in which character formation occurs within voluntary institutions operating under a metanormative rights-based framework. Flourishing becomes both a personal achievement and a socially supported process without collapsing into paternalism.

 A synthesis must explicitly address autonomy, spontaneous order, and the role of civil society institutions. These concepts are central to Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s realist liberalism and provide the institutional context necessary for integrating Kristjánsson’s moral psychology without collapsing into state-centered perfectionism.

Autonomy, for Rasmussen and Den Uyl, is not merely negative freedom from interference but the positive capacity for self-directed practical reasoning and responsible agency. Flourishing requires individuals to function as authors of their own lives, exercising judgment in selecting values, projects, and commitments. Kristjánsson’s autonomy-supportive pedagogy aligns with this view insofar as it emphasizes internalization of moral reasons rather than external compliance. However, Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Individualistic Perfectionism insists that autonomy must be institutionally protected through rights-respecting frameworks that prevent coercive moral engineering.

Spontaneous order further clarifies how moral development can occur without centralized design. Following Hayekian insights incorporated into Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s realist turn, social coordination emerges through decentralized interactions, cultural evolution, and voluntary associations. Moral norms, educational practices, and character formation strategies evolve organically within communities rather than being imposed from above. Kristjánsson’s emphasis on moral ecology can be reconceived within this spontaneous order framework, where diverse educational models compete, adapt, and innovate according to local needs and values.

The institutions of civil society serve as the primary mediating structures between individuals and the state. Families, religious organizations, independent (private) schools, professional associations, charities, and community networks constitute the institutional infrastructure of a free society. These voluntary associations may be able to provide moral formation environments consistent with Kristjánsson’s character education goals while remaining compatible with Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s metanormative liberalism. They allow pluralistic experimentation in virtue cultivation without political homogenization.

This institutional architecture preserves both moral substance and political restraint and avoids the false dilemma between moral relativism and state-enforced virtue. Instead, it supports a pluralistic ecosystem of character formation anchored in autonomy, spontaneous order, and voluntary cooperation. Within this framework, Kristjánsson’s developmental insights may potentially gain practical application while remaining compatible with liberty-centered political theory.

Kristjánsson’s detailed work on the process of flourishing has the potential to usefully complement Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s work on its preconditions. Several of his ideas may be able to be incorporated into a liberal perfectionist perspective without violating its metanormative constraints.

1. Articulating the “Individual” in Individualistic Perfectionism: Rasmussen and  Den Uyl assert that flourishing is individualized but say less about how individuals develop the capacity for such self-direction. Kristjánsson’s developmental psychology of virtue—how phronesis, empathy, and integrity are cultivated from childhood—provides essential content for understanding the “individual” who is to be the agent of his own flourishing. This can strengthen their ethics by showing how the capacity for self-direction is nurtured, not merely presupposed.

2. Enriching the Concept of Flourishing: Kristjánsson’s argument for the role of awe, wonder, and “epiphanies” offers a compelling expansion of the “generic goods” that constitute a flourishing life. A liberal perfectionist can argue that education should expose children to the potential for such experiences (through art, science, nature, philosophy) as part of developing their capacity to appreciate and pursue a full life, without dictating the specific objects of awe.

3. A Framework for Voluntary Educational Communities: Rasmussen and  Den Uyl’s framework favors voluntary association. Kristjánsson’s research provides a blueprint for what parents and educators in such voluntary communities (including charter schools, private schools, or homeschooling networks) might aim for in character education. It offers an empirically-informed “perfectionist” curriculum that respects pluralism by being one offered option among many, not a state-mandated monopoly.

4. Connecting Entrepreneurship and Moral Education: Rasmussen and Den Uyl draw an analogy between the entrepreneur and the moral agent, both navigating uncertainty with creativity and alertness. Kristjánsson’s work on exemplarity and moral development provides a pedagogical correlate: how to educate individuals to become such alert, creative moral “entrepreneurs” of their own lives. This creates a powerful synergy between their economic and ethical individualism.

Conclusion

Kristjánsson’s Aristotelian ethics and educational philosophy advance contemporary virtue theory by reconnecting flourishing with empirical psychology and institutional practice. In turn, Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Individualistic Perfectionism provides the necessary political safeguards for preserving individual moral agency.

Kristján Kristjánsson and the duo of Rasmussen and Den Uyl represent two strands of contemporary neo-Aristotelian thought. Kristjánsson delves deeply into the normative and developmental question of how human beings become virtuous and flourish, particularly through education. Rasmussen and Den Uyl address the prior political question of how to create a society where diverse, individualized pursuits of flourishing can coexist peacefully, grounding their answer in metanormative theory and metaphysical realism.

Their projects are not so much incompatible as they are complementary, operating at different levels of analysis. The primary tension lies at the intersection of state action and education. However, within a political order that respects rights as metanorms, Kristjánsson’s work may become invaluable. It provides a guide for the voluntary communities, families, and individuals that seek to answer the normative question within their own lives. By integrating Kristjánsson’s insights into the cultivation of character, practical wisdom, and a sense of wonder, the Individualistic Perfectionism of Rasmussen and Den Uyl could gain greater psychological depth and pedagogical traction. Together, these bodies of work potentially offer a more complete picture: a liberal society that protects the space for freedom, populated by individuals educated to use that freedom wisely in the pursuit of a truly flourishing life. 

 References

Den Uyl, Douglas J.  and Rasmussen Douglas B. (2016). The Perfectionist turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh University Press.

Kristjánsson, Kristján. (2015). Aristotelian Character Ethics: An Aristotelian Approach to moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.

Kristjánsson, Kristján. (2019). Flourishing as the Aim of Education: A neo-Aristotelian View. Routledge.

Rasmussen, Douglas B.  and Den Uyl, Douglas J. (2005). Norms of liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-perfectionist Politics. Pennsylvania State University Press.

Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl, Douglas J.  (2020). The Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism. Edinburgh University Press.

 

Other essays by Ed Younkins on this site:

Younkins, Edward W (2025) “What Contribution did David L. Norton Make to our Understanding of Ethical Individualism?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 18, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “How can dialectics help us to defend liberty?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 8, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. October 24, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “Can Polarized Moral Politics be Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. December 13, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W (2026) “Does Humanomics Need a Moral Anchor?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 22, 2026.

Does Aristotle’s assertion that a viable political system requires a supportive culture still have relevance today?

 

Some readers may be wondering why anything written about culture and politics over 2000 years ago could possibly have contemporary relevance. Fred D. Miller J.R. makes a strong case that Aristotle’s views remain relevant in his recently published book, Aristotelian Statecraft. In particular, Miller demonstrates that we can still learn a lot from Aristotle about the relationships between moral character, culture and political systems.

In the first part of this essay I will draw upon Miller’s book, particularly Chapter 15, to explain the basis for Aristotle’s assertion that a viable political system requires a supportive culture. In the second part I will outline Miller’s observations about the contemporary relevance of the relationship between culture and political systems. In the third part I will reflect on implications of Miller’s work for the role political entrepreneurship in institutional change, drawing on my recent essays on that topic.

Aristotle’s thesis

At this point I should explain why I think Aristotle was intending to convey the idea that a viable political system requires a supportive culture in the sentence quoted in the epigraph (Pol. V.9.1310a). The quote appears in a context where Aristotle is writing about laws being democratic or oligarchic. Since he is also referring to a constitution as something that might be influenced by education of the young, it seems reasonable to infer that in this context he sees a constitution as being constituted mainly of mores (i.e. informal institutions).

Aristotle observes that the moral character of a polis reflects the moral character of its citizens. His thesis that a viable political system requires a supportive culture can be seen to stem from his moral psychology. The line of argument is summarized in the following points:

• Individuals develop character traits, including social virtues, through their voluntary habitual actions in social settings. Good character has two components: pursuit of virtuous ends; and practical wisdom to choose the best means to those ends.
• Justice and friendship are the most important social virtues. Justice aims at establishing some kind of equality among individuals whereby they all get what properly belongs to them and can cooperate for mutual advantage. Friendship goes beyond justice. Friends choose what is good for each other, and each believes their own good is chosen by the other. Friendship entails trust as well as respect.
• “When a number of individuals cooperate in an association over a period of time, their shared character traits and practical knowledge become an integral part of the culture of the association.” (p. 370)
• Political friendship – a situation where individuals regard fellow citizens as their friends - is closely related to consensus. It is typically found in a society where the rich and the poor (and others with divergent interests) agree about important issues and trust people in authority to act in the common interest.
• However, if people are not careful to treat each other justly, political friendship will be eroded, resulting in civil strife between parties with divergent interests. As the culture is corrupted “individuals will seek to aggrandize themselves at the public expense and the association will become unjust, unstable, and fragile”.

Miller concludes:

“The practical upshot of Aristotle’s thesis is that legislators and policy makers should be concerned about supporting and advancing culture by promoting education and the institutions and practices necessary for the formation of virtuous character traits.” (p. 371)

Miller’s observations about contemporary relevance

The point about emergence of civil strife among those with divergent interests seems to me to be relevant to explaining the link between interest group politics and growth of populism in Western democracies. I will return to that topic later.  

In discussing the contemporary relevance of Aristotle’s thesis, Miller focuses on the role of culture in the political transition of the countries that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s. Miller sets the scene for that discussion by noting that Alexis de Tocqueville advanced similar ideas to Aristotle in Democracy in America.

Tocqueville noted that democratic political institutions suited to common traits of Americans could not easily be transferred to Europe. He suggests that traits such as self-help, mutual beneficence, and active participation in voluntary associations made Americans more self-reliant and less dependent upon government support.

Miller also draws upon Douglas North’s views on the path-dependence of culture. He quotes a passage in which North cites examples of unsuccessful attempts to transplant to other countries the constitutions and laws of the United States and other successful Western countries. Those attempts failed because the formal institutions being transplanted were incompatible with the prevailing cultures of recipient countries.

Miller’s observations about the political transition following communist rule draw initially on the work of Svetozar Pejovich (“The Uneven Results of Institutional Change in Central and Eastern Europe: The Role of Culture”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 2006). Pejovich’s theoretical framework rests on the idea that the transactions costs of integrating new formal rules are higher when members of the community perceive the consequences of those rules to conflict with their prevailing culture. He applies that framework to discuss the great disparity in economic freedom among Central and Eastern European countries in 2004, advancing the hypothesis that countries with a stronger Western cultural influence have been more successful in making the transition than those with a tradition of Eastern Orthodox Christianity or Islam. Pejovich observes that culture in the less free and unfree groups has “a bias toward collectivism, egalitarianism, and shared values that predates communism”.

Miller expands Pejovich’s analysis to cover political and personal freedom and extends the period covered to 2002. Drawing upon a range of sources, he identifies three groups of countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for 2020-2022: consolidated democracies; consolidated semi-democracies; and hybrid regimes. The consolidated democracies are Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Slovakia. The consolidated semi-democracies are Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. The19 hybrid regimes include Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Serbia, and Hungary.

The author notes that most of the countries that got off to a good start after the fall of communism have continued their trajectories to consolidate democratic capitalism.  He adds: “A notable exception was Hungary, which was demoted to the hybrid zone after a conservative government adopted a new constitution.”

Miller notes that most countries in the hybrid group have made little progress to democratic capitalism. He then adds:

“On the other hand, it is noteworthy that none of these countries have reverted to outright authoritarianism. It is as if they have an inner tendency preventing them from rising above or falling below a certain level. Aristotle’s thesis suggests a plausible explanation of this phenomenon: the parameters of political change are determined to a significant extent by a country’s underlying culture.”

Implications for political entrepreneurship

Miller’s book contains a great deal of information about Aristotle’s view of statecraft which is highly relevant to consideration of political entrepreneurship. In this section of the essay, however, I want to focus on two of my essays discussing the roles of culture and political entrepreneurship as determinants of economic and personal freedom.

The first of these essays is entitled Part II: Can cultural values explain freedom levels? In that essay I observe the existence of a weak positive relationship between economic freedom and an index of facilitating values that I have developed and a strong positive relationship between Christian Welzel’s emancipative values index and personal freedom levels. This research is broadly supportive of the view that culture plays an important role as a determinant of formal institutional settings.

However, my main focus was on outlier countries, whose freedom levels could not be readily explained by culture. I suggested that outlier status can be attributed to the influence of political entrepreneurship. It is relatively easy to identify individual political entrepreneurs who have contributed to institutional outcomes in countries with economic and/or personal freedom ratings substantially lower than might be predicted by underlying cultural values. However, when governments have relatively high regard for individual liberty, political entrepreneurship tends to be more subtle, and less focused on individual national leaders.

Looking at the data base used in this analysis, 24 countries can be identified as belonging to the former Soviet bloc. Of those,10 have both economic and personal freedom levels within a range of plus or minus 1 unit of that predicted by underlying cultural values. Armenia is the only country in which both personal and economic freedom are greater the predicted level; Albania is the only other country where economic freedom is greater than the predicted level. Azerbaijan is the only country with both personal and economic freedom are less than the predicted level and is also the only country with economic freedom less than the predicted level. Apart from Armenia, the countries with personal freedom greater than the predicted level are Bosnia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia and Romania. Apart from Azerbaijan, the countries with personal freedom levels lower than the predicted level are Belarus, Russia and Tajikistan.

This analysis provides some support for the Aristotle/Miller thesis even though it suggests that political entrepreneurship can also play an important role in determining economic and personal freedom levels.

The second of my essays relevant to the role of culture and political entrepreneurship is entitled Part VI: What are the consequences of path dependence? In that essay I argue that the culture of preferment-seeking and plunder currently associated with interest group politics in Western liberal democracies took a long time to reach its current state, but it is now entrenched and will be difficult to overcome. The problem arises from path dependence. Changing the rules of the game to reduce the adverse impact of interest group politics poses a large challenge for reform-minded political entrepreneurs.

The development of my line of argument has features in common with the Aristotle/ Miller thesis outlined above. The most obvious common element is reference to Douglas North’s views on the path dependence of culture.

My line of argument also relies heavily on the views of James M Buchanan about social virtues. Those views have an Aristotelian flavour. Buchanan argues that two norms underpin liberal democracy: that a sufficient proportion of the population can make their own choices and prefer to be autonomous rather than dependent on others; and that a sufficient proportion of the population enter relationships with others based on reciprocity, fair dealing, and mutual respect. My attempt to link Buchanan’s views to Aristotle has led me to John Passmore’s book, The Perfectibility of Man (1970). Buchanan claims that book “remains the definitive work on the history of ideas” related to its title. From the little I have read of Passmore’s book, it is clear that he is influenced by Aristotle (but more critical of Aristotle’s views than I am).

I began my path dependence essay with famous quotes from Frédéric Bastiat about the state being the great fiction by which everyone tries to live at the expense of everyone else; and the universal franchise as likely to result in universal plunder. It is now clear to me, however, that Bastiat’s comments should be viewed in the light of Tocqueville’s observation that democratic political institutions suited to common traits of Americans could not easily be transferred to Europe. In that light, at the time they were made Bastiat’s comments seem to have been more pertinent to continental Europe than to the Anglosphere. Over the last 150 years, democratic political institutions do seem to have had greater resilience in the Anglosphere than in other parts of the world.

However, in my view Aristotle’s warning that social trust will be eroded if people are not careful to treat each other justly has now also become highly pertinent to the Anglosphere. We are seeing increasing evidence that as the culture is corrupted “individuals will seek to aggrandize themselves at the public expense”. Our democratic political institutions now seem to be becoming increasingly “unjust, unstable, and fragile”.

Conclusion

 This essay was prompted by my reading of Chapter 15 of Fred Miller’s book, Aristotelian Statecraft. That chapter discusses how Aristotle’s observation that the moral character of a polis reflects the moral character of its citizens supports his view that a viable political system requires a supportive culture.

In that chapter, Miller also discusses the varied political transition of countries following the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s to illustrate that democratic capitalism is only viable if culture is supportive. He demonstrates that the countries that have been most successful in making the transition have had a history of relatively strong Western cultural influence. Cultural influences in many of the other countries seem to hold them back from either advancing strongly toward democratic capitalism or reverting to outright authoritarianism.

I also considered whether the Aristotle/Miller thesis is consistent with the conclusions of two essays in my series on political entrepreneurship. The findings of my essay on the extent to which cultural values explain freedom levels are broadly supportive of the role of cultural values, even though I emphasize that political entrepreneurship can also play an important role.

My essay on the consequences of path dependence offers strong support for the Aristotle/ Miller thesis in the context of considering the gradual erosion of social virtues in Western liberal democracies. I think we are now observing the consequences of failure to heed Aristotle’s warning that social trust will be eroded if people do not treat each other justly.

Can the rise of populism be explained as a reaction to the rule of experts?

 

In an essay written over 15 years ago I observed that we were beginning to see a populist reaction to the rule of experts in the United States and (to a lesser extent) in Australia. In more recent essays, however, I have tended to see populism as a manifestation of interest group politics. These explanations are not mutually exclusive, but it may be useful to consider how the rule of experts and populism are both entangled with interest group politics.

My 2010 essay

The essay was entitled: Does Australia also have a ruling class? It was prompted by an article by Angelo Codevilla which suggested that Democrat and Republican office-holders in recent governments in the United States had shown “a similar presumption to dominate and fewer differences in tastes, habits and opinions ... than between both and the rest of the community”. He claimed: “They think, look, and act like a class.”

Codevilla discussed several characteristics of this “ruling class”. For example, he suggested that they believe themselves to be “the best and brightest while the rest of Americans are retrograde, racist, and dysfunctional unless properly constrained”. They view the common people’s words as “like grunts, mere signs of pain, pleasure and frustration”.

I concluded that while Australia also had a self-appointed ruling class which could be identified with the public service and the political left, I didn’t think the conservative side of Australian politics was as closely identified with that ruling class as in the United States. That explains why populist politicians were not particularly popular in Australia at that time.

In retrospect, however, I think I also displayed some “ruling class” attitudes in my essay:

“In my view the words of non-experts on complex economic issues do have little more value than a grunt. Whether we are talking about economic policy, brain surgery or plumbing, I think it should be self-evident that the views of experts count for more than those of non-experts.”

I still think that the views of experts should count for more than those of non-experts, although these days I try to avoid being offensive. Apart from the tone of my comment, I should have made clear that there are reasons to doubt that some of those who claim economic expertise know what they are talking about. The claims that some economists make about the potential to regulate complex market systems to produce better outcomes deserve no more respect than the similar claims of non-experts.

In his book, Expert Failure, published in 2018, Roger Koppl brings an economic perspective to “the problem of experts”. I will briefly consider Koppl’s line of argument in the following section.

Expert Failure

Koppl acknowledges that we must rely on experts even though experts may not be completely reliable and trustworthy sources of the advice we require from them.

 He defines an “expert” as anyone paid to give an opinion. That definition leaves open the question of whether experts are reliable or unreliable.

 Koppl adopts the Hayekian view that knowledge is generally emergent from practice, often tacit, and embodied in our norms, habits, practices, and traditions. His comparative institutional approach leads to the conclusion that expert error and abuse are more likely when experts have monopoly power, and less likely in a “competitive” market for expert opinion.

I expect most economists would view that as commonsense, but it is far removed from standard practice in many fields which rely on expert knowledge. Based on his study of the use of expert witnesses in law, Koppl observes that it is common to encounter the view that it is scandalous for the opinions of men of science to be challenged, even by other scientists. It is often held that the knowledge of expert witnesses is or should be uniform, unambiguous and certain. Experts are often encouraged to come to a common understanding rather than to offer competing views.

Koppl observes that the division of knowledge makes it impossible for anyone to avoid a limited and partial perspective, which implies a parochial bias in our perceptions and judgments. That kind of bias cannot be eliminated by blinding protocols – such as the double-blind requirements used in testing of pharmaceuticals.  It can only be mitigated by multiplying the number of experts and putting them in positions of genuine rivalry.

The book contains an interesting discussion of epistemic systems design in an experimental economics laboratory. In that setting, the experimenter is in the god-like position of defining unambiguously what the truth is and examining how close experimental subjects come to it in different institutional settings. The knowledge gained of which institutional structures promote the discovery and elimination of error is relevant to the real world. Experimental systems design studies offer opportunities to test the role of network structure in producing reliable knowledge in scientific fields.

Koppl comments:

“Rather than attempting to instruct people in how to form true opinions, we might reform our social institutions in ways that tend to induce people to find and speak the truth.”

However, at the end of the next chapter, after considering the problems arising from the monopoly of expert opinion in government -  referred to as the rule of experts or the entangled deep state - the author suggests that the experimental approach of “piecemeal institutional reform (which is mostly borrowed from Vernon Smith) does not have an obvious application to the entangled deep state.”  He concludes:

“If my diagnosis of the deep state is at all correct, reform is urgently required. I freely confess, however, that I have no specific ideas on how we might attempt to roll back the deep state with a reasonable prospect of success.”

Nevertheless, Koppl offers useful insights into the nature of the problem arising from the rule of experts. His conclusion that the problem of experts “mostly boils down to the question of knowledge imposition” is highly relevant to consideration of institutional approaches to determination of public policies.

In the introductory chapter to his book Koppl explains that he values pluralistic democracy and is as much opposed to populism as to the rule of experts.  He argues for pluralism on the grounds that each of us has at best a partial view of the truth:

“In a pluralist democracy, competing partial perspectives on the truth have at least a chance to be heard and to influence political choices. Decisions in a political system – be it populist, elitist, or something else – that override or ignore plural perspectives will be based on knowledge that is at best limited, partial, biased.”

In the process of developing that view Koppl refers to an article by Christopher Bickerton and Carlo Accetti (“Populism and Technocracy: Opposites or Complements?” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 20(2), 2015) which describes populism and technocracy as two organizing poles of politics which are both opposed to “party democracy”. I will now discuss that article because it raises the question in my mind of whether party democracy has more in common with interest group politics than with pluralism.

Party democracy, interest group politics and pluralism

 Bickerton and Accetti argue that whilst populism and technocracy are usually assumed to be opposed to each other, there is also an important element of complementarity between them. Both populism and technocracy are predicated on an implicit critique of party democracy. The authors suggest that “if we accept the idea that politics is increasingly structured in terms of this conflict between populism and technocracy, then we find that even the very possibility of articulating a defense of party democracy is excluded from the political spectrum”.

I have no difficulty agreeing with Bickerton and Accetti if they are just using different words to say that both populism and the rule of experts are opposed to pluralistic democracy. Technocracy seems to correspond closely with rule of experts, but “party democracy”, as the authors describe it, seems to me to corresponds more closely to interest group politics than to the role of encompassing political groups in a two-party pluralistic democracy.

The authors define party democracy as a political regime based on two key features: the mediation of political conflicts through the institution of political parties; and the idea that the specific conception of the common good that ought to prevail and therefore be translated into public policy is the one that is constructed through the democratic procedures of parliamentary deliberation and electoral competition. The role of political parties in “mediation of political conflicts” is the focus of my concern.

The authors suggest that an important function performed by political parties is that of “integrating a plurality of particular interests” and moulding them into “an overarching conception of the common good”. When political parties aim to do such things, it seems to me that they end up cobbling together coalitions of interest groups which seek to obtain benefits for themselves at the expense of others. That is essentially what interest group politics is about.

In my view, better outcomes are produced when political parties take on the role of encompassing political groups in two-party pluralistic democracies. In discussing the importance of encompassing political groups in a two-party system of government, Mancur Olson asserted that the leader of a party “whose clients comprise half or more of the society naturally is concerned about the efficiency and welfare of the society as a whole” because this affects the party’s electoral prospects.  (See further discussion and reference here.)

 As I have explained elsewhere (for example in a recent essay on the consequences of path dependence) the growth of interest group politics has tended to contract economic freedom, constrain economic growth and increase public debt levels. As a result, voters have tended to become increasingly disenchanted with conventional politics.

It seems to me that as party politics has increasingly focused on pandering to particular interest groups it has helped to bring about a situation where more people have become more willing to listen to populists who tell them that they are being disadvantaged by the policies of conventional political leaders. Unfortunately, most of those populist leaders advance policies that are likely to produce even worse economic and social outcomes.

The ubiquity of populism, rule of experts, and interest group politics

Looking at recent politics in the United Sates, it might seem appropriate to identify the Democratic Party with rule of experts and the Republican Party with populism. However, that assignment understates the extent of populism in the Democratic Party, which tends to seek popular support by attributing economic woes to the wealthy 1% of the population in much the same way as economic nationalists in the Republican Party attribute economic woes to import competition and immigration. It also understates the extent to which the current Administration relies on commercial expertise – dealmaking – in running the government. It seems that the rule of one group of experts has been replaced by rule of another group with different expertise. The problems arising from the monopoly of expert opinion have changed their character but have not disappeared.

Roger Koppl’s reference to the “entangled deep state” reflects his awareness that the rule of experts is not immune to interest group politics. He notes that participants in the American deep state “have a variety of competing and parochial interests”. More generally, interest group politics is strongly associated with the entanglement of entrepreneurs and interests in private and public sectors.

Interest group politics seems to have attended to the pleas of increasingly narrow groups in recent years. As well as seeking support of broad economic groups such as unions, industry groups, and groups with differing social and environmental attitudes, political parties have increasingly sought the support of narrow interest groups by engaging in identity politics. The progressive side of politics has favoured groups that have previously been disadvantaged by ethnicity, gender and sexual orientation. The conservative side of politics has pushed back against what they label as wokeness, while seeking support from some groups, e.g. young men, who perceive themselves to be disadvantage by it.

Another interesting development in interest group politics in the United States is the emergence of an alliance between conservative populists and the high-tech community. It is not easy to comprehend how populists who claim to be concerned about economic and social impacts of competition from imports and immigration could be complacent about the economic and social impacts of AI. Action by the U.S. government to facilitate rapid development of AI has been accompanied by a change in the economic nationalist narrative away from its populist roots to emphasize the importance of retaining technological leadership in AI in the face of increasing competition from China.

The warning of President Eisenhower, quoted in the epigraph, might now be relevant for reasons that he could not have foreseen. Public policy is not only at risk of becoming the captive of a scientific-technological elite supported by the administrative state, it is also at risk of becoming the captive of a scientific-technological elite controlling the development of powerful AI models.

However, I don’t think we should assume that a future in which AI models will have an increasing influence on social and economic outcomes will necessarily be worse than a future in which the entangled deep state retains its current influence.  It is possible that rivalry between different AI models will ensure that their social and economic impacts are relatively benign and consistent with pluralistic democracy. Even now, greater use of truth-seeking bots has potential to lessen the problem of rational ignorance, and thus to reduce the susceptibility of voters to populists peddling false narratives.

Conclusions

The rise of populism in the Western liberal democracies can be explained to some degree as a reaction to the “ruling class” attitudes of experts within governments.  I have recently tended to see populism as a manifestation of interest group politics, but it is worth considering how the rule of experts and populism are entangled with interest group politics.

The essay has outlined the views presented by Roger Koppl in his book, Expert Failure. Koppl offers the useful insight that the main problem arising from the rule of experts is knowledge imposition. Expert error and abuse are more likely when experts have monopoly power and are less likely when experts are placed in positions of genuine rivalry. Koppl argues that pluralist democracy is superior to both the rule of experts and populism because it enables competing partial perspectives on the truth to have a chance to be heard.

I have also considered the view of Christopher Bickerton and Carlo Accetti that both populism and technocracy are predicated on an implicit critique of party democracy. I suggested that party democracy, as the authors described it, seemed to have more in common with interest group politics than with pluralistic democracy. In my view, interest group politics is largely to blame for the poor economic and social outcomes that have encouraged the growth of populism.

My main conclusion is that the rule of experts, populism, and interest group politics are currently ubiquitous on both the progressive and conservative sides of politics. Populism is certainly not confined to one side of politics and populist governments don’t eliminate problems arising from the monopoly of expert opinion. In the U.S. a populist executive has continued to discourage rival views, while attempting to substitute expertise in commercial deal-making for expertise in statecraft.

The emergence of an alliance between the current U.S. Administration and the high-tech community poses a risk that public policy may become captive to a scientific-technological elite controlling the development of powerful AI models.  We should not assume, however, that a future in which AI models have an increasing influence on social and economic outcomes will necessarily be worse than one in which the entangled deep state retains its current influence. Rivalry between AI models may even have potential to produce better outcomes.

Do people judge my book by its cover design?

 

I don't know the answer to that question. I doubt that cover design has much influence on judgements that people make about books after they have read them. However, cover design might influence decisions to purchase and read books. We may agree with the aphorism that “you can’t judge a book by its cover”, yet not look much beyond the cover in deciding whether to read a book.

A few days ago, Md. Sujon Sarker, a new acquaintance on LinkedIn, began a discussion with me about my book, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing. Before long, he offered the following comment:

“I noticed one thing about your cover, that is, the text in your cover title is not visible, the text is blended with the background, we want to fix this text problem of yours, we will give it a free design correction.”

Md. Sujon Sarker’s opinion carries some weight. He is a “Book Cover & Interior Formatting Specialist”.

It is obviously an exaggeration to say that the text on the cover is not visible, but I acknowledge that it does tend to blend with the background.

Before accepting the offer of a “free design correction”, I make sure that my new acquaintance was aware that I had no intention of creating a new edition of the book which could make use of his design. I told him that I wanted to stick with the sailboat theme, and drew attention to this passage in the Preface:

“Is there an image that captures the ideas associated with freedom, progress, and human flourishing presented in this book? The picture of yachts on the front cover comes close. Yachts are a symbol of freedom because the navigators of each yacht decide where they will go. They are a symbol of economic progress because yachting is an example of a leisure activity that progress has enabled large numbers of people to enjoy. They are a symbol of human flourishing because they capture the idea of life as a journey, a voyage of discovery, in which individuals determine their own direction, but all face many similar challenges.”

Perhaps I should also have added that I had taken the photo used in the current cover design and felt some attachment to it.

Here are the cover designs that Md. Sujon Sarker provided to me:

 

 

Those designs capture the theme I was looking for and the lettering stands out appropriately.

Md. Sujon Sarker lives in Bangladesh but offers support to authors and publishers worldwide. Anyone seeking his services can use the following contact information:

Email: sujongdf@gmail.com

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/md-sujon-sarker-6ba2b8235