Are Spontaneous Order and neo-Aristotelian Arguments for a Free Society Compatible?

 This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other publications, including several published on this site. (Please see the list after the end of this essay.) 

 

The defense of a free society has emerged from diverse intellectual traditions. One line of argument, associated with thinkers such as Friedrich A. Hayek, Gerald A. Gaus, Jonathan Haidt, and John Hasnas grounds liberty in cultural evolution, spontaneous order, epistemic limits, and moral psychology. From another direction, Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl have developed a neo-Aristotelian justification of natural rights rooted in individualistic perfectionism, virtue ethics, and the metanormative structure of political morality. These two traditions have often been viewed as distinct and divergent: the former emphasizing emergent social complexity, evolved rules, the limits of reason, and epistemological humility; the latter emphasizing teleological ethics, virtue, and the normative structure of human flourishing.

I have been somewhat hard on Hayek’s approach over the years. This is because I have been a strong proponent of the Aristotelian eudaimonist perspective which I believe is foundational and the soul of the idea of a free society. Whereas I saw Austrian economists like Menger and Rothbard taking a realist natural-law-oriented Aristotelian perspective and road toward objective economics, I viewed Hayek’s emphasis on spontaneous order as implying the relative unimportance and inadequacy of individual rationality. Over the years, under the tutelage of Winton Bates, I have gained greater respect for Hayekian ideas. The bridge between my foundational neo-Aristotelian orientation and Hayek’s evolutionary/emergent order/epistemic perspective is the realization that human nature is both fixed and discovery-oriented. We have a fixed need for agency and flourishing but we live in a world of complexity and ignorance.  Whereas one tradition focuses on the teleological requirements of human flourishing, the other tradition focuses on the emergent complexity of social systems. My neo-Aristotelian perspective underpins and complements the cooperation to mutual advantage perspective which incorporates the Hayekian notion that spontaneous order enables individuals to pursue diverse purposes peacefully. Spontaneous order is consistent with individual freedom and human flourishing because it is characterized by voluntary interactions.

This essay argues that these approaches are compatible and complementary. When properly understood, the evolutionary-epistemic arguments of the Hayekian tradition provide the descriptive and explanatory framework for understanding how complex social orders emerge and function, while the neo-Aristotelian perfectionism of Rasmussen and Den Uyl provides the normative foundation for why individual liberty ought to be protected. Together, they offer a comprehensive vision of a free society that is both empirically grounded and ethically justified—a society that emerges spontaneously yet serves the ultimate end of human flourishing.

The Evolutionary and Epistemic Case for a Free Society

At the heart of Hayek's contribution to social theory lies the concept of spontaneous order. Social order, Hayek argues, "is not brought about by human design and concerted agreement; rather, it emerges spontaneously, as the unintended outcome of the actions of many individuals who are separately pursuing their goals”. This insight challenges the constructivist rationalism that has dominated much of Western thought—the presumption that beneficial social institutions must be products of deliberate human design.

The market order exemplifies this spontaneous formation. Coordination is achieved not through central direction but through "a constant readjustment of individual plans in the light of new information encoded in the price system". Prices serve as knowledge-surrogates, allowing individuals to coordinate their activities without possessing more than a sliver of the total information dispersed throughout society. This epistemic function of markets represents one of Hayek's most enduring contributions: the demonstration that decentralized decision-making enables a more efficient use of resources than any centrally planned system could achieve, precisely because knowledge is necessarily dispersed and often tacit.

Gerald Gaus extends this Hayekian insight, arguing that the open society is characterized by a complexity that defies comprehensive moral justification in traditional terms. Drawing on formal models and empirical evidence, Gaus shows that "the Open Society is grounded on the moral foundations of human cooperation originating in the distant evolutionary past, but has built upon them a complex and diverse society that requires rethinking both the nature of moral justification and the meaning of democratic self-governance". Gaus's understanding of evolution makes him more optimistic than Hayek about the ability of modern humans to refrain from adopting a tribal moral outlook. Whereas Hayek suggests that tribal morality makes the open society a precarious achievement, Gaus offers the nuanced view that human social life is characterized by an ongoing tension between a tendency to widen moral obligations and a tendency to pull back to emphasize social proximity. 

Hayek's theory of cultural evolution provides the mechanism by which spontaneous orders develop. This evolutionary process operates independently of human reason: "rules are not selected because individuals understand their functions; rather, practices which had first been adopted for other reasons, or even purely accidentally, were preserved because they enabled the group in which they had arisen to prevail over others".

Hayek's distinctive contribution lies in applying an evolutionary framework to the problem of socio-economic-political organization. His theory of spontaneous order delivers the crucial insight that "if we want to generate in society any particular order of a certain degree of complexity, we should look for general rules of conduct which, if followed by individuals, would tend to induce that order to form spontaneously". These rules of just conduct exhibit specific structural characteristics: they are negative, purpose-independent, abstract, universal, and permanent.

The evolution of the common law provides a paradigmatic example. Judges, in deciding particular cases, "are consciously trying to give greater coherence to the law," yet each decision "is unintentionally playing a part in the formation of a spontaneous order". Through this process of systematic mutual adjustment of expectations, the law evolves toward greater coherence without any comprehensive design.

Jonathan Haidt's moral foundations theory adds a psychological dimension to this evolutionary account. Drawing on cross-cultural research, Haidt and his collaborators identified innate, modular foundations of human moral reasoning that emerged as adaptive responses to challenges in our evolutionary history. The theory proposes six foundations: Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, Loyalty/Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, Sanctity/Degradation, and Liberty/Oppression. This framework explains both the universality of moral concerns and their cultural variation.  Haidt argues that moral intuitions precede reasoning and that different cultures emphasize different moral foundations. Morality diverges because different cultures utilize these foundations differently. He explains that liberal societies succeed, not because they eliminate diversity, but because they create institutional frameworks that allow diverse moral psychologies to exist.

In addition, John Hasnas has developed a Hayekian concept of empirical natural rights as pre-political rights that have evolved in the state of nature through human interaction and normatively grounded in social peace. He argues that this pre-political, secular, and practical justification for empirical natural rights can be possessed and enforced in the absence of a centralized state.

The neo-Aristotelian Case for Natural Rights

Rasmussen and Den Uyl identify what they term "Liberalism's Problem": a fundamental tension between ethics and politics. Liberal political principles purport to be universal, applying to all individuals without exception, yet liberalism is not supposed to favor one conception of the good life over another. Moral pluralism is essential to the liberal polity. The challenge, then, is to find "the foundation and structure to deal with this tension between each individual's liberty to pursue his own version of flourishing and the universality of liberalism's tenets".

This problem has led many liberal theorists toward either moral skepticism (denying that we can know what constitutes human flourishing) or moral minimalism (reducing morality to the thinnest possible set of requirements). Rasmussen and Den Uyl reject both approaches. They seek instead to provide a robust ethical foundation for liberalism that nevertheless remains compatible with moral pluralism—a perfectionist basis for non-perfectionist politics.

The solution lies in a crucial distinction between normative and metanormative principles. Normative principles concern what one ought to do or how one ought to be—they guide action and character development. Metanormative principles, by contrast, "regulate the conditions under which [normative] conduct could take place". They do not prescribe particular forms of flourishing but instead establish the framework within which individuals can pursue their own conceptions of the good life.

The linchpin of this argument is the concept of self-direction. Self-direction is characterized as "the act of bringing to bear one's reason and judgment on one's surroundings, making plans to act within or upon them, and conducting oneself accordingly". Crucially, Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that "self-direction is both a necessary condition for, and an operating condition of, the pursuit and achievement of human flourishing".

This claim has profound implications. One cannot flourish unless one has acted, and acting requires reasoning practically and acting on one's best judgment. Flourishing is not something that happens to a passive recipient; it is an achievement of an active agent. Yet at the same time, "self-direction does not imply any particular form of flourishing". One self-directed person may pursue a religiously influenced conception of flourishing, while another equally self-directed individual pursues a secular form. Self-direction is universal and compatible with pluralism. It is required of all moral agents regardless of their normative viewpoint.

Self-direction is thwarted when others can direct an individual without consent—primarily through the initiation of force. Thus, metanormative principles in the form of individual rights protect the conditions for self-direction by prohibiting the initiation of force. This protection does not favor any particular account of flourishing; it simply ensures that each individual has the space to pursue his or her chosen path.

Rasmussen and Den Uyl characterize their position as Individualistic Perfectionism. This formulation captures both elements of their view: it is perfectionist in affirming that human flourishing is the ultimate standard of value, but it is individualistic in recognizing that flourishing is necessarily achieved by particular persons in their own unique circumstances. There is no single template for human excellence; rather, "human flourishing is something each individual must achieve in his or her own way".

Thus, individualistic perfectionism grounds a natural rights doctrine. Because flourishing requires self-direction, and self-direction requires freedom from coercion, individuals possess natural rights to the conditions of their flourishing. These rights are not derived from social convention or utilitarian calculation but from the very nature of human beings as rational agents capable of directing their own lives toward flourishing ends.

 Building a Bridge—Complementarity and Integration

 The first and most fundamental complementarity between these traditions lies in their respective contributions to descriptive explanation and normative justification. The Hayekian tradition excels at explaining how complex social orders emerge, function, and evolve. It demonstrates that market orders, legal systems, and other institutions can coordinate millions of individuals without any central direction, precisely because they operate through abstract rules that allow for local adaptation and knowledge utilization. It shows that cultural evolution selects rules and practices that enable groups to prosper without requiring that individuals understand why these rules work.

What the Hayekian tradition does less well is provide a normative foundation for why these orders ought to be respected and protected. Hayek's own instrumentalism—his emphasis on the prosperity and coordination that spontaneous orders produce—invites the response that if some other arrangement could produce more prosperity, it would be justified. Moreover, evolutionary arguments alone cannot bridge the is-ought gap. The fact that certain rules have evolved does not, without more, establish that they are morally binding.

This is precisely where the neo-Aristotelian framework supplies what is missing. Rasmussen and Den Uyl's individualistic perfectionism provides a normative grounding for individual rights that does not depend on the outcomes of evolutionary processes. The right to self-direction is not justified because it produces good consequences (though it does), but because self-direction is a necessary condition for human flourishing, and human flourishing is the ultimate standard of value. The rights to life, liberty, and property are not merely useful conventions but moral requirements rooted in the nature of human agency.

Yet these normative requirements are not, as some critics of liberalism have charged, impositions of a particular conception of the good on those who do not share it. Because the metanormative framework protects only the conditions for self-direction, it is compatible with a wide range of substantive conceptions of flourishing. It does not tell one individual how to flourish; it only ensures that he has the freedom to pursue his own vision while respecting the equal freedom of another person to pursue his.

The second complementarity concerns the relationship between social orders and individual flourishing. The Hayekian tradition demonstrates that spontaneous orders generate conditions of prosperity, peace, and coordination that no central planner could replicate. The price system, evolved legal rules, and other spontaneous institutions create a framework within which individuals can pursue their diverse ends more effectively than they could in any deliberately constructed alternative. 

The neo-Aristotelian tradition, by contrast, focuses on what individuals do within that framework. Flourishing is not something that society produces for individuals. It is something that individuals must achieve for themselves through their own choices and actions. However, flourishing requires certain enabling conditions—most notably, freedom from coercion and the ability to direct one's own life. These conditions are precisely what spontaneous orders, when properly constrained by metanormative principles, provide. 

Here we see a deep harmony. The spontaneous order of the market does not guarantee that anyone will flourish. It merely creates the space within which flourishing is possible. As Rasmussen and Den Uyl emphasize, rights "do not guarantee success or even provide the conditions of successful action. All they do is provide the conditions that make such action possible". This is exactly what spontaneous orders do. They establish a framework of general rules that allows individuals to pursue their own purposes without promising that those purposes will be achieved. The rules of a free society—property rights, contract enforcement, prohibitions on force and fraud—do not ensure flourishing, they merely make flourishing possible. The actual achievement of flourishing depends on the virtues, judgments, and efforts of individuals themselves.

A third complementarity concerns the nature of knowledge and practical reasoning. Hayek's evolutionary epistemology emphasizes the limits of explicit, articulable knowledge. Much of what we know is tacit, embedded in practices and habits that we cannot fully explain. The rules that have survived cultural evolution embody a wisdom that exceeds the comprehension of any individual—a theme Hayek developed in his critique of constructivist rationalism. 

This epistemological humility resonates with the Aristotelian emphasis on practical wisdom (phronesis). For Aristotle, ethical knowledge is not like mathematical knowledge; it cannot be reduced to general rules that can be applied mechanically. Practical wisdom involves perception, judgment, and the ability to discern what a particular situation requires. The virtuous person does not simply apply pre-existing rules but sees what is called for in concrete circumstances.

The metanormative framework of rights respects this structure of practical knowledge. By protecting the space for individual judgment rather than prescribing substantive outcomes, it allows each person to exercise practical wisdom in directing his or her own life. The general rules of just conduct—negative, abstract, universal—provide a framework within which individuals can exercise judgment without attempting to substitute for that judgment.

This suggests that the spontaneous order of rules and the teleological structure of human action are not opposed, but mutually supporting. The evolved rules of a free society do not replace individual judgment. Rather, they create the conditions under which individual judgment can operate effectively. They protect the sphere within which practical wisdom is exercised while also providing the general expectations that make coordinated action possible.

Haidt's moral foundations theory provides yet another point of connection. The identification of liberty as a distinct moral foundation suggests that concern for freedom from oppression is not merely a preference or a cultural artifact but a deep feature of human moral psychology. This foundation resonates with the emphasis on self-direction in the neo-Aristotelian framework. Both recognize that individuals have a moral stake in being able to direct their own lives without external domination.

The neo-Aristotelian framework, by grounding rights in the nature of human flourishing rather than in any particular configuration of moral sentiments, provides a normative anchor that can withstand shifts in moral psychology. Even if the Liberty foundation is not universally salient, the requirement of self-direction for flourishing remains. The metanormative framework protects the conditions for flourishing regardless of whether individuals are psychologically attuned to the importance of liberty.

Another point of complementarity has been pointed out by Winton Bates. Whereas Hasnas argues that empirical natural rights have instrumental moral value regardless of the moral theory one adopts, Bates explains that it makes more sense to argue that empirical natural rights provide the metanormative conditions that allow moral conduct to occur.  This metanormative perspective concurs with Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s more foundational theory of  Individualistic Perfectionism

A final point of complementarity concerns the relationship between complexity and pluralism. Gaus emphasizes that the open society generates "autocatalytic diversity"—diversity that feeds on itself, producing ever more complex patterns of belief, value, and practice. This complexity defies traditional modes of moral justification and democratic governance. We cannot, from any single vantage point, comprehend the full range of goods that individuals pursue or the full consequences of our institutional arrangements.

 Rasmussen and Den Uyl's individualistic perfectionism embraces this pluralism while avoiding relativism. Because flourishing is achieved by individuals in their own unique circumstances, we should expect a diversity of flourishing lives. There is no single template for human excellence. Different temperaments, talents, and circumstances call forth different configurations of virtue and achievement. Yet this pluralism does not entail that anything goes—flourishing remains a normative standard, and some ways of life fail to realize it.

 The metanormative framework of rights accommodates this pluralism by protecting the conditions for self-direction without prescribing substantive outcomes. It does not require that we agree on what flourishing consists in. It only requires that we agree on the framework within which we pursue our diverse conceptions. This is precisely the kind of agreement that Gaus, drawing on social contract theory and public reason liberalism, seeks to articulate: an agreement on the rules of the game rather than on the goals to be pursued within it.

Conclusion 

The evolutionary and neo-Aristotelian defenses of a free society, far from being rivals, emerge as complementary accounts of the same phenomenon from different perspectives. The Hayekian tradition, enriched by Gaus's formal modeling and Haidt's moral psychology, explains how free societies emerge, how they function, and why they are fragile. It demonstrates that complex orders can arise spontaneously, that cultural evolution selects for rules that enable coordination and prosperity, and that human moral psychology provides both resources and obstacles for sustaining such orders.

The neo-Aristotelian tradition, as developed by Rasmussen and Den Uyl, explains why such orders are worth defending. It grounds individual rights in the nature of human flourishing, showing that self-direction is both necessary for and an operating condition of the pursuit of excellence. The metanormative framework of rights protects the conditions under which individuals can exercise practical wisdom and achieve flourishing in their own unique ways.

Together, these traditions offer a comprehensive vision: a free society is an emergent order that creates the conditions for human flourishing, and human flourishing is the ultimate end that justifies and limits the exercise of political power. The rules that evolve spontaneously are not arbitrary conventions but embodiments of practical wisdom. The rights that protect individual liberty are not mere constraints but enabling conditions for the good life.

This synthesis has implications beyond academic philosophy. In an age of political polarization and skepticism about liberal institutions, it offers a defense of freedom that is both empirically grounded and ethically correct. It acknowledges the complexity of modern societies while affirming that this complexity serves human purposes. It embraces pluralism without falling into relativism, and it defends universal principles without imposing a single conception of the good. 

The bridge between evolutionary and neo-Aristotelian arguments reveals that liberty and flourishing are not opposed but interdependent. Liberty is the political condition for flourishing, and flourishing is the moral purpose of liberty. In protecting the former, we enable the latter; in pursuing the latter, we justify the former. The free society, understood in this integrated way, is both our evolutionary inheritance and our highest aspiration—a precarious achievement that deserves our understanding and our defense.

References 

Bates, Winton. 2024. “Did Hayek Acknowledge the Importance of Individual Self-Direction in His Vision of Spontaneous Order?”. Freedom and Flourishing. May, 21.

Bates, Winton, 2024. “Did Robert Nozick Hold a View of the Evolution of Natural Rights that is Similar to that Held by John Hasnas?’ Freedom and Flourishing. Nov. 11

Bates, Winton. 2024.’ Can Empirical Natural Rights be Viewed as Metanormative Principles?’ Freedom and Flourishing.  Dec. 10.

Bates, Winton. 2025. “How Can the Study of Human Nature Help us to Reach Normative Conclusions in Political Philosophy?”. Freedom and Flourishing. October, 31.

Bates, Winton. 2026 (forthcoming). “How do the Concepts of Spontaneous Order and Social Evolution Relate to Individual Flourishing?’. In Edward W. Younkins, (ed.) From Politics to Morality: Implications of Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Norms of Liberty.  London: Bloomsbury. 

Den Uyl, Douglas J. and Rasmussen, Douglas B. 2016. The Perfectionist Turn. Edinburgh University Press.

Gaus, Gerald. 2011.  The Order of Public Reason. Cambridge university Press.

Gaus, Gerald. 2016. The Tyranny of the Ideal. Princeton University Press.

Gaus, Gerald. 2021. The Open Society and Its Complexities. New York: Oxford University Press.

Haidt, Jonathan. 2012. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. New York: Vintage Books,

Hasnas, John. 2024. Common Law Liberalism: A New Theory of the Libertarian Society. Oxford; Oxford University Press.

Hayek, Friedrich A., 1960. The Constitution of Liberty, University of Cambridge Press.

Hayek, Friedrich A. 1967. Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, Friedrich A. 1973-79. Law, Legislation and Liberty, 3 volumes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl., Douglas J. 2005. Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005. 

Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl., Douglas J. The Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 

Younkins, Edward W. 2024. “Is a Free Society a Multiple Paradigm Ideal?” The Savvy Street. April 14.

 

Other essays by Ed Younkins on this site:

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “What Contribution did David L. Norton Make to our Understanding of Ethical Individualism?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 18, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “How can dialectics help us to defend liberty?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 8, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. October 24, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “Can Polarized Moral Politics be Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. December 13, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2026) “Does Humanomics Need a Moral Anchor?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 22, 2026.

Younkins, Edward W. (2026) “Is Character Education Compatible With Individualistic Perfectionism” Freedom and Flourishing. February 27, 2026.

Does human perfectibility pose a problem?

 

This essay was prompted by my reading of John Passmore’s book, The Perfectibility of Man, which was first published in 1969. 

I read the book mainly because of James M. Buchanan’s suggestion that “it remains the most definitive work on the history of ideas” relating to the extent to which classical liberalism depends on some presumption that man is perfectible. Buchanan made that suggestion at the beginning of a chapter entitled “Classical liberalism and the perfectibility of man”, in his book Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative (2005). Buchanan argued that although classical liberalism does not depend on people being especially "good" in a conventional sense, there is nevertheless a presumption of human perfectibility in classical liberalism. He argued that classical liberalism requires that sufficient persons (i) prefer to govern themselves and not be dependent upon others; (ii) respect the person and property of others; (iii) eschew attempts to implement impractical visions of utopian perfectionism; and (iv) be willing to defend the political institutions of liberal society against its enemies.

I had another reason for reading The Perfectibility of Man. As an Australian interested in Aristotle’s view of human perfectibility, I felt that I should by now have read a book on this topic by a distinguished philosopher who was my compatriot.

The book was enjoyable to read and I learned a lot from it. However, I disagree with the author’s assessment of Aristotle’s application of teleology to individual flourishing. It seems to me that Passmore’s view that that “there is something more than a little strange” in “identifying perfection with the realization of potentialities” is not consistent with the view he expresses at the end of the book that humans “are capable of more than they have ever so far achieved”.

I will return to that point later in this essay. Meanwhile, I will briefly outline the scope and content of Passmore’s book.

Passmore’s history of ideas on perfectibility

Passmore discusses the long history of ideas about the perfectibility of humans from Ancient Greece and Rome to the 1960s. He discusses the differing views of Christians over the last 2000 years as well as views associated with the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the influence of social action, scientific progress and natural evolution.

The following paragraph, referring to the views of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955), summarizes the themes of the book:

“To an extraordinary degree, then, Teilhard built into a single system almost all the main forms of perfectibilism which we have so far distinguished from one another. He was a mystic: perfection consists in union with God. He was a Christian: perfection depends on Christ’s working in man through evolution. He was a metaphysician: perfection consists in the development to its final form of that consciousness     which is present, according to Teilhard, even in elementary electrons. He believed in perfection through science: scientific research is, in his eyes, the prototype of “working with God.” He believed in perfection through social change: men are to be perfected through their participation in a society infused with love. He believed that Christianity shows us in what perfection consists: the New Testament, and especially Paul, reveal to us the nature of that final unity in which evolution must finally come to rest; the Incarnation, the sacrifice of the Mass, symbolize the unity of the material and the spiritual. He believed that science can demonstrate that humanity is moving towards such a perfection. He was Pelagian in his constant emphasis on human effort; he was anti-Pelagian in so far as he argued that God’s grace is essential if mankind is to achieve its final perfection. If Teilhard had not existed, it would almost have been necessary to invent him, in order to weave together our diverse themes.”

Towards the end of the book, it becomes obvious that Passmore is particularly concerned about the tyrannical outcomes of government attempts to implement utopian ideas relating to human perfectibility.

I will now turn to the point on which I disagree with Passmore.

Aristotle’s teleology

Passmore notes that, according to Aristotle, “potential is incomplete, formless, imperfect”. That implies “the actual is ‘perfect,’ then, in so far as it is the realization of, or the giving form to, a potentiality”. He then comments:

“But there is something more than a little strange in thus identifying perfection with the realization of potentialities. Suppose a man is potentially a liar. When he actualizes that potentiality, has he thereby perfected himself? At this point, it is important to recall that the general concept of perfection does not have written into it any suggestion of moral excellence. A man can be a perfect scoundrel or a perfect idiot just as he can be a perfect saint; he can commit a perfect crime, be a perfect forger, or have a “perfectly rotten time of it.” But, as we have already pointed out, when we speak of “perfectibility,” as distinct from perfection simpliciter, the situation is different; to assert that man is perfectible is to assert that he can become, in some sense taken to be absolute, a better person. To the extent to which an analysis of perfection is directed towards helping us to answer the question whether human beings are, or are not, perfectible, it must not allow the response: “they are perfectible all right: there are plenty of men who are potential villains and who actualize that potentiality perfectly.” (p.14)

It seems to me that Aristotle’s perception of individual human perfectibility does have a suggestion of moral excellence written into it. As Passmore acknowledges, Aristotle saw the good for man, as “an activity of soul in accordance with goodness”. In that context he notes that Aristotle argues that the human good consists in a life of contemplation.

However, Aristotle suggests in Book I of the Ethics that the good of man consists in our living in accordance with practical wisdom. In his book Rational Man - in which the passage quoted in the epigraph appears - Henry Veatch comes out strongly in support of the latter view.

Veatch explains that from an Aristotelian viewpoint, a person who is honest, courageous or temperate “will not be one who has merely been conditioned to follow unthinkingly certain approved patterns of behavior. He will be one who has learned to let his choices and preferences be determined by such knowledge and understanding as he may have, rather than to proceed simply from chance feelings and impulses of the moment or from long established but mechanical habits of response.” (p. 74-5)  

In his Preface to the 2003 edition of Rational Man, Douglas Rasmussen makes the point that “when Veatch spoke of how to “perfect” oneself, he did not mean that one should become Godlike, immune to degeneration, or incapable of harm. Rather it is to fulfil those potentialities and capacities that makes one fully human.”

Passmore’s bottom line

Passmore concludes that “perfectibilism is dehumanizing”:

“To achieve perfection in any of its classical senses, as so many perfectibilists have admitted, it would first be necessary to cease to be human, to become godlike, to rise above the human condition.”

However, the concept of perfectibility endorsed by Neo-Aristotelians such as Veatch and Rasmussen certainly doesn’t require humans to become godlike.

And Passmore’s final paragraph suggests to me that there is little difference between his views on perfectibility and those of the Neo-Aristotelians mentioned above:

“In spite of these reflections, which might lead us to reject perfectibilism in any of its forms, it is very hard to shake off the feeling that man is capable of becoming something much superior to what he now is. This feeling, if it is interpreted in the manner of the more commonsensical Enlighteners, is not in itself irrational. There is certainly no guarantee that men will ever be any better than they now are; their future is not, as it were, underwritten by Nature. Nor is there any device, whether skilful government, or education, which is certain to ensure the improvement of man’s condition. To that extent the hopes of the developmentalists or the governmentalists or the educators must certainly be abandoned. There is not the slightest ground for believing, either, with the anarchist, that if only the State could be destroyed and men could start afresh, all would be well. But we know from our own experience, as teachers or parents, that individual human beings can come to be better than they once were, given care, and that wholly to despair of a child or a pupil is to abdicate what is one’s proper responsibility. We know, too, that in the past men have made advances, in science, in art, in affection. Men, almost certainly, are capable of more than they have ever so far achieved. But what they achieve, or so I have suggested, will be a consequence of their remaining anxious, passionate, discontented human beings.” (p. 258)

Conclusion

This essay was prompted by my reading of John Passmore’s book, The Perfectibility of Man.

Passmore makes a strong case that government attempts to implement utopian ideas about human perfectibility result in tyrannical outcomes.

In my view, he also offers a persuasive argument that perfectibilism is dehumanizing when it is approached from the perspective of attempting to rise above the human condition - to become godlike.

However, I disagree with Passmore’s view of Aristotle’s application of teleology to individual flourishing. Passmore suggests that because the general concept of perfection does not have written into it any suggestion of moral excellence, it is possible for some people to actualize their potential perfectly by becoming villains. My response is that Aristotle’s understanding of human perfectibility does have a suggestion of moral excellence written into it. In support, I also refer to Henry Veatch’s view of the link between virtuous behaviour and the exercise of practical wisdom.

Nevertheless, after considering Passmore’s bottom line about the possibility for greater human achievement, I conclude that his view that perfectibilism is dehumanizing does not necessarily apply to Neo-Aristotelian perfectibilists. It certainly doesn’t apply to those of us who maintain that seeking to perfect oneself is about becoming “fully human”, rather than godlike.

Is Character Education Compatible with Individualistic Perfectionism?

 This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other publications, including several published on this site. (Please see the list after the end of this essay.)  

 

 Interest in Aristotelian ethics has produced diverse accounts of flourishing, virtue, and moral development. Kristján Kristjánsson has emerged as a contemporary defender of virtue ethics applied to psychology and education (Kristjánsson, 2015 and 2019). Meanwhile, Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl have developed a distinctive neo-Aristotelian liberalism centered on individualistic perfectionism and metanormative political theory (Rasmussen and Den Uyl, 2005 and 2020 and Den Uyl and Rasmussen, 2016).

This essay examines two distinct but complementary projects within a framework of neo-Aristotelian freedom and flourishing. While both projects share a commitment to human flourishing (eudaimonia) as an objective, naturalistic end, they diverge markedly in their primary focus—one on the normative ethics of character development, the other on the metanormative foundations of political liberty. This essay first summarizes Kristjánsson’s core arguments concerning character, practical wisdom, and education. It then critically evaluates his project before comparing it with Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s theoretical architecture of Individualistic Perfectionism. The article concludes by discussing how Kristjánsson’s developmental insights can potentially be integrated with a liberty-centered perfectionist framework. It does this by assessing their compatibility and exploring how aspects of Kristjánsson’s educational and character-focused framework might enrich and build upon the political philosophy of Rasmussen and Den Uyl.

 Aristotelian Character Ethics and Moral Psychology

 Kristjánsson (2015) defends a conception of moral character grounded in Aristotelian virtue ethics. He rejects reductive behaviorist or situationist interpretations of moral psychology, arguing instead that virtues constitute integrated dispositions involving cognition, emotion, motivation, and action. Virtue, on this account, is not mere conformity to external rules but stable excellence of character.

Central to this framework is practical wisdom (phronesis), which Kristjánsson describes as the coordinating capacity that enables agents to deliberate well about particular circumstances. Practical wisdom integrates moral perception, emotional regulation, and rational judgment. It allows ethical flexibility without collapsing into relativism.

Kristjánsson further defends an objective but pluralistic conception of flourishing. Flourishing is grounded in human nature and rational agency, yet admits multiple instantiations shaped by personal talents, cultural contexts, and life projects. This position preserves moral realism while accommodating diversity.

He develops an account of virtue that emphasizes its cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions. The practical ramifications are thoroughly explored. Kristjánsson considers whether and how schools can counteract the effects of a poor upbringing, the role of teacher training in fostering virtue, and specific methodologies for classroom practice. He rejuvenates the Aristotelian idea that virtue is developed through guided practice, habituation, emotional attunement, the emulation of exemplars, virtue literacy, deliberative dialogue, and Habituation framing the school as a crucial polis for moral development.

Guided practice involves modeling appropriate responses, providing structured opportunities for practice, and offering corrective feedback. Habituation combines behavioral repetition with reflective endorsement where virtues are practiced in a variety of contexts such as classroom discussions, group projects, conflict resolution, and community service. Emotion education teaches that virtues imply states of character involving both right reason and rightly ordered emotions (i.e., affective cultivation). The goal is to align reason and feeling using practical tools such as classroom dialogue, literature discussions, and reflective journaling. The emulation of moral exemplars provides images of flourishing with reference to historical figures, literary characters, community leaders, or teachers themselves. Virtue literacy is concerned with providing students with a moral vocabulary and helping them to identify and differentiate virtues. Deliberative dialogue is connected to virtue literacy and involves students examining cases and reasoning together about what a virtuous agent would do. Finally, the creation of a whole-school ethos or culture supportive of virtue development is another potential methodological emphasis. Such a culture embeds virtues in school policies, reward systems, disciplinary procedures, extracurricular activities, mentoring systems, honor codes, and so on. This book thus provides an interdisciplinary framework, drawing from philosophy, education, psychology, and sociology, to argue for character education as the foundational process for initiating young people into a life of virtue.

 Flourishing as the Aim of Education 

In Flourishing as the Aim of Education, Kristjánsson (2019) extends Aristotelian ethics into educational theory. He criticizes technocratic schooling models that emphasize standardized performance metrics at the expense of moral development. Instead, he argues that education should aim at cultivating virtuous, practically wise, and autonomous individuals capable of responsible self-direction.

Kristjánsson proposes an integrated model of moral education combining habituation, reflective understanding, and autonomy-supportive pedagogy. Students should internalize moral reasons rather than merely conform to behavioral expectations. He introduces the concept of “virtue literacy,” emphasizing moral vocabulary, ethical reasoning skills, and practical application. 

Importantly, Kristjánsson situates education within a broader moral ecology. Schools, families, peer cultures, and social institutions jointly shape moral development. Effective character education therefore requires institutional coherence between stated values and organizational practices.

Flourishing as the Aim of Education represents an expansion and deepening of Kristjánsson’s earlier work. Explicitly an outgrowth of his previous monograph, this book shifts the focus from character per se to the overarching aim it serves: student flourishing. Taking the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia as its basis, Kristjánsson develops a theoretical study of flourishing that goes beyond Aristotle’s approach.

Kristjánsson contends that education’s ultimate purpose is to contribute to the student’s “good life.” This good life, however, must involve more than moral virtue or subjective happiness. He introduces the “Flourishing–Happiness Concordance Thesis” to critically examine the relationship between objective flourishing and subjective well-being, questioning whether they always align. He observes that these don’t always go hand in hand He contends that, yes, one can have happiness with flourishing but one can also happiness with no flourishing, no happiness with flourishing, and, of course, no happiness with no flourishing.  A significant and novel argument in the book is that even “supreme moral virtue” is insufficient for full flourishing. Kristjánsson proposes that flourishing requires engagement with “self-transcendent ideals” and the cultivation of “awe-filled enchantment”.

This leads him to incorporate elements often overlooked in standard character education literature: contemplation, wonder, awe, and what he terms “epiphanies”—transformative moments of moral and existential insight. He also extends the theory of exemplarity, arguing for the emulation of moral exemplars as a pathway to flourishing that moves beyond traditional models. By allowing for social, individual, and educational variance within the concept of flourishing, Kristjánsson provides a nuanced framework that engages with socio-political and spiritual issues, making it relevant for diverse educational contexts. Each chapter concludes with practical “food for thought” for educators, bridging theory with classroom practice. 

Critical Evaluation

While Kristjánsson’s synthesis is philosophically sophisticated and empirically informed, several limitations warrant scrutiny. First, his framework occasionally under-theorizes political constraints on institutional moral authority. Although he emphasizes autonomy-supportive education, he remains relatively silent on the legitimacy boundaries between education and moral governance.

From a flourishing individualist perspective, this raises concerns about value imposition. Even well-intentioned character education programs risk homogenizing moral outlooks and undermining pluralism. Kristjánsson’s emphasis on shared virtues requires careful specification to avoid transforming education into ideological socialization.

In addition, Kristjánsson’s reliance on institutional coordination presupposes cooperative alignment among cultural actors. In highly pluralistic societies, such coherence is unlikely. Without robust protections for parental choice and civil society autonomy, flourishing-oriented education may become politically contested.

Nevertheless, these limitations do not undermine the core contribution of Kristjánsson’s work. Rather, they highlight the need for integration with political theories that safeguard moral agency while enabling character development.

 Rasmussen and Den Uyl: Individualistic Perfectionism and Metanormativity

Rasmussen and Den Uyl articulate a distinctive neo-Aristotelian framework grounded in their philosophy of Individualistic Perfectionism. Flourishing is agent-relative: individuals pursue objective goods in diverse ways shaped by personal context and responsibility. Ethical objectivity does not entail uniform life plans. 

Their political theory is structured around metanormativity. In Norms of Liberty (2005), they argue that rights function as higher-order norms that protect the social space necessary for flourishing without prescribing substantive moral ends. Political institutions should enable flourishing conditions rather than enforce ethical ideals.

Norms of Liberty addresses what the authors term “liberalism’s problem”: how to establish a political/legal order that does not preferentially structure the conditions for one person’s or group’s flourishing over another’s. Their brilliant solution is the distinction between normative and metanormative principles.

Normative principles guide individual moral conduct—they are the virtues and goods that constitute a flourishing life. Metanormative principles, in contrast, concern the political/legal framework that makes the pursuit of diverse moral lives possible. Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that individual rights (understood as negative liberties) are metanormative principles. Their function is not to directly promote human flourishing but to “create a space for each person to pursue a different and distinct form of life” by protecting the possibility of self-directed activity. Rights are thus “context-setting”; they establish the conditions under which moral conduct can occur, recognizing that coerced action can never be moral.

This allows them to advocate for a “perfectionist basis for non-perfectionist politics.” A neo-Aristotelian perfectionist ethics (which holds that flourishing is an objective, individualized telos) supports a non-perfectionist politics that refrains from legally mandating any particular vision of the good life.

In The Perfectionist Turn  (2016),  Rasmussen and Den Uyl shift from defending liberalism to fleshing out the “individualistic perfectionism” in ethics that undergirds their political theory. They challenge the assumption that a neo-Aristotelian ethical framework cannot support liberal politics by detailing the features of this alternative ethical system.

Individualistic Perfectionism maintains that while human flourishing is an objective end grounded in human nature, its concrete realization is uniquely individualized for each person. Generic goods (e.g., knowledge, friendship, health) and virtues (e.g., rationality, justice, courage) are necessary but must be integrated by individual practical wisdom (phronesis) in light of one’s specific circumstances, talents, and relationships. This ethics is agent-relative and anti-constructivist; moral truth is discovered in reality, not constructed by rational agreement. The book positions this framework as a major alternative to prevailing constructivist approaches in contemporary ethics.

 

In The Realist Turn (2020), they further emphasize responsibility and moral agency as central components of human flourishing. Flourishing requires self-directed practical reasoning within institutional frameworks that respect individual sovereignty.

The Realist Turn completes the trilogy by defending the metaphysical realism required for both individualistic perfectionism and natural rights. The authors argue that the entire project rests on the conviction that “man and the world exist apart from our cognition of them, and that people can know their nature”.

They launch a sustained critique of constructivism—the view that moral principles are determined by idealized rational procedures rather than discovered facts about reality. Constructivism, they contend, severs ethics from metaphysics, leading to a procedural, rule-governed, “one-size-fits-all” approach that cannot account for the individualized, context-sensitive nature of flourishing. In contrast, metaphysical realism holds that values are “fact-based” and discovered through rational engagement with the world. This realist turn is presented as essential for a proper comprehension and defense of freedom, as it grounds rights in the natural order of things.

Compatibility with Kristjánsson

Kristjánsson’s Aristotelian psychology essentially aligns with Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s ethical foundations. All emphasize objective flourishing, rational agency, practical wisdom, and character development. Kristjánsson’s developmental account of how virtues emerge complements Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s more abstract normative framework.

However, tensions arise regarding institutional authority. Kristjánsson’s educational perfectionism contrasts with Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s insistence on metanormative neutrality. A synthesis would reinterpret Kristjánsson’s insights through voluntary institutional contexts: families, private schools, community organizations, and civil associations rather than centralized state programs.

Kristjánsson and Rasmussen and Den Uyl share fundamental philosophical commitments that make their projects broadly compatible within the neo-Aristotelian tradition.

1. Objective Flourishing: Both affirm that human flourishing (eudaimonia) is an objective, naturalistic end, not a mere subjective preference.

2. The Role of Virtue: Both see moral virtue as a central constituent of the good life. Kristjánsson’s entire educational project is built on this premise, while Rasmussen and Den Uyl list virtues and generic goods necessary for any individualized flourishing.

3. Anti-Constructivism: Both reject constructivist approaches to ethics. Kristjánsson grounds character in a realist anthropology, and Rasmussen and Den Uyl make the critique of constructivism a centerpiece of their metaethical and metaphysical arguments.

4. The Social Nature of Flourishing: Both acknowledge that flourishing is inherently social. Kristjánsson emphasizes the educational community, while Rasmussen and Den Uyl view friendship as a constituent good and sociality as a necessary condition.

5. The Need for Practical Wisdom (Phronesis): Both emphasize the role of individual judgment. For Kristjánsson, students must develop practical wisdom to navigate moral life. For Rasmussen and Den Uyl, phronesis is the faculty that integrates generic goods into a unique, individual life plan.

Despite shared ground, their focal points create significant divergences.

1. Primary Focus: Normative vs. Metanormative: This is the most fundamental difference. Kristjánsson’s work operates at the normative level: How do we become good and flourish? His subject is the content and process of moral education. Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s work is primarily metanormative: What political framework allows different answers to the normative question to coexist? Their subject is the context for moral activity, not the activity itself.

2. The Role of Politics and the State: Rasmussen and Den Uyl rigorously limit the state’s role to securing rights (the metanormative framework), arguing politics is “not suited to making men moral”. Kristjánsson, while not prescribing a state-led curriculum, inherently sees public education as a key institution for normative character formation. A tension arises: if the state funds and regulates schools, can it do so without violating the “non-perfectionist” principle by endorsing a particular (Aristotelian) vision of the good?

3. The Sufficiency of Moral Virtue: Kristjánsson’s later work argues that moral virtue is necessary but not sufficient for flourishing, requiring awe, wonder, and self-transcendence. Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s list of generic goods is more traditional and inclusive, but their framework might accommodate Kristjánsson’s “enchanted” elements as legitimate aspects of an individualized flourishing life. However, their emphasis on self-direction and agent-relativity might view prescribed “spiritual” elements in education with more caution.

4. Scope of the “Social”: For Kristjánsson, the educational community is a direct vehicle for moral formation. For Rasmussen and Den Uyl, sociality is a good, but the political/legal order must be neutral among the diverse forms of social life individuals choose. The “open-ended” nature of sociality in their framework prioritizes voluntary association over the structured community of the school.

 Toward a Synthesis

Integrating the ideas of Kristjánsson with those of Rasmussen and Den Uyl has the potential to yield a richer framework of neo-Aristotelian freedom and flourishing. Kristjánsson provides the psychological and pedagogical mechanisms by which individuals acquire moral competence. Rasmussen and Den Uyl supply the political architecture that protects moral freedom.

Such a synthesis supports a decentralized moral ecology in which character formation occurs within voluntary institutions operating under a metanormative rights-based framework. Flourishing becomes both a personal achievement and a socially supported process without collapsing into paternalism.

 A synthesis must explicitly address autonomy, spontaneous order, and the role of civil society institutions. These concepts are central to Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s realist liberalism and provide the institutional context necessary for integrating Kristjánsson’s moral psychology without collapsing into state-centered perfectionism.

Autonomy, for Rasmussen and Den Uyl, is not merely negative freedom from interference but the positive capacity for self-directed practical reasoning and responsible agency. Flourishing requires individuals to function as authors of their own lives, exercising judgment in selecting values, projects, and commitments. Kristjánsson’s autonomy-supportive pedagogy aligns with this view insofar as it emphasizes internalization of moral reasons rather than external compliance. However, Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Individualistic Perfectionism insists that autonomy must be institutionally protected through rights-respecting frameworks that prevent coercive moral engineering.

Spontaneous order further clarifies how moral development can occur without centralized design. Following Hayekian insights incorporated into Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s realist turn, social coordination emerges through decentralized interactions, cultural evolution, and voluntary associations. Moral norms, educational practices, and character formation strategies evolve organically within communities rather than being imposed from above. Kristjánsson’s emphasis on moral ecology can be reconceived within this spontaneous order framework, where diverse educational models compete, adapt, and innovate according to local needs and values.

The institutions of civil society serve as the primary mediating structures between individuals and the state. Families, religious organizations, independent (private) schools, professional associations, charities, and community networks constitute the institutional infrastructure of a free society. These voluntary associations may be able to provide moral formation environments consistent with Kristjánsson’s character education goals while remaining compatible with Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s metanormative liberalism. They allow pluralistic experimentation in virtue cultivation without political homogenization.

This institutional architecture preserves both moral substance and political restraint and avoids the false dilemma between moral relativism and state-enforced virtue. Instead, it supports a pluralistic ecosystem of character formation anchored in autonomy, spontaneous order, and voluntary cooperation. Within this framework, Kristjánsson’s developmental insights may potentially gain practical application while remaining compatible with liberty-centered political theory.

Kristjánsson’s detailed work on the process of flourishing has the potential to usefully complement Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s work on its preconditions. Several of his ideas may be able to be incorporated into a liberal perfectionist perspective without violating its metanormative constraints.

1. Articulating the “Individual” in Individualistic Perfectionism: Rasmussen and  Den Uyl assert that flourishing is individualized but say less about how individuals develop the capacity for such self-direction. Kristjánsson’s developmental psychology of virtue—how phronesis, empathy, and integrity are cultivated from childhood—provides essential content for understanding the “individual” who is to be the agent of his own flourishing. This can strengthen their ethics by showing how the capacity for self-direction is nurtured, not merely presupposed.

2. Enriching the Concept of Flourishing: Kristjánsson’s argument for the role of awe, wonder, and “epiphanies” offers a compelling expansion of the “generic goods” that constitute a flourishing life. A liberal perfectionist can argue that education should expose children to the potential for such experiences (through art, science, nature, philosophy) as part of developing their capacity to appreciate and pursue a full life, without dictating the specific objects of awe.

3. A Framework for Voluntary Educational Communities: Rasmussen and  Den Uyl’s framework favors voluntary association. Kristjánsson’s research provides a blueprint for what parents and educators in such voluntary communities (including charter schools, private schools, or homeschooling networks) might aim for in character education. It offers an empirically-informed “perfectionist” curriculum that respects pluralism by being one offered option among many, not a state-mandated monopoly.

4. Connecting Entrepreneurship and Moral Education: Rasmussen and Den Uyl draw an analogy between the entrepreneur and the moral agent, both navigating uncertainty with creativity and alertness. Kristjánsson’s work on exemplarity and moral development provides a pedagogical correlate: how to educate individuals to become such alert, creative moral “entrepreneurs” of their own lives. This creates a powerful synergy between their economic and ethical individualism.

Conclusion

Kristjánsson’s Aristotelian ethics and educational philosophy advance contemporary virtue theory by reconnecting flourishing with empirical psychology and institutional practice. In turn, Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Individualistic Perfectionism provides the necessary political safeguards for preserving individual moral agency.

Kristján Kristjánsson and the duo of Rasmussen and Den Uyl represent two strands of contemporary neo-Aristotelian thought. Kristjánsson delves deeply into the normative and developmental question of how human beings become virtuous and flourish, particularly through education. Rasmussen and Den Uyl address the prior political question of how to create a society where diverse, individualized pursuits of flourishing can coexist peacefully, grounding their answer in metanormative theory and metaphysical realism.

Their projects are not so much incompatible as they are complementary, operating at different levels of analysis. The primary tension lies at the intersection of state action and education. However, within a political order that respects rights as metanorms, Kristjánsson’s work may become invaluable. It provides a guide for the voluntary communities, families, and individuals that seek to answer the normative question within their own lives. By integrating Kristjánsson’s insights into the cultivation of character, practical wisdom, and a sense of wonder, the Individualistic Perfectionism of Rasmussen and Den Uyl could gain greater psychological depth and pedagogical traction. Together, these bodies of work potentially offer a more complete picture: a liberal society that protects the space for freedom, populated by individuals educated to use that freedom wisely in the pursuit of a truly flourishing life. 

 References

Den Uyl, Douglas J.  and Rasmussen Douglas B. (2016). The Perfectionist turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh University Press.

Kristjánsson, Kristján. (2015). Aristotelian Character Ethics: An Aristotelian Approach to moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.

Kristjánsson, Kristján. (2019). Flourishing as the Aim of Education: A neo-Aristotelian View. Routledge.

Rasmussen, Douglas B.  and Den Uyl, Douglas J. (2005). Norms of liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-perfectionist Politics. Pennsylvania State University Press.

Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl, Douglas J.  (2020). The Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism. Edinburgh University Press.

 

Other essays by Ed Younkins on this site:

Younkins, Edward W (2025) “What Contribution did David L. Norton Make to our Understanding of Ethical Individualism?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 18, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “How can dialectics help us to defend liberty?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 8, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. October 24, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “Can Polarized Moral Politics be Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. December 13, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W (2026) “Does Humanomics Need a Moral Anchor?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 22, 2026.