Why Bother Considering Whether Government is Necessary?

 

Before my most recent trip to India I had to choose which of two recently purchased books I should take with me: Aeon Skoble’s Deleting the State, or Salvatore Babones’ Dharma Democracy. I chose Dharma Democracy (which I have since written about here) because I didn’t like the idea of trying to explain to an airport official that Deleting the State is a philosophical treatise rather than a manual for the violent overthrow of governments.

At that time, I would not have been able to point to pages 107-8 where Skoble argues explicitly against violent action to remove a government in any “nominally liberal democracy”. In the Afterword of the recently published second edition of his book, the author takes the opportunity to emphasize his opposition to violence by giving reasons for eschewing it and reiterating that deleting the state means “deleting the idea of the necessity of the state”.

The subtitle of the book is Requiem for an Illusion. The illusion Skoble refers to is the Hobbesian Fear that in the absence of a government “to keep them all in awe” people would find themselves at each others’ throats - in a war “of every man against every other man”.  I will discuss later the author’s reasons for considering the Hobbesian Fear an illusion.

Skoble regards the neo-Aristotelian conception of human flourishing provided by Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl as providing the best defense of a theory of individual liberty. He notes, however, that in Norms of Liberty the Dougs leave open the question of whether a political/legal order defending individual rights necessitates the existence of a state. Skoble points out that the difference between a state and a political/legal order is not trivial.

What is the point of philosophical anarchism? 

In the Afterword Skoble writes:

“If deleting the state means deleting the generally held notion that we need to have a state, and the only way to do it is to make philosophical arguments, we’re in a lot of trouble. Philosophers have a poor track record of being persuasive to large majorities. So what, one might ask, is the point of philosophical anarchism?”

The author goes on to answer that question cogently. However, before considering his response, I want to present a contrary argument.

Is the existence of government an issue that should occupy the minds of those who believe that liberty supports human flourishing? As far as I know, there is no country in the world in which citizens are currently faced with a choice between having a minimal state or no state at all. In liberal democracies – the countries that currently enjoy the greatest personal and economic freedom – liberty is being threatened by political movements with authoritarian tendencies. Authoritarianism is presented in the wrapping of different varieties of collectivist idealism which offer citizens the opportunity to attribute personal and social problems to immigration, foreign competition, the greed of the wealthy, systemic discrimination, environmental degradation or anything else that appears to justify a larger role for government. Shouldn’t libertarians be focusing their attention on supporting the political/legal order – democracy, or representative government - that has been most successful in promoting personal and economic freedom?

Readers who doubt that the countries with greatest economic and personal freedom are liberal democracies should take a look at the graphs shown in an essay I wrote last year. There may be serious errors in common measures of personal freedom for some countries - as noted in my recent essay on Indian politics – but the weight of evidence suggests that representative government has hitherto been more successful in defending individual rights than any other contemporary form of politico/legal order that currently exists in the real world.

So, how do I justify spending time thinking about utopian concepts such as philosophical anarchism instead of spending all my efforts opposing the advances of authoritarianism?

The first defence that comes to mind is that I find it interesting to think about the question of whether government is necessary. I think that is sufficient justification for a human to spend some time thinking about any topic.

However, I have reasons to be particularly interested in the potential for utopian thinking to play a useful role in considering public policy issues. I have claimed in the past:

“We are more likely to improve opportunities for human flourishing if we approach public policy issues with a view to both (a) upholding ideals that ought to apply and (b) the real-world constraints that should not be overlooked.”

I made that comment in a short essay considering Chris Sciabarra’s discussion of the anti-utopianism in the methodology of Marx and Hayek in Marx, Hayek and Utopia.

Skoble argues that anarchist arguments can help people to think about the limits of state power. He suggests that they can be used to clarify that getting a different group of office-holders into power will not resolve problems that are attributable to institutional structures. He cites mass incarceration and business regulation that stifles innovation as examples. He sums up:

“To make the case against the state is to undermine the idea that coercion is necessary for social order or that it is beneficial to human society. It is to point the way toward the continual need to scale back the scope of state power. It is to affirm the priorities of liberty and its necessary connection to human flourishing, and to keep us mindful of the ways in which the state, and our often-unthinking obedience to it, hinders that flourishing.”

Allaying the Hobbesian Fear

Those who argue that a government is necessary to maintain social cooperation often refer to the prisoner’s dilemma in game theory. Players can obtain a greater payoff if they both cooperate than if they both defect. However, each player has an incentive to defect in the hope of obtaining a greater payoff at the expense of the other player. On that basis, it is claimed that in the absence of a coercive intervention to enforce cooperation both players will end up defecting.

However, Skoble observes that defection is only the winning strategy in a one-shot game - social cooperation emerges spontaneously when the prisoner’s dilemma game is repeated over long periods. In support of this argument he refers to Robert Axelrod’s book The Evolution of Cooperation, which found that a tit-for-tat (reciprocation) strategy gave players higher payoffs than constant defection. The author notes that strategies that allow for the possibility that a defecting player may have made a mistake offer higher payoffs than tit-for-tat.

It may be worth adding that the utility maximizing assumptions of game theory tend to be less conducive to social cooperation than are real people engaged in trust games in a laboratory setting. As Vernon Smith and Bart Wilson noted in Humanomics, anonymously paired people are “predominantly caring other-regarding, independent actors in the personal social exchange context of trust games in the laboratory”.

Skoble makes the point that law ought to be construed as a natural consequence of attempts of people to live and work together rather than as something requiring a coercive monopoly power. Among other things, he notes that enforcement of property rights requires “a society that in fact recognizes the practicality of recognizing property rights” rather than a “monopolistic coercive authority”. In that context he discusses the history of spontaneous evolution of civil law conflict resolution drawing upon works by David Friedman and Murray Rothbard.

The author devotes a chapter to providing an extended example of the potential for disaster relief to be provided via voluntary cooperation rather than a centralized political authority.

In his final chapter, Skoble discusses the question of whether disagreements between libertarian anarchists and minimal-state libertarians are radically incommensurable, or capable of being resolved by dialogue. He argues that there are “no fundamental premises or values that separate anarchists from libertarian minimum-statists” that would prevent the differences between them being resolved by dialogue. There is even potential for dialogue between libertarians and welfarist liberals. Political philosophy can explore relevant questions such as the circumstances, if any, under which the will of the majority should override individual liberty.

Additional considerations

One argument that is sometimes advanced in opposition to philosophical anarchism is that a written constitution helps to protect liberty. Perhaps that is true of the United States, but it is not difficult to find examples of countries where constitutional provisions have failed to protect liberty. The former Soviet Union comes to mind. There are also notable examples of countries which have maintained a relatively high degree of liberty without written constitutional protections. Britain comes to mind.  

Roderick Long has suggested that those who believe government is necessary are being misled by a metaphysically illusive picture of what constitutional restraints are and how they work:

“The metaphysical illusion I referred to is the habit of thinking of constitutional restraints (checks and balances, separation of powers, etc.) as though these structures existed in their own right, as external limitations on society as a whole. But in fact those structures exist only insofar as they are continually maintained in existence by human agents acting in certain systematic ways. A constitution is not some impersonal, miraculously self-enforcing robot. It’s an ongoing pattern of behavior, and it persists only so long as human agents continue to conform to that pattern in their actions.” (Long, 2008)

I have previously discussed similar views of the nature of constitutions by Sheldon Richman (here) and Douglass North (here).

A more difficult argument to contend with is that the free rider problem would prevent adequate provision of national defense. I think John Hasnas has advanced an appropriate response to that argument. He suggests that an inability to raise sufficient capital to engage in foreign military adventures or pre-emptive warfare without resort to coercion proves nothing about the potential for defense against outside aggression to be funded voluntarily.

Hasnas acknowledges that he doesn’t know whether sufficient funds could be raised by voluntary means to fund protection against outside aggression. He suggests:

“No one believes that we can transition from a world of states to anarchy instantaneously. No reasonable anarchist advocates the total dissolution of government tomorrow. Once we turn our attention to the question of how to move incrementally from government to anarchy, it becomes apparent that national defense would be one of the last governmental functions to be de-politicized.”

That seems to me to be a sensible position to adopt. It does not preclude the possibility that a society that moves incrementally to reduce coercion of some by others will one day end up not requiring coercion to ensure appropriate provision of any goods currently provided by governments.

Conclusion

This essay has been prompted by my reading of the Second edition of Aenon Skoble’s book, Deleting the State.

Early in the essay, I posed the question of whether the existence of government is an issue that should currently occupy the minds of libertarians in the light of current threats to liberty by political movements with authoritarian tendencies. Skoble provides an appropriate response in his defense of philosophical consideration of the possibility of anarchy. In particular, he suggests that such philosophical endeavours help libertarians to make the point that getting a different group of office holders into power will not resolve problems that are attributable to the existence and scope of state power.

A central concern of the book is to allay the Hobbesian Fear that people will be unable to obtain the benefits of social cooperation in the absence of a government to maintain order. In my view, Skoble provides strong arguments to allay that fear.

I endorse Skoble’s view that law ought to be construed as a natural consequence of attempts of people to live and work together, rather than as something requiring a coercive monopoly power. Constitutional restraints are not self-enforcing. It cannot be assumed that they would continue to offer protection of the rights of citizens if enforcement of them did not have broad community support.

The question of how national defense could be provided without coercive taxation is probably the most challenging obstacle to attempts by philosophical anarchists to persuade minarchists that anarchy is a viable option. In my view, it makes sense to acknowledge the difficulties that would be encountered at present in ensuring adequate voluntary provision of defense resources. That doesn’t mean, however, that it makes sense to assume that coercive taxation will always be required to fund defense. Libertarians who have the objective of reducing coercion “as much as possible in society”, should leave open the possibility that at some stage elimination of the state could become a viable option.  

References

Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, 1984).

Babones, Salvatore, Dharma Democracy: How India Built the Third World’s First Democracy (Connor Court Publishing, 2025).

Hasnas, John, Common Law Liberalism: A New Theory of the Libertarian Society (Oxford University Press, 2024).

Hayek, F. A. The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press, 1960)

Long, R. T. “Market anarchism as constitutionalism”, in R. T. Long & T. R. Machan (Eds.), Anarchism/Minarchism: Is a government part of a free country? (Ashgate Publishing, 2008). pp. 133–154.

Sciabarra, Chris Matthew, Marx, Hayek and Utopia (State University of New York Press, 1995).

Skoble, Aeon J. Deleting the State: Requiem for an Illusion, Second edition (Independent Institute, 2026).

Smith, Vernon L., and Bart J. Wilson, Humanomics: Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations for the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge University Press, 2019).

Are Spinoza’s Philosophy and Neo-Aristotelian Philosophies of Freedom and Flourishing Compatible?

 This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other publications, including several published on this site. (Please see the list after the end of this essay.) 

 

The philosophical systems of Baruch (Benedict de) Spinoza and contemporary neo-Aristotelian thinkers such as Ayn Rand, Douglas B. Rasmussen, and Douglas J. Den Uyl represent distinct yet somewhat convergent approaches to understanding reality, human nature, and the conditions for human flourishing. Spinoza’s rationalist monism and determinism appear, at first glance, to be at odds with the teleological realism, moral objectivism, and emphasis on individual agency characteristic of Objectivism and Individualistic Perfectionism. However, upon closer examination, these traditions exhibit areas of comparability, partial compatibility, and parallel insights across metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy.

 

This essay explores both the divergences and convergences between these traditions, arguing that while they differ in foundational metaphysical commitments—particularly regarding determinism, free will, and the nature of God—they share a deep commitment to reason, self-mastery, and the pursuit of human flourishing within a naturalistic framework.

 

Metaphysics

 

Spinoza’s metaphysics is grounded in substance monism: there exists only one infinite substance, which he identifies as God or Nature (Deus sive Natura). Everything that exists is a mode or expression of this single substance, and all events follow necessarily from its nature. Reality is fully determined and governed by immutable laws. Contingency is merely epistemic, not ontological.

 

By contrast, Rand and neo-Aristotelians affirm a pluralistic, realist metaphysics. Rand’s axiom, “existence exists’, asserts that reality is objective, composed of distinct entities governed by the laws of identity and causality. Rasmussen and Den Uyl, drawing on Aristotle, emphasize that beings have natures, potentials, and ends. Human beings, as rational animals, possess capacities that can be actualized through virtuous activity.

 

Despite these differences, an important parallel emerges: they all do not depend upon supernaturalism in the traditional sense. Spinoza’s God is not a transcendent creator but identical with nature, Rand explicitly rejects any form of supernaturalism, and Rasmussen and Den Uyl adopt a naturalistic Aristotelian framework. Their Individualistic Perfectionism is not incompatible with, or does not rule out, theism, but their arguments do not depend upon a theistic foundation. Though compatible with theism, natural moral law does not depend on theology for its account of ethics. Thus, all three perspectives share a commitment to the intelligibility, order, and law-governed structure of reality. Each involves a solid metaphysical realism.

 

However, a key contrast remains. Spinoza’s universe is necessitarian, whereas neo-Aristotelians affirm teleological openness—a world in which potentials may or may not be realized depending on human action.

 

The Nature of the Universe

 

Rand famously defends the idea that the universe is fundamentally benevolent—not in the sense that it guarantees success, but in that it is open to human achievement and does not thwart rational effort. The world is knowable, and success is possible through rational action.

 

Spinoza, by contrast, rejects anthropocentric evaluations of the universe. Nature is neither benevolent nor malevolent; it simply is. Events unfold according to necessity, without regard to human purposes. The perception of good and evil arises from human perspectives, not from nature itself.

 

Rasmussen and Den Uyl adopt a position closer to Rand’s, though more nuanced. The world contains both opportunities for, and obstacles to, flourishing, but human beings can achieve flourishing through rational self-direction within appropriate social conditions.

 

Thus, while Spinoza offers a vision of cosmic neutrality, Rand and neo-Aristotelians emphasize a conditionally benevolent universe—one that rewards rational engagement, though not automatically.

 

Epistemology

 

Spinoza is a paradigmatic rationalist. He distinguishes three kinds of knowledge: imagination (inadequate ideas), reason (adequate ideas), and intuitive knowledge (the highest form). True knowledge involves grasping the necessary relations among things.

 

Rand, by contrast, defends a form of conceptual empiricism. Knowledge begins with perception and is organized through abstraction and logic. Reason is volitional and requires active engagement.

 

Rasmussen and Den Uyl emphasize practical reason, which guides action rather than merely contemplating necessity. Human beings must deliberate about how to live, integrating diverse goods into a coherent life. Despite methodological differences, all share: (1) confidence in reason’s ability to know reality; (2) rejection of skepticism and relativism; and (3) emphasis on knowledge as essential to flourishing. In addition, Spinoza’s “adequate ideas” parallel the neo-Aristotelian emphasis on rational judgment, though the latter is more action-oriented and less geometrically deductive.

 

 Free Will, Determinism, and Human Action

 

Spinoza is a strict determinist. Human beings believe themselves free because they are ignorant of the causes determining their actions. True freedom consists not in indeterminacy but in understanding necessity and acting from reason rather than passive emotions. True freedom is recognition that all things are necessary parts of God/nature, in understanding necessity, and acting from reason rather than passive emotions. Spinoza defines freedom not as free will but as understanding the necessity of nature allowing individuals to act according to reason rather than passions. Spinoza’s truncated version of “free will” (what he calls freedom) appears to hold that a human being can decide not to be controlled by his passions.

 

Rand and other neo-Aristotelians, however, affirm genuine agency. Rand holds that the choice to think or not to think is fundamental and irreducible. Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that moral responsibility requires self-direction and the capacity to choose among alternatives.

 

This difference is significant and limits full compatibility. However, a parallel remains: both traditions value rational self-governance. For Spinoza, the “free man” is guided by reason. For neo-Aristotelians, the virtuous person exercises rational choice. Thus, while Spinoza redefines freedom as understanding necessity, neo-Aristotelians retain a more robust notion of freedom as volitional self-direction.

 

 Passions, Emotions, and Virtue

 

Spinoza offers a sophisticated theory of the emotions, distinguishing between passions (passive states caused by external factors) and actions (active states arising from adequate ideas). The goal of ethics is to transform passive emotions into active ones through understanding.

 

Rand similarly argues that emotions are consequences of value judgments and must be guided by reason. Unchecked emotions can lead to irrationality and self-destruction.

 

Rasmussen and Den Uyl, following Aristotle, emphasize that virtues involve the proper integration of reason and emotion. Moral development requires habituation, reflection, and judgment.

 

All three perspectives converge on: (1) the need to regulate emotions through reason; (2) the idea that self-mastery is essential to flourishing; and (3) the rejection of emotionalism as a guide to life. In addition, Spinoza’s concept of increasing one’s “power of acting” parallels the Aristotelian idea of realizing one’s potentials through virtue.

 

 Ethics, Flourishing, and Happiness

 

Spinoza’s ethics is deeply eudaimonistic. The highest good is the intellectual love of God, a rational understanding of the unity and necessity of nature. Happiness consists in this understanding and the peace it brings. True flourishing (conatus) arises from rational understanding which leads to virtues, joy, and a sense of unity with God/nature. Acting according to the dictates of reason aligns oneself with God/nature.

 

Rand defines happiness as the state resulting from achieving one’s rational values. Flourishing requires productive work, rationality, and integrity.

 

Rasmussen and Den Uyl articulate individualistic perfectionism, in which flourishing is objective but agent-relative. Each person must achieve excellence in a way appropriate to his or her circumstances.

 All of the above reject hedonism, see flourishing as an activity guided by reason, and link happiness to the successful exercise of human capacities. They differ in that Spinoza emphasizes contemplation and understanding, Rand emphasizes production and achievement, and Rasmussen and Den Uyl emphasize plural, individualized excellence.

 

Politics, Rights, and the Nature of the State

 

Spinoza’s non-normative and power-centric political philosophy emphasizes stability, peace, and freedom of thought. He supports democratic governance and argues that individuals retain the right to think freely even under political authority. However, Spinoza does not ground rights in moral principles. Instead, rights are coextensive with power. One has a right to do whatever one has the power to do. His naturalistic ontology of rights holds that rights are expressions of actual capacities. Might makes right as a descriptive (not moral) claim.

 

Political life emerges from interacting self-interested agents seeking survival and flourishing. Political society emerges as a natural development. Spinoza views political society as a dynamic process of interactions. The state is an organic outgrowth of human interactions.

 

In contrast, Rand and Rasmussen/Den Uyl defend natural rights grounded in human nature. For Rand rights protect individual freedom of action. For Rasmussen and Den Uyl, rights are metanormative principles that secure the conditions for self-direction without prescribing specific ways of life. Their concept of metanormativity is crucial. Political institutions should not enforce virtue but should create a framework within which individuals can pursue flourishing. All support freedom of thought and limited government, Spinoza lacks a robust natural rights theory, and the neo-Aristotelians provide a stronger moral justification for liberal institutions.

 

God, Nature, and Ultimate Reality

 

Spinoza’s God is identical with nature—an impersonal, infinite substance. Understanding God is equivalent to understanding reality. Rand rejects God entirely, advocating a fully secular worldview. Rasmussen and Den Uyl also do not rely on theological foundations. Despite differences, all share a naturalistic orientation and do not rely on traditional theism. Spinoza’s God functions more as a metaphysical principle than as a personal being. Despite deep metaphysical differences, several powerful parallels emerge; (1) Primacy of Reason: All view reason as essential to human life; (2) Self-Mastery: Flourishing requires control over passions; (3) Naturalism: Reality is intelligible and law-governed; (4) Freedom of Thought: Intellectual liberty is essential; and (5) Eudaimonism: Happiness is achieved through rational activity.

Still, important differences remain: Determinism vs free will; Monism vs pluralism; and Power-based vs rights-based political theory. These differences limit full philosophical integration but allow for meaningful dialogue and mutual enrichment.

 

 Conclusion

 

The philosophies of Spinoza and contemporary neo-Aristotelians offer complementary insights into the nature of reality, human agency, and flourishing. Spinoza provides a vision of rational harmony within a deterministic universe, emphasizing understanding and intellectual love.  Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s idea that individual rights serve as metanorms echoes the Spinozist importance of self-directed rational activity. Rand and Rasmussen/Den Uyl offer a vision of rational self-direction within a free society, emphasizing choice, virtue, and individual flourishing.

 

While their metaphysical foundations differ significantly, their shared commitment to reason, self-mastery, and human flourishing reveals a philosophical kinship. Together, they illuminate different dimensions of the human condition: our embeddedness in a lawful universe and our capacity for rational self-direction.

 

 

Recommended Reading

 

 Arfa, Orit.  2014 Spinoza & Ayn Rand: How to Reconcile Spinoza’s God with Rand’s Atheism. Route 60 Press.

Den Uyl, Douglas J. 1983. Power, State, and Freedom: An Interpretation of Spinoza’s Political Philosophy. Assen, Neth: Van Gorcum.

Den Uyl, Douglas J.  and Rasmussen, Douglas B. 2016. The Perfectionist Turn. Edinburgh University Press.

Spinoza, Baruch. 1677 (1996). Ethics. edited and translated by Edwin Curley. Penguin Classics.

Spinoza, Baruch. 1670. (2007) Theological-Political Treatise. edited by Jonathan Israel. Cambridge University Press.

Rand, Ayn. 1964. The Virtue of Selfishness. New American Library.

Rand, Ayn. 1979.  Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. New American library.

Rasmussen, Douglas B., and Den Uyl, Douglas J.  2005. Norms of Liberty. University Park: Penn State University Press.

Rasmussen, Douglas B., and Den Uyl, Douglas J. The Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism. 2020. Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan.

 Other essays by Ed Younkins on this site:

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “What Contribution did David L. Norton Make to our Understanding of Ethical Individualism?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 18, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “How can dialectics help us to defend liberty?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 8, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. October 24, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “Can Polarized Moral Politics be Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. December 13, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2026) “Does Humanomics Need a Moral Anchor?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 22, 2026.

Younkins, Edward W. (2026) “Is Character Education Compatible With Individualistic Perfectionism?” Freedom and Flourishing. February 27, 2026.

Younkins, Edward W. (2026) “Are Spontaneous Order and neo-Aristotelian Arguments for a Free Society Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing. March 19, 2026.

Is Indian Democracy an Extraordinary Success Story?

Salvatore Babones puts the view that Indian democracy is an extraordinary success story in his book, Dharma Democracy: How India Built the Third World’s First Democracy, which was published last year.

Babones describes himself as “a skeptical quantitative and comparative sociologist who came to the subject with an interest in democracy not (initially at least) with any particular interest in India itself”

I read the book during my most recent visit to India. I came to it with a particular interest in India and a desire to understand whether that country is more appropriately viewed as the world's largest democracy, or as an elective autocracy in which personal freedom is severely restricted. Babones has persuaded me that the first view is closer to being correct.

The structure of this essay is as follows. In the next section I discuss the graph presented above. I then draw upon Dharma Democracy to explain why Babones implies that the freedom data depicted in the graph understates personal freedom in India. The following sections outline why Babones views Indian democracy as a success story, his explanation for that success, and the reception his book has received in India. I present some personal views before concluding.

A Visual Starting Point: Emancipative Values and Personal Freedom

To frame the discussion, I use the chart above showing data from the World Values Survey and the Human Freedom Index. The horizontal axis presents Christian Welzel’s emancipative values index, a measure of cultural support for autonomy and expressive freedoms. The vertical axis shows personal freedom as assessed by the Fraser/Cato Human Freedom Index. I have previously explained the chart more fully on this blog, when using it to explore global patterns of authoritarianism associated with political entrepreneurship.

I am using the chart here to highlight how India appears to be situated within the broader global landscape. India appears in the middle of the distribution: less free than Western democracies but significantly freer than many culturally comparable societies. The chart suggests that the degree of personal freedom in India is much as might be expected for a country with India’s level of economic development and cultural values.

However, historical data suggests that personal freedom was much higher in India during the first decade of this century. It declined to its current level (around 6/10) from a rating substantially higher than might be expected based on emancipative (around 7/10). 

Possible errors in the measurement of personal freedom

Babones implies that the Fraser/Cato index understates the personal freedom that Indians experience. He argues that there is bias in all democracy and freedom indexes that use of subjective data from the Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem). Apparently, nearly all of V-Dem’s survey indicators are coded by country experts, most of whom are academics residing in the country being studied. In the case of India, that methodology may introduce bias in recent freedom indicators because Narendra Modi and his BJP party are “widely reviled among social scientists both within India and in the West”.

This raises several issues. First, the Fraser/Cato index’s reliance on V-Dem seems to be modest. As far as I can see, only one item tends to depress India’s freedom score: that is V-Dem’s score for Media and expression under the heading “Expression and information”. On that item, V-Dem’s score is not far below the scores of Freedom House, BTI and CLD, which are also used in the Fraser/Cato index. It is possible, however, that data from Freedom House, BTI and CLD are subject to similar methodological biases as the data from V-Dem.

Second, India’s academics have some good reasons to criticize Modi’s human rights record. Nevertheless, in my view Babones’ allegation of bias carries weight because V-Dem gives Indian democracy a lower rating at present than in 1976 - during Indira Gandhi’s “Emergency” rule - when civil rights were suspended.

Third, some other freedom indexes provide a rosier picture of civil liberties in India than Fraser/Cato. For example, the Civil liberties rating for India incorporated in the Democracy Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) is higher than for Armenia and Georgia – a ranking which is inconsistent with that shown in the above chart.

On balance, it seems to me that Babones has made a plausible case that democracy and personal freedom are in better shape in India than is often claimed by critics of the Modi government.

 India as an Extraordinary Democratic Success

Babones argues that “India’s democracy is in better shape than that of just about any other developing country”. His central claim is that India’s democracy is historically exceptional.

He emphasizes that India is the only large, poor, post‑colonial society to maintain continuous electoral democracy for more than seven decades. Unlike Western democracies, which evolved gradually over centuries, India launched universal suffrage at independence despite widespread illiteracy and immense cultural diversity. For Babones, this makes India not a fragile democracy but an extraordinary one - a global outlier whose success cannot be understood through Western liberal frameworks.

He grounds this argument in several propositions:

·        India conducts elections involving hundreds of millions of voters with consistently high turnout. Babones sees this as evidence of a deeply internalized democratic ethos.

·        India’s democratic resilience is rooted in its dharmic heritage, which emphasizes pluralism, decentralisation, and negotiated social order.

·        Most post‑colonial states experienced military coups and/or authoritarian consolidation. India did not.

·        India has vast civil society networks which have tended to inculcate a sense of national unity.

·        India’s electoral system has enabled historically disadvantaged communities to gain political voice – it is helping these communities to overcome social disadvantages.

Babones has included a chapter discussing the status of Muslims in India. In that context he suggests that nationhood is a work in progress. One interesting statistic he cites is that 99% of Indian Muslims report being “proud” to be Indian. He also makes the point that in a country that is 80% Hindu, “Muslims will never experience full social inclusion unless Hindus actively invite them into the national mainstream.”

Reception of “Dharma Democracy”

I asked Grok and CoPilot to provide summaries of the reception that the book has received in India.

Grok notes that as a relatively recent book from a smaller publisher, it hasn’t yet garnered widespread mainstream academic or Western critical reviews. However, the book has been well-received in circles aligned with its thesis. Reviewers highlight its challenge to global democracy indices, defense of India’s success via “dharma” and Hindu civil society, and data-driven rebuttals to criticisms of Modi-era democracy. One highly critical reviewer argues the book is misguided because it fails to address the Indian Constitution’s alleged anti-Hindu biases.

CoPilot offered similar comments, noting specifically that some critics are concerned that support for the Hindu civilization thesis tends to downplay pluralism and legitimize majoritarian narratives. Extending its analysis beyond formal reviews, it notes that much Indian academic discourse pushes back against the core thesis of the book. Many Indian scholars continue to view recent developments in India’s democracy as problematic. CoPilot sums up: “The book has not been dismissed; it’s being taken seriously in India, but primarily as a provocative intervention in an ongoing debate rather than a settled or widely accepted interpretation.”

Personal Perspectives

I cannot claim to have spent much time discussing politics during my three visits to India. Readers who are interested in my motives for visiting India can find relevant information here, here, here, here and here.

However, when discussion has turned to politics, the people I met have tended to express views that either strongly oppose or strongly support prime minister Modi. There were exceptions, but the views seemed to be linked to education levels – those with a university degree tended to be critical of Modi’s human rights record, whereas those without a university education were highly supportive of his emphasis on nationalism and economic development.

One observation stands out: critics of Modi expressed their views to me openly and without hesitation. These were not whispered conversations but frank and confident exchanges, often in public settings. That willingness to criticise the government directly to a foreign visitor is not something one would expect in a society where personal freedom is severely restricted. This suggests that India’s public sphere retains a level of openness that complicates the more pessimistic narratives about democratic decline.

My own view of Modi has moderated over the years. When he was first elected, international reporting had me viewing him as a somewhat alarming Hindu nationalist, whose policies might cause disorder. Perhaps Modi has himself become more moderate as he has focused on achievement of Viksit Bharat, which translates as “Developed India”. The image he presents internationally is certainly that of an extraordinarily diplomatic leader who seeks mutually beneficial relations with nearly all other countries.

While reading Babones’ book I pondered whether a “dharma democracy” would differ substantially from one based on Western individualism. At a superficial level, a “dharma democracy” might be seen to place less emphasis on personal freedom because dharma is about “duty” or “right action” rather than individual rights. However, the Indian concept of dharma seems to me to be close to Aristotelian ideas of individual self-actualization in accordance with natural purpose (telos). Babones notes that the Indian philosopher, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888-1975), suggested “every form of life, every group of men has its dharma, which is the law of its being”.

It seems to me that when Indians speak of duty to the nation what they have in mind might generally have more to do with doing the right thing - for example, adherence to societal norms that make democracy possible – because such behaviour is honorable and integral to self-realization, rather than an obligation that necessarily entails self-sacrifice.

 I am left wondering whether there is much difference in practice in the way Indian democracy is conducted by comparison with Western democracies. It seems possible that Indian democracy may be conducted with a little more regard to the norms of reciprocity, fair-dealing and mutual respect that restrain citizens from seeking to use the political process to exploit their compatriots.  

Conclusions

Salvatore Babones argues in Dharma Democracy that India is an extraordinary democratic outlier among post‑colonial societies. I think that line of argument holds up surprisingly well once one examines both the historical record and the limitations of the freedom indices that dominate international commentary. The evidence suggests that India’s personal freedoms, while imperfect, are not in the state of collapse that some critics claim.

The dharmic framing of democracy that Babones highlights offers a useful reminder that democratic resilience can emerge from cultural resources that differ from those of the West. India’s traditions of pluralism, decentralization, and negotiated social order have helped sustain a vast and diverse electorate through seven decades of elections. Whether or not one embraces the full “dharma democracy” thesis, it is clear that India’s democratic foundations run deeper than many external observers assume.

The reception of Dharma Democracy inside India reflects this complexity. Supporters see it as a welcome challenge to Western academic pessimism; critics worry that it risks legitimizing majoritarian narratives. Yet the very fact that the book has sparked open, vigorous debate is itself evidence of a public sphere that remains lively and accessible.

My own conversations in India reinforce that impression. Critics of the government spoke freely and confidently, even in public settings - something inconsistent with the idea of a society sliding into authoritarian silence. At the same time, the polarization of views, often along educational lines, reflects the tensions of a rapidly modernizing nation.

In the end, distinctive characteristics of India’s society have shaped its experience of democracy. Distinctive cultural values help to explain why Indian democracy has been surprisingly resilient. If the norms of reciprocity, restraint, and mutual respect that underpin democratic life continue to hold, India’s democracy may remain not only durable but an extraordinary success story. 

Are there no policies worth retaining to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Australia?

 This is a guest post by Geoff Edwards.

Tasmania-raised, Geoff has held economist positions at the Productivity Commission, La Trobe and Melbourne Universities, the Australian Treasury and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. His research has focused on public policy for energy, water, agriculture and industry. Geoff's research has been published in The Economic Record, The American Economic Review, The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, The American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Quarterly and elsewhere, including “Freedom and Flourishing”. (Geoff has previously published here about gas price policies.) 

In this post, Geoff discusses one of the policies announced by Angus Taylor, leader of the Opposition, in his recent budget reply speech in the Australian parliament.

The Opposition leader's budget reply often serves as an opportunity for the Opposition to present the narrative that it proposes to take to the next election. Angus Taylor’s recent budget reply speech has special significance. Since this was his first budget reply speech, it provided an opportunity for Taylor to point out the shortcomings of the Government’s economic policies and to propose a radically different approach. The political context surrounding Angus Taylor's budget reply speech added urgency, as the Liberal-National Party coalition faces an existential crisis, with competition from Teal Independents, on its left flank, and more intense competition from One Nation, on its right flank.

The Government’s budget, the fifth delivered by Jim Chalmers, seeks to address chronically low productivity growth and perceived generational inequity with policies that are anticipated to result in a higher public debt burden to be serviced by future generations. Taylor outlined a platform centred on "generational tax reform" through indexing income tax brackets to inflation (the "tax back guarantee"), cutting net overseas migration, and restricting certain welfare services to Australian citizens only. As Geoff notes below, Taylor also foreshadowed a radical shift away from policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Geoff Edwards writes:

Opposition leader Angus Taylor said a government he led would stop targeting net zero greenhouse emissions. It would increase use of fossil fuels, running coal-fired power generators "as long and as hard as possible". Mr Taylor wants "cheap energy". He blamed  the renewables push and the energy bureaucracy for high energy prices. The reality is that the impact of high world prices for oil, gas and coal on electricity costs are also relevant. 

There is a certain irony in Mr Taylor's rejection of net zero 2050. It was he as Energy and Climate Minister with then  Prime Minister Scott Morrison who, in October 2021, first announced Australia's commitment to net zero. Subsequently, in opposition, the Liberal Party followed its smaller coalition partner, the Nationals, in walking away from net zero 2050.

Australia generates about one per cent of global greenhouse emissions. It cannot  influence climate perceptibly, domestically or globally. But a majority of Aussies according to surveys see it responsible for doing its bit to reduce carbon dioxide and other greenhouse emissions, so the atmosphere is more conducive to good living conditions for humans and other species. And I want my grandkids to grow up in an Australia that has policies and a culture that take seriously caring for the global commons that is the atmosphere.

Yes, remove subsidies on solar electricity, household batteries and EVs—-though I don't see that reducing electricity prices. And credit to Mr Taylor for the rational initiative of removing the ban on nuclear energy in Australia, so long as any investments in nuclear are made through unsubsidised, technology-neutral competitive processes.

But the Safeguard Mechanism, a de facto tax on carbon emissions, attacked by the Opposition leader, is the right way to go. It is a price directly on the pollution that harms the habitat of humans and other living things. 

Under the Safeguard Mechanism, the country's largest industrial firms have a baseline level of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions they can make without penalty. The baseline is reduced each year. Emissions in excess of the baseline need to be offset by purchasing approved carbon credit units; these are accredited emission reductions made in such ways as soil carbon sequestration, vegetation management and energy efficiency gains.

Yes, the Safeguard Mechanism increases prices a small amount; appropriate for efficient pricing when producers are made to pay a real cost. The Productivity Commission and others, focusing on efficiency in the energy sector and beyond, and on cost-effectiveness in reducing emissions, recommend extending the Safeguard Mechanism so disincentives to pollute the atmosphere are experienced by more of the polluters.  It is especially incongruous that individual electricity generating facilities are not subject to an emissions tax. 

 

Geoff Edwards

Kew, Vic.