Is Ayn Rand’s Philosophy Consistent with Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics?

 

This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling

University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other publications, including several published on this site. (Please see the list after the end of this essay.) 

The first half of this essay was previously published in Le Québécois Libre on March 15, 2009. Ed and I agree that, since his essay was first published, Douglass Rasmussen and Douglass Den Uyl have improved upon Rand's approach. (Ed compared the work of Rasmussen and Den Uyl with that of Rand in an essay published by The Savvy Street on October 19, 2023.)

 

During the last fifty years or so, there has been a revival of scholarly interest in the virtues in general and in virtue ethics in particular. Many thinkers turned to a neo-­Aristotelian version of virtue ethics, but none had previously made a better or more consistent case than Rand (1957; 1964; 1967; [1966-67] 1990).¹ She explains that attaining moral perfection means achieving the highest level of human flourishing of which one is capable of reaching. Rand details how and why the consistent practice of seven virtues is essential for a person to attain his objective well-being (i.e., his flourishing).

For Rand, morality is a type of enlightened and rational self-in­terest—each individual's moral obligation is to attain his own moral well-being. She defines value as “that which one acts to gain and/or keep” (1964, 27). The purpose in pursuing values is the flourishing of one's own life. Values are thus at the root of morality. Proper moral norms are determined by human nature. Rand's ethical egoism sees naturalism as leading to facts that become the basis for objective judgments of value. An objective value is a feature of reality that is positively related to the flourishing of an individual human being. An objective value is relational and exists in a life-affirming relationship to a particular person.

Rand defends the principled pursuit of one's own flourishing. She explains that promoting one's own interest requires a person to consistently follow principles. A human being needs to understand, in the framework of principles, the cause and effect relationships between his actions and the achievement of his values. Moral principles are formulated through observation and induction regard­ing the effects of various forms of action on one's well-being. A man must identify and follow rational principles if he is to flourish.

Moral principles, as guides to life-promoting actions, are defined in relationship to the facts that makes them essential. For man to survive, he must discern the principles of action necessary to direct him in his relationships with other men and with nature. Man's need for these principles is his need for a code of morality. To flourish, a person must select proper principles and act in accordance with them. Human flourishing requires the identification and practice of a particular systematic code of morality. The traditional major virtues, as recast by Rand, provide the rational principles for this code of morality-virtues are manifestations of the rational long-range standards or principles that life as a human being requires.

Rand explains that a virtue is the act by which one gains and/ or keeps an objective value. From another perspective, character traits that objectively and rationally benefit their possessor are deemed to be virtues. The virtues are egoistic or partial to oneself, but not in any objectionable sense. A virtuous character is the result of appropriate actions and is contributive to further appropriate actions. 

The Objectivist Virtues

Rand explains throughout her writings that the rational pursuit of one's self-interest requires the consistent practice of seven principal virtues: rationality, honesty, independence, justice, integrity, produc­tiveness, and pride. Unfortunately, she did not produce a comprehen­sive, systematic, and detailed work with respect to the virtues. On the positive side, Tara Smith (2006) has endeavored to provide a detailed explanation of the virtues in the context of Rand's rational egoism.

Rationality, the primary virtue, involves full focus, commitment to reality, and the constant expansion of one's knowledge. Rationality is one's recognition and acknowledgment of reason as one's only source of knowledge, judge of values, and guide to action. Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man's senses; it is man's fundamental means of survival and a practical instrument for gaining the values that further one's life. Rationality is concerned with the method by which an individual reaches his conclusions rather than being concerned with the particular conclusions that he comes to. Rationality is essential to the kind of practical actions required to attain human flourishing. It involves acceptance of the conditions necessary for man's flourishing. The virtue of rationality requires an individual to act on his rational conclusions.

Rationality requires the exercise of six additional derivative virtues that can be viewed as expressions of rationality (48-74). Honesty is the refusal to fake reality-it is the rejection of unreality and the recognition that the unreal can have no value. Misrepresenting reality does not change reality. Facts are independent of a person's beliefs. For honesty, a person must renounce misrepresentation, artifice, and evasion. He must also develop an active mind and act on his knowledge-an honest person seeks knowledge because he needs it to act properly. Honesty is practical. An individual must be truthful with himself, and not pretend that reality is something other than what it is. Self-deception is counter-productive. Dishonesty diverts an individual from identifying and seeking rational plans for gaining objective values. Dishonesty diminishes one's self-esteem and pride. It also changes facts and his own rationality into his enemies. Whereas an honest person depends on others' virtues, a dishonest person relies upon their vices.

Through dishonesty, a man makes himself dependent on others' standards, expectations, judgments, and ignorance. A liar depends upon others' naivete and he must strive to keep them unaware. In reality, an individual is apt to profit the most from others' rationality, knowledge, and virtues. Honesty, like all the virtues, is contextual and does not require one to tell the truth in all cases. It is permissible (and moral) to lie in order to protect a value that is being threatened. The use of force or fraud by an aggressor changes the conditions and the relationship between honesty and life. Lying is wrong when done in an attempt to gain a value (75-105).

An independent person establishes his primary orientation to reality rather than to other people. Accepting the primacy of existence, the independent person goes by his own judgment of reality. Independence requires a person's acceptance of the responsi­bility for making his own judgments, gaining knowledge through the use of his own mind, and surviving and flourishing by the efforts of his own mind. Thought is performed individually. Because reason is a characteristic of the individual human person, knowledge must be attained by the individual. Because thinking is a self-directed activity, the requirement of independence is implied in the requirement of rationality. Independence can be viewed as the method through which an individual comprehends ideas. It is essential to follow through by acting on his independent judgment.

It is permissible to learn from others provided that one thinks through and grasps the ideas for himself. A man can be independent while not being the creator or discoverer of new ideas. What is important is a person's own judgment. In our division of labor society, it is rational to make use of the knowledge of experts and people who are more experienced. However, it is essential not to accept unconditionally whatever the other person says merely because it is the judgment of another person. It is necessary not to substitute the judgments of others for one's own judgment. It is important to assess, to the best of one's ability, the ideas presented and the legitimacy of the expert's qualifications, education, and experience (106-34). 

Because other people are potential values or disvalues to an individual, it is essential to judge other individuals' character and conduct objectively and to act accordingly. The personal virtue of justice involves the application of rationality to the evaluation and treatment of other persons. These moral assessments and judgments require fidelity to reality and the use of one's reason rather than yielding to one's emotions.

It is essential to give each person that which he deserves. This idea reflects respect for causality-certain causes justify certain effects. This value-oriented perspective on justice recognizes that virtuous actions bring values into existence and that unprincipled or irrational actions damage or destroy values. It is rational to reward virtues with positive values and vices with punishments or negative values.

 Smith explains that a man should judge others objectively and treat them as they deserve because that is the best way to achieve his own personal flourishing. In fact, everyone is in a position to profit from actions that produce value and to be diminished by actions that harm or extirpate values. Injustice destroys the natural causal chain by rewarding corrupt conduct and punishing virtuous conduct. The Randian view is that both those who receive just treatment and the individual bestowing that treatment profit from that practice. It follows that one should support and endorse qualities in other people that benefit himself and dissuade those attributes that are damaging to oneself. It is necessary to judge, evaluate, and act properly toward other people in order to attain one's values and flourishing (135-75).

 Integrity is loyalty in action to rational principles and to one's convictions and values. There should be no breach or dichotomy between one's thought and moral principles and his actions. Integrity is fundamental to attaining one's values and flourishing. Integrity requires a policy and the conscientious consistent practice of life promoting principles. Smith explains that Rand condemns some, but not all, forms of compromise. There is a difference between a compromise of moral principle and a compromise of the details of a situation falling under a moral principle. It follows that when a person voluntarily negotiates toward a final agreed-upon price, he is not compromising the principle of free trade (176-97).

Productiveness, the process of creating material values, is necessary for human survival. Such values should be created rather than being confiscated. Productive work is the process through which man's mind maintains his life. It is through productive work that man's consciousness controls his existence; it involves the adjustment of nature to man's requirements and the translation of ideas into physical form. All productive work requires a combination of mental and physical exertion in varying proportions depending upon the particular kind of work. Values in reality are made possible by the existence of knowledge. Although the mental aspect is primary, this does not imply that there is some type of separation from the physical realm. The product of one's work must acquire physical existence outside of one's consciousness. Existential values are made possible through the application of a person's knowledge.

Productive work is necessary for a man both materially and spiritually; according to Rand, it is the central purpose of a person's life. Productivity depends upon one's rationality and sustains a man's self-esteem and sense of identity. Productive work can act as the integrating central element of a person's life. As such, it can be viewed as both an end and as a means (198-220). 

Pride (i.e., moral ambitiousness) is the commitment to attain one's own moral perfection. Pride demonstrates the exercise of the other six Randian virtues and involves one's dedication to achieving the highest or best character state of which he is capable of attaining. Like Aristotle, Rand views pride as the “crown of the virtues.” Smith explains that pride involves one's commitment to rationality in thought and action, the systematic pursuit of achievement, life­-advancing actions, and the continual strengthening of one's character. Pride leads a person to the self-esteem that is necessary for human life. Moral perfection is essential for one's personal flourishing (221-46).

Rand and Aristotle

 The similarities between Rand and Aristotle are substantial. Both hold that ethics is grounded in a conception of human nature and that the good life consists in the fulfillment of that nature. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue; for Rand, happiness is the state of consciousness that proceeds from the achievement of one’s values. Both identify reason as the distinctive human capacity and the foundation of virtue. For Aristotle, the rational part of the soul is what distinguishes humans from other animals; for Rand, “reason is man’s basic means of survival”. Both conceive of virtue as a kind of excellence in functioning—the excellent exercise of one’s human capacities. As Smith notes, humans’ ultimate goal is “not only to maintain our lives, but to live well, which means excellent functioning, both physical and psychological”. Both maintain that the virtues are interconnected and that full virtue requires possession of all of them.

Despite these deep affinities, important differences separate Rand from Aristotle. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is the ultimate end, and virtues are traits that characteristically produce it. For Rand, “man’s life” qua rational being is the standard of value. This difference is subtle but significant: Rand’s standard is more explicitly biological and individualistic, whereas Aristotle’s is more social and contemplative. Aristotle’s ethics is thoroughly social; human beings are political animals who can only flourish in a polis. Rand’s ethics, by contrast, is radically individualistic. While she does not deny the value of social relationships, she insists that the individual’s own life is the ultimate standard and that others are to be valued only insofar as they are values to oneself. This is the most fundamental difference. Aristotle’s ethics is eudaimonist but not egoist in the strong sense; the good life involves friendship, justice, and contemplation of the divine. Rand’s ethics is unapologetically egoist: the moral purpose of life is one’s own happiness, and all virtues are justified by their service to self-interest. As Smith puts it, “egoistic rational principles ‘stem entirely from their practical service to self-interest’”. For Aristotle, happiness is an activity—the active exercise of virtue. For Rand, happiness is a consequence of virtuous action, a state of consciousness that results from the achievement of values. This difference has profound implications for the relationship between virtue and value, as we shall see.

Rand and Contemporary Virtue Ethics

 Rand’s ethics shares important features with contemporary virtue ethics, particularly in its emphasis on character, its rejection of act-centered moral theories, and its focus on human flourishing. Like contemporary virtue ethicists such as Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse,  Rand grounds ethics in a conception of natural human goodness and argues that virtue enable human flourishing. She shares with them a rejection of both consequentialist calculation and deontological rule-following in favor of a focus on the kind of person one should be and the kind of life one should live. However, Rand’s ethics differs from mainstream contemporary virtue ethics in several crucial respects. Contemporary virtue ethics is typically not egoist; it allows for genuine altruism and often emphasizes the social dimensions of virtue. Rand’s unapologetic ethical egoism sets her apart. As Smith observes, “contemporary virtue ethicists dance around the question of ethical egoism” precisely because egoism is “usually considered predatory, hedonistic, or subjectivist”. Contemporary virtue ethicists typically justify virtues by their contribution to eudaimonia, but they do not reduce virtue to self-interest. Rand, by contrast, explicitly justifies virtues by their service to self-interest: they are “the means by which one gains and/or keeps” values. Contemporary virtue ethics often includes virtues such as kindness, compassion, and generosity. Rand’s list is narrower and more focused on individual excellence. Rand’s metaethics is more foundationalist and more explicitly naturalistic than most contemporary virtue ethics. She seeks to derive moral norms from facts about human nature in a way that many contemporary virtue ethicists would find too ambitious.

 There are strong reasons to classify Rand as a virtue ethicist. Her ethics is “virtue-centered”; virtues are the central organizing concepts of her normative theory. She grounds ethics in a conception of human flourishing. She emphasizes character and the kind of person one should be. She rejects act-centered moral theories in favor of a focus on the agent. Moreover, Rand’s ethics shares the teleological structure of classical virtue ethics. Like Aristotle, she holds that ethics is about how one should live, and that the answer is determined by human nature. Like contemporary virtue ethicists, she argues that virtues enable human flourishing. However, there are also reasons to resist classifying Rand as a virtue ethicist in the strict sense. Her ethical egoism sets her apart from most virtue ethicists. Her explicit instrumentalism about virtue—the claim that virtue is the means to value—seems to conflict with the virtue ethicist’s claim that virtue is an intrinsic good.

 A defensible position is that Rand’s ethics is a distinctive form of virtue ethics—one that combines elements of eudaimonism and egoism, and in a unique synthesis. It is “virtue-centered” in its normative structure, but it is also egoist in its justification and teleological in its foundation. As Smith argues, Rand’s ethics is “a form of naturalistic eudaimonism, which shares some features with the Aristotelian virtue ethics of Hursthouse and Foot, but differs from them in its unapologetic ethical egoism”.

The Relationship Between Value and Virtue

 To understand the relationship between value and virtue in Rand’s ethics, we must begin with her definitions. Rand defines a value as “that which one acts to gain and/or keep” and a virtue as “the act by which one gains and/or keeps” a value. This definitional relationship is crucial: virtues are the means to values; values are the ends that virtues serve. A moral value is “an object (or thing) by means of which one promotes one’s life,” while a moral virtue is “an action (or choice) by means of which one does so”. Virtues “are the basic types of actions proper to the life of a rational being; thus, they are discovered and validated by reference to the nature and requirements of human life”.

 One interpretation of Rand’s ethics holds that virtues are merely instrumental to values. As Leonard Peikoff states, citing Rand, “morality is no more than a means to an end; it defines the causes we must enact if we are to attain a certain effect”. On this view, “virtue is (by definition) the means to value”. Virtue is “practical” in the sense that it “minimizes the risks inherent in life and maximizes the chance of success”. This interpretation treats virtue as purely instrumental to happiness—a necessary means but not itself an aspect of happiness. Virtue and happiness are conceptually independent; happiness is the end, and virtue is merely the means. However, this instrumental interpretation may be incomplete. Another interpretation is that virtue can be partly constitutive of happiness—both a means to happiness and partly an end in itself. On this view, “virtue is partly constitutive of happiness, such that happiness is partly defined in terms of virtue”.

 The most adequate interpretation may be that Randian virtues are both instrumental and constitutive. They are instrumental in that they are the means by which one gains and keeps values. They are constitutive in that the exercise of virtue is itself a form of value—a manifestation of the excellent functioning that constitutes human flourishing. This view avoids the false dichotomy between virtue as merely instrumental and virtue as wholly an end in itself. It allows us to say that virtues are means to the ultimate value of life while also recognizing that virtuous activity is itself part of the good life.

 Why Action Is Primary in Virtue

 For Rand, virtue is primarily a matter of action. She defines virtue as “the act by which one gains and/or keeps” a value. This definition is not accidental; it reflects a fundamental philosophical commitment. Virtues are not primarily dispositions or traits; they are actions—or, more precisely, patterns of action.

This action-primacy follows from Rand’s metaphysics and epistemology. Since values are things one acts to gain and keep, and virtues are the actions by which one does so, virtue is inherently action-oriented. One cannot be virtuous merely by having good intentions or admirable sentiments; one must act virtuously. 

The primacy of action in Rand’s virtue ethics has been recognized by scholars. Tara Smith has written on “The primacy of action in virtue,” arguing that virtues are fundamentally about what one does. This emphasis on action distinguishes Rand’s virtue ethics from more dispositional accounts that treat virtues primarily as character traits.

 The primacy of action reflects the practical orientation of Objectivist ethics. Morality is not a theoretical exercise but a practical science—a guide to living. As Rand puts it, the purpose of morality is to guide individuals to the achievement of their happiness. This purpose is achieved through action, not merely through contemplation or good intentions.

 The emphasis on action also reflects Rand’s view of human nature. Human beings are not born with fixed characters; they create their characters through their choices and actions. As Rand famously said, “Man is a being of self-made soul”. Character is not given; it is achieved through the consistent practice of virtue.

 Despite the primacy of action, the Objectivist virtues do have a dispositional dimension. A virtue is not just an isolated action but a pattern of acting. It is a characteristic way of responding to situations, a settled disposition to act in certain ways. This dispositional dimension is evident in Rand’s descriptions of the virtues. Honesty is not just telling the truth on a particular occasion but a commitment to refusing to fake reality. Justice is not just one fair judgment but a settled disposition to judge people objectively. Integrity is not just one act of loyalty to principle but a steadfast commitment to one’s convictions.

 However, Rand’s conception of character differs from the Aristotelian conception in important respects. For Aristotle, character is a stable disposition that is acquired through habituation; for Rand, character is something one chooses and achieves through the consistent exercise of one’s rational judgment. Rand rejects the notion that one is born with character or that character is simply a product of social conditioning. Instead, “through one’s choices and actions one acquires one’s character traits and habits”. Character is not a given but an achievement—the result of countless choices to act in accordance with reason or in defiance of it.

 The most adequate view is that Objectivist virtues are both actions and states of character—or rather, that they are states of character consisting in patterns of action. A virtue is a settled disposition to act in certain ways, but that disposition is realized in and through action. There is no virtue apart from virtuous action; there is no character apart from the choices that constitute it. This integration of action and character reflects Rand’s broader philosophical commitments. Since existence is primary and consciousness is relational, character is not a separate entity but a pattern of behavior. The virtuous person is not someone who has virtue as a possession but someone who acts virtuously consistently. As Rand might put it, virtue is not a state one is in but a way one lives.

Conclusion

 Ayn Rand’s Objectivist virtue ethics presents a distinctive synthesis of Aristotelian eudaimonism, rational egoism, and action-centered morality. Her ethics shares with Aristotle a teleological naturalism, a conception of virtue as excellence in functioning, and the primacy of reason. Yet it departs from Aristotle in its radical individualism, its unapologetic ethical egoism, and its more explicit instrumentalism about the relationship between virtue and value.

 The relationship between virtue and value in Rand’s ethics is complex. While virtues are instrumentally related to values—they are the means by which one gains and keeps values—they may also be constitutively related to the ultimate value of happiness. Virtuous activity is not merely a means to happiness but is itself an expression of the excellent functioning that constitutes human flourishing.

 Rand can legitimately be classified as a virtue ethicist, though of a distinctive kind. Her ethics is virtue-centered in its normative structure, eudaimonist in its teleology, and egoist in its justification. The primacy of action in her virtue ethics reflects her practical orientation and her view that character is achieved through choice and action. The Objectivist virtues can be viewed as states of character, but only insofar as character is understood as a pattern of action rather than a static possession.

 Ultimately, Rand’s virtue ethics offers a challenging and coherent vision of the moral life—one that insists on the primacy of the individual, the centrality of reason, and the practical nature of virtue. Whether one accepts or rejects her conclusions, her contribution to the virtue ethics tradition deserves serious philosophical engagement.

Notes

 

The first half of this essay was previously published in Le Québécois Libre on March 15, 2009.

¹ For rival explanations of virtue ethics, see Annas 1998; Crisp and Slote 1997; Darwall 2002; Foot 1978; 2001; Gaut 1997; Hunt 1997; Hursthouse 1999; Korsgaard 1996; MacIntyre 1997; McDowell 1978; Slote 1992; 1995; Swanton 1995; Wallace 1978; and Zagzebski 1996. 

References 

Annas, Julia. 1998. Virtue and eudaimonism. Social Philosophy and Policy 15, no. 1 (Winter): 37-55.

Anscombe, G.E.M. 1958. Modern Moral Philosophy. Philosophy 33: 1-19.

Crisp, R. and M. Slore, eds. Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Darwall, Stephen L., ed. 2002. Virtue Ethics. Boston: Blackwell Publishing Limited.

Foot, Philippa. 1978. Virtues and Vices. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Gaut, Berys. 1998. The structure of practical reason. In Ethics and Practical Reason, edited by Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 161-88.

Gotthelf, A. and Lennox, J. G. (eds. 2010). Metaethics, Egoism, and Virtue: Studies in Ayn Rand’s Normative Theory, University of Pittsbirg Press.

Hunt, Lester H. 1997. Character and Culture. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.

Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1999. On Virtue Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.

Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1997. The nature of the virtues. In Virtue Ethics, edited by Roger Crisp and Michael Slate. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 118-40.

McDowell,John. 1978. Virtue and reason. Monist 62: 331-50.

Peikoff, Leonard. 1991. Objectivism; The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. Dutton.

Rand, Ayn. 1957. Atlas Shrugged. New York: Random House.

———. 1964. The Virtue of Selfishness. New York: New American Library.

———. [1966-67] 1990. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. Expanded second edition. Edited by Harry Binswanger and Leonard Peikoff. New York: Meridian.

———. 1967. Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal. New York: New American Library.

Slote, Michael. 1992. From Morality to Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press.

 ———. 1995. From Morality to Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, Tara. 2006. Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Swanton, C. 1995. Profiles of the Virtues. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76: 47-72.

Wallace, James D. 1978. Virtues and Vices. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Zagzebski, L. 1996. Virtues of the Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.

 

Other essays by Ed Younkins on this site:

Younkins, Edward W. “What Contribution did David L. Norton Make to our Understanding of Ethical Individualism?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 18, 2025.

----------------------------“How can dialectics help us to defend liberty?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 8, 2025.

---------------------------“How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. October 2, 2025.

----------------------------- “Can Polarized Moral Politics be Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. December 13, 2025.

----------------------------- “Does Humanomics Need a Moral Anchor?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 22, 2026.

----------------------------- “Is Character Education Compatible With Individualistic Perfectionism?” Freedom and Flourishing. February 27, 2026.

 ----------------------------- “Are Spontaneous Order and neo-Aristotelian Arguments for a Free Society Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing. March 19, 2026.

----------------------------- “Are Spinoza’s Philosophy and Neo-Aristotelian Philosophies of Freedom and Flourishing Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing. June 4, 2026. 

----------------------------- “The Architecture of Freedom: Randy Barnett’s Natural Law Case for a Free Society” Freedom and Flourishing. June 26, 2026.

----------------------------- “Robust Political Economy and Neo-Aristotelianism: Complementary Visions of Freedom and Flourishing” Freedom and Flourishing. July 10, 2026.

 

Did the Enlighteners Reject Aristotle?

 

In his book, The Enlightenment: The Pursuit of Happiness 1680-1790, Ritchie Robertson uses the term “Enlighteners” to describe the proponents of the Enlightenment. I will briefly describe Robertson’s book before explaining how my reading of it has caused me to consider the question posed above.

 

The Enlightenment is monumental in terms of its discussion of the contributions of numerous Enlighteners and its detailed coverage of topics including science, religion, ethics, government, philosophy and revolution, as well as its length (983 pages, including references and index). The author has done well to make his tome interesting to read.

Robertson has a positive attitude toward the Enlighteners. He suggests that “the Enlightenment stands for the endeavours of thinkers, writers and practical administrators in many countries to increase the well-being of humanity”. In the Preface, he attempts to summarise what the Enlighteners sought to do:

“For them, to enlighten humanity is to clear away the false beliefs which have blinded people to their own interests; to oppose the power of institutions, especially the organized Churches, which have encouraged such blindness; to arrive at a true understanding of human nature, and of the political and economic societies in which people live; to increase people’s well-being and happiness; and to do so by close attention to empirical facts and the use of reason.”

In his concluding chapter, Robertson notes that critics of the Enlightenment sometimes refer to it as ‘the Enlightenment project” to imply that it can be reduced to a single model that is responsible for all the ills of modernity. The author aimed to provide a “fine-grained” presentation of “a rich and complex historical period, and a diverse body of thought”. Despite the criticism I offer below, I believe that Robertson has achieved that objective.

 Robertson’s book has been the subject of several extensive reviews since its first publication in 2020. Rather than attempting to provide a comprehensive review of The Enlightenment, I refer readers to a review by Gary Saul Morson entitled “Daring to Know” (Morson, 2021).

What prompted my question?

Chapter 1, entitled “Happiness, Reason and Passion”, opens with the following sentence:

“The Enlightenment declared the conviction that the goal of life was happiness, and that if this goal could be attained at all, it was to be found in the here and now.”

As I read that, the thought crossed my mind that Aristotle got there first. A few pages later, I thought the author was about to acknowledge the debt that the Enlighteners owed to Aristotle when he writes:

“The belief that the purpose of human life is the attainment of happiness is called ‘eudaemonism’.”

However, Aristotle doesn’t rate a mention. Instead, attention is focused on Epicurus, the bad odour that had surrounded that philosopher during the Middle Ages and the caution his admirers needed to display during that period.

I accept that there are grounds to argue that the beliefs that most Enlighteners had about happiness may have been closer to those of Epicurus than to those of Aristotle. As Darrin McMahon has observed, most Enlightenment thinkers tended to put greater emphasis on pleasure and good feeling than did Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics (McMahon, 2005, p.209).

Nevertheless, when I was reading Robertson’s book I expected that he would have mentioned Aristotle in his discussion of the Enlighteners’ views on happiness. Does that make me guilty of presentism – a tendency to see the past from a present day perspective?

From a present day perspective, it is not difficult to consider Aristotle’s views on their merits, disentangling them from the religious dogma of the Middle Ages. Perhaps it was more difficult for the Enlighteners to do that.

Did the Enlighteners reject Aristotle? That is a big question. I will confine myself to considering three relevant aspects:

 Did the Scientific Revolution discredit Aristotle?

Did any of the Enlighteners see merit in Aristotle’s views?

Would it make sense to view any of the influential Enlighteners as Neo-Aristotelians?

The Scientific Revolution

Francis Bacon and Galileo Galilei played major roles in the Scientific Revolution which preceded the Enlightenment.

Robertson notes that Bacon “rejected the empty abstractions of scholastics who immersed themselves in Aristotle and ignored the world around them”. He also notes: “Bacon’s dismissal of Aristotelian abstractions was supported by such hands-on experimenters as Robert Boyle.”

Although Robertson discusses Galileo’s contributions, he doesn’t mention his view of Aristotle. John Sellars has pointed out that although Galileo mocked those who adhered slavishly to the letter of Aristotle’s works regardless of what new evidence might be presented, he suggested that “if Aristotle were now alive, he would change his opinion”. Aristotle would not have held on to beliefs that conflicted with new evidence. Sellars notes that Jacopo Zabarella and Alessandro Piccolomini had previously suggested that a true Aristotelian would embrace Aristotle’s spirit of inquiry. Piccolomini asserted that he would rely first and foremost on experience and observation, even if that meant disagreeing with Aristotle from time to time (Sellars, 2023, pp. 106-7).

If the Enlighteners felt inclined, it was possible for them to discuss Aristotle without being seen to endorse everything he wrote.

Enlighteners who saw merit in Aristotle’s views

Francis Hutcheson and Adam Smith saw some merit in Aristotle’s views.

Hutcheson was one of the most influential figures of the Scottish Enlightenment. Robertson notes that a central point in Hutcheson’s moral philosophy was that moral goodness denotes “a quality in actions which makes us approve the action, and love the actor, even though it does not serve our advantage”. By suggesting that humans possess a moral sense, Hutcheson was differing from the view of Epicureans that humans are motivated only to avoid pain and seek pleasure.

In developing his own philosophy, Hutcheson referred to Aristotle’s view of happiness:

“Thus according to the just observation of Aristotle, “The chief happiness of active beings must arise from action; and that not from action of every sort, but from that sort to which their nature is adapted, and which is recommended by nature.” When we gratify the bodily appetites, there is an immediate sense of pleasure, such as the brutes enjoy, but no further satisfaction; no sense of dignity upon reflection, no good-liking of others for their being thus employed. There is an exercise of some other bodily powers which seems more manly and graceful. There is a manifest gradation; some fine tastes in the ingenious arts are still more agreeable; the exercise is delightful; the works are pleasant to the spectator, and reputable to the artist. The exercise of the higher powers of the understanding, in discovery of truth, and just reasoning, is more esteemable, when the subjects are important. But the noblest of all are the virtuous affections and actions, the objects of the moral sense” (Hutcheson, 1755, Ch.ii).

In A System of Moral Philosophy, Hutcheson made many favourable references to Aristotle. The main point on which he expressed opposition was in respect of Aristotle’s view that some people are “natural” slaves.

Adam Smith considered the views of Aristotle, along with those of Plato, Zeno and Epicurus, in Theory of Moral Sentiments. His discussion of Aristotle’s moral philosophy is respectful of the idea that virtue is a middle state between extremes of excess and deficiency. One example he cites is that magnanimity lies between “the excess of arrogance and the defect of pusillanimity, of which the one consists in too extravagant, the other in too weak a sentiment of our own worth and dignity”. Smith goes on to note Aristotle’s emphasis on the development of good habits (Smith, 1984/1759, VII.ii.1, para.11-14).

Smith suggested that the moral philosophy of Epicurus “is, no doubt, altogether inconsistent” with that which he had been endeavouring to establish” (Smith, 1984/1759, VII.ii.1.2. para.13). He noted that for Epicurus virtue was only to be pursued to prevent pain and to procure ease and pleasure. By contrast, Plato, Aristotle and Zeno had a different view:

“Man, they thought, being born for action, his happiness must consist, not merely in the agreeableness of his passive sensations, but also in the propriety of his active exertions” (Smith, 1984/1759, VII.ii.1.2. para.17).

Immanuel Kant was another Enlightenment philosopher who saw merit in some of Aristotle’s views. In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant said formal logic had not been able to advance a single step since Aristotle established it, “and, thus, to all appearance has reached its completion” (Kant, 1787). The field of formal logic is somewhat removed from happiness and virtue ethics, but it is worth noting that Kant treats Aristotle as having essentially perfected an entire field of inquiry.

Neo-Aristotelian Enlighteners?

It is probably fair to say that few of the influential Enlightenment philosophers would have been comfortable being labelled as Aristotelians. When we look at the writings of some of them through modern eyes, however, the influence of Aristotle seems striking. Aristotelian ideas about human flourishing as reason-guided and connected to human nature seems to have been thoroughly absorbed into the natural law tradition (partly through Aquinas and the scholastics) that some Enlighteners could apparently express an Aristotelian viewpoint without feeling any need to invoke Aristotle by name.

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) is one of the main characters in Robertson’s book. Unfortunately, however, Robertson doesn’t draw out the parallels between the viewpoints of Aristotle and Herder.

Herder’s philosophy of history has an Aristotelian flavor because it was founded on the study of human nature. Herder’s concept of humanität – the goal toward which individuals are striving – seems to have a lot in common with Aristotle’s concept of ergon, and the idea that exercising reason and virtue defines what it means to be a human. Herder treats reason and humanity's distinctive powers as central to human flourishing.

In Herder's view, each culture has its own centre and specific form of happiness within itself - a conception of happiness as the actualisation of a being's specific nature and capacities, which is structurally very close to Aristotle's eudaimonia. In that respect, Herder’s account seems similar to that of modern Neo-Aristotelian classical liberals who emphasize that individuals may flourish in different ways in different communities and cultures.

I am indebted to Robertson for also bringing Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui (1694-1748) to my attention. Burlamaqui was a Genevan legal and political theorist. The passage in the epigraph at the beginning of this essay is taken from his book, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law. The longer quote from that book below serves to illustrate that it might be appropriate to view him as a Neo-Aristotelian Enlightener - his views certainly have much in common with those of some modern Neo-Aristotelians:  

“Happiness is that internal satisfaction of the soul which arises from the possession of good; good is whatever is agreeable to man for his preservation, perfection, entertainment, and pleasure. Evil is the opposite of good.

Man incessantly experiences, that there are some things convenient, and others inconvenient to him; that the former are not all equally convenient, but some more than others; in fine, that this conveniency depends, for the most part, on the use he knows how to make of things, and that the same thing which may suit him, using it after a certain manner and measure, becomes unsuitable when this use exceeds its limits. It is only therefore by investigating the nature of things, as also the relations they have between themselves and with us, that we are capable of discovering their fitness or disagreement with our felicity, of discerning good from evil, of ranging every thing in its proper order, of setting a right value upon each, and of regulating consequently our researches and desires.

But is there any other method of acquiring this discernment, but by forming just ideas of things and their relations, and by deducing from these first ideas the consequences that flow from thence by exact and close argumentations? Now it is reason alone that directs all these operations. Yet this is not all: for as in order to arrive at happiness, it is not sufficient to form just ideas of the nature and state of things, but it is also necessary that the will should be directed by those ideas and judgments in the series of our conduct; so it is certain, that nothing but reason can communicate and support in man the necessary strength for making a right use of liberty, and for determining in all cases according to the light of his understanding, in spite of all the impressions and motions that may lead him to a contrary pursuit.

Reason is therefore the only means, in every respect, that man has left to attain to happiness, and the principal end for which he has received it” (Burlamaqui,2006 /1763, Ch.V). 

Robertson notes that Burlamaqui’s book was a prescribed text at Harvard and Princeton universities and “helped to shape the minds of many later protagonists of the American Revolution”. He suggests that the influence of Burlamaqui’s views might help account for presence of the right to pursue happiness in the American Declaration of Independence.

I concluded a previous essay entitled,‘Why did the US Declaration of Independence specify an unalienable right to the pursuit of happiness?’ by suggesting that, in the American colonies at the time of the Declaration, pursuit of happiness “was widely perceived in terms that have a great deal in common with the activity of human flourishing, as perceived by Aristotle and his followers”.

Unfortunately, while drawing attention to Burlamaqui's influence on Jefferson's "pursuit of happiness", Robertson fails to point out that Burlamaqui's conception of happiness is thoroughly Aristotelian in structure. 

Conclusion

While reading Ritchie Robertson’s tome, The Enlightenment: The Pursuit of Happiness 1680-1790, I was struck by the absence of any reference to Aristotle in the author’s discussion of eudaimonia. That made me wonder whether I was guilty of presentism - perhaps I was reading the Enlightenment through modern eyes shaped by a renewed interest in Aristotelian ethics. On reflection, I do not think that charge holds. The resources for separating Aristotle from scholastic dogma were available to the Enlighteners themselves. Zabarella, Piccolomini and Galileo had already articulated the distinction between the letter and the spirit of Aristotle's work before the Enlightenment properly began. It was open to any serious thinker of the period to engage with Aristotle on his merits.

Did the Enlighteners reject Aristotle? Some prominent Enlighteners were explicitly opposed to Aristotle - Locke's version of the blank slate idea, Hume's empiricist scepticism, and Bentham's utilitarian calculus all represent deliberate departures from Aristotelian foundations. But as this essay has tried to show, that is far from the whole story. Hutcheson and Smith engaged respectfully and substantively with Aristotle's ethics. Kant credited him with having essentially completed an entire field of inquiry. And figures like Herder and Burlamaqui reproduced recognizably Aristotelian structures of thought about happiness and human flourishing, apparently without feeling the need to acknowledge the debt.

That last point is perhaps the most interesting one. Robertson himself draws attention to Burlamaqui's influence on Jefferson's "pursuit of happiness," yet does not notice that Burlamaqui's account of happiness - reason as the indispensable guide to the good life, directed toward the perfection of human nature - is thoroughly Aristotelian in character. A more Aristotle-aware reading of the Enlightenment would not diminish Robertson's achievement in mapping a rich and complex period. It would, however, complicate the familiar narrative in which the Enlightenment broke cleanly from ancient authority. The pursuit of happiness that Robertson places at the heart of the Enlightenment had stronger Aristotelian roots than he acknowledges.

References

Burlamaqui, Jean-Jacques, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, trans. Thomas Nugent, ed. and with an Introduction by Peter Korkman (Liberty Fund, 2006/1763).

Hutcheson, Francis, A System of Moral Philosophy, Edited and with an Introduction by Knud Haakonssen and Christian Maurer (Liberty Fund, first published posthumously in 1755).

Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn (Project Gutenberg Ebook,1787).

McMahon, Darrin M., Happiness: A History (Grove Press, 2006).

Morson, Gary Saul, “Daring to Know” (Claremont Review of Books, Fall 2021).

Robertson, Ritchie, The Enlightenment: The Pursuit of Happiness 1680-1790 (Penguin Books, 2022).

Sellars, John, Aristotle: Understanding the World’s Greatest Philosopher (Penguin Books, 2023).

Smith, Adam, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (Liberty Fund, 1984/1759).

Robust Political Economy and Neo-Aristotelianism: Complementary Visions of Freedom and Flourishing

 This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other publications, including several published on this site. (Please see the list after the end of this essay.) 

 

Introduction

 Mark Pennington’s Robust Political Economy: Classical Liberalism and the Future of Public Policy (2011) is an ambitious and systematic defense of classical liberalism. The author seeks to provide a comprehensive analytical framework for evaluating political and economic institutions according to their ability to withstand the twin human frailties of limited rationality and limited benevolence. Drawing upon insights from F.A. Hayek, James M. Buchanan, and the broader public choice and Austrian traditions, Pennington constructs a case for classical liberal institutions—private property, the rule of law, competitive markets, and a minimal state—against the three major challenges that have been mounted against them: market-failure economics, communitarianism, and egalitarian social justice. Pennington complements Hayek’s epistemic critique with the motivational critique from public choice theory. Even if governments had perfect information, they would still face: (1) Rent-seeking: Interest groups lobbying for privileges. (2) Bureaucratic incentives: Agencies maximizing budgets rather than serving the public. (3) Political myopia: Politicians prioritizing short-term electoral gains over long-term welfare.

 Pennington's framework rests on a foundation that is predominantly epistemic and evolutionary. He grounds liberty in cultural evolution and the cognitive limits of human beings, arguing that classical liberalism is superior because it copes better with our ignorance and self-interest. What Pennington does not provide, and what his framework implicitly requires, is a robust moral underpinning: a philosophical grounding that tells us why liberty matters, what human beings are for, and what constitutes a well-lived life. This is precisely what the neo-Aristotelian tradition, as articulated in Ayn Rand's Objectivism and Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl's Individualistic Perfectionism, supplies.

 This essay argues that Pennington's robust political economy and neo-Aristotelian perfectionism are complementary. Pennington shows how social cooperation emerges from individuals choosing under specific institutional arrangements; the neo-Aristotelians show what makes those choices meaningful and why the institutional arrangements that facilitate individual flourishing are morally required. Together, they form a powerful framework that addresses different but interconnected aspects of the human condition: the epistemic-institutional and the ethical-teleological. 

The Core Framework: Knowledge and Incentive Problems

 Pennington's central innovation is the concept of "robustness" as applied to political economy. An institution is robust if it can withstand the stresses and strains wrought by human imperfections. Pennington identifies two fundamental human imperfections that any viable political-economic order must confront. The first is the knowledge problem: human beings possess limited cognitive capabilities, operate under conditions of uncertainty, and possess imperfect information. The second is the incentive problem: human beings possess limited benevolence, are usually self-interested, and tend to act opportunistically. Any serious evaluation of institutions must ask: how well do they cope with these realities?

 Pennington's approach represents a deliberate departure from the idealized theorizing that dominates much of mainstream economics and political philosophy. Critics of classical liberalism, he argues, have long maintained that competitive market arrangements and minimal state frameworks could only work effectively under highly idealized conditions. Market-failure economists assume the benchmark of full-information, perfect competition, and complete means-ends rationality. Communitarians and egalitarians assume levels of public-spiritedness and deliberative capacity that are simply not present in real human populations. What Pennington shows is that these critiques are asymmetrical: they hold markets to ideal standards while assuming away the same problems for their preferred alternatives. A truly robust argument must explain how any proposed institutional model will perform under real-world conditions of ignorance and self-interest.

 When these comparisons are made with appropriate symmetry, Pennington contends, classical liberal institutions emerge as more robust than their rivals. Competitive markets facilitate a process of trial-and-error learning that minimizes the consequences of any particular error. If decision-making is dispersed across many agents, mistakes are localized and corrigible; if it is centralized, mistakes are amplified and difficult to reverse. Similarly, the capacity for exit—the ability of individuals to withdraw from relationships with providers of goods and services—provides a disciplinary check on potentially predatory behavior. Where voice (democratic participation) is the only option, individuals are captive to collective decisions; where exit is available, they can vote with their feet.

Responding to the Three Challenges

 Pennington systematically applies his robust political economy framework to three major challenges confronting classical liberalism.

 Market Failure Economics: The neoclassical case for government intervention rests on the identification of market failures—externalities, public goods, monopoly power, and information asymmetries—that supposedly justify corrective state action. Pennington argues that this approach suffers from a fatal asymmetry. It assumes that government actors possess the knowledge and incentives to correct market failures effectively, while ignoring the knowledge and incentive problems that afflict political decision-making. Government regulators face the same cognitive limitations as market participants, and they face additional incentive problems: they are not subject to the profit-and-loss test that disciplines private actors, and they are susceptible to capture by concentrated interests. A robust political economy must compare real markets with real governments, not idealized markets with idealized governments.

 Communitarianism and Deliberative Democracy: Communitarians argue that markets undermine social solidarity, civic virtue, and the conditions for meaningful democratic deliberation. They propose dialogic and deliberative democratic processes as alternatives to market exchange. Pennington responds by pointing to the knowledge and incentive problems that afflict deliberative institutions. Participants possess limited information, conflicting values, and unequal influence. Deliberative democracy assumes that participants can engage in rational, public-spirited dialogue aimed at discovering the common good. But real political deliberation is characterized by strategic behavior, interest-group politics, and the inherent difficulty of aggregating dispersed knowledge. The principle of exit, by contrast, allows individuals to signal their preferences through voluntary choice rather than forcing them to persuade others or be bound by collective decisions. Markets, far from destroying social capital, generate spontaneous cooperation among strangers through the mechanism of voluntary exchange.

 Egalitarianism and Social Justice: Egalitarian critics argue that markets produce unjust inequalities and that the state must redistribute resources to achieve social justice. Pennington argues that the welfare state's social goals cannot be attained by its proposed means. Redistributive programs face severe knowledge problems: central planners cannot know the diverse preferences, circumstances, and trade-offs facing millions of individuals. They also face severe incentive problems: taxes and transfers create disincentives for productive activity and encourage rent-seeking. Moreover, the attempt to achieve distributive justice through political processes generates its own forms of inequality (political inequality), where some groups capture the state apparatus for their own benefit. A classical liberal framework, with its emphasis on private property, rule of law, and competitive markets, is more robust in generating widespread prosperity and enabling individuals to pursue their own conceptions of the good. A robust political economy evaluates social justice proposals according to their actual consequences rather than their stated intentions.

Exit versus Voice

 

One of the book’s most distinctive themes is the superiority of exit over voice. Many democratic theorists emphasize “voice,” meaning participation in collective decision-making. They argue that citizens should shape public policies through deliberation and democratic discussion. Pennington does not reject democratic participation entirely. However, he argues that the ability to exit unsatisfactory arrangements is often more effective than political voice. In markets, consumers can choose alternative suppliers. Workers can seek different employers. Individuals can form new organizations. Entrepreneurs can introduce innovative alternatives. Exit generates powerful feedback mechanisms. Organizations that fail to satisfy people lose customers, members, or resources.

 

Political systems rely primarily upon voice. Yet, voting provides weak and indirect feedback. Individual votes rarely affect outcomes, and dissatisfied citizens often cannot escape policies imposed upon them. Voice is a majoritarian, zero-sum game. The freedom to exit therefore frequently produces greater responsiveness and adaptability than collective decision-making alone. 

Policy Applications

In the second part of the book, Pennington applies his framework to three concrete policy domains: poverty relief, international development, and environmental protection.

 On poverty, Pennington argues that the welfare state's approach to poverty relief—redistributive transfers and publicly provided services—is undermined by the knowledge and incentive problems that plague centralized provision. The traditional welfare state exacerbates poverty by destroying the informational signals and incentives necessary for social mobility. By providing monopolized, tax-funded services, the state crowds out mutual-aid societies, charities, and private low-cost providers who are culturally and geographically closer to the problems.  A classical liberal approach, emphasizing economic growth, property rights, and competitive provision of services, is more robust in generating the conditions for lasting poverty reduction.

 On international development, Pennington challenges the global governance paradigm that dominates development policy. The top-down, aid-based approach favored by international institutions suffers from the same knowledge and incentive problems that afflict domestic welfare states. This approach fails because it ignores local knowledge and incentives, fuels corruption, and props up predatory regimes in developing nations, Development, Pennington argues, is more likely to emerge from spontaneous processes of institutional adaptation, competitive experimentation, and the protection of property rights. True development is an evolutionary, bottom-up process requiring secure property rights, the rule of law, and free trade thus permitting local entrepreneurs to experiment, integrate into global value chains, and discover their own comparative advantages.

 On environmental protection, Pennington challenges the assumption that environmental problems require centralized regulatory solutions. He argues that private property rights, market mechanisms, and common-law remedies can address environmental challenges more robustly than centralized command-and-control regulation, because they harness dispersed knowledge and align incentives with ecological stewardship. Pennington calls for  a “free-market environmentalist” framework where property rights can be extended to land, water basins, and wildlife, giving private owners a financial incentive to preserve resources for the future. Decentralized tort law and liability rules are more robust than centralized command-and-control regulations because they allow local courts to evaluate specific harms based on local evidence rather than imposing rigid national standards.

The Missing Moral Anchor

 Pennington's robust political economy is a remarkable achievement in comparative institutional analysis. Yet, it suffers from a significant deficiency: it lacks a substantive moral foundation. Pennington grounds his defense of classical liberalism in epistemic humility and institutional pragmatism. Liberty is valuable because it works better—it is more robust in coping with our cognitive limitations and moral imperfections. But this leaves unanswered a series of deeper questions.

 Why is robustness valuable? For what are institutions robust? If the goal is merely the survival of the system or the maximization of material output, robustness might be instrumentally valuable. But Pennington's framework does not tell us what human beings are for, what constitutes a flourishing human life, or why liberty is not merely instrumentally but intrinsically valuable. The framework is, in this sense, incomplete. It tells us that classical liberal institutions are the best means to some unspecified end, but it does not articulate the end itself. Pennington's framework provides a powerful case for liberty as a practical matter, but it does not provide a case for liberty as a moral imperative.

The neo-Aristotelian Alternative

 The neo-Aristotelian tradition supplies the moral anchor that Pennington's framework lacks. This tradition, as articulated in Ayn Rand's Objectivism and in the work of Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, places moral agency and human flourishing at the center of inquiry.

 Ayn Rand's Objectivism: Rand's philosophy offers a systematic ethical framework grounded in the nature of human beings as living organisms whose survival and flourishing depend on the exercise of reason and the pursuit of productive achievement. For Rand, the fundamental moral question is: what does human life require? The answer is a morality of rational self-interest, in which the individual's own life and flourishing are the ultimate standard of value. Freedom—the absence of physical coercion from others—is the necessary condition for the exercise of reason and the pursuit of productive achievement. Rand's Objectivism provides a normative foundation for liberty that complements the epistemic and institutional arguments of robust political economy.

 Rasmussen and Den Uyl's Individualistic Perfectionism is a neo-Aristotelian ethical framework that identifies the good for human beings with the development or flourishing of natural human capacities. Unlike traditional perfectionist theories, which often lead to statist conclusions, Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that individualistic perfectionism supports a liberal, non-perfectionist political theory. The key insight is that the flourishing of individuals is self-directed: each person must discover and pursue their own flourishing through their own choices and actions. The political order's role is not to dictate what flourishing consists in, but to establish the conditions—private property, rule of law, freedom of association—under which individuals can pursue their own flourishing in their own way. This is the institutional framework that Pennington's robust political economy defends, but Rasmussen and Den Uyl provide the ethical justification that Pennington's framework lacks.

Complementarity

 The complementarity between Pennington's robust political economy and neo-Aristotelian perfectionism is striking. They address different but interconnected aspects of the human condition.

 Pennington's framework addresses the epistemic-institutional dimension. It asks: given that human beings are cognitively limited and morally imperfect, what institutional arrangements best enable them to coordinate their activities, generate knowledge, and produce prosperity? The answer is classical liberalism: private property, competitive markets, rule of law, and a minimal state. Pennington shows how these institutions work—how they harness dispersed knowledge, align incentives, enable trial-and-error learning, and provide for peaceful cooperation among strangers.

 The neo-Aristotelian tradition addresses the ethical-teleological dimension. It asks: what is human flourishing, and what does it require? The answer is that human flourishing consists in the exercise of reason, the pursuit of productive achievement, and the development of one's capacities through self-directed action. Freedom is not merely instrumentally valuable as a means to prosperity; it is valuable as the condition for the exercise of moral agency. The neo-Aristotelians show why liberty matters—why it is not merely a useful institutional arrangement but a moral imperative grounded in the nature of human beings.

 The two approaches are not competitors; they are complements. Pennington shows that classical liberal institutions are the means to human flourishing—that they are the most robust way of organizing social cooperation given human limitations. The neo-Aristotelians show that human flourishing is the end that these institutions serve—that liberty is valuable because it enables individuals to live well. Together, they provide a complete framework: a defense of liberty that is both institutionally grounded and morally anchored.

A Powerful Interdisciplinary Vision

 The integration of robust political economy and neo-Aristotelian perfectionism offers a powerful vision. It combines insights from economics, political science, philosophy, and ethics into a coherent framework for understanding and defending a free society. From economics, it draws on Austrian market-process theory and public-choice theory to understand how markets generate and transmit knowledge, how incentives shape behavior, and how institutions channel self-interest into socially beneficial outcomes. From political science, it draws on comparative institutional analysis to evaluate how different regime types perform under real-world conditions of imperfect knowledge and imperfect incentives. From philosophy, it draws on the neo-Aristotelian tradition to articulate a conception of human flourishing, to ground liberty in the nature of human beings, and to provide a moral justification for classical liberal institutions. From ethics, it draws on the tradition of individualistic perfectionism to explain why freedom is not merely instrumentally but ethically valuable, and why the political order should be oriented toward enabling individuals to pursue their own flourishing.

 This interdisciplinary vision addresses the full range of questions that a complete political philosophy must answer. It answers the institutional question: what arrangements best enable human cooperation? It answers the epistemic question: how do we know what works? It answers the ethical question: what is human flourishing, and what does it require? And it answers the political question: what should the state do, and what should it leave to individuals?

 Moral Agency

 One of the most powerful points of connection between Pennington's framework and the neo-Aristotelian tradition is their shared emphasis on the individual as a choosing agent. Pennington shows how social cooperation emerges from individuals choosing under specific institutional arrangements. Markets are not mechanisms that produce outcomes independently of human choice; they are frameworks within which millions of individuals make choices, learn from their mistakes, and coordinate their activities through voluntary exchange. The capacity for exit—the ability to choose among alternative providers, employers, and communities—is central to the robustness of classical liberal institutions. Choice is not an afterthought in Pennington's framework; it is the engine of the entire system.

 The neo-Aristotelians deepen this insight by explaining what makes choice meaningful. They identify the good for human beings with the development or flourishing of natural human capacities. But this flourishing cannot be imposed from above; it must be achieved through the individual's own choices and actions. Each person must discover what constitutes flourishing for them, pursue it through their own efforts, and take responsibility for their own life. The political order's role is to establish the conditions under which this self-directed pursuit of flourishing is possible. This is the role that Pennington assigns to classical liberal institutions: they provide the framework within which individuals can make choices, learn from their mistakes, and pursue their own conception of the good.

 The complementarity here is profound. Pennington provides the institutional analysis of how choice works under different arrangements; the neo-Aristotelians provide the ethical analysis of why choice matters and what it is for. Together, they offer a vision of human beings as moral agents whose capacity for self-directed flourishing is both the foundation and the purpose of a free society.

Conclusion

 Mark Pennington's Robust Political Economy is an important contribution to classical liberal thought. It provides a systematic, rigorous, and empirically grounded defense of classical liberal institutions against the major challenges of contemporary political economy. By focusing on robustness—the ability of institutions to cope with limited rationality and limited benevolence—Pennington shows that classical liberalism is not a utopian ideal but a practical necessity. It is the political-economic framework that best enables human beings to cooperate, learn, and prosper despite their cognitive limitations and moral imperfections.

Yet, Pennington's framework is incomplete. It lacks a moral anchor—a philosophical grounding that tells us why liberty matters, what human flourishing consists in, and why the institutions Pennington defends are not merely useful but morally required. This is where the neo-Aristotelian tradition supplies what is missing. The neo-Aristotelians restore moral agency and human flourishing to the center of inquiry. They provide the ethical foundation that Pennington's epistemic and institutional arguments require.

 Together, robust political economy and neo-Aristotelian perfectionism form a powerful framework. Pennington shows how classical liberal institutions work and why they are the most robust means of organizing social cooperation. The neo-Aristotelians show what human flourishing consists in and why liberty is the necessary condition for its pursuit. The first addresses the institutional-epistemic dimension of the human condition; the second addresses the ethical-teleological dimension. They are not competitors but complements, each supplying what the other lacks.

 The vision that emerges from this integration is one of human beings as choosing agents, capable of reason and self-directed action, whose flourishing depends on the freedom to pursue their own conception of the good within a framework of private property, rule of law, and competitive markets. It is a vision that is both realistic and aspirational—realistic in its acknowledgment of human limitations, aspirational in its affirmation of human potential. It is a vision that deserves the attention of anyone who seeks to understand and defend a free society.

References

 Buchanan, James M. and Tullock, Gordon. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Den Uyl, Douglas J.  and Rasmussen, Douglas B. 2016. The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hayek, F.A. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 

Hayek, F.A. The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. 1988. Edited by W.W. Bartley III, Chicago :University of Chicago Press.

 Pennington, Mark. 2011. Robust Political Economy: Classical Liberalism and the Future of Public Policy. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

 Pennington, Mark. "Robust Political Economy Revisited: Response to Critics." Critical Review 28, no. 3-4 (2016).

 Pennington, Mark. "Robust Political Economy." Policy 27, no. 4 (Summer 2011-12): 3-9.

 Rand, Ayn. The Virtue of Selfishness. New York: New American Library, 1964.

 Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl, Douglas J. 2005. Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State Universitty Press

Other essays by Ed Younkins on this site:

Younkins, Edward W. “What Contribution did David L. Norton Make to our Understanding of Ethical Individualism?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 18, 2025.

----------------------------“How can dialectics help us to defend liberty?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 8, 2025.

---------------------------“How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. October 2, 2025.

----------------------------- “Can Polarized Moral Politics be Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. December 13, 2025.

----------------------------- “Does Humanomics Need a Moral Anchor?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 22, 2026.

----------------------------- “Is Character Education Compatible With Individualistic Perfectionism?” Freedom and Flourishing. February 27, 2026.

 ----------------------------- “Are Spontaneous Order and neo-Aristotelian Arguments for a Free Society Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing. March 19, 2026.

----------------------------- “Are Spinoza’s Philosophy and Neo-Aristotelian Philosophies of Freedom and Flourishing Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing. June 4, 2026. 

----------------------------- “The Architecture of Freedom: Randy Barnett’s Natural Law Case for a Free Society” Freedom and Flourishing. June 26, 2026.