How does Entangled Political Economy help us to understand political entrepreneurship?

 

After I finished reading Richard E. Wagner’s book, Politics as a Peculiar Business, the thought crossed my mind that I should encourage people to read what I was about to write about it before reading the other essays I have recently written about political entrepreneurship. The titles of the other essays are:

Can the concept of political entrepreneurship help us to understand authoritarianism?

What role does political entrepreneurship play in institutional change?

Should we expect our political leaders to be great and good?

I have been writing essays about political entrepreneurship to improve my understanding of the topic. In the process I have felt like that a blind man trying to build up a picture of an elephant in his mind by approaching it from different angles. After I finish writing this essay, I might be able to turn my mind to considering how best to present my understanding of the concept and its relevance to liberty and human flourishing.

Entangled Political Economy

The full title of Richard E. Wagner’s book is Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy (Edward Elgar, 2016).  

Wagner refers to the ancient Indian parable of the blind men and the elephant in suggesting that political economy is best approached from the standpoint of plausible reasoning rather than demonstrative reasoning.

Plausible reasoning starts from the standpoint that the object of inquiry cannot be known in full detail to the inquirer.

By contrast, demonstrative reasoning begins with a set of assumptions about human behavior, and then analyses the implications of those assumptions. The conventional welfare economics approach to the role of government - with its assumption that government acts like an omniscient and benevolent dictator attempting to maximize the well-being of citizens by correcting externalities and providing public goods – provides a relevant example of demonstrative reasoning.

The analytical framework of Entangled Political Economy recognises that both “polity and economy are areas of practical action that operate in similar but not identical fashion.”

The author suggests that human nature has “a bi-polarity about it that generates both polity and economy.” The political side of human nature entails recognition that we are social creatures who live in close proximity and engage in cooperation and conflict. The economic side entails recognition that we need “to make a livelihood” and desire “to be self-directed as against being conscripts in someone’s army”.

I am not persuaded that “bi-polarity” is the best way to capture the idea that humans are “political animals” whose interactions with other members of the species are not always motivated by personal benefit. It seems to me that human nature inclines individuals to seek to flourish by making wise and well-informed choices about all aspects of their lives that they are able to influence, including their interactions with others. 

However, as public choice theorists have noted, most people lack sufficient motivation to allocate the time and effort required to make well-informed choices in relation to national politics because their individual choices are unlikely to have much impact on national outcomes. Wagner’s view of entangled political economy draws on that public choice literature.

I certainly agree that political economy should focus on the full range of interactions among persons and entities within society. As Wagner notes, that perspective has important implications for social change:

“The framework of entangled political economy accommodates recognition that societies change only through individual action inside those societies, and with those actions spreading within the society according to the receptivity of other members of that society to those changes.”

Although Entangled Political Economy is based on a description of different kinds of interactions among individuals in the real world, it represents a departure from the way many economists have previously thought about the interaction between politics and economics. Wagner reminds readers that it has been customary to “envision a polity as a kind of lord of the manor who overseas what is denoted as economy.” He points out that discussion is usually in terms of “additive political economy” in which polity and economy are denoted as independent entities and polity intervenes in economy to correct “market failure”. He argues:

“The Progressivist vision of political presence and dominance throughout society is abetted by the vision of additive political economy because that vision provides rationalization for unlimited political action.”

Political entrepreneurship

 Wagner argues that it makes sense to view politics as a peculiar form of business because it has many characteristics in common with business. Both are sources of livelihood for people, entail competition, and are supported by administrative educational organisations. Both must attract investors to provide capital. Both involve entrepreneurship.

The main difference between political entrepreneurship and market entrepreneurship arises because of the difference between dyadic and triadic relationships. Dyadic relationships involve two people; triadic relationships involve three. Wagner observes that market relationships can be reduced mostly to a set of dyadic relationships where both parties benefit. Political relationships typically require a set of triadic relationships where two people exchange mutual support and a third is forced to provide financial support.

Wagner explains:

“Within the triadic relationships associated with electoral competition … a political entrepreneur can construct a supporting coalition by crafting a transactional structure that entails gainers and losers, while at the same time generating a supporting ideological cover that softens and conceals the redistributive character of the transaction.”

The difference between market and political competition has implications for the qualities required for successful entrepreneurship in different contexts. Wagner suggests that while puffery is an understandable part of market competition, “electoral competition is mostly about puffery”. Systemic lying is a feature of political competition. Sentiment tends to play a larger role, relative to reason, in political competition because of the absence of a direct connection between the individual elector’s choice and the outcome obtained. Voting is like ordering a meal at a restaurant and being served the same meal as everyone else, irrespective of what you ordered. Wagner notes Vilfredo Pareto’s view that ideological articulation can induce people to support measures that they might have opposed in a market setting. Voters generally embrace policies that enable them to feel good about themselves.

Wagner argues that little substantive work is accomplished through elections and political campaigns. The substantive work of policy choice takes place “outside electoral politics and entails the interactive elements necessary for constructing and maintaining deals.” He suggests a parliamentary assembly can be viewed as an “investment bank” because it is “a hub for making deals” involving selection and funding of projects. In that context:

“Entrepreneurs are thus competing among themselves to seize the future. Successful entrepreneurship offers both fame and fortune.”

In reading Wagner’s account of political entrepreneurship, it occurred to me that the significance of electoral competition in the United States is greater than he portrays it to be. That perception is based partly on my (somewhat cursory) observation of the presidential election in 2024 and the performance of the Trump administration in its first 100 days in office.

The 2024 U.S. election and its aftermath may be atypical, but similar political entrepreneurship has been on display in some European elections.  As discussed in a previous essay, political entrepreneurs tend to focus on niches in the marketplace of ideas. They seek to attract support from people who are discontented with current economic and social outcomes by emphasizing alleged problem-solving capacities of their ideas. Their success in attracting a loyal support base of customers who are willing to help them to sell their narrative depends to a large extent on the strength of competition from politicians selling different narratives, and on the extent of resistance by journalists and members of the public who consider their narratives to be incorrect, or that their policy proposals are unworkable, unconstitutional, unethical, or otherwise unhelpful.

I also observed that the discussion of entangled political economy in Politics as a Peculiar Business seemed more relevant to countries with parliamentary systems of government than to those with presidential systems, where much business seems to be done via “executive orders”. However, that is not intended as criticism. It may reflect the greater role of “executive orders” in the U.S. in the years since the book was published.

How can entanglement be contained?

One of Wagner’s aims in writing the book was “to explain how an entangled political economy can generate its own momentum to transform a constitution of liberty into a constitution of control”. He refers to the credit market as providing an example of how this occurs. Private ordering of credit markets is vulnerable to entanglement for two reasons. On the demand side are market participants who are dissatisfied with how they fare in privately ordered credit markets. On the supply side are “political figures who want to catapult themselves from background to foreground in the cosmic drama that is human society”.

Another example relates to the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution which provides for just compensation when the government takes private property for public use. However, Wagner observes that “history over the past century or so has increasingly run in the direction of governments taking property for what are private uses and paying only partial or token compensation”. A clear constitutional provision is not necessarily “sufficiently strong to deter rapacious interest groups from using government as an instrument of predation”.

Wagner refers to Vincent Ostrom’s observation that government involves a Faustian bargain: “instruments of evil – power over other people – are to be employed because of the good they might do, recognizing that evil might also result.” 

How can we minimize the potential for evil to result? Wagner suggests that the alternatives are “parchment” and “guns”.

“Parchment” refers to constitutional rules. Constitutional rules may remain effective if supported by public morality – sufficient numbers of people being willing to refrain from use of the powers of the state to enrich themselves at the expense of others. This approach relies on education and related processes to cultivate virtue and wisdom.

“Guns” refers to an approach that looks primarily to “a kind of opposition of interests to limit government predation”. Wagner suggests that “guns” may complement “parchment”. He writes:

“The basic principle behind this approach is for governmental action to require some concurrence among different participants with opposed interests.”

Wagner suggests that when it becomes habitual for people to use politics in a predatory manner that may “promote alternative beliefs as to what comprises just conduct”. He concludes that “parchment and guns … would seem to be nonseparable ingredients of constitutional order in the final analysis.”

Wagner tells us that his reference to guns is metaphorical, so what he has in mind may not necessarily be violent. For example, those who believe themselves to be victims of predation have an incentive to form associations to protect their interests in the courts and may be able to exert countervailing power the political arena.

While I believe that entangled political economy offers important insights about interactions between participants in politics and markets, I would have liked the author to explore more fully the macroeconomic consequences of increasing entanglement. Perhaps that would have led to a more optimistic conclusion.

In Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing I suggested that although most liberal democracies are heading for major economic crises in the years ahead there are reasons to be optimistic “that governments will eventually introduce institutional reforms to enable the drivers of progress to restore growth of opportunities.” (See Chapter 6, particularly p. 120)

My optimism presupposes the emergence of political entrepreneurs who understand the nature of the problems that need to be addressed and can marshal the political support required to carry out appropriate institutional reforms to correct those problems.

Conclusions

The discussion of entangled political economy in Richard Wagner’s book, Politics as a Peculiar Business, is helpful to an understanding of the context in which political entrepreneurship occurs in the liberal democracies.

Entangled political economy focuses on the full range of interactions among persons and entities within society. It emphasizes that societal change occurs only through individual actions. Entangled political economy represents a departure from the view of those economists (and governments) who have envisioned a polity as a kind of lord of the manor who overseas an economy.  

Wagner argues that politics has many characteristics in common with private business, but it is characterized by triadic relationships rather than dyadic relationships. Market relationships can be reduced mainly to sets of relationships between two people, both of whom benefit. Politics typically requires sets of relationships where two people exchange mutual support and a third is forced to provide financial support.

The author suggests that the main work of political entrepreneurs – interactions to construct deals - takes place outside electoral politics. He suggests that parliaments can be viewed as kinds of investment banks because they are hubs for making deals involving selection and funding of projects.

In my view the significance of electoral politics and deal-making by executive arms of governments is greater than Wagner portrays it to be. However, my view has been strongly influenced by events since 2016, when his book was published.

Wagner argues that entangled political economy generates its own momentum to transform a constitution of liberty into a constitution of control. He is pessimistic about the prospect for entanglement to be contained via constitutional rules and moral conduct. He suggests that habitual use of politics in a predatory manner promotes an alternative view of what constitutes just conduct.

In my view, Wagner might have come to a more optimistic conclusion if he had more fully explored the macro-economic consequences of increasing use of the powers of the state for predatory purposes. Economic crises may eventually bring about appropriate institutional reforms if political entrepreneurs emerge who can marshal the political support required to implement them.  

Should we expect our political leaders to be great and good?

 

I am writing this during an election campaign in Australia. By international standards, both chief contenders for public office could be aptly described as neither conspicuously great nor notoriously bad.

However, over the last three years, Australians have experienced the worst government that I can remember. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the political alternative on offer would have been much better.

During the current election campaign, both chief contenders for national leadership have seemed oblivious to the decline in productivity growth that caused the good times to stop rolling on in this country. It has apparently not registered with them that vote-buying spending proposals are less appropriate under such circumstances than economic reforms to restore productivity growth. Moreover, the election campaign is being conducted as though nothing that has happened recently in the international economic and political environment might require Australians to prepare for difficult times ahead.

Fortunately, the question that I have posed above does not require me to consider which of the contenders for national leadership is most worthy of being prime minister of Australia.

Before I go any further, however, I should outline my (somewhat complicated) view of party politics in liberal democracies. I have yet to see a system of government that is better than the two-party system at enabling voters to hold governments accountable for their actions. One of the downsides of that system, however, is that it provides a strong incentive for political parties to reward team players who are willing to set aside their own views to support a party line. The insincerity that is often on display in the public performance of politicians makes it is difficult to avoid regarding politics as a disreputable profession. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that democratic political systems sometimes produce leaders who are highly principled and effective in enhancing opportunities for human flourishing.  

Should we expect our political leaders to be great and good? That question has arisen from previous research that I have undertaken about the roles of culture, ideology, and political entrepreneurship as factors influencing levels of economic and personal freedom in different countries. I will briefly outline some points emerging from that research before discussing Robert Faulkner’s book, The Case for Greatness: Honorable Ambition and its Critics (2007).

Points emerging from previous research

• Cultural values do not fully explain levels of economic and personal freedom in different countries. Suppression of liberty in countries with relatively low levels of economic and personal freedom, e.g. China, Iran and Venezuela, is a product of the ideologies of the governments concerned rather than the cultural values of the peoples. Similarly, a substantial number of countries with relatively high personal and economic freedom are performing better in that regard than can readily be explained on the basis of prevailing cultural values.
• It is not difficult to identify political entrepreneurs who have historically been major players determining outcomes in many jurisdictions where economic and personal freedom seems substantially at variance with underlying cultural values. There are good reasons for that. Media coverage tends to focus on political leaders, the challenges they face and the policies they adopt.
• Douglas North saw political entrepreneurship as being required to overcome high transactions costs involved in changing institutions – the rules of the game of society. There are high transactions costs associated with institutional change because institutions are path dependent, e.g. embedded in culture.
• Political entrepreneurship takes place within culture and is concerned with interpreting and influencing culture as well as formal rules (constitutions, laws and regulations). Some research suggests that successful political entrepreneurs tend to advance their ambitions by focusing on niches in the marketplace of ideas that established parties do not satisfy. They win support by emphasizing the problem-solving capacities of their ideas.
• Max Weber argued that charismatic and demagogic leadership may be required to overcome the impersonal forces of bureaucratization within democracies. Demagogic leaders are responsible for their cause, and thus capable of intentionally and rationally directing state power towards its achievement.  
• Weber suggested that demagogic leadership can be consistent with democracy, but he seems to have left aside the question of whether a demagogic leader can be both good and great.

The essays from which those points were abstracted can be found here and here.

 The Case for Greatness

 In making the case for greatness Robert Faulkner observes that thoughtful citizens and appreciative historians have no difficulty in acknowledging the greatness of people like George Washington, Winston Churchill and Nelson Mandela. By contrast, many of those who generalize about human affairs display a doubting cynicism about such greatness. He notes that “social scientists speak much of rational maximizing, power seeking, self-interest, and popular voice, but not much of extraordinary judiciousness, honorable aims, and knowing justice” and that “influential professors of philosophy and literature talk confidently of autonomy and equal dignity, while deprecating ambition for office and accomplishment as elitist domineering or a remnant of repressive culture”.

The author’s key contention is that the accounts of political greatness by Aristotle, Plato, and Xenophon “illuminate our experiences of a Mandela or a Margaret Thatcher far better than the critical and doctrinal theorizing that is more familiar and has been in the works for three or four centuries”.

 The book begins by considering Aristotle’s account of an honorable and just form of grand ambition. It then considers the political dangers and psychological dynamics of the less bounded and less just forms of ambition, using Alcibiades and Cyrus as examples of individuals who seek to rule empires. That is followed by a chapter discussing George Washington as an example of a gentleman-statesman. Along the way, the author notes the role of Niccolo Machiavelli in turning the orientation of much thinking about human affairs from what men should do “from duty and the best life” to what men do to advance themselves and their followers in wealth and power. The final chapters discuss modern theories that obscure the moral-political phenomenon of political greatness and make it “peculiarly alien to our apprehension and sensibilities”. One of the final chapters is devoted to discussion of the egalitarian theories of John Rawls and Hannah Arendt. The other discusses the theories of Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche.

In what follows, I focus mainly on what the author has to say about Aristotle. Readers who are looking for a more comprehensive summary of The Case for Greatness should read the review by Paul A. Rahe.

Faulkner observes that Aristotle ranks greatness of soul as the "crown" needed to perfect all the virtues, including justice. He writes:

 “Aristotle does not mince words on this topic, and neither should we. No greatness without goodness, yes, but also no true goodness without greatness. The great-souled human being, in claiming a worthy stage, claims for human excellence the prominence and tasks it deserves. Accordingly, while greatness of soul "cannot exist without" such other virtues as moderation and justice, it also "enhances their goodness." A man of such virtue is too noble to stoop, or to accept the second best, especially in his own conduct. Aristotle calls greatness of soul a kosmos. It is an ornament of good character that is also an exalting order: an ordering heightened by an awareness of the grand activities such a soul calls for and is owed.”

Aristotle views the great-souled man as having a disposition to claim great honours because he considers himself worthy of them. The great-souled man has a true estimate of his own worth. He claims tasks that no-one else can do, or do as well. The great-souled man disdains the offices commonly sought by other ambitious people; he seeks the tribute and high offices that are “great things.

Aristotle equates greatness of the soul with magnanimity - which he also equates with excellence and justice. However, the great-souled man’s disposition is complicated because he seeks great positions and honours from others as well as virtue of soul for himself. Aristotle suggests that the great-souled man holds that nothing is greater than his own virtue and seems to regard any honour as less than what is due a soul of such worth.

The great-souled man’s desire for superiority may harbour a despotic impulse, but his virtue gives this impulse something of an honorable and just direction. Faulkner writes:

“It is the priority of virtue and honor, so understood, that largely distinguishes Aristotelian greatness of soul and a Washington.”

Later, he explains more fully:

“Knowledge of his virtue helps uphold the great man amidst changing fortune. Unlike Machiavelli's great man, his measure is not ambitious mastery of fortune, but living well amidst fortune's gifts and trials. It is after this purification of grand ambition that Aristotle sharply separates true pride from the all-too-common arrogance of the privileged. "In truth," "rightly," "justly," only the good should be honored.”

Faulkner concludes:

“Aristotle's diagnosis comes to this: the great-souled man is at once drawn above humanity and drawn to humanity. He exhibits his superiority by aiding his fellows, and yet his wish is less to aid them than to avoid being or appearing dependent on them.”

Faulkner suggests that while Nicomachean Ethics seems to imply that greatness of the soul is a desirable attribute of political leaders, Aristotle moderates that view in the Politics and Ethics. In Politics, he doesn’t forget the best man’s claims but presents them “only after defending at length the more common and political claimants to rule”. At one point he even praises “the decent and equitable man” over the great man. In Ethics, Aristotle suggests that greatness, especially great power, is overrated: “it is possible for one who is not a ruler of land and sea to perform noble action.”

Faulkner writes:

“Given the likelihood of war, the difficulties of preserving any regime, and the extreme rarity of the best regime, there will be opportunities enough for noble deeds, great things, and superiority over others. A great-souled man will have his opportunities; he will be often needed. But such a force, if a blind force, may also harm itself and those whom it would rule, including the most thoughtful. Whatever else Aristotle's Ethics and Politics may be, whatever the defects, his is surely a model effort to supply comprehensive light to the grandly ambitious and to those who depend on them.”

Faulkner ends his book with a discussion of Nietzsche, who “unlike Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Kant, trumpets an animus against ordinary people”. Faulkner’s final comment:

“Nietzsche's proposals and diagnoses alike invite us to look to more moderate accounts, whether in examples such as a Washington or in the historians and philosophers who took seriously what is good and true as well as what is strong and great. To encourage such looking is what this book is about.”

My assessment

I think Robert Faulkner has made a stronger case for goodness than greatness as a desirable attribute in political leaders. Greatness is required in times of crisis, but competence will suffice most of the time. It is important to recognize, however, that winning an election doesn’t make a person competent in dealing with public policy issues. People can acquire skills relevant to statecraft in a variety of different ways but, as in other professions, on-the-job experience seems indispensable to high-level performance.

The case that Faulkner makes for goodness leads to the question of what we mean by goodness as applied to political leaders. As I see it, there are two different aspects to this question.

The first concerns personal ethics. Should citizens expect the holders of high office in a democracy to conform to widely accepted norms of ethical behaviour? If we expect our sporting heroes to confirm to such norms in their off-field behavior, there is perhaps an even stronger case for the similar standards to be applied to politicians. Since politicians regularly ask voters to trust them to implement policies, it seems appropriate for voters to expect them to demonstrate trustworthiness in their personal behavior. (Of course, the personal ethics of candidates is only one of the matters that voters should consider, and other matters may well be more important in particular instances.)

The second aspect concerns confusion of soulcraft and statecraft. Soulcraft, the means by which individuals flourish and find fulfillment in life, is a matter that is best left for individuals to pursue in the manner they choose for themselves. Since self-direction is fundamental to individual flourishing, it is a mistake to believe that it can be advanced via government action to promote particular views of moral excellence. Aristotle may have had reason to believe that was possible in a polis in the ancient world, but it is certainly not possible in modern societies which are characterised by much greater diversity of cultural and religious influences.

Some Neo-Aristotelian philosophers have drawn a clear distinction between soulcraft and statecraft. In their book Norms of Liberty, Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl imply that the main role of statecraft is to restore or construct a political/ legal order in which “it might be possible for different individuals to flourish and to do so in different ways (in different communities and cultures) without creating inherent ethical conflict in the overall structure of their social/ political context.” (p 83)

In my view, we should judge our political leaders to be very good if they can manage to move the political/legal order toward achieving that outcome.

What role does political entrepreneurship play in institutional change?

 

One of the reasons I quoted that passage by Douglass North is because it mentions political entrepreneurship. I went looking for a quote from North in Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance because I was particularly impressed by that book when I first read it about 30 years ago. (The quoted sentence appears on page 87.)

As defined by North, institutions are “the rules of the game of society” that shape human interaction. He argued that formal institutions—such as constitutions, laws, and regulations—make up only a small proportion of the sum of constraints that shape choices. Informal constraints include codes of conduct, norms of behavior, conventions, and customs. They may be internalized in personal values, rather than imposed by others.

North acknowledged that political entrepreneurship plays a role in institutional change. He doesn’t have much to say about political entrepreneurship, but his analysis implies that political entrepreneurs may play an important role in reducing transactions costs associated with institutional change.

Path dependence and institutional stickiness

The transactions costs of institutional change are high because of the path dependence of institutions. As institutions evolve, ideologies tend to evolve to support them. Organizations and interest groups that have grown up under existing institutions often have a stake in maintaining them.  

The most important point I had remembered from reading Institutions … is that countries with similar formal institutions – constitutions, property rights etc. – can have vastly different economic performance outcomes if informal institutions (cultural settings) are different. Governments and international agencies that have sought to transplant formal institutions to foreign countries have been slow to recognize that point.

The implications of path dependence have been further explored by Peter Boettke, Christopher Coyne, and Peter Leeson in “Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics”, Chapter 6 in Culture of Economic Action, ed. Laura E. Grube and Virgil Henry Storr (2015).  The authors contend that the ability of a new institutional arrangement to take hold when it has been transplanted depends on that institutions status in relations to indigenous agents in the previous time period. They suggest that institutional transplants are unlikely to stick if they are inconsistent with indigenously introduced endogenous institutions.

The analytical framework used by Boettke et al is also relevant to considering the challenges faced by endogenous political entrepreneurs in bringing about institutional change.

Entrepreneurship (political and economic)

As discussed recently on this blog, political entrepreneurship has characteristics that differ from economic entrepreneurship. I suggested that it might be reasonable to assume that political entrepreneurs are motivated largely by the satisfaction they obtain from constructing ideological narratives and selling them, and from exercising the political power required to implement policies.

Nevertheless, there are similarities between political and economic entrepreneurship that become apparent when economic entrepreneurship is considered in a cultural context. In his article, “The discovery and interpretation of profit opportunities and the Kirznerian entrepreneur”, reproduced as Chapter 3 of Culture and Economic Action (cited above), Don Lavoie writes:

“Entrepreneurship necessarily takes place within culture, it is utterly shaped by culture, and it fundamentally consists in interpreting and influencing culture.” (p. 50)

He suggests:

“entrepreneurship is the achievement not so much of the isolated maverick who finds objective profits others overlooked as of the culturally embedded participant who picks up the gist of a conversation.” (p. 51)

Later, he observes:

“Most acts of entrepreneurship are not like an isolated individual finding things on beaches; they require effort of the imagination, skillful judgements of future costs and revenue possibilities, and an ability to read the significance of complex social situations.”

In the following chapter of Culture and Economic Action, Virgil Henry Storr and Arielle John suggest that rather than viewing Lavoie’s contribution as a critique of Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship it is more appropriate to view it as a suggestion as to how that theory may be fruitfully amended. The amendments suggested by Lavoie seem to me to make the role of the economic entrepreneur seem similar in some respects to the role of a political entrepreneur.

Max Weber’s understanding of political entrepreneurship

Douglass North seems to have given minimal acknowledgement of Max Weber’s work as a social theorist, even though there was considerable overlap in their areas of interest.  Francesca Trivellato has noted that in one publication North does refer to Weber as a scholar of “the role of belief and values in shaping change”. Weber is, of course, most often remembered for his theory of the Protestant ethic but he also made other important contributions.

Weber’s writings on charismatic and demagogic leadership shed some light on the nature of political entrepreneurship in democracies. The following points summarize an article by Xavier Márquez, entitled “Max Weber, demagogy and charismatic representation”, published in the European Journal of Political Theory (2024).

• Weber argued that effective leaders must be able to fight for ‘causes’ beyond the narrow immediate interests of economic groups or party organisations and thus to struggle against the impersonal forces of bureaucratization (the subsumption of politics under bureaucratic and technical imperatives). Effective leaders must therefore have a charismatic form of authority – the only form of authority capable of overcoming the constraints of organisation, legality and tradition.
• The need to appeal to mass publics in modern democratizing societies selects for leaders who have a talent for mobilising large groups of people through rhetorical means. In the context of mass politics, charismatic authority manifests as demagogy. Weber thinks of the masses as unorganized and irrational and argues that even ‘democratically’ elected leadership is a form of ‘dictatorship which rests on the exploitation of the emotionality of the masses.
• Weber's praise for charismatic and demagogic leadership is tempered by the worry that political leaders must also be responsible. This is so in a twofold sense: objectively, a political system must be able to hold leaders accountable for their actions; and subjectively, leaders must display an ethics of responsibility, and thus be able to ‘take responsibility’ for their actions.
• Elections formalize the recognition of charisma. If charismatic leaders capable of mobilizing and representing broad masses will tend to arise in any case, it is better if the recognition of their charisma is subject to periodic formal tests rather than informal, extra-legal events.
• Charismatic authority in the broadest sense tends to appear in moments of deep, even existential crisis, where the charismatic leader performs a ‘miracle’ for a group that feels otherwise impotent and deeply threatened, and can sustain itself only when the leader can provide such ‘miracles.
• The charismatic demagogue produces a wondrous or miraculous representation of the people as a charismatic community but also a ‘wondrous’ representation of himself.
• Weber argues that charismatic leaders must provide evidence of benefiting their charismatic community if they are to retain their authority. The implicit ‘bargain’ between leaders and followers that exists even in cases of strong charismatic authority allows us to speak of a degree of accountability and influence.
• Instead of distinguishing between the ‘mere’ demagogue and its antithesis, the statesman, in terms of whether or not they deceive the demos or act for the common good, Weber stresses the ethical distinction between the politician who is responsible for their cause, and thus capable of intentionally and rationally directing state power towards its achievement (in what is, strictly speaking, a value–rational way), and the politician who is not.
• Lack of objectivity (wishful thinking, extreme overconfidence, ignoring inconvenient information) in assessing a situation leads to irresponsible political action, insofar as it leads to a misunderstanding of the means necessary to achieve particular ends and the physical, social and political constraints on the use of such means. All leaders are susceptible to these vices, but the situation of the charismatic demagogue, surrounded by adoring followers and capable of summoning the adulation of crowds, makes these vices extremely common occupational hazards.
• Weber hoped that training in committee or party work would hone the political judgement of leaders so that they would be more likely to see the consequences of their decisions and to take responsibility for them. 

Márquez argues that Weber's conception of charismatic authority allows some demagogues to play a genuinely democratic role in modern societies when viewed through contemporary theories of representation. He suggests that a Weberian analysis of democracy points to the need for strong accountability mechanisms and for institutions that socialize potential leaders into productive habits of adversarial conduct and responsibility, while preventing easy ‘buck passing’.

Márquez observes that although Weber provides a stronger sense of democratic possibility than did Joseph Schumpeter, he is very much the ancestor of the ‘minimalist’ model of democracy that Schumpeter first articulated explicitly in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. (I wrote about Schumpeter’s model of democracy here in 2012.)

Directions of future research

This essay is the second in a series in which I am attempting to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship. The first essay can be found here.

My next step is to read Robert Faulkner’s book, The Case for Greatness (2007). I am wondering whether the ancients thought it was possible for a charismatic demagog to also be a "great-souled" leader who is keen to promote liberty and opportunities for individuals to flourish. 

After that, I will consider how the concept of political entrepreneurship fits in with modern public choice literature.

Summary and Conclusions

This essay briefly considers the context in which political entrepreneurship is most relevant, some similarities between economic and political entrepreneurship, and the role of charismatic and demagogic leadership in political entrepreneurship within democracies.

The essay begins by considering the role that Douglas North saw for political entrepreneurship in bringing about institutional change – i.e. change in the rules of the game of society. Political entrepreneurship is required to overcome high transactions costs of change that arise from the path dependent nature of institutions. Building on the concept of path dependency, Peter Boettke, Christopher Coyne and Peter Leeson developed an analytical framework to consider the consequences of institutional stickiness for foreigners engaged in institution building exercises that seek to transplant institutions from one country to another. That framework is also relevant to considering the challenges faced by political entrepreneurs seeking to bring about institutional reforms in their own countries.

The essay then turns to consideration of the relevance to political entrepreneurship of Don Lavoie’s view of economic entrepreneurship. Lavoie suggests that entrepreneurship takes place within culture and is concerned with interpreting and influencing culture. He makes the role of the economic entrepreneur seem similar in some respects to that of the political entrepreneur.

The other major topic considered in the essay is the contribution that Max Weber makes to our understanding of political entrepreneurship through his writings on charismatic and demagogic leadership. Weber makes the case that charismatic and demagogic leadership may be required to overcome the impersonal forces of bureaucratization within democracies. He also sheds light on the circumstances in which demagogic leadership can be consistent with democracy.

North and Weber both add to our understanding of the role of the political entrepreneur in overcoming obstacles to institutional change. However, the fundamental question that both leave aside is how to ensure that institutional change enhances liberty and opportunities for individuals to flourish.  

Why is cheap domestic gas a bad policy choice?

 

This is a guest post by my old friend, Geoff Edwards. I refer to him as my old friend not because of his age (he is not much older than me) but because I have known him for a long time. Geoff was my supervisor when I began working in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in Canberra in 1967, and found a way to give me some interesting research projects to work on. Several years later, Geoff left the Australian public service to pursue an economics career in academia.

The post has its origins in an email message that Geoff sent me a few days ago suggesting that the “east coast gas reservation” plan, recently announced by Peter Dutton, the Leader of the Opposition in the federal parliament, was bad policy. The plan seeks to reduce the domestic price of gas by delivering to the domestic market “an additional 10 to 20 per cent of the east coast’s demand – gas which would otherwise be exported for use in other markets for consumers in those countries.”

Since this proposal was announced at the beginning of the current Australian election campaign, I should make clear that while I agree with Geoff that Dutton’s gas plan is bad policy, I don’t consider Dutton’s Liberal Party to be a greater source of bad policies than any of the other political parties contesting this election. That explains why I have chosen the quote from The Wisdom of Henry Hazlitt to put at the top of this post.

Here is the guest post by Geoff Edwards:

Peter Dutton says his government would separate the domestic price of gas in eastern Australia from the export price.

For efficient resource use for tradeables, whether meat, steel or gas, prices within Australia need to be driven by prices in world markets.

That is fundamental to the liberal trading order long supported by Australia.

Seeking to make the price of gas used in Australia independent of the price in international trade is a policy of distorting the gas market and the broader economy.

Not efficient. Not liberal. Not smart.

High gas prices perform the valuable, albeit sometimes painful, role of discouraging use of environmentally-negative gas in electricity generation and directly.

And imagine the ammunition the domestic subsidy policy would provide to Australia's powerful friend in the US to expand trade restrictions.

In order to relieve pressures on households and small businesses without introducing damaging, incentive-destroying market distortions, cash payments targeted to those judged most in need would be a better way to go.

Geoff Edwards

Kew, Vic, 3101

Addendum

Several comments have been received on Geoff's post other than those below. 

First, here is an exchange between Bernard Wonder and myself on LinkedIn:

Bernard: "Geoff's suggested payments to households could be funded by a reformed resource rent tax."

My response:

It could be funded that way. However, the introduction of such a tax is somewhat complex because the states own the resource (onshore) and mining companies are sensitive to the sovereign risk issues associated with governments extracting a larger slice of rents than companies agreed to pay prior to their investment.

Bernard: "Sounds like a sacred cow, Winton."

My response:

Geoff’s proposal could be viewed as an alternative to the current government’s approach of providing a subsidy to all power users. It is funded from general revenue, which has been boosted by high international gas prices.

Second, an email to Geoff from Neil Bryon:

"I completely agree re Dutton’s gas policy.

Albanese’s house battery proposal is also bad policy, but in a different way - using taxpayer funding to subsidise wealthier citizens to install a very inferior technology.

EV (car batteries) are 4-8 times the KwH capacity of fixed house batteries and a fraction of the cost/unity of storage capacity. If anyone did want a battery to store PV solar power during the day to use at night, (I do not) by far the best and cheapest is a battery on 4 wheels (except Tesla who won’t / can’t do vehicle to house or vehicle to grid). All the Japanese Korean Chinese and most European EVs will.

My general point is that governments are notoriously weak at choosing technology winners ( e.g. many now think NBN was a white elephant once 5G arrived)."

Third, an email to Geoff from David Player:

"Burning gas is a bad thing as it increases the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere which in turn increases the temperature of the Earth, and Global Warming is bad.

BUT

If burning gas significantly reduces the amount of coal being burned, it is the better of the two evils.

Burning coal releases lots of very nasty gases into the atmosphere, while burning 

gas is relatively clean.  Apart from the CO2 of course!"