Can the concept of political entrepreneurship help us to understand authoritarianism?

 

In this essay I discuss the relevance of the concept of political entrepreneurship to an understanding of political outcomes that have substantially affected personal and economic freedom in different countries. The essay has a particular focus on authoritarianism. My understanding of that concept is based on  the view of Hans Eysenck that people who have an authoritarian personality are attracted to the possibility of oppressing others. People who have authoritarian values see such oppression as justified. Authoritarian governments oppress people by restricting their personal and economic freedom to a greater extent than other governments.

The essay focuses on political outcomes which seem incongruent with underlying cultural values in a range of countries. It suggests that political entrepreneurship has influenced the ideologies currently reflected in personal and economic freedom in those countries. It also considers the current role of political entrepreneurship in harnessing cultural and economic grievances to pursue a range of different ends in the liberal democracies.

The essay draws on some of my previous research on the extent to which cultural values can explain authoritarianism and on the influence of cultural backlash and economic grievances on political outcomes in liberal democracies. That research is summarized prior to considering the nature and relevance of political entrepreneurship.

Can cultural values explain authoritarianism?

My answer to that question is that cultural values do not fully explain authoritarianism – the ideologies of some governments are at variance with cultural values. The best way to explain how I came to that conclusion is by referring readers to the accompanying graph which shows levels of economic freedom and personal freedom for 85 countries. Please note that the personal freedom scale on the vertical axis is in reverse order with highest levels of personal freedom at the bottom. (The graph has previously been published in an article in The Savvy Street in 2023.)

Please focus on the labelling of data points. I have attached country labels only to those data points where freedom ratings are substantially different from predicted levels based on indexes of emancipative and facilitating values which were constructed using World Values Survey data. The methodology for constructing these indexes is explained in the Savvy Street article and on this blog (here and here).

The colour of the labelled points depends on whether freedom is greater than or less than predicted—green if greater than predicted, red if less than predicted. The size of the labelled points is larger if both personal and economic freedom are greater than or less than predicted.

It is clear from the graph that freedom ratings of most of the countries with low personal and economic freedom are substantially lower than predicted by corresponding emancipative and facilitating values. The countries in which both personal and economic freedom is less than predicted include China, Iran and Venezuela. It seems obvious that suppression of liberty in those countries is a product of the ideologies of the governments concerned rather than the cultural values of the peoples.  

The graph also shows that a substantial number of countries with relatively high personal and economic freedom are performing better in that regard than can readily be explained on the basis of prevailing values. Most of the countries concerned are not the high-income countries of North America, Western Europe, Oceania, and East Asia that come to mind when one thinks of countries with relatively high levels of economic and personal freedom.

The existence of countries in which freedom levels are substantially greater than predicted by facilitating and emancipative values suggests that government support for economic and personal freedom may precede or accompany the evolution of facilitating and emancipative values. The transition to high levels of economic freedom often takes place over an extended period. As market-friendly economic reforms promote the growth of economic opportunities, this could be expected to lead to the gradual evolution of facilitating values supporting higher levels of economic freedom. The growth of economic opportunities could be expected to encourage people to place higher value on personal autonomy and to become more trusting of others.

Milton Friedman observed that economic freedom “promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the other” (Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 1982, 9). As economic development proceeds, the evolution of emancipative values provides additional support for personal freedom.

The correlation between economic and personal freedom is strikingly evident in the graph. There are not many countries with relatively high personal freedom and low economic freedom, or vice versa. Argentina—which stands out as the only country having high personal freedom despite low economic freedom—helps illustrate why that is so. In the published article, I suggested:

“In Argentina, the decline in economic freedom over the last 20 years has been accompanied by worsening economic prospects, which seem likely to lead, before long, to an economic and political crisis. Hopefully, the political response to the crisis will be to restore greater economic freedom and make personal freedom more secure, rather than to restrict personal freedom to suppress criticism of government policies.”

A few months after that comment was published, Javier Milei was elected president of Argentina and has successfully introduced policy reforms to expand economic freedom. (Unfortunately, I cannot claim that my essay was influential in bringing that about.)

Cultural and economic grievances as explanators of political change

In the preceding essay on this blog I discuss the question: “Is cultural backlash a major determinant of political outcomes in the liberal democracies?” My intial focus was on the view which Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart presented in their book, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism (2019),  that the spread of post-materialist values has induced a cultural backlash among cultural conservatives. They suggested on that basis that the combination of authoritarianism and populist rhetoric is a threat to liberal democracy.

In my view, Norris and Inglehart were mistaken in attributing cultural backlash to the spread of post-materialist values. I argued that it would be more correct to attribute cultural backlash to the illiberalism of progressives who have been advocating what Yascha Mounk has described as the identity synthesis (see: The Identity Trap, 2023). The identity synthesis has provoked a backlash because it rejects neutral rules like equal opportunity and free speech in favour of action to promote the interests of particular groups that have suffered from discrimination in the past.

Some recent research by John Burn-Murdoch, published in the Financial Times ‘Why the Maga mindset is different’, March 7, 2025) has suggested that over the last 20 years the values held by people who identify with the right wing of U.S. politics has moved closer to the values of people in Turkey, Russia and China than to people who identify with the right wing of politics in Europe. It remains to be seen what impact, if any, this apparent retreat from classical liberal values will have on the institutions of liberal democracy in the United States. 

Norris and Inglehart acknowledge that economic grievances also play an important role in encouraging people to support policy remedies proposed by populists. In that context, I have referred to some research published in an essay on this blog that has highlighted the adverse impact that slower economic growth can have on life satisfaction, particularly of young people. I suspect that the longer-term slowdown in economic growth in the liberal democracies might be more important in generating support for populist policies than are grievances that can be related directly to the impact of import competition or immigration.

However, we live in a world where the policies that political leaders sell to voters depend on how voters perceive reality. Those perceptions are not always accurate. Some opinion leaders on both the progressive and conservative sides of politics attempt to sell voters a distorted view of reality. As I wrote that I was reminded of a comment I made in my review of Michèle Lamont’s book, Seeing Others, 2023. I suggested:

“On the question of factual accuracy, Lamont’s narrative, which suggests that the workers have reason to be angry with the wealthy one percent, seems to me to be just as questionable as Donald Trump’s narrative which suggests that the workers have reason to be angry about globalization and immigration. Neither of those narratives promotes an accurate understanding of economic reality.”

The concept of political entrepreneurship

Catherine De Vries and Sara Hobolt have suggested that competition between political parties in European countries is like competition in economic markets. In both contexts long-standing dominant players (firms or parties) may be challenged by disruptive new players. The central objective for both challengers and incumbents is the control of government and the delivery of public policies. Political entrepreneurs play a key role because a party that engages in successful political policy innovation can enjoy an effective monopoly on an issue and reap the consequent electoral benefits. (De Vries CE, Hobolt SB. Challenger Parties and Populism. LSE Public Policy Review. 2020; 1(1): 3, pp. 1–8. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31389/lseppr.3)

De Vries and Hobolt were writing about multi-party systems in which several political parties are competing for power. However, a similar form of competition occurs when an innovative political entrepreneur within a major political party challenges established leadership factions by offering a product that is more appealing to supporters of the party.

Valentina Ausserladscheider has contributed to an understanding of political entrepreneurism by providing a framework to consider reasons for the political success of Jörg Haider, the leader of the Austrian Freedom Party, during the 1990s. Haider’s winning formula was based on a policy mix of authoritarian and and neoliberal policies, which was particularly successful during a time of economic turmoil and uncertainty. (See Chapter 9 of Culture, sociality, and morality : new applications of mainline political economy edited by Paul Dragos Aligica, Ginny Seung Choi, and Virgil Henry Storr, 2021).

Ausserladscheider emphasizes that the strategies of political entrepreneurs are not determined solely by voters’ ideological positions. Successful political entrepreneurs don’t offer the same policies as their competitors. They advance their political ambitions by focusing on niches in the marketplace of ideas that established parties do not satisfy, and on winning support by emphasizing the problem-solving capacities of their ideas. For example, the entrepreneurial strategy of far-right parties is their “nationalist and nativist core ideology”, leading to policies such as immigration restrictions that are claimed to solve a range of problems.

As illustrated by the example of Jörg Haider, the strategies that political entrepreneurs follow to attract support can result in political programs that offer a mix of libertarian and authoritarian policies.

The influence of political entrepreneurs

From a cursory inspection of the accompanying graph, people who have rudimentary knowledge of global politics would have no difficulty identifying political entrepreneurs who have historically been major players determining outcomes in many jurisdictions where economic and personal freedom seems substantially at variance with underlying cultural values. There are good reasons for that. Media coverage tends to focus on political leaders, the challenges they face and the policies they adopt.

The role of political entrepreneurship is not always obvious in liberal democracies where the institutions of representative government have been respected for many decades. However, it doesn’t make sense to assume that changes in public opinion will be automatically reflected in public policy even in countries with representative government. In general, the responses of political markets to new information (e.g. poll data about shifts in public opinion on particular issues) depend to a much larger extent on decisions by big players than do responses to new information in financial and commodity markets.

A better understanding of the reasons why political entrepreneurs behave as they do might help us to assess whether current political developments are likely to expand or constrain economic and personal freedom. Those outcomes depend on both the motivations of the individuals concerned and on the social and economic context in which they operate.

Like other humans, political entrepreneurs are motivated by a range of factors. It is usually unrealistic to assume that they are motivated solely by a desire to maximize social welfare (whatever that means), to maximize the number of votes they obtain, to maximize personal wealth, or to obtain the perks of the office. Given the nature of their occupation, however, it seems reasonable to assume that political entrepreneurs obtain more satisfaction than most other people from constructing ideological narratives and selling them, and from exercising the political power required to implement policies.

In some instances, ideological predilections may play a dominant role. For example, while social and economic context helps to explain why revolutions occurred in China and Iran in the 20^th century, the repression of individual liberty following those revolutions stemmed directly from the ideologies of revolutionary leaders - Mao Zedong in China and Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran.

Similarly, while the economic problems confronting the United States and Britain during the 1980s provided contexts in which substantial changes in the direction of economic and social policies could be contemplated, the responses of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher owe much to their respective commitments to economic freedom. The reforms currently being pursued by Javier Milei in Argentina seem to be similarly motivated.

Looking around the world, a range of different ideological predilections seem to be playing a role in policies advocated by political entrepreneurs. For example, we see ideological considerations playing a role among those seeking opportunities to expand the welfare state, to redistribute wealth, to promote “equity” for community groups which have suffered from discrimination in the past, to save the environment from CO2 emissions, to pursue international humanitarian goals, or to pursue nationalist goals by restricting immigration, raising trade barriers, and withdrawing from international organisations. Some of those policies have potential to impinge adversely on economic and personal freedom.

As we have seen earlier, even if political entrepreneurs are motivated mainly by a desire to exercise political power, the innovative aspect of their role requires them to focus on niches in the marketplace of ideas that established parties (or factions) do not satisfy. They seek to attract support from people who are discontented with current economic and social outcomes by emphasizing the problem-solving capacities of their ideas. Their success in attracting a loyal support base of customers who are willing to help them to sell their narrative depends to a large extent on the strength of competition from politicians selling different narratives, and on the extent of resistance by journalists and members of the public who consider their narratives to be incorrect or that their policy proposals are unworkable, unconstitutional, unethical, or otherwise unhelpful.

In my opinion, the ability of some political entrepreneurs (from both conservative and progressive sides of politics) to persuade large numbers of people to accept false narratives is posing an increasing threat to liberty in the liberal democracies. False narratives pose a threat to liberty because they often provide a basis for false beliefs that problems can be solved by restricting personal and economic freedom. For example, the personal freedom of people who refused vaccinations for Covid was restricted inappropriately in many countries because of false narratives that unvaccinated people were likely to spread infection. And economic freedom is currently being restricted in some countries through imposition of higher import barriers on the basis of false narratives about the impact of free trade.

A few decades ago, people seemed to have been more willing to put their trust in political commentators who took pride in remaining politically independent and well-informed. Those commentators were able to expose false narratives to a greater extent than now occurs, and thus to limit the influence of political entrepreneurs who base their policies on falsehoods.

In recent years, however, mainstream media has become increasingly polarized. The rise of social media seems to have aggravated the problem. Many exchanges of views about political issues on social media consist largely of recitations of false narratives promulgated by political leaders.

Some commentators who are independent and well-informed can still be found in both mainstream and social media, but prevailing cultures may need to give greater respect to the search for truth before those people will have sufficient influence to discourage political entrepreneurs from promoting false narratives.

Conclusions

Authoritarian and libertarian political outcomes don’t just appear out of nowhere. Underlying cultural values that have evolved over long periods of time go some of the way toward explaining levels of economic and personal freedom in different countries. However, political entrepreneurship also plays an important role.

The role of political entrepreneurs is most apparent in those countries where underlying cultural values are less supportive of economic and personal freedom. Political entrepreneurs have played an important role in some of those countries in promoting either more or less freedom than would be expected on the basis of underlying cultural values.

The role of political entrepreneurship has been more constrained in those liberal democracies where the institutions of representative government have been respected for many decades.

However, the ability of some political entrepreneurs (from both conservative and progressive sides of politics) to persuade large numbers of people to accept false narratives is posing an increasing threat to personal and economic freedom in the liberal democracies. Polarization of the media means that such claims are now less subject to independent scrutiny than they were a few decades ago.

Recent political developments are raising the question of whether cultural change in some liberal democracies has emboldened some political entrepreneurs to challenge conventions regarding government respect for judicial rulings on the legality of their activities. Governments that do not perceive themselves to be bound by judicial interpretation of laws and constitutions are unlikely to have much regard for individual liberty. Any government which claims that its actions are beyond legal challenge because they reflect the general will of the people is showing obvious signs of authoritarianism.

Addendum

Chris M Sciabarra has given me permission to publish the following comment, which he has provided by email:

"I just read the essay and enjoyed it; I'll have to give a bit more thought to it. You make some very good, persuasive points, though there are some claims that I need to process a bit more. I think the whole concept of political entrepreneurship has some weight here. I wonder how, for example, it might mesh not only with public choice thinking, but also with Hayek's insights about how the 'worst get on top' when political power becomes the only power worth having. If that's the case, then political entrepreneurship in a populist age morphs into a kind of political con game that attacks the very roots of liberal democracy---something you acknowledge in your conclusions.

One of the issues that concerns me is that while there was a backlash against the "identity synthesis" of illiberal progressives, I don't think that was the key factor that influenced the outcome of the election. Incumbent parties lost all around the world, whether they were perceived as 'right'- or 'left'-leaning. In the US, of course, Trump won over Harris. In the UK, the Conservative Party was defeated. The Liberal Democrats lost in Japan, while in France, a coalition of left-wing and centrist parties gained ground. And so forth. I think that inflation, stagnant wages, housing affordability, etc. led most incumbents to defeat because whoever is in power is the party that takes the blame for the conditions on the ground. 

That said, I also think that the "identity synthesis" on the illiberal left has only been replaced by a different kind of "identity synthesis" on the illiberal right, given the right's embrace of nationalism and, in many cases, a virulent form of nativism, riding on profound anti-immigrant fervor. Not to mention the illiberal right's obsession with scapegoating the smallest of minorities---like transgender-identifying people, who make up about 0.6% of the population. This is as much of an illiberal right-wing play on identity politics as anything we've seen on the left." 

Chris has now posted a more extensive review on Notablog . 

Notablog is also worth visiting for other reasons - including the opportunity to take a break from worrying about authoritarianism to listen to the "Song of the Day". 

 

Is cultural backlash a major determinant of political outcomes in the liberal democracies?

 

In recent years, a major transformation has occurred in the politics of many of the liberal democracies as major political parties have increasingly been challenged, or taken over, by populists. What has brought this about? Can it be attributed to some kind of cultural backlash?

My starting point in this essay is the analysis of Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart in their book, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism (2019). I then consider some problems associated with this analysis, focusing particularly on the authors’ definition of authoritarian values and some critical comments by Armin Schäfer. In the following sections, I consider the relevance of Yasha Mounk’s explanation of Tne Identity Trap, the nature of the backlash to changing economic circumstances, and John Burn-Murdoch’s outline of differences between conservatives in the U.S. and Europe in values and attitudes regarding international cooperation.

The Norris-Inglehart analysis

The book by Norris and Inglehart seemed like a good place to begin considering cultural backlash theory because Ronald Inglehart deserves to be remembered with great respect for his efforts in creating a cultural model which explains a great deal about the reasons why people from different parts of the world often hold widely different views on social and political issues. Inglehart’s cultural model has two dimensions: secular rational values versus traditional values; and self-expression values versus survival values. He documented a shift from materialist values, which emphasize safety and security, to post-materialist values, involving increasing emphasis on individual freedom, occurring as a consequence of ongoing economic growth.

Norris and Inglehart argue that the spread of post-materialist values has induced a backlash among cultural conservatives. The authors do not dismiss explanations of growing support for authoritarian populism which emphasize economic grievances associated with economic globalization, immigration, stagnant real incomes, and perceptions of growing inequality. They find that populist attitudes are strongly influenced by personal experience of economic insecurity and perceptions of the national economy’s performance. However, according to their definition, “authoritarian values” are more common among old people than young people, and are more strongly linked with the respondent’s birth cohort than with economic indicators.

The authors found that anti-immigration attitudes were more strongly linked with authoritarian and populist values than with protecting economic interests. And, even after controlling for a range of attitudes toward immigrants and economic conditions, the respondent’s birth cohort remains the most important predictor of authoritarian values.

Norris and Inglehart believe that “the combination of authoritarian values disguised by populist rhetoric” is “potentially the most dangerous threat to liberal democracy.”

To assess the threat to liberal democracy that may be posed by those values and attitudes it is important to consider how the authors define authoritarian values.

Have authoritarian values been measured correctly?

 The authors conceptualize “authoritarian” values “as a cluster of three related components, emphasizing the importance of (i) conformity (strict adherence to group conventions and traditional customs); (ii) security (safety and protection of the group against risks, justifying strict enforcement and aggression toward outsiders who threaten the security or the accepted group norms); and (iii) loyalty (supporting the group and its leaders).” They view populism “as a style of rhetoric reflecting first-order principles about who should rule, claiming that legitimate power rests with ‘the people’ not the elites.”

The main problem I have with the Norris-Inglehart definition of authoritarian values is that many of the people I know who emphasize conformity to group conventions, group security, and loyalty to the group and its leaders, would be more appropriately labelled as conservatives than as authoritarians. The conventions they seek to uphold are concerned with civility rather than oppression. They emphasize national security because they see it as necessary to avoid becoming the victims of oppression. They display loyalty to the group and elected leaders because they identify as citizens of the nation in which they live.

It seems to me that a more appropriate measure of authoritarian values is implicit in Christian Welzel’s work on emancipative values. The people who hold authoritarian values are those whose values are on the lower end of the scale of emancipative values. Welzel developed the concept of emancipate values to measure the beliefs that people hold about such matters as the importance of personal autonomy, respect for the choices people make in their personal lives, having a say in community decisions, and equality of opportunity. More information about Welzel’s research on emancipative values can be found here.

My understanding is that people who have an authoritarian personality are attracted to the possibility of oppressing others. That is the view of Hans Eysenck, who undertook some pathbreaking work on the personality predictors of political extremism. An important implication of that view is that authoritarian values are not the preserve of either the conservative or progressive side of politics.

That line of reasoning might suggest that the Norris-Inglehart analysis is more relevant to understanding a conservative backlash than the emergence of authoritarian tendencies that might threaten democracies. Nevertheless, as discussed later, there is some evidence that people who identify with the right wing of U.S. politics now have values more akin to Russians and Turks than to the supporters of right wing parties in western Europe.

How much do cultural attitudes vary by age?

In an article entitled “Cultural Backlash? How (Not) to Explain the Rise of Authoritarian Populism”, published in 2021, Armin Schäfer found that, on most issues, people in different age groups have similar cultural attitudes. His analysis suggests that older cohorts are slightly more likely to vote for authoritarian (right wing) parties but less likely to vote for populist ones. His conclusion is that generational replacement is unlikely to attenuate the rise of authoritarian (right wing) populism.

Schäfer does not dismiss cultural explanations of populism. He agrees with Norris and Inglehart that opposition to immigration is linked systematically to authoritarian (conservative) values and a lack of trust in politics.

A backlash to the illiberalism of progressives

 It is common for the spread of post-materialist values to be accompanied by conservative resistance, but much of that resistance seems to dissipate over time. Many cultural conservatives now seem to have accepted, however reluctantly, some of the social changes that they strongly opposed a few decades ago e.g. divorce, pre-marital sex and legalization of homosexuality, and they now also seem to be going through the process of accepting other social changes, such as same sex marriage.

In my view, it is the authoritarian tendencies of many progressives that has promoted a voter backlash, rather than the spread of post-materialist values. The best discussion I have read about the authoritarian tendencies of progressives has been provided by Yascha Mounk in his book, The Identity Trap, published in 2023. Mounk does not refer explicitly to “authoritarian tendencies” but the illiberalism that he discusses amounts to the same thing in my view.

In writing about what he refers to the “identity synthesis”, Mounk recognizes that its advocates are seeking to remedy serious injustices affecting marginalized groups that have historically suffered “terrible forms of discrimination”.  The identity synthesis is concerned with many different kinds of groups including those related to race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, and disability.  The distinguishing feature of the identity thesis is that its advocates reject neutral rules like equal opportunity and free speech in favour of action to promote the interests of particular groups. According to this thesis, the way the state treats each citizen – and how citizens treat each other – should depend on the identity group to which they belong.

Mounk’s main point is that the identity synthesis will ultimately prove counterproductive: 

“Despite the good intentions of its proponents, it undermines progress toward genuine equality between members of different groups. In the process, it also subverts other goals we all have reasons to care about, like the stability of diverse democracies.”

The identity synthesis subverts the stability of democracies because it makes it harder for people to broaden their allegiances beyond a particular identity. It is a political trap because it makes it harder to sustain diverse societies whose citizens trust and respect each other. It “pits rigid identity groups against each other in a zero-sum battle for resources and recognition.”

Much of Mounk’s book is devoted to a philosophical discussion of how the identity synthesis evolved. The story he tells is of a short march through the institutions, associated with postmodernism, rather than the long march of cultural Marxism. He suggests that since the identity synthesis is inherently about ongoing tension between different identity groups it lacks Marxism’s utopian promise of eventually abolishing all class distinctions.

There has also been a backlash to the authoritarian tendencies within the environmental movement. Although environmental activism is not part of the identity synthesis discussed by Mounk, he makes the interesting observation that in embracing “intersectionality” many voluntary organisations have broadened their missions in line with the idea that all forms of oppression are connected. He gives the Sierra Club as an example.

What about the economy?

The analysis in the preceding essay on this blog leads me to suspect that the longer-term slowdown in economic growth in the liberal democracies might be more important in generating support for populist policies than are grievances that can be related directly to import competition or immigration. Import competition and immigration may just be convenient scapegoats.

The preceding essay shows:

• The perception of having a lower standard of living than parents at a comparable age has a substantial adverse impact on life satisfaction ratings.
• Perceptions of standard of living relative to parents are positively related to past economic growth experience of the countries in which people live.
• In the high-income countries, low growth has a greater adverse impact on young peoples’ perceptions of their standard of living relative to parents than on the corresponding perceptions of old people.

A backlash to internationalism?

John Burn-Murdoch, a researcher who works for the Financial Times, recently made an international comparison of the values of people associated with different political parties in article entitled ‘Why the Maga mindset is different’ (March 7, 2025). His analysis, using data from the World Values Survey, suggests that in many respects (including attitudes to international cooperation) the values of people who identify with the U.S. right wing are closer to the values of people in Turkey, Russia, and China than to those who identify with right wing parties in Europe, or with the U.S. left. His analysis also suggests, however, that “the US Republicans of 20 years ago were no keener on autocracy than the average Canadian or Western European – and just as supportive of international co-operation.”

Perhaps that change of attitudes reflects a cultural backlash that can be partly attributed to 9/11 and the outcomes of the Iraq and Afghan wars. It may also be partly attributable to increasing dissatisfaction with the performance of international organisations, and a perception that U.S. taxpayers have been making excessive contributions to those organisations.

It is important to note that even where a substantial proportion of the population of a country endorses authoritarian values, that does not necessarily result in authoritarian political institutions. That finding emerges from some analysis published on my blog in 2023 in an essay entitled:  “To what extent do international differences in personal freedom reflect people’s values?”  The analysis uses Christian Welzel’s emancipative values data from the World Values Survey and personal freedom data from Cato. It indicates that international differences in personal freedom do broadly reflect the prevalence of emancipative values (the opposite of authoritarian values). However, there are many outliers. For example, personal freedom in China and Iran is lower than might be predicted solely on the basis of the prevalence of emancipative values, whereas personal freedom in Armenia, Georgia, Cyprus and Taiwan is higher than might be predicted on that basis.

Personal freedom in the U.S. seems broadly consistent with the overall prevalence of emancipative values in that country (including both the left and right wings). The current U.S. government is clearly seeking to implement a major change in the direction of many government policies. I am not yet persuaded, however, that its actions will have a substantial adverse impact on the institutions of liberal democracy. 

Conclusions

Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart argue that the spread of post-materialist values has induced a cultural backlash among cultural conservatives. On that basis they suggest that the combination of authoritarianism and populist rhetoric is a threat to liberal democracy.

In my view, Norris and Inglehart were mistaken in attributing cultural backlash to the spread of post-materialist values. It would be more correct to attribute cultural backlash to the illiberalism of progressives who have been advocating what Yascha Mounk has described as the identity synthesis. The identity synthesis has provoked a backlash because it rejects neutral rules like equal opportunity and free speech in favour of action to promote the interests of particular groups that have suffered from discrimination in the past.

Economic grievances play an important role in encouraging people to support policy remedies proposed by populists. My previous research has highlighted the adverse impact that slower economic growth may have on life satisfaction. I suspect that the longer-term slowdown in economic growth in the liberal democracies might be more important in generating support for populist policies than are grievances that can be related directly to the impact of import competition or immigration.

Some recent research has suggested that over the last 20 years the values held by people who identify with the right wing of U.S. politics has moved closer to the values of people in Turkey, Russia and China than to people who identify with the right wing of politics in Europe. It remains to be seen what impact, if any, this apparent retreat from classical liberal values will have on the institutions of liberal democracy in the United States.

How difficult would it be for individuals to adjust to zero economic growth?

 

It would not be difficult for governments to achieve zero economic growth. They would just need to do more of the things that they are doing at present to slow down the adoption of new technology, create policy uncertainty, protect inefficient firms and industries from competition, and reduce the incentives for people to work. I could make a more detailed list of policies they could adopt, but I am not in the business of advising politicians about how to achieve zero growth.

Those who argue for lower economic growth don’t talk much about adverse psychological impacts that people might experience as a consequence. They seem to assume that if economic growth was stopped, average life satisfaction would stay where it is now. The basis for that assumption is that in high-income countries, further increases in income offer negligible benefits in terms of increased life satisfaction. That is consistent with the views of Richard Easterlin, who was made famous by his pathbreaking research on the relationship between economic growth and indicators of subjective well-being. Easterlin argues:

“At a point in time, happiness varies directly with income both among and within nations, but over time the long term growth rates of happiness and income are not significantly related.”

That passage is quoted in an article by Michael Plant which provides quite a strong defense of Easterlin’s position.

In my view, Easterlin is broadly correct. As incomes rise, additional economic growth can be expected to make a progressively smaller contribution to psychological well-being (as commonly measured by average life satisfaction ratings). Nevertheless, people may have good reasons to seek to have higher incomes. As I discussed in Chapter 1 of Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing, psychological well-being is only one of the goods of a flourishing human.

However, the main point I propose to make in this essay is that adoption of policies to achieve zero economic growth would be likely to pose substantial psychic costs (psychological adjustment costs) for many people as they are forced to revise their expectations downwards. I begin the essay by discussing international data on the perceptions that people have about their standard of living relative to their parents and then link that data to average life satisfaction.

1.        Are perceptions of standard of living relative to parents related to economic growth?

In the latest round of the World Values Survey (WVS 2017-22) respondents were asked the following question about their standard of living: “Comparing your standard of living with your parents’ standard of living when they were about your age, would you say that you are better off, worse off or about the same?” (I downloaded that data for as many countries as possible using the WVS’s excellent facility for online analysis.)

Matching the WVS data with World Bank data on per capita income (NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD) and rate of growth in per capita income (NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG) left me with a data set covering 63 countries. I used income data for 2002, and growth data for the period from 2002 to 2022. The reasoning behind that was to separate the growth experience prior to 2002 (reflected in income levels for 2002) from subsequent growth experience.

(It would have been nice to be able to conduct this analysis using a larger data set, but beggars can’t be choosers. I hope that one day someone will attempt to replicate and extend the study using a data set for a larger number of countries.)

Countries were allocated to four groups of approximately equal size:

• Low-income, low growth e.g. Pakistan, Kenya
• Low-income, high growth e.g. China, Indonesia, India
• High-income, low growth e.g. U.S.A., Germany, Australia
• High-income, high growth e.g. South Korea, Singapore.

The average percentage of those who consider themselves to be better off than their parents at a comparable age is shown in Figure 1a. As might be expected, a higher percentage of people are in the “better off” category in the high-income and high growth countries.

Figure 1b shows that the percentages in the “worse off” category are lowest in the high income and high growth countries.

Figure 1c shows that the percentage who are “about the same” is higher in the low growth countries than in the high growth countries.

Overall, this analysis suggests that perceptions of standard of living relative to parents are positively related to past economic growth experience of the countries in which people live. Historical growth experience, reflected in per capita income levels in 2002, and more recent growth experience over the last 20 years are both relevant.

2.        Do perceptions of standard of living relative to parents differ according to the age of respondents?

As might be expected, Figure 2a shows that in the high income, low growth countries older people are less adversely affected by low growth than are young people. The fact that more than half of respondents aged 50+ still perceive their standard of living to be better than that of their parents, presumably reflects the benefits of higher economic growth rates earlier in their working lives.

The picture presented in Figure 2b is consistent with that in Figure 2a.

Figure 2c indicates that there is not much difference between age groups among respondents who perceive that their standard of living is about the same as that of their parents.

Overall, perceptions of standard of living relative to parents do differ somewhat according to the age of respondents. In particular, in the high-income countries, low growth has a greater adverse impact on young people than on old people.

3.        Are life satisfaction ratings influenced by perceptions of standard of living relative to parents?

Figure 3 shows average life satisfaction ratings for each of the four categories of countries and each of the three categories of responses to the question about standard of living relative to parents.

Several observations may be made:

First, average life satisfaction ratings are higher for the high-income, low growth group than for other countries. It is somewhat surprising that life satisfaction is not as high, or higher in the high-income, high growth group. It might be interesting to speculate about that result, but my focus is on the question of whether perceptions of standard of living relative to parents influence life satisfaction ratings.

Second, average life satisfaction ratings of those who perceive their standard of living to be about the same as their parents are not much lower than for those who perceive their standard of living to be higher than that of their parents.

Third, average life satisfaction ratings of those who perceive their standard of living to be lower than that of their parents are substantially lower than for those who perceive their standard of living to be higher than that of their parents. That is true for all four groups of countries.

The important point to note is that the perception of having a lower standard of living than parents had at a comparable age has a substantial adverse impact on life satisfaction ratings.

Implications

The implications of the observed relationship between perceptions of standard of living relative to parents at a comparable age and economic growth experience are obvious. Lower economic growth is likely to result in increasing percentages of people having lower living standards than their parents. If economic growth is brought to a halt, the percentages who perceive that their living standards are lower than those of their parents would presumably end up approximately equal to the percentages who perceive that their incomes are higher than those of their parents.  

The implications for average life satisfaction of an increase in percentages who feel worse off than their parents at a comparable age are also obvious from the analysis presented above. An increase in the percentage of people who perceive that they have a lower standard of living than their parents is likely to result in a decline in average life satisfaction. The extent and duration of the associated decline in psychological well-being could be expected to vary depending on the resilience of individuals.

The analysis suggests that the psychic costs of adjustment to zero economic growth would initially fall most heavily on young people. In countries where per capita incomes are relatively high, older members of the population have been able to retain the benefits of higher economic growth that occurred earlier in their working lives.

In an earlier study focusing on Australia I found that in the 18-54 years group 33% felt better off than their parents; 48% felt worse off, and 19% felt that their incomes were about the same as their parents’ incomes at a comparable age. Consistent with the findings of the current study, those who felt worse off than their parents had substantially lower life satisfaction.

The Australian study looked more deeply at the group who feel worse-off than their parents, to observe the extent to which their life satisfaction experiences interacted with their resilience. As might be expected, the results indicated that people with relatively high resilience were able to maintain relatively high life satisfaction despite feeling worse off than their parents were at a comparable age.

Implications of three different kinds follow from acknowledging that lower economic growth causes an increasing proportion of the population to experience the psychic costs associated with disappointed expectations.

First, at an individual level, those affected are posed with the problem of how to adjust to the new set of circumstances. They may need the support of family and friends, and possibly professional help, to moderate the psychic costs involved.

Second, governments, and those advising them, need to consider whether there are more sensible ways to pursue policy objectives. The psychic costs associated with zero economic growth make this outcome less desirable, irrespective of whether it is pursued deliberately or occurs as a consequence of the incompetence of those responsible for economic policies.

Third, observers of interactions within social and economic systems need to consider likely responses of voters who are disappointed that it has become more difficult to achieve the goal of being able to maintain a standard of living at least as high as that of their parents. Voters can be expected to blame government policies for their predicament. From a social science perspective, the interesting question is whether government policy responses are more likely to restore economic growth or make the problem worse.

Conclusions

This essay has focused on the likely impact on average life satisfaction at a national level of policies to achieve zero economic growth. Data from the World Values Survey has been used to examine the relationship between the perceptions of respondents about their standard of living relative to their parents at a comparable age and economic growth in the countries in which they reside. That data has then been linked to average life satisfaction.

The main findings are:

Perceptions of standard of living relative to parents are positively related to past economic growth experience of the countries in which people live.

In the high-income countries, low growth has a greater adverse impact on young peoples’ perceptions of their standard of living relative to parents than on the corresponding perceptions of old people.

The perception of having a lower standard of living than parents at a comparable age has a substantial adverse impact on life satisfaction ratings.

These findings imply that lower economic growth rates would be likely to result in an increasing proportion of the population having lower living standards than their parents, and hence, lower average life satisfaction. The psychic costs of adjustment to zero economic growth would initially fall most heavily on young people.

Zero economic growth would have implications for individuals, governments and social scientists:

• At an individual level, those whose expectations have been disappointed are posed with the problem of how to adjust.
• Governments and their advisors are posed with the problem of considering whether there are more sensible ways of pursuing policy objectives.
• Social scientists are posed with the problem of assessing whether voters in different countries are more likely to respond in ways that will fix the problem by restoring economic growth, or to make it worse by favoring policies that will lead to economic decline.

The problems of psychological adjustment to lower economic growth should no longer be ignored.

Addendum

I have received the following comment by email from Arthur Grimes, Senior Fellow, Motu, Wellington, New Zealand:

"This is an excellent article - thanks for the contribution to understanding these issues.

Another angle is to think about how people's life satisfaction reacts when incomes in their country grow more slowly than comparable and/or neighboring countries. There are a couple of studies that show an analogous situation to your results; i.e. people in more slowly growing countries feel worse off (in subjective wellbeing terms) than do people in higher growth countries."

My response:

One of the articles that Arthur referred to is: Arthur Grimes and Marc Reinhardt, ‘Relative Income, Subjective Wellbeing and the Easterlin Paradox: Intra- and Inter -national Comparisons’, published as Chapter 4 in: Mariano Rojas (Ed.) The Economics of Happiness: How the Easterlin Paradox Transformed Our Understanding of Well-Being and Progress (Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2019).

The abstract of the article is as follows:

“We extend the Easterlin Paradox (EP) literature in two key respects. First, we test whether income comparisons matter for subjective wellbeing both when own incomes are compared with others within the country (intra-national) and with incomes across countries (inter-national). Second, we test whether these effects differ by settlement-type (rural through to large cities) and by country-type (developed and transitional). We confirm the intra-national EP prediction that subjective wellbeing is unchanged by an equi-proportionate rise in intra-country incomes across all developed country settlement-types. This is also the case for rural areas in transitional countries but not for larger settlements in those countries. International income comparisons are important for people’s subjective wellbeing across all country-settlement-types. Policy-makers must therefore consider their citizens’ incomes in an international context and cannot restrict attention solely to the intra-national income distribution.”

In combination with my results, the findings of the article suggest to me that a range of different reference points are relevant to life satisfaction ratings. Arthur has provided another reason to expect people in more slowly growing countries to feel worse off (in subjective wellbeing terms) than do people in higher growth countries.   

What is the problem with aggressive realism in international relations?

 

Before I outline John Mearsheimer’s theory of aggressive realism, I will present my version of the classical liberal view of international relations.

A classical liberal view

As the epigraph might suggest, I subscribe to a view of international relations that has been around, in one form or another, at least since the time of the Ancient Greeks. The poet Hesiod, one of the founders of Greek epic poetry, advised his brother, Perses, to avoid thinking of obtaining wealth by engaging in predatory violence, including war. He urged Perses to respect the rights of other people, and to seek prosperity by working and engaging in peaceful competition with economic rivals.

As I see it, it is natural for individuals to seek to flourish by engaging in peaceful pursuits in mutually beneficial collaboration with others. However, it is an unfortunate fact of life that some people - individuals, groups, and nations - seek to obtain wealth by predation. People can flourish by engaging in peaceful pursuits only if they are able to protect themselves from predation.

It is not difficult to identify predatory nations which have a recent track record of seeking to invade the territory of other jurisdictions or threatening acts of violence against them. 

People in neighboring jurisdictions have an obvious incentive to protect themselves, and each other, from such predatory behavior. Nations that do not have predatory intent toward other jurisdictions have an incentive to band together to form communities of peaceful nations. The purpose of these multinational communities is to establish and enforce international rules that outlaw invasion and other violent activities that predatory nations undertake.

The multilateral communities of peaceful nations (MCPN) that I have in mind would have more in common with some existing security treaties than with the United Nations. I envisage that the MCPN would exist solely for mutual protection and would avoid attempting to pursue other objectives such as protecting individual rights, promoting economic development, or pursuing environmental objectives.  Multilateral cooperation might be desirable to pursue some of those other objectives, but the MCPN are more likely to be effective in pursuing the objective of discouraging predation if they focus specifically on that objective.

The approach proposed above should enable liberal democracies to avoid becoming involved in pathetic attempts to impose the institutions of liberal democracy on people with different belief systems, values, and ideals. However, it would support provision of military aid to Ukraine - to support its defense against Russian aggression, to Israel - to support its defense against terrorism sponsored by Iran, and to Taiwan - to counter Chinese threats of invasion.

I have previously outlined some similar ideas in myreview of Christopher Coyne’s book, In Search of Monsters to Destroy.

The approach proposed here has much in common with the classical liberal approach to international relations theory described by Edwin van de Haar in a monograph entitled, Human Nature and World Affairs, published by the London-based Institute of Economic Affairs in 2023.

The theory of aggressive realism

When a friend suggested a few weeks ago that I should watch Lex Fridman’s interview of John Mearsheimer, my initial reaction was that I had already knew enough about Mearsheimer’s views because someone had referred them to me in 2022, soon after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. I suggested that my friend should take a look at Niall Ferguson’s refutation of Mearsheimer. Surprisingly, he took up my suggestion, so I felt obliged to watch the Mearsheimer interview.

After watching the interview, my initial reaction was that I had heard enough from John Mearsheimer to last me for at least the rest of 2025. However, I had to acknowledge (to myself) that Mearsheimer’s approach to the issues was scholarly, So I decided that it might be worth trying to find out more about the basis for his views. That is how I came to read, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2014 edition).

Mearsheimer argues that the overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power. Since no state is likely to achieve global hegemony, the world is condemned to “perpetual great power competition”.

His theory of aggressive realism is based on 5 bedrock assumptions:

1. The international system is anarchic, in the sense that the system comprises independent states that have no central authority above them. 
2. Great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability. 
3. No state can ever be certain about another state’s intentions, regarding the use of offensive military capability.
4. Survival is the primary goal of great powers – they are unlikely to be able to pursue other goals if they are conquered.
5. Great powers are rational actors – they think strategically about how to survive in their external environment.

Mearsheimer argues that these assumptions are realistic and that, together, they “create powerful incentives for great powers to think and act offensively with regard to each other”.  He suggests that hegemony is the best way for any state to guarantee its own survival.

The author views aggressive realism as a prescriptive theory as well as a descriptive theory. If great powers want to survive, they should behave like aggressive realists.

The extent to which states fear each other determines the severity of their security competition as well as the probability that they will fight a war. An “unbalanced multipolarity” is the power configuration that generates the most fear because it contains a potential hegemon which stands a good chance of dominating the other great powers in its region and the world.

Much of Mearsheimer’s book is devoted to marshalling historical evidence in support of his theory, but the final chapter focuses on a specific application of his theory. In that chapter, he seeks to answer the question: Can China rise peacefully?

Mearsheimer does not believe China can rise peacefully. He argues that if China maintains rapid economic growth over the next few decades, it is likely to end up in an intense security competition with the United States and its neighbors. He views China as a potential hegemon and the current international power configuration as an unbalanced multipolarity.

According to Mearsheimer, the optimal policy for the United States to adopt toward China is “containment”, rather than other alternatives including preventive war, pursuing policies aimed at slowing China’s economic growth, or seeking to weaken China by fomenting trouble within its borders. Containment means “keeping Beijing from using its military forces to conquer territory and more generally expand its influence in Asia”. Mearsheimer suggests that the U.S. should form a balancing coalition with as many of China’s neighbors as possible.

Where is the problem?

As I see it, there are two main weaknesses in Mearsheimer’s analysis. The most fundamental problem stems from assumption 3. In order to argue that aggressive realism is the optimal strategy for a state to adopt, I think it would be necessary to argue that there is always a great deal of uncertainty about the intentions of neighboring states, rather than just lack of certainty. Perhaps it is true that no state can ever be certain about another state’s intentions, but I think states can usually make well-informed judgements about the intentions of their neighbors. Australia and New Zealand, for example, can be sufficiently certain about their intentions toward each other, to refrain from adopting offensive postures in that relationship. I think the same has generally been true of relations between Canada and the United States over the last century, but the recent rhetoric of the U.S. president might suggest that Canada would be wise to begin to re-assess the probability that the U.S. will continue to respect its territorial integrity.

Those examples illustrate the point I want to make. It is possible to make probabilistic assessments about the intentions of other states from past behavior and the rhetoric of their leaders. Some states obviously have peaceful intentions towards their neighbors whereas other states are currently engaged in predatory activities. In other instances, the probability of predatory behavior over the next decade might lie in the range from 0.1% to 1%; or from 90% to 100%; or in some other range.

The other weakness in Mearsheimer’s analysis seems to me to be an excessive focus on China as the potential hegemon. I agree with his analysis and policy prescription relating to China - as long as “containment” is pursued in a manner that can be presented to the Chinese government as a response to its aggressive policies toward its neighbors, rather than as an attempt to impede China's peaceful interactions with its neighbors.

 It seems to me, however, that communities of peaceful nations should be concerned to discourage all states from predation on their neighbors.  States that profit from predation have no incentive to stop until they assess that the costs of further predation are outweighed by the benefits. States in the neighborhood of Russia, Iran, and North Korea have good reasons to seek to contain the aggressive tendencies of those countries. Given that China, Russia, Iran and North Korea engage in military cooperation with each other, it would be particularly unwise for the U.S. and its allies to be unduly pre-occupied with responding to the rise of China.

Conclusions

John Mearsheimer’s theory of aggressive realism suggests that the over-riding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power. He argues that there are powerful incentives for all great powers to act offensively with regard to each other.

The crucial assumption that Mearsheimer makes is that no state can ever be certain about another state’s intentions, regarding use of offensive military capability. I argue that it is possible for states to make probabilistic assessments about the intentions of other states based on past behavior and the rhetoric of their leaders.

It is not difficult to identify nations that have a recent track record of predatory behavior. Peaceful nations have an obvious incentive to band together to enforce international rules that outlaw invasion and other violent predatory activity.

Mearsheimer’s concerns about challenges that could arise from emergence of a new hegemon have led him to focus on the risks posed by the rise of China. While I agree with much of his analysis regarding the threat posed by China in the years ahead, it would be unwise for peaceful nations to overlook the threats currently posed by others (including Russia, Iran and North Korea) who clearly have predatory intentions toward other jurisdictions in their neighborhoods and are currently engaging in military cooperation in pursuit of their several objectives.