What role has political entrepreneurship played in changes in human freedom this century?

 

For the purposes of this exercise, I have used the Human Freedom Index, published by Cato and the Fraser Institute, to identify which countries have experienced greatest change in human freedom this century.

In my view, this index provides the best available information on the state of liberty throughout the world. The latest publication in this series, The Human Freedom Index 2024, by Ian Vásquez, Matthew D. Mitchell, Ryan Murphy, and Guillermina Sutter Schneide, provides measures of personal and economic freedom in 2022 for jurisdictions covering 98% of the world’s population. The accompanying data set enables change in personal and economic freedom to be assessed for 157 countries over the period from 2000 to 2022.

This study is associated with my recent research efforts directed toward attempting to understand the role of political entrepreneurship in institutional change. The research reported here links most directly to some previous research which suggests that levels of personal and economic freedom in some countries have been more strongly influenced by political entrepreneurship than by underlying cultural values of the people.

The idea behind the current study is that if we can identify the countries that have experienced greatest change in economic and personal freedom and know a little about the recent political history of those countries, we will better placed to make judgements about the factors responsible for institutional change. The question I ask myself is whether changes in freedom can be attributed to the efforts of a political entrepreneur with an ideological mission, as opposed to other factors such as cultural change in the broader community, responses to economic crises, and external factors including advice of foreign governments and international agencies.

In this essay, I first consider the above graph which shows changes in personal and economic freedom this century for the full data set (157 countries) and then consider a second graph showing the same data for countries with above median human freedom in 2022.

Jurisdictions with greatest change in human freedom

The human freedom index reflects the combined impact of economic freedom and personal freedom. In the graph shown above, the 10 countries with greatest improvement in human freedom are labelled and identified with a green marker and the 10 countries with the greatest decline in human freedom are labelled and identified with a red marker.

An initial point worth noting about the graphs is the relatively small number of countries in the bottom right quadrant with an increase in personal freedom accompanied by a decline in economic freedom. That result is consistent with Milton Friedman’s observation that economic freedom “promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in this way allows the one to offset the other.” Hopefully, the people in counties in the top left quadrant, who have experienced substantial increases in economic freedom under oppressive governments, will subsequently be able to experience greater personal freedom as well.

It is not difficult to identify political entrepreneurs who have made a major contribution to repression of liberty in jurisdictions that have experienced the greatest declines in human freedom since 2000. Peronism remained a dominant force in Argentinian politics in the first two decades on this century, even though Juan Peron died in 1974. The political landscape in Venezuela was dominated by Hugo Chavez and Nicholas Maduro, who have both pursued policies inimical to economic and personal freedom. In Venezuela, Daniel Ortega held the presidency for extended periods. Chad was subject to authoritarian rule by Idriss Deby Itno until his death in 2021. Iranian politics has been dominated by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei since 1989. Much of the decline in economic and personal freedom in Egypt has occurred since 2014, under the presidency of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. In Turkey, economic and personal freedom have also declined substantially since 2014, when Recep Erdogan came to power. The ruler of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, imposed substantial additional restrictions on personal freedom following the outbreak of civil war in 2011. Personal freedom in Hong Kong has been increasingly restricted since 2012 when Xi Jinping came to power in China. The decline in personal freedom in Bahrain since 2010 reflects the response of the government of King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa to an upsurge of political opposition.

It is more difficult to identify political entrepreneurs who have made a major contribution to expansion of liberty in jurisdictions that have experienced the greatest improvement in human freedom since 2000. That may partly reflect poor media coverage of good news stories in Africa. Substantial improvements in human freedom occurred in Liberia under the political leadership of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and in Gambia, under the leadership of Adama Barrow.

Some of the other countries that have experienced substantial improvements in human freedom have had governments that have tended to favour free markets consistently. Countries in that category include Lebanon, Armenia, Sierra-Leone and Colombia.

In some countries, including Timor-Leste, international agencies have played an important role in encouraging policies to strengthen government institutions and reduce corruption.

Many of the countries that have experienced substantial increases in human freedom have improved from a low base and still have human freedom levels well below the world average. Countries in that category include Angola, Lebanon, Laos and Sierra-Leone.

 Changes in freedom in relatively high freedom countries

 

When we focus on countries which currently have relatively high levels of freedom, a substantially different set of countries emerges as the 10 with largest declines or increases in economic freedom. Argentina is the only country with reduced human freedom which is common to both groups. Timor Leste and Armenia are the only countries with increased human freedom that are common to both groups.

Among countries with reduced human freedom, political entrepreneurs who have played a prominent role in implementing restrictive policies include Victor Orban in Hungary, Pravind Jugnauth in Mauritius, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Andrzej Duda in Poland.

The decline in human freedom in Guyana, Greece, France, UK, and USA seem to have occurred mainly via gradual slippage rather than deliberate policy. In addition, restrictions on freedom imposed in those countries during the coronavirus epidemic had not been fully removed in 2022.

It is difficult to identify political entrepreneurs who have played a prominent role in promoting economic and personal freedom in the countries with greatest increases in human freedom. However, Maia Sandu played a prominent role in Moldova. Bidzina Ivanishvili has played a prominent role in politics in Georgia since 2012, during a period of improvement in human freedom, but it is unlikely that his more recent political endeavours have had a positive influence on human freedom.

The countries with greatest increase in human freedom generally have policies which strongly favour free markets. The main exceptions seem to be the governments of Malawi and Timor Leste, which have been less supportive of economic freedom.

Conclusion

This essay has focused on countries that have experience substantial changes in human freedom over the period from 2000 to 2020 in an endeavour to assess the role of political entrepreneurship in those changes.

The Human Freedom Index, published by Cato and the Fraser Institute, has been used to identify countries with greatest changes in freedom levels. Information on the recent political history of those countries has then been used to assess whether the changes could be attributed to the influence of political entrepreneurs with an ideological mission.

The study first considered changes in freedom in the full data set of 157 countries and then at changes in freedom for countries with above median freedom levels.

My general conclusion is that, at least during the period considered, political entrepreneurship has played a larger role in bringing about substantial declines in human freedom than in bringing about substantial improvements in human freedom.

Where did Carl Schmitt go wrong in his critique of democracy?

 

I first became aware of Carl Schmitt about 30 years ago while reading Friedrich Hayek’s book, Law, Legislation and Liberty. At that stage I was left with the impression that while Schmitt still had influence among German legal philosophers, his views were mainly interest to people wondering how a respected academic could become a Nazi. Over the last year or so, however, I seem to be coming across increasing references to the relevance to contemporary politics of Schmitt’s views about friend-enemy distinctions and the autonomy of the political.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides the following biographical information about Schmitt:

“Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) was a conservative German legal, constitutional, and political theorist. Schmitt is often considered to be one of the most important critics of liberalism, parliamentary democracy, and liberal cosmopolitanism. But the value and significance of Schmitt’s work is subject to controversy, mainly due to his intellectual support for and active involvement with National Socialism.”

My reading of the full entry about Schmitt in the Stanford Encyclopedia (written by Lars Vinx) reinforced the impression I previously had that Schmitt’s political philosophy is inherently authoritarian. However, the conclusion that Peter C. Caldwell reached in his literature review is ambivalent:

“What Schmitt’s real message is remains disputed. Fifty years after the first reflections on his work began to appear, his interpreters still battle over whether he was primarily a brilliant lawyer and theorist of constitutional democracy or a gravedigger of democracy and apologist for authoritarianism; an intellectual adventurer and opportunist or a serious analyst of modernity; a conservative trying to save what could be saved of the European heritage or an antisemite and Nazi.”

(‘Controversies over Carl Schmitt: A Review of Recent Literature’, The Journal of Modern History 77, June 2025)

The focus of this essay has been determined largely by a couple of books that I have read recently. I focus on three aspects of Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy. First, I consider Adrian Vermeule’s synthesis of Catholic integralism and Carl Schmitt’s view that politics is war. Second, I consider the link between entangled political economy and Carl Schmitt’s concept of the autonomy of the political. Finally, I reconsider Friedrich Hayek’s view of Carl Schmitt’s legal philosophy.

Vermeule’s synthesis of integralism and Schmittian illiberalism

My initial source for the discussion of integralism was Kevin Vallier’s book, All the Kingdom’s of the World (2023). I recently reviewed Vallier's book in an essay entitled, ‘Are integralists opposed to natural rights?’, but neglected to mention Vermeule’s affinity with the political philosophy of Carl Schmitt.

Vallier refers to Vermeule’s article, The Ark of Tradition, which is a review of Schmitt’s book, Roman Catholicism and Political Form. Vermeule writes:

“My suggestion, which is consistent with Schmitt’s vision, but goes beyond what he articulates, is that the Church serves as a kind of ark, whose vocation is to preserve the living tradition of the Verbum Dei amidst the universal deluge of economic-technical decadence, and the eventual self-undermining of the regime.”

He goes on to quote Schmitt:

“Should economic thinking succeed in realizing its utopian goal and in bringing about an absolutely unpolitical condition of human society, the Church would remain the only agency of political thinking and political form. Then the Church would have a stupendous monopoly: its hierarchy would be nearer the political domination of the world than in the Middle Ages.”

My understanding of what Schmitt meant by “an absolutely unpolitical condition of human society”, is a condition in which people would no longer be interested in drawing “friend-enemy distinctions”. Schmitt claimed that life in a completely de-politicized world would be shallow, insignificant, and meaningless.

Such views seem to me to be mistaken and to have potential to cause a great deal of unnecessary misery. In fields of human endeavour such as business and sport, friendly rivalry obviously helps to make life meaningful for many people. However, friendly rivalry does not require friend-enemy distinctions. Opportunities for human flourishing are enhanced in societies where individuals tend to seek mutual benefit from voluntary (and friendly) interactions with other people, rather than seeking to benefit from the friend-enemy distinctions associated with coercive political processes.  

Lars Vinx notes: 

“Some interpreters have explained Schmitt’s hostility towards liberal de-politicization as being grounded in the view that a willingness to distinguish between friend and enemy is a theological duty.”  

That made me wonder, very briefly, whether a theologian could argue that it is necessary for Christians to be able to distinguish between friend and enemy in order to follow Jesus’s exhortation to love one’s enemies. Before wasting too much time, however, I reminded myself of Erasmus’s message about refraining from wars over theology, which seems to me to remain as relevant today as at the time of the Protestant Reformation. (If further explanation is required, please read something I wrote about Erasmus a few years ago.)

Autonomy of the political

In my recent essay entitled “How does entangled political economy help us to understand political entrepreneurship?”, I drew heavily on Richard E. Wagner’s book, Politics as a Peculiar Business,. However, that essay doesn’t discuss the link that Wagner draws between entangled political economy and Carl Schmitt’s concept of the autonomy of the political.

The concept of autonomy of the political describes power relations and the behaviour of those who hold political power in society. The surface impression is that a small number of rulers dominate larger masses of citizens, but power is ever present in society and can be manifested in a variety of different ways. Wagner’s concept of entangled political economy “rests on the twin autonomies of the political and the economic in society, and the interaction between those autonomies being a source of turbulence within society.”   

Wagner writes:

“For Schmitt, the autonomy of the political rested on exceptional circumstances and the friend–enemy distinction. Exceptional circumstances mean that a rule of law cannot be articulated that will cover every possible point of decision that might arise. The presence of exceptions is a point where the autonomy of the political enters into society. The friend–enemy distinction is a feature of the crooked timber of humanity that surely intensifies with increases in societal complexity and the hierarchical ordering in terms of status that comes in the wake of growing complexity.”

Schmitt argued that even if constitutional arrangements are crafted to support private ordering of societal interaction, the autonomy of the political will assert itself in the guise of exceptional circumstances. As the scale of the polity expands, consensual action tends to give way to factional action, wherein some factions gain at the expense of others. For example, whereas application of general rules and principles might require a few pages of tax codes, factional action to achieve concessions generates thousands of pages of tax codes.

To consider Schmitt’s proposed remedies for factional politics, I have looked beyond the references to Schmitt in Wagner’s book. My main source is the Stanford Encyclopedia entry written by Lars Vinx.

Schmitt’s views about the problems of democracy and the need for strong political leadership are similar to those of Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter (discussed in earlier essays, here and here). However, while Weber and Schumpeter defend liberty, Schmitt regards constitutionally guaranteed freedoms as concessions of the state to the individual.

Weber and Schumpeter emphasize the importance of constitutional procedures, but Schmitt’s view of constitutions seems ambivalent. Schmitt understands democracy as the self-rule of the people. He argues, however, that since the will of the people is not necessarily reflected in the majority view, representative government is not necessarily any more intimately connected with the principle of democracy than a dictatorship in the name of the people. 

Schmitt denies the possibility of changing the fundamental nature of an established constitution via use of rules contained within it. Nevertheless, he acknowledges the possibility of suspending a constitution through a sovereign decision on the exception. He also acknowledges that a people, in a renewed exercise of their constituent power, might legitimately choose a non-liberal and non-parliamentarian form of democracy. 

Friedrich Hayek’s view

Hayek held similar views to Schmitt concerning the ability of the majority in a representative assembly with unlimited powers “to confine its activities to aims which all members of the majority desire, or even approve of”. The majority can only be kept together by “paying off each of the special groups by which it is composed”. (LLL, V3, 138)

In a footnote to that passage, Hayek suggested that in the 1920s “the weakness of the government of an omnipotent democracy was very clearly seen by the extraordinary German student of politics, Carl Schmitt.” However, Hayek added that “Schmitt regularly came down on what to me appears both morally and intellectually the wrong side.” (LLL, V3, 194-5)

The passage quoted in the epigraph at the top of this essay appears in Volume 1 of Law, Legislation and Liberty (p 71). It is immediately followed by the assertion that “long before Hitler came to power” Carl Schmitt “devoted all his formidable intellectual energies to a fight against liberalism in all its forms”. (Hayek’s perception that Schmitt was so clearly opposed to all forms of liberalism has been disputed. Some of Schmitt’s writings apparently give the impression that he was trying to save Europe’s liberal heritage.)

Later in the same paragraph, Hayek explains that Schmitt’s final formulation of his central belief about the law entailed “concrete order formation”. Schmitt posits that law is fundamentally a form of political and social organisation grounded in a community’s values, and that the state is the embodiment of the community’s legal order. Hayek argues that under that view of law, individuals are “made to serve concrete purposes”.

Hayek contrasts Schmitt’s view of law with his own view that law consists of “abstract rules which make possible the formation of a spontaneous order by the free action of individuals through limiting the range of their actions.”

While Schmitt saw the state as giving expression to the values of the dominant community group, Hayek saw law as consisting of rules of just conduct that have evolved to protect individual liberty.

Conclusions

Carl Schmitt is remembered as a prominent German legal and political theorist who became a Nazi. However, Schmitt’s political affiliations have not prevented frequent reference being made to views about friend-enemy distinctions and the autonomy of the political in contemporary discussions about political institutions.

This essay has focused on three aspects of Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy: Adrian Vermeule’s synthesis of Catholic integralism and Carl Schmitt’s view that politics is war; the link between Richard Wagner’s concept of entangled political economy and Carl Schmitt’s concept of the autonomy of the political; and Friedrich Hayek’s view of Carl Schmitt’s legal philosophy.

Schmitt argued that if economic liberalism succeeded in bringing about an absolutely unpolitical condition of society – a condition where people were no longer interested in making friend-enemy distinctions – the Catholic church would be able to dominate the world. He reasoned that that this religious organisation would dominate in those circumstances because it would be the only agency still engaged in political thinking. I am puzzled as to why he thought a religious organisation would be last to abandon the habit of making friend-enemy distinctions. It seems to me that criminal organisations would be likely to pose a greater obstacle to establishing an unpolitical utopia because friend-enemy distinctions are more intrinsic to their activities.

Schmitt presented a valid argument that constitutional arrangements crafted to support private ordering are prone to corruption by interest group politics. The autonomy of the political exerts itself as some groups argue for exceptions to general rules to obtain benefits at the expense of others.

Other political theorists have proposed stronger executive government as a remedy for problems that interest groups pose for the functioning of liberal democracies. However, Schmitt proposed more extreme remedies. For example, he suggested that under exceptional circumstances a government could make a “sovereign decision” to suspend a constitution.

Friedrich Hayek acknowledged that Schmitt had clearly seen the weakness of omnipotent democracy in the 1920s, but suggested that he “regularly came down on the wrong side” in proposing remedies.

Hayek argued that under Schmitt’s final formulation of his beliefs about the law, individuals are made to serve concrete purposes determined by the state. By contrast, Hayek viewed law in terms of abstract rules of just conduct that have evolved to protect individual liberty.

In my view Schmitt went wrong in his critique of democracy by seeking authoritarian remedies rather than changes in the rules of the game to address the specific problems that he identified.

Are integralists opposed to natural rights?

 

Who are integralists? And why should anyone be interested in their views about natural rights?

I knew next to nothing about integralists before reading Kevin Vallier’s book, All the Kingdoms of the World, published in 2023. I read the book because of my interest in political movements that may pose a threat to liberty. By examining integralism, the author aims to help liberals and post-liberals to understand religious anti-liberalisms.

Vallier writes:

“Catholic integralists say that governments must secure the earthly and heavenly common good. God authorizes two powers to do so, they assert. The state governs in matters temporal, and the church in matters spiritual. Since the church has a nobler purpose than the state (salvation), it may authorize and direct the state to support it with certain policies, such as enforcing church law. At times, the church may need assistance to advance its objectives.”

After reading that, my first thought was that it would be necessary for Catholics to make up a high proportion of the population of a country before integralism could possibly be a force to be reckoned with. The idea that governments should enforce Catholic church law in countries like the United States and Australia would seem almost as preposterous to most citizens as the idea that the governments of those countries should enforce Sharia law.

Yet, groups of people who have strong anti-liberal convictions (socialists and environmental activists as well as religious extremists) often find ways to exert political influence that is disproportionate to the numbers of their supporters.

Vallier suggests that the modern integralist movement was founded around 2012 as a movement for spiritual renewal based on views of Thomas Pink. However, integralism has been transformed by Adrian Vermeule and his allies to have a greater focus on politics. Vallier suggests:

“Vermeule is building a new anti-liberal elite designed to steer the New Right.”

Rather than attempt to provide a comprehensive review of Vallier’s book, I focus here on the views of Adrian Vermeule and their implications for natural rights.

The views of Adrian Vermeule

Vermeule is a Harvard law professor, and a leading scholar in administrative law. He became interested in integralism soon after his conversion to Catholicism in 2016.

Vermeule has little to say about integralism as an ideal. His focus is on “helping integralists to develop a serious theory of the state and a theory of state capture.”

Vallier notes that Vermeule builds on Patrick Deneen’s criticism of liberalism in his book, Why Liberalism Failed. In response to Deneen’s book, I wrote an essay entitled, “Is John Locke responsible for the failings of liberal democracy?” I suggested that Deneen’s argument that John Locke is responsible for the failings of liberal democracy stems from a mis-reading of a paragraph in the Second Treatise of Government. Nevertheless, I welcomed Deneen’s support for practices that sustain culture within communities and his recognition that it is important for members of self-governing communities to have exit rights.  

Vermeule rejects Deneen’s belief that “Politics and human community must percolate from the bottom up, from experience and practice.” Vermeule argues that in order to protect religious communities, Catholics must take over the state and destroy liberalism from the top down.

Vermeule brought to integralism a non-originalist, non-contextualist legal philosophy. Rather than adopting the usual approach of American conservatives who read the U.S. Constitution according to the framer’s intent or the text’s plain meaning, Vermeule argues that the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with “the common good”.

The concept of “common good” is linked to natural law. Natural law is seen to direct humans to pursue goods that help them to flourish. Since humans flourish in groups, natural law determines the common good for each group as a whole. An effective criminal justice system is an example of a common good.

However, Vallier tells us that Vermeule seeks to advance the common good theologically as well as politically via a strong administrative state:

“The state can help citizens grasp and follow the natural law, promote the earthly common good, and even help them pursue the heavenly common good—corporate salvation in Christ. The administrative state serves as the church’s deputy for the salvation of souls.”

Vermeule’s vision of “integration from within” requires integralists to capture the state and turn it toward religious objectives. That will be possible, he asserts, because liberalism is doomed.  The tendency of liberals to push for new liberties will eventually exceed the populace’s appetite for freedom. As members of the public object to whatever appears on the progressive liberal agenda beyond legalisation of divorce, contraception, abortion, same-sex marriage and transgenderism, the persecution of non-liberals will become more aggressive. Non-liberals will crave the return of “strong gods”.  

Vermeule apparently believes that “a small, devoted cadre can instigate a Catholic-led American counterrevolution against liberalism.” Vallier suggests that in Vermeule’s view, Catholics have only two options: “become rulers or become subjects.” He states:

“Make no mistake: Vermeule means to install a ruler.”

Vallier discusses several reasons why a peaceful transition to integralist rule is unlikely to be possible. The most important point he makes is that even if Vermeule is correct about the collapse of liberalism, he has “no story” about why integralism must follow liberalism. Integralists would be competing with other groups. They would struggle to dominate Catholics with more moderate views and nonviolent unbaptized resistors, let alone “violent and enraged” progressives.

Vallier also argues that, once established, an integralist order would lack moral stability.  His line of argument is somewhat complicated, but his main point seems to be that “the integralist ideal depends on people acting from a firm grasp of the true good” rather than from fear.  He notes that Václav Havel’s observation that under communist rule in Eastern Europe everyone ended up complying with authoritarian social norms to avoid punishment, rather than from moral conviction.

The relevance of natural rights

The only reference I could find to natural rights in Vallier’s book is in a reference to John Finnis’s book, Natural law and Natural Rights. Vallier discusses human rights in the context of Catholic social thought. He notes:

“The Catholic Church embraces many such rights. These include the right to health care, the right to vote, and freedom of religion. Catholic social thought claims that governments exist to protect universal human rights. The church has not set natural law aside, though. When we talk about human rights, we thereby talk about natural law.”

At that point, the author provides a reference to Finnis’s book (pages 198-200) which contains a discussion of the grammar of rights. In his discussion of natural law and natural rights, Finnis notes that some values have been widely recognized in all human societies. All human societies show a concern for the value of human life, cooperation, property, and reciprocity. That provides the background against which Finnis develops his list of basic values, including life, sociability, and practical reasonableness. Practical reasonableness requires one “to bring one’s own intelligence to bear effectively … on choosing one’s actions and lifestyle, and shaping one’s own character”. Finnis argues that an important implication of practical reasonableness is that “it is always unreasonable to choose against any basic value, whether in oneself or in one’s fellow human beings.”

I can understand why Vallier views human rights in the context of Catholic social thought. Since one of his aims is to “reach out to those skeptical of liberal order”, none of his arguments “presupposes liberal commitments”. I hope he persuades many readers that integralism is inconsistent with the declaration of religious freedom adopted by the Second Vatican Council in 1965. However, from my perspective (as a non-Catholic) that doesn’t get to the heart of the matter.

In my view, the heart of the matter is whether integralism is consistent with recognition of natural rights. From my reading of Vallier’s book, it seems obvious that integralists are opposed to government recognition of the natural rights of individuals. For example, integralists want governments to help them to discourage heresy and apostasy.

As I see it, the best way to defend classical liberalism from the advocates of integralism, Sharia law, communism, illiberal progressivism, and every other brand of authoritarianism, is by promoting an understanding that government recognition of natural rights offers a solution to the social problem of enabling people to flourish in different ways without the flourishing of any person or group being given preference over that of others. Drawing extensively on the wisdom of other people, I sought to explain that approach in my book, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing.   

How does Entangled Political Economy help us to understand political entrepreneurship?

 

After I finished reading Richard E. Wagner’s book, Politics as a Peculiar Business, the thought crossed my mind that I should encourage people to read what I was about to write about it before reading the other essays I have recently written about political entrepreneurship. The titles of the other essays are:

Can the concept of political entrepreneurship help us to understand authoritarianism?

What role does political entrepreneurship play in institutional change?

Should we expect our political leaders to be great and good?

I have been writing essays about political entrepreneurship to improve my understanding of the topic. In the process I have felt like that a blind man trying to build up a picture of an elephant in his mind by approaching it from different angles. After I finish writing this essay, I might be able to turn my mind to considering how best to present my understanding of the concept and its relevance to liberty and human flourishing.

Entangled Political Economy

The full title of Richard E. Wagner’s book is Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy (Edward Elgar, 2016).  

Wagner refers to the ancient Indian parable of the blind men and the elephant in suggesting that political economy is best approached from the standpoint of plausible reasoning rather than demonstrative reasoning.

Plausible reasoning starts from the standpoint that the object of inquiry cannot be known in full detail to the inquirer.

By contrast, demonstrative reasoning begins with a set of assumptions about human behavior, and then analyses the implications of those assumptions. The conventional welfare economics approach to the role of government - with its assumption that government acts like an omniscient and benevolent dictator attempting to maximize the well-being of citizens by correcting externalities and providing public goods – provides a relevant example of demonstrative reasoning.

The analytical framework of Entangled Political Economy recognises that both “polity and economy are areas of practical action that operate in similar but not identical fashion.”

The author suggests that human nature has “a bi-polarity about it that generates both polity and economy.” The political side of human nature entails recognition that we are social creatures who live in close proximity and engage in cooperation and conflict. The economic side entails recognition that we need “to make a livelihood” and desire “to be self-directed as against being conscripts in someone’s army”.

I am not persuaded that “bi-polarity” is the best way to capture the idea that humans are “political animals” whose interactions with other members of the species are not always motivated by personal benefit. It seems to me that human nature inclines individuals to seek to flourish by making wise and well-informed choices about all aspects of their lives that they are able to influence, including their interactions with others. 

However, as public choice theorists have noted, most people lack sufficient motivation to allocate the time and effort required to make well-informed choices in relation to national politics because their individual choices are unlikely to have much impact on national outcomes. Wagner’s view of entangled political economy draws on that public choice literature.

I certainly agree that political economy should focus on the full range of interactions among persons and entities within society. As Wagner notes, that perspective has important implications for social change:

“The framework of entangled political economy accommodates recognition that societies change only through individual action inside those societies, and with those actions spreading within the society according to the receptivity of other members of that society to those changes.”

Although Entangled Political Economy is based on a description of different kinds of interactions among individuals in the real world, it represents a departure from the way many economists have previously thought about the interaction between politics and economics. Wagner reminds readers that it has been customary to “envision a polity as a kind of lord of the manor who overseas what is denoted as economy.” He points out that discussion is usually in terms of “additive political economy” in which polity and economy are denoted as independent entities and polity intervenes in economy to correct “market failure”. He argues:

“The Progressivist vision of political presence and dominance throughout society is abetted by the vision of additive political economy because that vision provides rationalization for unlimited political action.”

Political entrepreneurship

 Wagner argues that it makes sense to view politics as a peculiar form of business because it has many characteristics in common with business. Both are sources of livelihood for people, entail competition, and are supported by administrative educational organisations. Both must attract investors to provide capital. Both involve entrepreneurship.

The main difference between political entrepreneurship and market entrepreneurship arises because of the difference between dyadic and triadic relationships. Dyadic relationships involve two people; triadic relationships involve three. Wagner observes that market relationships can be reduced mostly to a set of dyadic relationships where both parties benefit. Political relationships typically require a set of triadic relationships where two people exchange mutual support and a third is forced to provide financial support.

Wagner explains:

“Within the triadic relationships associated with electoral competition … a political entrepreneur can construct a supporting coalition by crafting a transactional structure that entails gainers and losers, while at the same time generating a supporting ideological cover that softens and conceals the redistributive character of the transaction.”

The difference between market and political competition has implications for the qualities required for successful entrepreneurship in different contexts. Wagner suggests that while puffery is an understandable part of market competition, “electoral competition is mostly about puffery”. Systemic lying is a feature of political competition. Sentiment tends to play a larger role, relative to reason, in political competition because of the absence of a direct connection between the individual elector’s choice and the outcome obtained. Voting is like ordering a meal at a restaurant and being served the same meal as everyone else, irrespective of what you ordered. Wagner notes Vilfredo Pareto’s view that ideological articulation can induce people to support measures that they might have opposed in a market setting. Voters generally embrace policies that enable them to feel good about themselves.

Wagner argues that little substantive work is accomplished through elections and political campaigns. The substantive work of policy choice takes place “outside electoral politics and entails the interactive elements necessary for constructing and maintaining deals.” He suggests a parliamentary assembly can be viewed as an “investment bank” because it is “a hub for making deals” involving selection and funding of projects. In that context:

“Entrepreneurs are thus competing among themselves to seize the future. Successful entrepreneurship offers both fame and fortune.”

In reading Wagner’s account of political entrepreneurship, it occurred to me that the significance of electoral competition in the United States is greater than he portrays it to be. That perception is based partly on my (somewhat cursory) observation of the presidential election in 2024 and the performance of the Trump administration in its first 100 days in office.

The 2024 U.S. election and its aftermath may be atypical, but similar political entrepreneurship has been on display in some European elections.  As discussed in a previous essay, political entrepreneurs tend to focus on niches in the marketplace of ideas. They seek to attract support from people who are discontented with current economic and social outcomes by emphasizing alleged problem-solving capacities of their ideas. Their success in attracting a loyal support base of customers who are willing to help them to sell their narrative depends to a large extent on the strength of competition from politicians selling different narratives, and on the extent of resistance by journalists and members of the public who consider their narratives to be incorrect, or that their policy proposals are unworkable, unconstitutional, unethical, or otherwise unhelpful.

I also observed that the discussion of entangled political economy in Politics as a Peculiar Business seemed more relevant to countries with parliamentary systems of government than to those with presidential systems, where much business seems to be done via “executive orders”. However, that is not intended as criticism. It may reflect the greater role of “executive orders” in the U.S. in the years since the book was published.

How can entanglement be contained?

One of Wagner’s aims in writing the book was “to explain how an entangled political economy can generate its own momentum to transform a constitution of liberty into a constitution of control”. He refers to the credit market as providing an example of how this occurs. Private ordering of credit markets is vulnerable to entanglement for two reasons. On the demand side are market participants who are dissatisfied with how they fare in privately ordered credit markets. On the supply side are “political figures who want to catapult themselves from background to foreground in the cosmic drama that is human society”.

Another example relates to the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution which provides for just compensation when the government takes private property for public use. However, Wagner observes that “history over the past century or so has increasingly run in the direction of governments taking property for what are private uses and paying only partial or token compensation”. A clear constitutional provision is not necessarily “sufficiently strong to deter rapacious interest groups from using government as an instrument of predation”.

Wagner refers to Vincent Ostrom’s observation that government involves a Faustian bargain: “instruments of evil – power over other people – are to be employed because of the good they might do, recognizing that evil might also result.” 

How can we minimize the potential for evil to result? Wagner suggests that the alternatives are “parchment” and “guns”.

“Parchment” refers to constitutional rules. Constitutional rules may remain effective if supported by public morality – sufficient numbers of people being willing to refrain from use of the powers of the state to enrich themselves at the expense of others. This approach relies on education and related processes to cultivate virtue and wisdom.

“Guns” refers to an approach that looks primarily to “a kind of opposition of interests to limit government predation”. Wagner suggests that “guns” may complement “parchment”. He writes:

“The basic principle behind this approach is for governmental action to require some concurrence among different participants with opposed interests.”

Wagner suggests that when it becomes habitual for people to use politics in a predatory manner that may “promote alternative beliefs as to what comprises just conduct”. He concludes that “parchment and guns … would seem to be nonseparable ingredients of constitutional order in the final analysis.”

Wagner tells us that his reference to guns is metaphorical, so what he has in mind may not necessarily be violent. For example, those who believe themselves to be victims of predation have an incentive to form associations to protect their interests in the courts and may be able to exert countervailing power the political arena.

While I believe that entangled political economy offers important insights about interactions between participants in politics and markets, I would have liked the author to explore more fully the macroeconomic consequences of increasing entanglement. Perhaps that would have led to a more optimistic conclusion.

In Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing I suggested that although most liberal democracies are heading for major economic crises in the years ahead there are reasons to be optimistic “that governments will eventually introduce institutional reforms to enable the drivers of progress to restore growth of opportunities.” (See Chapter 6, particularly p. 120)

My optimism presupposes the emergence of political entrepreneurs who understand the nature of the problems that need to be addressed and can marshal the political support required to carry out appropriate institutional reforms to correct those problems.

Conclusions

The discussion of entangled political economy in Richard Wagner’s book, Politics as a Peculiar Business, is helpful to an understanding of the context in which political entrepreneurship occurs in the liberal democracies.

Entangled political economy focuses on the full range of interactions among persons and entities within society. It emphasizes that societal change occurs only through individual actions. Entangled political economy represents a departure from the view of those economists (and governments) who have envisioned a polity as a kind of lord of the manor who overseas an economy.  

Wagner argues that politics has many characteristics in common with private business, but it is characterized by triadic relationships rather than dyadic relationships. Market relationships can be reduced mainly to sets of relationships between two people, both of whom benefit. Politics typically requires sets of relationships where two people exchange mutual support and a third is forced to provide financial support.

The author suggests that the main work of political entrepreneurs – interactions to construct deals - takes place outside electoral politics. He suggests that parliaments can be viewed as kinds of investment banks because they are hubs for making deals involving selection and funding of projects.

In my view the significance of electoral politics and deal-making by executive arms of governments is greater than Wagner portrays it to be. However, my view has been strongly influenced by events since 2016, when his book was published.

Wagner argues that entangled political economy generates its own momentum to transform a constitution of liberty into a constitution of control. He is pessimistic about the prospect for entanglement to be contained via constitutional rules and moral conduct. He suggests that habitual use of politics in a predatory manner promotes an alternative view of what constitutes just conduct.

In my view, Wagner might have come to a more optimistic conclusion if he had more fully explored the macro-economic consequences of increasing use of the powers of the state for predatory purposes. Economic crises may eventually bring about appropriate institutional reforms if political entrepreneurs emerge who can marshal the political support required to implement them.